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Reading the essays in this collection, several thoughts come to mind. First, 
one of congratulations to the editors for gathering such an interesting, 
timely, well- informed and rigorously argued set of essays. Second, recog-
nition of the confidence displayed by the authors. I mean, this not as a 
matter of personal temperament or psychology, but of a shared sense that 
Aristotelian ideas have much to offer in the effort to understand the things, 
processes and events that are the focus of the natural sciences, especially 
physics and biology, and to recognise the scope for, but also the limits of 
cross- categorical explanations: the inanimate, the non- rational animate, the 
minded.
Fifty years ago, such confidence would have seemed eccentric, for the 
tide of reductionism in the philosophy of science was then strong and high, 
and the presumption was that by stages, and perhaps increasingly rapidly, 
psychology would reduce to biology, that to chemistry and that, in turn, to 
physics. given the prevailing conception of chemical and physical systems 
this implied a ‘mechanistic’ view of living organisms. Additionally, it was 
assumed that causal explanations are law- like, or presuppose law- like gen-
eralisations, and that talk of causation as expressing the powers and thereby 
the essential nature of an agent is at best a façon de parler and at worst the 
effect of fallaciously inferring the existence of non- contingent relations in 
nature from conceptually linked modes of description in which antecedent 
conditions are redescribed in terms of consequent ones. Thus, from ‘sugar 
was placed in water and dissolved’, one moves to ‘water caused the sugar to 
dissolve’ and from that proceeds to ‘a solvent caused the sugar to dissolve’ 
thence to ‘water has a power to dissolve sugar’ and finally to ‘it is part of the 
intrinsic nature of water to dissolve sugar’. By means of analyses of this sort, 
applied in reverse, it seemed easy to dismiss any talk of natures and causal 
powers as a projection of certain modes of description, and not as indicating 
the possibility of non- contingent connections between things themselves. In 
much the same way, talk of natural processes serving and occurring for the 
sake of some end, typically an end beneficial to the subject of that process, 
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was thought to be a legacy of something akin, at its core, to animism, but 
given faux intellectual credibility through schemes that postulated ‘final’ 
causes: ends towards processes tend on account of intrinsic principles of 
order and activity.
It was generally known, of course, that these various ideas had a place 
in the history of philosophical and scientific theorising, and that the main 
figure associated with them was Aristotle, but as with the modern theorists 
of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the empiricists and reduction-
ists of the twentieth century saw themselves as thinking beyond and against 
both Aristotle and the tradition that followed him into the Middle Ages 
among Arabic and Western Latin thinkers.
The standard collection of Aristotle’s works on logic and methodology 
was named by his ancient followers the Organon and known to the medi-
eval by the Latinised version Organum (tool or instrument, in this case, 
for developing knowledge by sound reasoning). From the point of view 
of thinking about reasoning on relation to ‘science’, the most important 
of these texts is the Posterior Analytics, and this together with Aristotle’s 
Metaphysics provided the core of scholastic thinking about the analysis of 
change and the systematic study of things and their causes.
This history explains the significance of the title of Francis Bacon’s 1620 
work Novum Organum Scientiarum—New Tool for Science—focussed 
on methods of experiment and records of differences of setups, leading to 
inductions as to effective factors. Bacon refers to Aristotle 15 times in the 
New Organon, mostly unfavourably and for the same reason, that, accord-
ing to Bacon, he confuses natural philosophy with a priori reasoning ‘logic’: 
‘[he] made his natural philosophy a mere bond servant to his logic, thereby 
rendering it contentious and well- nigh useless’; and later he writes:
The most conspicuous example of [rational philosophers] was 
Aristotle, who corrupted natural philosophy by his logic: fashioning 
the world out of categories . . . doing the business of density and 
rarity (which is to make bodies of greater or less dimensions, that 
is, occupy greater or less spaces), by the frigid distinction of act and 
power; asserting that single bodies have each a single and proper 
motion, and that if they participate in any other, then this results from 
an external cause; and imposing countless other arbitrary restrictions 
on the nature of things . . . in the physics of Aristotle you hear hardly 
anything but the words of logic, which in his metaphysics also, under 
a more imposing name . . .1
Similar contrasts and criticisms of Aristotle are to be found in writings on 
the methods of natural philosophy by galileo, Boyle and Newton, and while 
the effect of such criticism and repudiation was to marginalise and more 
or less eliminate avowed Aristotelian ways of thinking, the suspicion of 
unwarranted insertions of metaphysical notions into the sphere of empirical 
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enquiry continued to be associated with ‘Aristotelianism’ into the twenti-
eth century as in Quine’s strictures against postulation of non- contingent 
modalities:
Curiously, a philosophical tradition does exist for just such a distinction 
between necessary and contingent attributes. It lives on in the terms 
‘essence’ and ‘accident’ . . . It is a distinction that one attributes to 
Aristotle (subject to contradiction by scholars, such being the penalty 
for attributions to Aristotle). But, however venerable the distinction, it 
is surely indefensible . . .2
II
given the modern consensus against the view that to understand the 
natural world and what occurs in it, we need to apply notions of 
essences, causal powers, natural tendencies, non- contingent relations 
and so on, how can it be anything other than quixotic to be discuss-
ing ‘neo- Aristotelian perspectives on contemporary science’, rather as if 
one were to be exploring astrological perspectives on astronomy? The 
answer is two- fold. First, there has been growing dissatisfaction with the 
approaches favoured by reductionist empiricism, and by its anti- realist 
constructivist and relativistic rivals. Second, serious attention has been 
given to the possible merits of an Aristotelian approach free of the preju-
dices of earlier periods.
early indications of the former included Larry Wright’s tentative rein-
statement of teleology in his important 1973 article on ‘Functions’, accord-
ing to which, in brief:
‘The function of X is Z’ [e.g., the function of oxygen in the blood is . . . 
the function of the human heart is . . . etc.] means
(a) X is there because it does Z,
(b) Z is a consequence (or result) of X’s being there.3
And in the same year, Rom Harré and e. H. Madden published one in a 
sequence of anti- empiricist essays on the idea of natural agency, which led 
two years later to the book Causal Powers. In the former they write:
The justification of a wholly non- Humean conceptual scheme, based 
upon the idea of enduring individuals with powers, rests in part on the 
success of such a scheme in resolving the problems bequeathed to us by 
the Humean tradition and in part must be achieved by a careful con-
struction of the metaphysics of the new scheme itself. By this we mean 
a thorough exposition of the meaning and interrelations of the concepts 
of the new scheme.4
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In Causal Powers, these, along with natures, natural kinds and natural 
necessity, are invoked in the development of a recognisably Aristotelian 
theory of scientific description and explanation. They write:
The relationship between co- existing properties or successive events 
or states is naturally necessary when they are understood by scientists 
to be related in fact by generative mechanisms, whose structure and 
components constitute the essential nature of the permanent things and 
materials in the world.5
They themselves do not make much of the Aristotelian character of their 
approach, but significantly, they do relate the causal power element of it to 
that of Aquinas, as expounded by two prominent analytical philosophers in 
a work published a decade previously:
An argument, very similar to ours, can be found in Anscombe and 
geach Three Philosophers. In giving an account of the philosophy of 
science of Aquinas they develop a theory of scientific explanation, of 
the related metaphysics of nature, in which they introduce the concept 
of a tendency attributable to natural agents, which is closely compa-
rable to our notion of a power.6
In fact, the author of the chapter on Aquinas was Peter geach alone, and 
this and other writings of his have been an important factor in the revival 
of a broadly Aristotelian approach presented in engagement with contem-
porary analytical philosophy. To this has been added the significant revival 
of modal metaphysics through the work of Kripke and others in conse-
quence of which appeals to essence and to nature- expressive causality are 
now familiar, if not commonly accepted, in contemporary philosophy of sci-
ence and metaphysics. For the most part, however, these remain somewhat 
general, not engaging with the details of the special sciences, and a valuable 
feature of the essays gathered here is that they do exactly that.
III
I mentioned two thoughts brought to mind in reading the following essays, 
but let me add a third that begins with an anecdote. Thirty years ago (1987), 
I went from the University of St Andrews to the University of Pittsburgh as 
a fellow of its Center for Philosophy of Science. At that time, the Director 
of the Center was Nicholas Rescher, who was then, and remains, the most 
prolific author of academic philosophical monographs among english- 
language philosophers (and probably all professional philosophers). At that 
point, he had authored 50 books; since then, there have been over a hundred 
more. In anticipation of me going to Pittsburgh, my former PhD supervi-
sor David Hamlyn, who was editor of Mind (and who had translated the 
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De Anima in the Clarendon Aristotle Series), said, adverting to the prodi-
gious scale of Rescherian productivity, ‘when you get there I want you to go 
into the Philosophy Department and call out “How many of you here are 
Nicholas Rescher?”’ Anyone who is familiar with Aristotle’s range, output 
and insight must feel something similar only intensified by the depth of his 
genius: ‘How many of those in the Lyceum were Aristotle?’ to which the 
answer, mirabile dictu, appears to be ‘just one!’ In my time at Pittsburgh, 
interest in Aristotle was very limited and exclusively historical, but 30 years 
on, the essays presented here, and many others besides, are testament to the 
enduring potential of Aristotelian philosophy to illuminate not only issues 
of human conduct, but the very nature of things inanimate, animate and 
minded.
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Preliminary Remarks
A recent revival in (neo- )Aristotelian philosophy is beginning to transform 
the landscape of contemporary analytic philosophy. ethics, metaphysics, 
and the philosophy of science are already feeling its influence.1 In this vol-
ume, we are taking some first steps in bringing this revolution to the special 
sciences of physics, biology, and psychology.
What does it take for a philosophical project to count as neo- Aristotelian? 
We (the editors) suggest five possible criteria of demarcation:
First, neo- Aristotelian philosophers count the concept of potentiality as an 
essential feature of their metaphysics. A neo- Aristotelian philosophy embraces 
what is commonly called a causal powers ontology, in which both active and 
passive powers are regarded as fundamental features of particular things in 
the world that bring about change by some kind of natural necessity. In this 
picture, the passage of time essentially involves intrinsic changes, and these 
changes are the actualization of prior potentialities. Causation is reducible 
neither to patterns of categorical fact (as in the neo- Humean project) nor to 
fundamental, transcendent laws of nature (as in the Armstrongian project). 
A causal powers ontology entails the reality of some type of teleology, since 
powers exhibit what george Molnar called ‘natural intentionality’, being 
directed toward possibly unrealized (future) actualities.
Secondly, a neo- Aristotelian account must include what Jonathan Schaffer 
has called a ‘layered’ or ‘structured’ view of reality,2 insofar as some entities 
and properties are regarded as being more fundamental than others, and 
other entities and properties are considered to be derived, existing in virtue 
of the existence of something more fundamental. The fundamental entities, 
according to some neo- Aristotelians, are basic substances; according to oth-
ers, certain primary powers.
Thirdly, a neo- Aristotelian account of reality is not monistic but involves 
a plurality of entities, both simple and composite. The whole cosmos is 
not the only substance, nor is everything made from a single set of simple 
substances, but the world also includes natural unities like biological organ-
isms, which are composite substances.
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Fourthly, substances in nature belong to recurring natural kinds, each 
with its own intelligible nature or essence. These commonalties are not sub-
jective, conventional, or wholly mind- dependent. With the possible excep-
tion of artefacts, neo- Aristotelians embrace a ‘sparse’ theory of real natures 
or essences (to use David Lewis’s terminology). There are no adventitious or 
arbitrarily constructed kinds of things (like Nelson goodman’s grue). It is 
the task of empirical science to discover which kinds really exist and which 
causal powers are grounded in each kind.
Finally, neo- Aristotelians reject extreme realism or Platonism. Neo- 
Aristotelian accounts of nature include no appeal to non- immanent, non- 
natural universals; they instead hold that mathematical models of the 
physical world should be regarded as idealizations that invariably involve 
an empirical loss of scientifically relevant information.
For the philosopher or scientist who has yet to explore this burgeon-
ing branch of contemporary philosophy, the existence of such anthologies 
as this one may at first seem surprising (or even perverse): why this sud-
den revival of interest in Aristotle’s metaphysics and philosophy of science, 
nearly 600 years after the Scientific Revolution had supposedly discredited 
them? In our view, there are four developments over the last 50 years that 
account for this remarkable reversal:
First, there has been a resuscitation of metaphysics within the world of 
analytic philosophy at large (much of it inspired by Aristotelian and scholas-
tic models)3 and a growing dissatisfaction with the rigid Humeanism about 
modality and causation that characterized much of early analytic philos-
ophy. Moreover, with the fall of the deductive- nomological model in the 
philosophy of science and the rise of causal explanation, new varieties of 
‘dispositionalism’ have emerged that reject reductive Humean analyses of 
dispositions in favour of causal powers (or capacities) occupying a more 
fundamental role in metaphysics.4
Secondly, there is a growing body of philosophically informed research 
into Aristotle’s conception of science whose cumulative effect has been to 
discredit the anti- scholastic myths and socio- politically charged carica-
tures of the early modern period in the eyes of many scholars.5 Contrary to 
received opinion, Aristotle’s natural science was not a purely deductive disci-
pline that starts from supposed self- evident truths. In fact, Aristotle has been 
rehabilitated as one of the most significant pioneers of systematic empirical 
research. Moreover, the infamous errors of Aristotle’s physics turn out to 
be tentative hypotheses entirely peripheral to his central commitments. It is 
possible to correct the shortcomings in Aristotle’s science without simulta-
neously jettisoning the insights that are contained in his metaphysics.
Thirdly, the prolonged efforts of physicists and philosophers to make 
sense of the quantum revolution have forced reflective thinkers in both dis-
ciplines to begin digging more deeply into the metaphysical toolbox, recov-
ering long- lost tools in order to cope with the problems raised, for instance, 
by the holism of quantum entanglement,6 or the apparently irreversible 
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nature of measurement,7 or the ineliminable role of real potentialies,8 and 
the coexistence of both commuting (classical) and non- commuting (quantal) 
properties.
Finally, instead of moving toward greater unification with ‘fundamental 
physics’, conceived in some monolithic or positivistic sense, the special sci-
ences have achieved greater autonomy through the discovery of many levels 
of emergent phenomena.9
In an age of fragmentation and specialization in which modern philoso-
phy has, at best, been permitted to play second fiddle to the sciences (or, at 
worst, been disregarded as irrelevant and outmoded), neo- Aristotelians are 
inspired by a revitalized conception of the philosopher as having an essential 
and integrative role to play in achieving knowledge of the natural order. 
given the ambiguous and incomplete picture of reality painted by our best 
physical theories, the shift from physical reductionism in the philosophy of 
science toward a stronger appreciation for the integrity of the special sci-
ences, and the resurgent interest in metaphysics in contemporary analytic 
philosophy, neo- Aristotelian philosophers today are invigorated by the pros-
pect of achieving a unified metaphysical account of reality, enhanced by the 
insights of a rich philosophical tradition and informed by contemporary sci-
ence. We think the essays we have gathered together in this collection convey 
something of that intellectual optimism and spirit of critical engagement.
Part 1
In what follows, we offer a brief summary of each of the papers included 
in this anthology. The first part of this collection is concerned with funda-
mental physics.
In Chapter 1, Xavi Lanao and Nicholas Teh defend Nancy Cartwright’s 
conception of the natural world as ‘dappled’. The current state of science 
points to the need for a plurality of theoretical frameworks, none of which 
has a claim to either universality or fundamentality. Such theoretical plural-
ism fits well with the Aristotelian conception of a natural world consisting 
of fundamental substances of a variety of kinds at a number of composi-
tional levels. Lanao and Teh defend this pluralism by critically examining 
the strongest possible case for fundamentalist unification, which consists in 
setting aside the mysteries of quantum theory and arguing for the funda-
mentality of Classical Continuum Mechanics in relation to the remaining 
branches of physical theory, a case recently made by Sheldon Smith. Lanao 
and Teh show that even under these most favourable possible assumptions, 
the case for unification falls short. In order to secure the universality of 
continuum mechanics, the content of the theory must be reduced to nullity.
In Chapter 2, edward Feser considers the challenge to traditional 
Aristotelian metaphysics posed by the ‘block universe’ of special relativity, 
as modeled by Minkowski spacetime. In this model, past, present, and future 
seem to be equally real and actual, in contrast to the Aristotelian conception 
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of change, which consists in ‘selectively conferring actuality on what are 
initially only potentialities’. Feser argues that the Aristotelian account of 
change is consistent with both the B Theory of time and with a wide variety 
of versions of the A Theory, in which case, the conflict between relativity 
and Aristotelian metaphysics would be only apparent. even on the supposi-
tion that the Aristotelian account entailed the most extreme version of the 
A Theory, namely, Presentism, Feser contends that Aristotelianism would 
be consistent with the scientific core of special relativity. Feser outlines four 
possible approaches to reconciling special relativity with Presentism, each 
of which involves the postulation of a metaphysically privileged relation of 
simultaneity that is empirically inaccessible.
In Chapter 3, Robert Koons turns the focus toward quantum physics, 
more specifically, to the modern (Oxford) version of the everett or many- 
worlds interpretation of quantum mechanics. The everettian interpretation 
has four crucial advantages over its competitors: it postulates a unified, 
deterministic evolution of the quantum wave function, it does not involve 
the postulation of any additional, so- far- unverified collapse mechanism, it 
permits the consistent and unified description of the entire cosmos within 
the quantum framework, and it complements nicely recent work on the 
measurement problem (within the decoherence and consistent- histories 
approaches). However, Koons argues that the interpretation suffers from two 
critical flaws, both of which can be solved by the addition of an Aristotelian 
account of substantial form. First, the Oxford everettians cannot apply 
Savage’s account of subjective probabilities in order to make sense of the 
derivation of quantum probabilities via the Born rule, since Savage’s axioms 
presuppose the uniqueness of outcomes. Second, the Oxford everettians 
reliance on the strategy of functionalist reduction of the ‘emergent’ world 
of macroscopic objects leads to a radical proliferation of emergent realities, 
with one corresponding to every consistent or nearly consistent story. The 
solution to the second problem requires the addition to the theory of a fixed 
inventory of Aristotelian essences, each of which can be realized only in very 
narrowly specified ways by the underlying wave functions. The addition of 
such Aristotelian essences can also be used to solve the first problem, since 
the macroscopic substances realizing those essences can collectively select 
one world at each branch as the uniquely actual one, restoring the unique-
ness of outcomes required by Savage’s axioms. The result is a new interpre-
tation of quantum mechanics, the Traveling Forms interpretation.
In Chapter 4, Alexander Pruss, offers a formal development of the 
Traveling Forms interpretation (TF) and defends it from various objections. 
Pruss also begins with the many- worlds interpretation, and, like Koons, he 
presses the objection that the MWI cannot make sense of quantum prob-
abilities. Solving that problem leads naturally to the ‘Many Minds’ interpre-
tation of Loewer and Albert, which can, in turn, be improved by moving 
to the ‘Traveling Minds’ interpretation of Squier and Barrett. However, 
both the Many Minds and Traveling Minds interpretations require an 
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unreasonably extreme version of mind- body dualism. In contrast, the TF 
interpretation is consistent with mind- body supervenience and avoids the 
possibility of mindless zombies. Pruss develops a version of the TF interpre-
tation that builds on the foundation of the modal interpretation of quantum 
mechanics: in particular, he relies on the indeterministic modal interpreta-
tion of Bacciagaluppi and Dickson. Pruss demonstrates that all substantial 
forms will naturally travel together through the branching structure of pos-
sible worlds.
In Chapter 5, William Simpson uses quantum physics to launch an attack 
on neo- Humean metaphysics (the main competitor to Aristotelianism 
in contemporary analytic metaphysics), in particular, a contemporary 
Humean account of the nature of causal powers. The phenomenon of 
quantum entanglement contradicts one of the two principal tenets of neo- 
Humeanism, as developed by David Lewis, namely, the principle of Humean 
Supervenience, according to which all facts supervene upon the distribution 
of intrinsic (local) qualities across ordinary spacetime. In a recent paper, 
Toby Handfield has attempted to rescue neo- Humeanism by jettisoning 
Humean Supervenience whilst retaining the other central tenet of Lewis’s 
system, the Principle of Recombination. Simpson argues that the two theses 
are not as neatly separable as Handfield supposes. Any accommodation of 
quantum entanglement threatens to destroy the very possibility of localized 
powers and dispositions, resulting in a version of Spinoza’s monistic neces-
sitarianism. Quantum holism prevents processes (and their structures) from 
being isolated in the way that Handfield requires, with the result that the 
cosmos comprises just one gigantic and indivisible process. This lack of iso-
lation makes the Recombination principle vacuous. Simpson also explores 
several alternative strategies for preserving neo- Humeanism, including ones 
involving Bohmian or objective- collapse mechanics. He argues that, whilst 
a modified form of Humean Supervenience can be reclaimed, such strategies 
end up with too impoverished a set of facts in the world’s ultimate super-
venience basis, excluding not only causal powers, secondary qualities and 
facts about consciousness, but also physical properties, like charge, mass, 
and spin, leaving only a world of featureless stuff. In fact, to rebuild a world 
of experiments and experimenters upon that slim foundation would require 
exactly the kind of unconstrained global functionalism that Koons criticized 
in Chapter 3.
In Chapter 6, Tuomas Tahko also considers the threat to localized causal 
powers posed by quantum holism. He challenges Jonathan Schaffer’s recent 
proposal of priority monism. According to this account, whilst the cosmos 
is the only fundamental substance, it nonetheless has many real parts. Tahko 
points out that quantum entanglement, in the absence of an Aristotelian 
account of multiple substances, entails that the proper parts of the cosmos 
exist only as appearances, not in reality (whether fundamental or not). 
Tahko suggests that the distinctness of substances might be linked to incom-
patible properties in the quantum formalism.
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Part 2
The second part of this anthology is focused on the special sciences of biol-
ogy and psychology.
In Chapter 7, Christopher Austin and Anna Marmodoro propose a special 
kind of power possessed by certain composite entities—namely, a dynamic 
structural power, by which the entity sustains itself in existence over time. 
They turn to the contemporary program of systems biology to provide real- 
world examples of such powers. Organisms maintain themselves in exis-
tence through the manifestation of a specialized kind of causal loop, a loop 
that is able to persist despite the organism’s mereological inconstancy. They 
argue that the ontological ground of this capacity for self- perpetuation is 
encoded in, but not reducible to, the features of the microscopic parts and 
their spatial and causal relations. The phenomenon of phenotypic plastic-
ity entails that the stability that characterizes organic life is quite abstract: 
it is not the maintenance of a single, unchanging morphology, but rather, 
the unfolding of a morphological space, a landscape that is continuous and 
dynamically connected. An account of the unity of this space requires refer-
ence to a stable Aristotelian essence.
In Chapter 8, Christopher Austin further develops this picture of sub-
stantial diachronic unity by way of examining the ‘evo- devo’ (evolutionary- 
developmental) program in biology. Instead of focusing on whole organisms, 
Austin illuminates his account with reference to stable developmental modules, 
which persist across swaths of evolutionary history. Although such modules 
are not plausible candidates for the status of substances, they could be integral 
parts of such substances, with an identity and nature that is tied to the identity 
and nature of the organisms to which they belong. Just as Aristotle explains 
that the existence of a hand or eye is dependent on that of the whole animal, so 
the reality of developmental modules provides indirect evidence of the substan-
tiality of organisms. Austin again appeals to the phenomenon of phenotypic 
plasticity and the existence of morphospaces with privileged regions of attrac-
tion as evidence of regulatory stability at the level of the organism.
In Chapter 9, David Oderberg responds to several objections to the exis-
tence of biological substances based on several kinds of borderline cases. Like 
Austin and Marmodoro, Oderberg argues that substantial form is needed 
as a principle of both synchronic and diachronic unity for organisms. He 
argues that, consequently, each substance can contain only one substantial 
form, and so substances cannot contain other substances as parts. In this 
chapter, he seeks to provide principled grounds for distinguishing biological 
substances (organisms) from non- substantial entities, such as autonomously 
existing organs and tissues, on the one hand, and multi- organism colonies 
and communities, on the other. Oderberg finds that the power of reproduc-
tion must play a central role in making these distinctions: organisms have 
the power to reproduce themselves, while mere organs and tissues do not. 
Although cells can reproduce themselves in special circumstances (as, for 
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example, when we cultivate lines of stem cells), they are naturally suited to 
form tissues and organs that can only reproduce themselves via their con-
tribution to the reproduction of an entire organism of the appropriate kind. 
Similarly, multi- species communities like lichens do not reproduce them-
selves. Instead, each species within the symbiotic community has its own 
independent mode of reproduction. In the case of natural communities of 
social animals, like colonies of ants, Oderberg relies on clear physiologi-
cal analogies between individual ants and non- social organisms in closely 
related phylogenetic families, like beetles or roaches. The similarity between 
an individual ant and a member of a non- social insect species makes the 
inference to the substantial nature of the individual ant irresistible, with the 
consequence that the ant colony is a real but non- fundamental entity.
In Chapter 10, Janice Chik Breidenbach seeks to rehabilitate the idea of ani-
mals as agents. She rejects the accounts of those who seek a kind of causal excep-
tionalism for human or rational agents (like Descartes, Roderick Chisholm, 
or Donald Davidson). Instead, by building on the work of Helen Steward, 
she develops a fully naturalistic account of causation by agents. For Steward, 
animals are ‘settlers’ of matters of fact and are characterized by rudimentary 
intentional states. Following the lead of elizabeth Anscombe, Steward and 
Breidenbach reject the identification of causation with the existence of strictly 
sufficient conditions. Breidenbach defends the possibility of real downward 
causation of parts by wholes in an indeterministic world by arguing that causa-
tion by substances is more fundamental than the event causation that has held 
center stage in philosophy since the time of David Hume. Like Marmodoro 
and Austin, Breidenbach emphasizes the importance of accounting for the 
diachronic unity of mereologically inconstant organisms, and she deploys the 
notion of substantial form as part of her response to Jaegwon Kim’s challenge 
to the very possibility of synchronic downward causation.
In Chapter 11, William Jaworski argues for the superiority of an 
Aristotelian conception of psychology on the grounds that it enables us to 
dispense with the mind/body dichotomy. Instead of thinking of psychology as 
the study of a separate domain of mental phenomena, Jaworski proposes that 
we follow John Dewey and understand psychology and the social sciences as 
the sciences of persons and other organisms, understood as structured indi-
viduals. For Jaworski, the role of Aristotelian substantial form is played by 
structure, which (like Austin and Marmodoro) he defines as the substance’s 
power to organize its material parts in such a way as to maintain itself and 
its characteristic activities in existence. Jaworski argues that our sciences also 
require structure (or form) as an account of the unity of certain biological 
and intentional activities. In order for structure to do the work of unifying 
powerful individuals and their activities, these structures cannot be identified 
with higher- order properties and relations of the organism’s parts, as it is 
by functionalists and other reductionists. Instead, structure must be posited 
as a simple and irreducible form of causal power. Jaworski argues that we 
should embrace ontological naturalism, according to which we should take 
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the practices of our best sciences as our guide to ontology. given the recog-
nition of structured activities of organisms (including human beings) in the 
biological and social sciences, such naturalism licenses a commitment to the 
real existence of powerful, structured individuals at the level of organisms.
In Chapter 12, Daniel De Haan suggests the possibility of some degree 
of rapport between Aristotelian hylomorphism and the New Mechanist 
Philosophy, a movement within the philosophy of biology and psychology. De 
Haan identifies a number of points of similarity between the two philosophical 
programs: both are committed to an ontological realism about organization 
and organized entities, both embrace pluralism about causation, explanation, 
and properties, and the two programs include similar accounts of the part- 
whole relation, with the causal powers of the parts partly grounded in fea-
tures of the whole. Neither camp takes ontological emergence to be limited 
to the rational or psychological domain: instead, both see it as ubiquitous in 
biology. even with respect to teleology, the differences lie within each camp 
rather than between them. In both cases, some prominent advocates defend a 
robust and non- perspectival realism about final causes.
Reflections
We (the editors) suggest that the two parts of this anthology may be seen to 
complement one another in the following way: we think the papers in Part 1 
point to the need to recover the Aristotelian concept of substantial form, 
both as a source of unity and continuity (in relation to the amorphous, inde-
terminate character of the local, microscopic aspects of the quantum wave 
function) and as a source of distinction, separation, and locality (in relation 
to the cosmic holism of the wave function); the papers in Part 2, on the other 
hand, suggest that the life sciences provide us with evidence for the kind of 
substantial form that is required—one that grounds both the synchronic and 
diachronic unity of organisms in a way that is irreducible to the properties 
of the microscopic components.
In the quest for a metaphysical account of nature that is adequate to the 
richness of reality, we think it is important that the physical and life sci-
ences should be considered together, not simply analysed in separation. In 
the absence of Part 1, we might legitimately question whether the evidence 
for the conceptual, explanatory, and methodological autonomy of the special 
sciences (discussed in Part 2) amounts to anything more than a ‘polite form 
of microphysicalism’, to paraphrase Bernard Williams.10 In other words, we 
might still find ourselves wondering whether, when god made microphysical 
reality, he had to make anything extra in order to complete the world, to para-
phrase Saul Kripke. However, Part 1, we suggest, does much to advance the 
case for the radical incompleteness of modern physics, at both the microscopic 
and cosmic scales, and the need for some form of ontological supplementa-
tion affecting the intermediate, macroscopic range. Conversely, in the absence 
of Part 2, we might worry that the paradoxes of contemporary physics are 
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simply insoluble, an inescapable set of mysteries. However, the cumulative 
weight of Part 2 suggests we have good grounds for believing in substantial 
forms that unify macroscopic objects (namely, organisms and their functional 
parts), despite mereological and qualitative inconstancy. The biological sci-
ences thereby provide us with ample evidence for the existence of causally 
powerful entities that are both fully localized and adequately determinate; 
that is, precisely those features that seem to be absent in our best current 
physical theories, as they have typically been understood.
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Part 1
The Philosophy of Physics

1.  Introduction
As demonstrated by the collection of essays in this volume (as well as Tahko 
(2012) and Novotny and Novak (2014)), Aristotelianism has recently been 
enjoying a revival in various subfields of philosophy, including metaphysics 
and the philosophy of science. To take an example that will play a motivat-
ing role in our discussion, the theme of “hylomorphism” has been widely 
discussed in analytic metaphysics (see Koons 2014) and references therein), 
as well as in the philosophy of quantum theory (Pruss 2017), the philosophy 
of mind (Jaworski 2017), and the philosophy of biology (Austin 2017).
Although the term “hylomorphism” is sometimes used very loosely, Neo- 
Aristotelians of a strict observance will want to reserve this term for a the-
ory of substance that avoids collapsing into either dualism or materialism. 
In particular, in order to avoid the latter collapse, Neo- Aristotelian sub-
stances must exhibit a strong form of unity, i.e. a unity such that the powers 
of a substantial whole cannot be completely grounded in the powers of its 
parts. (On this score, see Koons (2014), who argues for the more specific 
thesis that there must be a mutual relationship of partial grounding between 
a substantial whole and its parts.) More generally, many Neo- Aristotelians 
are interested in the possibility of a kind of emergent causal efficacy (such 
as the powers of an organism) which cannot be reduced to forms of causal 
efficacy that are sometimes regarded as more “fundamental” (such as the 
powers of the electrons that comprise the organism).
While it is a truism that one cannot directly read metaphysics off of sci-
ence, the above Neo- Aristotelian position can still be threatened by weaker 
claims about the relationship between science and metaphysics. Consider, 
for instance, the metaphysical thesis called “fundamentalism”, which holds 
that the laws of a (hypothetical) unified physical theory exhaustively govern 
all of material reality: In this view, it is difficult to see how the powers of 
substances could be anything other than entirely grounded in the powers of 
the entities of the unified physical theory; hence, this metaphysical picture 
is inconsistent with Aristotelian hylomorphism.1 But why should anyone 
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believe in such a metaphysical thesis? It is at this juncture that many think-
ers implicitly or explicitly invoke a connection with scientific practice:2
Fundamentalist Unification
The success of science (especially fundamental physics) at providing a 
unifying explanation for phenomena in disparate domains is good evi-
dence for fundamentalism.
Thus, although Neo- Aristotelians are not directly threatened by anything 
in science, they will want to find ways of warding off this interpretation of 
the “unifying role” that physics plays with respect to disparate domains of 
phenomena.
The goal of this essay is to recommend a particular set of resources to 
Neo- Aristotelians for resisting Fundamentalist Unification and thus for 
resisting fundamentalism. The set of resources in question originates in the 
work of Nancy Cartwright, who has famously drawn on the details of sci-
entific practice in order to launch an argument against fundamentalism.3 We 
would like to urge two points in particular:
(i)  Anti- fundamentalism is a live option, because genuine arguments in 
favor of Fundamentalist Unification are hard to come by, and the best 
(and most fully worked- out) argument for it rests on assumptions that 
beg the question against Cartwright’s epistemology of scientific models.
(ii)  Neo- Aristotelians should find Cartwright’s epistemology of scientific mod-
els appealing because it adopts the broadly Aristotelian approach of pri-
oritizing the concrete over the abstract—call this approach “concretism”.
Bringing these two points together, we submit that Cartwright’s approach 
offers Neo- Aristotelians a distinctively concretist epistemology of scien-
tific models that has the added benefit of making room for robust forms of 
Aristotelian metaphysical doctrines, such as hylomorphism. Nonetheless, 
we will also urge that Cartwright’s approach is in many ways underdevel-
oped and that it needs to be more fully worked out if it is to be incorpo-
rated into a compelling Neo- Aristotelian picture of the relationship between 
metaphysics and science.
The plan of the essay is as follows. Section 2 discusses the topic of what 
scientific practice- based reasons one might marshall in favor of fundamen-
talism. As we see it (and as the question has been understood in the litera-
ture), any practice- based attempt to adjudicate this issue has to reckon with 
two considerations that seem to pull in opposite directions. On the one hand, 
even our most impressive scientific theories seem to only apply to domains 
of reality in a “patchwork” way, and on the other hand, it is undeniable that 
much scientific work consists in devising theoretical structures that are in 
some sense “unifying”. Intuitively, the first consideration provides prima 
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facie evidence against fundamentalism, and the second consideration pro-
vides prima facie evidence in favor of it. Thus, a successful argument for 
Fundamentalist Unification needs to provide a convincing account of “theo-
retical unification” that explains away the appearance of theories only hav-
ing a patchwork application to reality. One such account that claims to be 
“practice- based” is that of Smith (2001), and we will consider his argument 
in favor of Fundamentalist Unification in this section.
In Section 3, we will argue that Smith’s account of theoretical unification 
turns on a specific and controversial epistemology of scientific models. We 
then highlight how Cartwright’s concretist account of the epistemology of 
models explicitly rejects Smith’s assumptions and leads to a different way 
of understanding substantive theoretical unification. Indeed, this rival epis-
temology forms the basis of Cartwright’s famous argument against funda-
mentalism, which we then discuss.
Section 4 draws on our previous discussion to sketch some general guide-
lines for the project of developing a concretist epistemology of models. 
Although we take inspiration from Cartwright’s anti- fundamentalist mor-
als, we also highlight some ways in which the approach that we recommend 
diverges from hers.
2.  Fundamentalism and Its Justification
Metaphysical fundamentalists believe that the universe is exhaustively gov-
erned by a limited set of principles, which are often called “fundamental 
laws of nature”. The popularity of metaphysical fundamentalism presum-
ably derives from the metaphysical hope—shared by various scientists and 
philosophers alike—that science will eventually discover the laws of nature 
that exhaustively govern all of material reality, from the causal agents 
implicated in quantum gravity to human and non- human organisms. These 
fundamental laws of nature are usually taken to be truths expressed in math-
ematical language, which accurately describe the behavior of all things in 
the world, at all times and places. However, they are typically not taken to 
be the actual laws of our most fundamental physical theories, but the laws 
of some future “Final Science” or “True Physics” that our current scientific 
efforts aim at (cf. Sklar 2003: Sec. 5; Hoefer 2010: 308).
In this paper, we will put aside armchair metaphysical speculation and 
instead focus on the following question: Based on the practice of science, 
what reasons might one have for accepting or rejecting metaphysical funda-
mentalism? By our lights, all parties to the debate will have to reckon with 
two practice- based facts that appear to be in tension with each other:
(1) Scientific theories have the appearance of having “patchwork” domains 
of application;
(2) Theories have been successful at providing “unifications” of such 
domains.
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Regarding (1), both fundamentalists and anti- fundamentalists should 
agree that our explanatory and predictive practices in science suggest a much 
more “dappled” or “patchwork” picture of scientific activity than what the 
fundamentalist hopes for. For instance, biology and chemistry are scien-
tific disciplines which seem to operate autonomously from physics: They 
often construct theories, give explanations, and make successful predictions 
without taking into account any fundamental laws of physics. Furthermore, 
fundamentalists should concede that even upon restricting scientific activity 
to “physics”, it often appears to be the case that different domains of phe-
nomena are described by different physical theories: To give an elementary 
example, point particle mechanics and fluid dynamics are physical theories 
that apply to relatively disjoint sets of classical phenomena.
With respect to (2), fundamentalists and anti- fundamentalists should 
likewise agree that various theories have had empirical and theoretical suc-
cess in playing a “unifying role” with respect to phenomena in different 
domains. The issue at stake is how such “unifications” should be under-
stood and what we are justified in inferring from them.
Let us briefly consider a fundamentalist narrative that emphasizes a 
particular understanding of (2) and uses this to explain away (1).4 Suppose 
that fundamentalists and anti- fundamentalists agree that, at least within 
the confines of certain experimental scenarios, we have good reason to 
believe in the truth of mathematical laws describing the behavior of basic 
kinds of particles/fields and their interactions. One fundamentalist strat-
egy for describing the unifying role of particle physics is to then elaborate 
on the narrative as follows: We also have good reason to believe that 
everything in the physical world is made up of these same basic kinds 
of particles. So, from the fact that everything is made up of the same 
basic particles and that we have reliable knowledge of the behavior of these 
particles under some experimental conditions, it is plausible to infer that 
the mathematical laws governing these basic kinds of particles within the 
restricted experimental settings also govern the particles everywhere else, 
thereby governing everything everywhere (Hoefer 2010: 317–18). A fun-
damentalist of this stripe would resist claims that the “patchwork” picture 
of science constitutes prima facie evidence in favor of anti- fundamentalism 
by denying that the patchwork picture carves at the joints of reality. Thus, 
for instance, Sklar claims that although explanations in biology and chem-
istry describe real phenomena in the world and are certainly useful for 
predictive purposes, they are not characterizing how things “really are” 
(Sklar 2003: Sec. 4).
From the anti- fundamentalist’s perspective, the problem with this asser-
tion is that it takes fundamentalism for granted, and then uses it to dismiss 
the prima facie evidence for anti- fundamentalism, viz. (1). If fundamental-
ists want to provide non- question- begging arguments for their position, 
they cannot assume that fundamentalism is true, since that would just be 
a statement of their (metaphysical) faith in fundamentalism. Instead, what 
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fundamentalists should do is to provide evidence in the form of an anal-
ysis of scientific practice that supports (2) and dispels the worries raised 
by (1). In other words, what is primarily at stake in the debate is whether 
Fundamentalist Unification is true.
Smith’s (2001) essays provide just such an account, albeit one that is 
limited to the domain of classical phenomena, i.e. systems for which the 
units of action are large in comparison with Planck’s constant, and whose 
speeds are small relative to the speed of light. He focuses on the question 
of whether classical phenomena are theoretically unified by a single theory, 
viz. Classical Continuum Mechanics (CCM). Although the focus on the case 
of classical mechanics might be seen as incurring a loss of generality, this 
is a particularly relevant case study for the debate about Fundamentalist 
Unification for two reasons. First, it focuses on well- established scientific 
theories that have been at the epicenter of this debate from the beginning 
(the origin of the debate can be traced back to Cartwright (1994)). And, 
second, this case does not involve inter- level relations or relations among 
different sciences, but focuses exclusively on a particular set of physical 
theories for which the length/energy scale is held fixed.5 Accordingly, this 
is arguably the case in which it is easiest for the fundamentalist to dem-
onstrate the unity of the domain of classical mechanics, because there are 
no complicating factors, such as complex inter- level relations, or a lack of 
well- established scientific theories that operate in that domain. Conversely, 
if we can show that the fundamentalist fails to even make it plausible that 
the domain of classical physics is unified, this would provide a strong case 
for the plausibility of anti- fundamentalism.
In constructing his argument, Smith draws on the work of Clifford 
Truesdell (1991), who sought to place Continuum Mechanics on a deduc-
tive foundation akin to that of euclid’s deductive axioms for geometry. 
Recall that in the theory of fluids and continuous media, “constitutive 
equations” are used to describe the response of a particular material to 
external stimuli—in other words, such equations provide a formal specifi-
cation of some particular material. Truesdell aspired to provide a general 
theory of the constraints that should be satisfied by “physically reason-
able” constitutive equations such as “determinism”, “local action”, and 
various invariance principles; let us call these the “Truesdell Constraints”.6 
With that in mind, we are now in a position to lay out Smith’s argument in 
favor of the following classical version of the Fundamentalist Unification 
thesis:
Classical Fundamentalist Unification (CFU)
The unificatory success of classical continuum mechanics demonstrates 
the truth of fundamentalism about the classical domain, viz. the laws 
of continuum mechanics govern the behavior of all phenomena within 
the classical domain.
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Smith’s Fundamentalist Argument for CFU
(F1)  A theory only applies to a domain insofar as it provides a prin-
cipled way of generating a set of models that are jointly able to 
describe all the phenomena in that domain.
(F2)  The theory of CCM admits of an infinite number of constitutive 
equations (or formal models of materials).
(F3)  The admissible constitutive equations of (F2) satisfy a small num-
ber of simple laws, viz. the Truesdell Constraints, which ensure 
that they obey some set of “physically reasonable” axioms.
(F4)  By (F2) and (F3), CCM has an infinite number of principled con-
stitutive equations/models.
(F5)  The constitutive equations of (F2) suffice to describe almost any 
classical phenomenon.
(F6)  By (F1), (F4), and (F5), CCM applies to the whole classical domain.
(Note that although our reconstructed argument focuses only on the case of 
contact forces, i.e. forces acting on the surface of a body, such as the force 
of the wind, a completely analogous argument can be constructed to cover 
the case of body forces, i.e. forces that act throughout the body, such as 
gravitation.)
The argument’s conclusion, i.e. (F6), is that CCM applies to the whole 
domain of classical mechanics, in the sense that for any possible phenom-
enon in that domain, the theory has a “principled” model that accurately 
describes that phenomenon. Thus, the argument attempts to establish 
Fundamentalist Unification by providing an interpretation of the unifying 
power of continuum mechanics that allows one to deduce CFU.
Notice that (F1) defines the conditions under which we can consider a 
particular domain to be unified by a theory. At a schematic level, (F1) is 
a shared premise between fundamentalists and anti- fundamentalists; how-
ever, fundamentalist and anti- fundamentalist may disagree on the determi-
nate interpretation of what counts as a principled model, which will in turn 
inform their judgments about when a domain counts as theoretically uni-
fied. In particular, (F2–4) assume a particular understanding of what it is 
for a theory to generate a model in a principled manner. For Smith, all that 
is required to generate such a principled model is to show the existence 
of a constitutive equation that satisfies the Truesdell Constraints (which 
define an infinite class of formal models for materials) (Smith 2001: 471). 
(F5) then asserts that such models suffice to provide a good description for 
“almost” any classical phenomena, thus effecting the desired “theoretical 
unification” of the classical domain. The next section elaborates on, and 
interrogates, the underlying assumptions of this particular account of theo-
retical unification; we will argue that once these assumptions are uncovered, 
Smith’s argument loses whatever initial plausibility it might have had as a 
non- question begging defense of CFU.
Dodging the Fundamentalist Threat 21
Section 3: Anti- Fundamentalism and Cartwright’s 
“Concretist” Epistemology of Models
In Section 3.1, we will first show that Smith’s argument in favor of CFU 
assumes a particular (and controversial) epistemology of models. We then 
sketch a rival epistemology of models that is due to Cartwright (1999)—we 
call this “concretism”. Section 3.2 then explains how concretism is deployed 
by Cartwright in her argument against CFU. The moral of this section, then, 
is that CFU (and Fundamentalist Unification, more generally) is extremely 
sensitive to one’s preferred epistemology of models. Moreover, the Neo- 
Aristotelian has little reason to accept anything close to the epistemology 
that Smith proposes.
Section 3.1: Aristotelian Concretism About Models
As noted above, the main point of contention between Smith and Cartwright 
is their interpretation of a “theoretical unification”. Consider that by invok-
ing the notion of a “principled” model, premise (F1) of Smith’s argument 
is referring to a set of criteria that need to be met in order for a theory to 
count as “unifying” a particular domain: Theories only apply to a domain 
D insofar as they can provide principled models for phenomena in D; thus, 
a unified theory of D needs to be able to provide principled models for all 
phenomena in D. In its schematic form, (F1) is shared by fundamentalists 
and anti- fundamentalists alike, because both parties agree that not just any 
model will count as principled! However, disagreements arise once we get 
into the specifics of the criteria according to which a model will count as 
principled, which will in turn determine what a “theoretical unification” 
consists in.
We will now explore Smith’s understanding of what it takes for a model 
to be principled. Recall that in his Fundamentalist Argument, premises 
(F2) and (F3) jointly describe the existence of an infinite set S of models 
that satisfy physically reasonable assumptions that we called the Truesdell 
Constraints; however, these premises do not yet claim that such models 
count as “principled” ways in which the theory can be applied to describe 
classical phenomena. Indeed, as far as these premises go, such a character-
ization might be consistent with the models being purely ad hoc or phenom-
enological (relative to the theory). The additional claim that the models in S 
are principled is made in (F4), and the claim that any classical phenomenon 
will be described by a model in S is made in (F5)—these two premises, then, 
are the controversial ones that we will now interrogate.
Why should one think that (F4) is true? A plausible way of reconstructing 
Smith’s reasoning here is as follows: evidently, we have a general method 
for demonstrating the existence of constitutive equations which satisfy the 
Truesdell Constraints; indeed, we know that there is an infinite set S of such 
models (cf. Smith 2001: 471–2). Now, several of these models happen to be 
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explicitly constructible and have been applied with great empirical success; 
the success of these models can then be taken to justify other models in S 
(Smith 2001: 474).
Based on this line of thought, let us spell out more precisely what Smith 
means by a “principled” model. According to Smith, a model is principled 
relative to a particular theory if it (i) fulfils the formal constraints that the 
theory sets for the generation of models (i.e. the Truesdell Constraints), (ii) 
these constraints represent some relevant physical aspects of the phenomena 
in the domain (i.e. general physical properties of materials), and (iii) some 
models that satisfy the constraints have been successfully used to describe, 
predict, and explain phenomena in that domain. This account of “prin-
cipled” is not a purely formal one, because some models of S need to suc-
cessfully predict empirical phenomena for this account to get off the ground; 
however, it is still highly formal in the sense that once this minimal empirical 
requirement has been met, the warrant of those models is transferred to S 
as a whole by very formal means, i.e. simply in virtue of the models in S 
satisfying the Truesdell constraints; the models in S are then judged to be 
principled. We shall call this general approach to the epistemology of mod-
els an “abstractionist” epistemology, since it is willing to count models as 
principled on the basis of highly formal criteria.
It seems to us that this “abstractionist” epistemology of models should 
raise the suspicions of Neo- Aristotelians, as well as others who philoso-
phers who share the intuition that warrant does not transfer in virtue of the 
kind of formal relationship that Smith wishes to lean on. As a toy example, 
consider the relationship between the following two models A and B in 
some set S of models which satisfies “physically reasonable constraints”: 
Let A be a model that has been extremely fruitful and empirically well- 
confirmed, such as the simple harmonic oscillator, and let model B simply 
be some other element of S whose existence we can perhaps only guarantee 
abstractly. Why should the empirical confirmation that attaches to A (in 
virtue of which it intuitively counts as “principled”), or some part thereof, 
transfer to B simply in virtue of their both being elements of S? Plausibly, 
the fact that they both satisfy “physically reasonable constraints” cannot be 
made to bear the weight of such a transfer of warrant, and, furthermore, it 
is at least conceivable that many models in S might simply fail to apply to 
anything in reality (or even in possible worlds that are “close” to the actual 
world). By contrast, A and B usually have a much tighter relationship in 
cases where we think the warrant has some chance of transferring, e.g., 
a case in which A is the simple harmonic oscillator, and B is a modifica-
tion of A to include a damping term. Returning now to the case of CCM, 
one might reasonably expect that the grounds on which a model is justi-
fied should include knowledge of how that model is related to some actual 
set of (real) materials and experimental settings, i.e. knowledge that goes 
beyond the idea that all “reasonable” constitutive equations should satisfy 
the Truesdell Constraints. Thus, from the concretist point of view, all that 
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Smith has shown is that CCM has the resources to articulate some very 
schematic degrees of freedom (i.e. the abstract notion of a constitutive equa-
tion satisfying the Truesdell constraints) which can be “filled in” in many 
different ways. Upon being filled in, they may or may not be applicable to 
real phenomena, and even if they are applicable, the extent to which such an 
application counts as “principled” should be taken to be an open question.
Let us now shift our focus to (F5): Why should we think that the set of 
constitutive equations compatible with the Truesdell Constraints is able to 
describe all real materials within the classical domain? According to Smith, 
the fact that there is an almost infinite number of constitutive equations 
that satisfy the Truesdell Constraints is good reason to believe that each 
phenomena of the domain will be described by some constitutive equation 
(Smith 2001: Sec. 4.2). However, just pointing out that the set of models that 
satisfy the Truesdell Constraints is infinite does not show that this set will 
contain all the models needed to describe each phenomenon in the domain. 
After all, it is reasonable to think an infinity of potential models might not 
be able to account for the diversity of real materials that one encounters in 
nature. Thus, an argument is needed here in order to show that any real 
material can be modeled (in a principled manner) by an element of S. We 
now consider an argument to this effect that is implicit in Smith’s remarks.
Smith thinks there are reasons to be optimistic about not just the num-
ber but also the variety of models contained in S—they are so various, he 
thinks that it is almost unthinkable that they could fail to model a real 
material in a principled way. When discussing the potential infinity and 
variety of contact forces, he presents as an example that he calls “Lindsay’s 
function”, which is a function introduced in Lindsay’s classic textbook on 
CCM. Lindsay’s function is an exponential “ansatz” that can account, via 
Fourier series theorems, for almost any function, subject to a small set of 
constraints. And since almost any force can be modeled by such a function, 
or so Smith’s story goes, Lindsay’s function provides principled models for 
such forces. Smith then wishes to run an analogous argument in the case of 
CCM, where the analog of the models generated by Lindsay’s function is 
S, i.e. the set of constitutive equations satisfying the Truesdell constraints 
(Smith 2001: Sec. 4.1).
The problem with this strategy for generating an infinite—and infinitely 
diverse—set of principled models that will account for any real material is 
that it severely vitiates the plausibility of Smith’s understanding of “prin-
cipled”. If we allow almost any function to fulfill the theoretical constraints 
and to define a principled model (as Smith suggests is the case in his example 
regarding Lindsay’s function), the relationship between empirically success-
ful principled models and the merely potential principled models turns out 
to be very loose indeed. Why should we think that we can transfer the epis-
temic warrant from empirically successful models in the set S to all the other 
models of S if we allow almost any function to define a principled model in 
the set? It seems that the reasons Smith gives to believe that (F5) is justified 
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also severely undermine the justification for (F4), thereby threatening the 
ability of Smith’s own definition of “principled” to set any substantive con-
straints on what counts as a principled model.
As we have just seen in detail, the disagreement between fundamentalists 
and anti- fundamentalists boils down to a disagreement about how to under-
stand principled models. The Neo- Aristotelian philosopher may acknowl-
edge that CCM can generate a set of models potentially capable of describing 
phenomena involving fluids and inter- body gravitational forces; however, 
the Neo- Aristotelian would take issue with understanding the relationship 
between the theory, the model, and the model’s application to material phe-
nomena in the highly formal terms that Smith relies on. Rather, philosophers 
of a Neo- Aristotelian inclination tend to think that experimental and material 
knowledge play a far more substantive role in the generation and justifica-
tion of principled models. We now turn to a way of spelling out these Neo- 
Aristotelian thoughts that has been championed by Nancy Cartwright.
Nancy Cartwright has developed an in- depth analysis of scientific prac-
tice defending what we call a “concretist” epistemology of models. The 
immediate consequence of her epistemology for the case at hand is that 
in order for a model to be principled, it is not enough that it accords to 
some general formal principles; we also need to have the relevant material 
and experimental knowledge that allow us to determine and justify whether 
some specific mathematical model fits the phenomenon at hand.
Cartwright does not offer an explicit definition of what it is for a model to 
be principled; however, she does offer heuristics concerning how principled 
models are generated in scientific practice.7 As we understand Cartwright, a 
model M of a phenomenon X in experimental context Y is principled only if 
it has been generated from theory T by means of a process that satisfies the 
following conditions:
(i)  The construction of the model takes into account information regard-
ing the material phenomenon X and experimental context Y (e.g., what 
causal factors of the phenomenon X are relevant, how to properly shield 
the experimental context Y in order to isolate X, etc.),
(ii) The construction of the model takes into account information regarding 
how to construct a computationally tractable model (e.g., how to gener-
ate a mathematical model that can be used for calculations, simulations, 
etc.), and
(iii)  The construction of the model takes into account knowledge about 
how to bridge the gap between theoretical and experimental knowledge 
(e.g., what can be simplified or idealized, what parameters should be 
defined, etc.).
Cartwright captures these conditions for the derivation of principled mod-
els in scientific practice by referring to a set of rules that she calls “bridge prin-
ciples”. Bridge principles are the primary guidelines for determining how we 
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can generate principled models from theory; indeed, they also determine the 
scope of the theory’s application by constraining the range of models that can 
be derived from a theory in a principled way. Note, however, that Cartwright 
emphasizes that bridge principles do not generate models solely on the basis 
of theoretical input; one must also have in mind the target of the model and its 
intended experimental context. In this sense, bridge principles should provide 
a way of determining whether the model matches the target phenomenon that 
is to some degree independent of the theory.
In Section 4, we will elaborate on how to more precisely understand 
a concretist epistemology of models more generally. For now, let us just 
emphasize once more that Smith’s argument requires us to accept an 
abstractionist epistemology of models in order for premises (F4) and (F5) 
to be justified. As we have noted, this abstractionist epistemology relies on 
allowing very permissive constraints on what counts as a principled model 
that strongly contrasts with Neo- Aristotelian methodological inclinations 
regarding the epistemic relevance of material and experimental knowledge. 
Fortunately for the Neo- Aristotelian, an abstractionist epistemology is not 
the only epistemology of models available. As we have seen, Cartwright 
presents a concretist epistemology of models that undermines key prem-
ises of Smith’s argument. Furthermore, as we show in Section 3.2 below, 
Cartwright’s concretist epistemology can be put into work in order to con-
struct a counter- argument against Fundamentalist Unification.
Section 3.2: Cartwright’s Anti- Fundamentalist Argument
The general underlying principle behind the above discussion is that, in 
order to understand what the standards are for a good theory- model rela-
tionship (i.e. how to produce and recognize principled models), we need to 
go beyond the theory. In addition to the theory, we also need to take into 
account theoretical know- how regarding what is computationally tractable, 
experimental know- how regarding the material conditions to implement the 
model, and practical know- how regarding how to bridge from theory to 
experiment.
On the basis of her analysis of scientific practice, Cartwright famously 
argues that science does not offer us a fundamentalist picture of the world. 
Instead, it offers us an image of the world as “dappled”, i.e. the world is not 
governed by a limited set of universal laws that apply to all domains, but is 
instead divided into small pockets of restricted regularities (Cartwright 1994). 
Here is the structure of her argument, as applied to the classical domain:
Cartwright’s Anti- Fundamentalist Argument
(F1)   Theories only apply to a domain insofar as there is a principled 
way of generating a set of models that are jointly able to de-
scribe all the phenomena in that domain.
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(AF2)   Classical mechanics has a limited set principled models, so it 
only applies to a limited number of sub- domains.
(AF3)   The limited sub- domains of AF2 do not exhaust the entire clas-
sical domain.
(AF4)  From (F1), (AF2), and (AF3), the domain of classical mechan-
ics is not universal, but dappled.
As we mentioned above, (F1) is a shared premise between fundamental-
ists and anti- fundamentalists. The differences arise in how they respectively 
understand what it takes for a model to be principled; Cartwright’s view 
on this is captured by premises (AF2) and (AF3) of the anti- fundamentalist 
argument.
Cartwright justifies (AF2) by pointing out that we only have the know- 
how to reliably apply a handful of bridge principles that cover only a limited 
set of sub- domains. This is because most of our material and experimental 
knowledge is limited to situations we can control by shielding the target 
system from external interferences. given these limitations on our mate-
rial and experimental knowledge, we cannot generate principled models 
that describe phenomena outside these shielded sub- domains. Accordingly, 
Cartwright’s strategy to justify (AF3) is just to point out that the classical 
domain is much larger that the conjunction of all the sub- domains defined 
by those shielded situations for which we have principled models that 
describe them.
The main insight driving Cartwright’s argument for the disunity of clas-
sical mechanics is precisely that for many phenomena within the domain 
of classical mechanics, we lack the material and experimental knowledge 
necessary to generate and apply models in a principled way. We may well 
have a formal mechanism that allows us to show the existence of a model, 
as suggested by Smith’s analysis, but this is insufficient to provide the right 
kind of theoretical unification.
Cartwright takes her concretist epistemology as a starting point for 
her analysis of scientific practice, which leads to the conclusion that the 
domain of classical mechanics is not universal, but dappled (i.e. AF4). 
Accordingly, Cartwright’s argument is an attempt to undermine CFU (and 
thereby Fundamentalist Unification) by providing an analysis of the relation 
between theories, models, and phenomena that highlights the limitations of 
classical mechanics to unify its whole domain.
Section 4: Towards a Concretist Epistemology of Models
One of the limitations of Cartwright’s concretist epistemology is that, as pre-
sented, the normative principles that she recommends are rather vague, and 
it is difficult to see how they generalize to cover different kinds of cases. The 
root cause of these limitations is what we might call Cartwright’s extreme 
“particularism” about the philosophy of science. Her writing sometimes 
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suggests that she does not think one can give any general guidelines and/or 
constraints for how to identify principled models and bridge principles, as 
well as the role that they play; all we can do is investigate the details of how 
they are used in scientific practice. For instance, she remarks the following 
with respect to interpretative models:
And what kinds of interpretative models do we have? In answering this, 
I urge, we must adopt the scientific attitude: we must look to see what 
kinds of models our theories have and how they function, particularly 
how they function when our theories are most successful and we have 
most reason to believe in them. In this book I look at a number of cases 
which are exemplary of what I see when I study this question. It is pri-
marily on the basis of studies like these that I conclude that even our 
best theories are severely limited in their scope.
(Cartwright 1999: 9)
So, for Cartwright, the amount of details and precision that a general 
account of principled models (or most scientific concepts) is very limited 
precisely because of the richness and variety that we find in scientific prac-
tice. At the end of the day, if we want to know the scope of a particular 
theory or whether a specific model is principled, we have to do the hard 
work of looking into the details of that theory and that model and how are 
they used in scientific practice.
In this section, we attempt to depart from Cartwright’s specific strain 
of particularism in order to attempt to define some general guidelines for 
a concretist epistemology of models. Section 4.1 presents Cartwright’s 
main case study in favor of her concretist epistemology of models, what 
she calls the “Neurath’s Bill” case. We use this case as an illustration of 
some of the central desiderata for a general concretist epistemology. The 
next sub- section, Section 4.2, will use the lessons learned in 4.1 to define 
the main desiderata for a concretist epistemology of models emphasizing 
the differences with Smith’s abstractionist epistemology. Finally, Section 4.3 
addresses the potential worry of whether and how a concretist epistemology 
of models can accommodate the role of theory and theoretical unification 
in scientific practice.
4.1 Some Lessons From the Neurath’s Bill Example
In keeping with her belief that the philosophy of science cannot be seri-
ously conducted except by attending to the details of scientific practice, 
Cartwright’s arguments are generally framed within the context of a physi-
cal example. For instance, her “Neurath’s Bill” example is the setting for 
trying to demonstrate “dappledness” within the domain of classical mechan-
ics. In this example, a $1,000 bill is dropped from the top of St. Stephen’s 
Square, travels erratically over the air while being swept away by the wind, 
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and finally lands somewhere in the square. Cartwright is skeptical that any 
theory will provide a “good description” for such cases, which has aspects 
best described by classical fluid mechanics, on the one hand, and aspects 
best modeled by point particle mechanics, on the other hand. It is worth 
quoting her conclusions from this example in full:
Let us set our problem of the 1000 dollar bill in St. Stephen’s Square to 
an expert in fluid dynamics. The expert should immediately complain 
that the problem is ill defined. What exactly is the bill like: is it folded or 
flat? straight down the middle, or . . . ? is it crisp or crumpled? how long 
versus wide? and so forth and so forth and so forth. I do not doubt that 
when answers can be supplied, fluid dynamics can provide a practicable 
model. But I do doubt that for every real case, or even for the majority, 
fluid dynamics has enough of the ‘right questions’ to ask to allow it to 
model the full set of causes, or even the dominant ones. I am equally 
sceptical that the models that work will do so by legitimately bringing 
Newton’s laws (or Lagrange’s for that matter) into play. How then do 
airplanes stay afloat? Two observations are important. First, we do not 
need to maintain that no laws obtain where mechanics runs out. Fluid 
dynamics may have loose overlaps and intertwinings with mechanics. 
But it is in no way a subdiscipline of basic physics; it is a discipline on 
its own. Its laws can direct the 1000 dollar bill as well as can those of 
Newton or Lagrange. Second, the 1000 dollar bill comes as it comes, 
and we have to hunt a model for it. Just the reverse is true of the plane. 
We build it to fit the models we know work. Indeed, that is how we 
manage to get so much into the domain of the laws we know.
Many will continue to feel that the wind and other exogenous fac-
tors must produce a force. The wind after all is composed of millions of 
little particles which must exert all the usual forces on the bill, both at a 
distance and via collisions. That view begs the question. When we have 
a good- fitting molecular model for the wind, and we have in our theory 
(either by composition from old principles or by the admission of new 
principles) systematic rules that assign force functions to the models, 
and the force functions assigned predict exactly the right motions, then 
we will have good scientific reason to maintain that the wind operates 
via a force. Otherwise the assumption is another expression of funda-
mentalist faith.
(Cartwright 1999: 284–5)
Let us highlight some important points in the quoted passage that bear 
on Cartwright’s concretist epistemology of models. First, it is important to 
note that Cartwright does not present this example as a challenge to the 
possibility of giving a scientific explanation of the trajectory of the bill, 
but as a challenge to the fundamentalist claim that all “classical phenom-
ena” fall under the domain of the same theoretical principles or laws. The 
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core disagreement between fundamentalists and anti- fundamentalists is not 
about whether there are actual or possible scientific explanations for all 
classical phenomena, but about to what extent all these (actual and pos-
sible) explanations that science provides fall under a unified set of theoreti-
cal principles or laws.
Second, the target of Cartwright’s skepticism is not the possibility of find-
ing a model for the 1000 dollar bill; rather, her skepticism is about the pos-
sibility of finding a principled model for that situation, that is, a model that 
is derived from the theory through systematic rules (i.e. bridge principles). 
Accordingly, the reason why the Neurath’s Bill example is a challenge to 
fundamentalists is not only because it is a complex situation, but because 
it is a situation sufficiently different from any situation that we have good 
models for and we have no systematic rules that tell us how to generate 
models for situations like this one.
There is a rather delicate but important issue that arises in the context of 
Neurath’s Bill (and other examples with a similar structure), and we believe 
that it is one about which Cartwright is not sufficiently careful. This can be 
seen from the fact that Cartwright slides from “skepticism about whether 
any theory will provide a good description for some phenomena” to “skepti-
cism about whether any theory will provide a principled predictive model 
for Neurath’s Bill”. This move is only licensed if one identifies “description” 
with “prediction”, which is not one of Cartwright’s explicit commitments. 
Furthermore, notice that any system that displays extreme sensitivity to ini-
tial conditions (such as Neurath’s Bill) will not admit of predictive models 
in practice, and so if “description” were to be identified with “prediction”, 
principled models in such cases would be ruled out by fiat. This seems unfair 
to Cartwright’s interlocutors and furthermore threatens to make Cartwright’s 
philosophy of models collapse into some form of operationalism. We thus 
conclude that the relevant question about cases such as Neurath’s Bill is not 
whether they admit of principled predictive models, but rather, whether they 
admit of principled models that adequately describe the empirical scenario.
Finally, note that Neurath’s Bill is supposed to be just one out of a cornu-
copia of scenarios within this domain which are not described by a unified 
set of laws and theoretical principles. Cartwright’s more general point is 
that classical mechanics is not unified because there are no laws or theoreti-
cal principles that apply in all the domain of classical mechanics. There are 
some domains of classical mechanics that we have a very good grasp of, 
such as point particle mechanics and fluid dynamics; however, there are 
many other domains where we do not have a good grasp of how to under-
stand (explain and predict) the phenomena occurring there. So, according to 
Cartwright, classical mechanics is not unified because its domain is divided 
in different sub- domains, not all of which can be accounted by a single set 
of theoretical principles or laws.
How can we build on the above morals to sketch some general desiderata 
for a concretist epistemology of models? To be clear, what we are trying to 
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do here is sketch guidelines for an approach that accepts the primacy of 
studying how particular theories/models work in order to make philosophi-
cal progress, while still avoiding the particularist extreme that Cartwright 
sometimes inclines towards (on which no general rules can be articulated). 
Based on the previous discussion, it seems to us that in the concretist’s view, 
a principled model needs to at least possess the following features:
(i)  It is predictively accurate when applied to the sub- domain D’ of the 
relevant domain D;
(ii)  It is descriptively accurate when applied to the relevant domain D;
(iii)  It is formally adequate with respect to the relevant theory;
(iv)  It is materially adequate with respect to the relevant experimental 
context.
(i) is an uncontroversial criterion that both concretist and abstractionist 
epistemologies will agree on. On the other hand, disagreements will begin 
to crop up with respect to (ii): For abstractionists such as Smith, the fact 
that some elements in a set S of models (where S is perhaps picked out by 
the requirement that its models satisfy some generic physical assumptions) 
satisfy (i) can be used to secure (ii) for other, non- predictive, elements of 
S—in other words, (i) is used to bootstrap to (ii) for D much larger than 
D’. On the other hand, Cartwright does not seem particularly interested to 
consider cases in which D differs from D’, i.e. she is generally only interested 
in models which are predictively accurate. We recommend that the concre-
tist explore a via media between the Smith and Cartwright positions: In 
particular, it seems plausible that some models can be descriptively accurate 
without being predictively accurate, perhaps in virtue of the specific (not 
merely formal) relationship that they bear to predictively accurate models.
(iii) is again an area in which one might expect some common ground 
between concretists and abstractionists (although there is quite a bit of room 
for disagreement about how tight these “formal relationships” have to be). 
And finally, (iv) will be another point of contention between concretists and 
abstractionists: as we saw in Section 2, Smith is not particularly concerned 
with the material adequacy of models, thus leading to his highly permissive 
conception of principled models.
4.2 Accommodating Abstraction Into Scientific Practice
Neo- Aristotelians emphasize the inherent complexity of the natural world, 
and show a healthy skepticism regarding the possibility of capturing such 
complexity with overly general and abstract methods. However, this skepti-
cism should not translate into a rejection of formalization and abstraction 
as theoretical tools which play a role (albeit a limited role) in understanding 
the natural world. Fortunately, the advocate of a concretist epistemology 
does not have to reject abstraction altogether as a theoretical tool; rather, 
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concretism grants abstraction a legitimate theoretical role in scientific prac-
tice while keeping in check the philosophical excesses that stem from a blind 
faith in the power of abstraction.
In particular, abstraction plays a crucial role in a kind of unification that 
we call Schematic Unification (SU). We have a case of SU when one tries 
to unify sub- theories by formulating a more abstract theory such that some 
laws/concepts/quantities of the sub- theories turn out to be instances of some 
laws/concepts/quantities of the abstract theory. Notice that, in itself, SU 
implies nothing about the prospects for theoretical unification, in the sense 
that finding a mathematical abstraction of a successful set of models (which, 
in turn, allows us to generate many new models) in no way guarantees that 
such an extension will describe a real domain. Indeed, radically generalizing 
a theory so that its range of models becomes infinite might in fact make it 
more difficult for the theory to have an empirical grip on reality.
Accordingly, one way of re- formulating Cartwright’s criticism of Smith’s 
account of theoretical unification is to say that Smith overemphasizes the 
role that SU has in theoretical unification. However, this is not to deny that 
SU has no legitimate role in theoretical unification. SU is a crucial step in 
setting up a common formal framework that allow us to understand and 
manipulate different theories and models under the same formalism. Physics 
provides various cases of SU forming part of a such a strategy to secure the-
oretical unification. For instance, take the case of Newtonian point- particle 
mechanics (PM). Let our sub- theories be (i) PM equipped with Universal 
gravitation as a special force law (gravitational PM); and (ii) PM equipped 
with Coulomb’s Law as a special force law (Coulomb PM). We then intro-
duce a unifying theory “Super PM”, which is PM equipped with a purely 
schematic force function F. evidently, SU is achieved by subsuming the dif-
ferent concrete forces under a single abstract force concept. Notice, however, 
that there is also a non- schematic, supplemental element that accompanies 
SU in this case: We are told how to combine different concrete forces, i.e. 
by vector addition. In other words, the schematic character of force is not 
only used to accomplish SU, but also provides a theoretical framework for 
describing interactions between gravitational PM and Coulomb PM.
Accordingly, under appropriate conditions, SU can yield a genuine strat-
egy for obtaining a larger theory that can unify two domains of phenom-
ena. From a concretist perspective, these “appropriate conditions” are those 
in which we have enough information about the material systems and the 
experimental context that we can supplement the schematic character of the 
concepts of the unifying theory with specific principles that bridge the gap 
between the mathematical abstraction and the concrete phenomena at hand.
Smith’s emphasis on SU exemplifies many of the general worries that 
motivate neo- Aristotelians’ skepticism with respect to the use (and abuse) of 
formal methods in the sciences. By distinguishing SU from theoretical uni-
fication and analyzing their relation and epistemic differences, a concretist 
epistemology of models allows for a more careful and empirically grounded 
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understanding of SU in theoretical unification. This thus provides an exam-
ple of how a Neo- Aristotelian framework can incorporate the use of formal 
methods as legitimate without compromising the relevance of materiality 
and concreteness.
Section 5: Conclusion
Our main aim in this paper was to provide the Neo- Aristotelian philoso-
pher with the conceptual tools to resist the fundamentalist challenge. We 
have argued that the best argument in favor of fundamentalism (Smith’s 
Fundamentalist Argument) is based on an implausible abstractionist epis-
temology of models that begs the question against the anti- fundamentalist 
and violates the Neo- Aristotelian ethos of emphasizing materiality and con-
creteness over formalization and abstraction.
Fortunately for the Neo- Aristotelian philosopher, Smith’s abstractionist 
epistemology of models is not the only viable option. Cartwright’s concre-
tist approach to the epistemology of models allows the Neo- Aristotelian 
philosopher to, first, resist Smith’s arguments for the theoretical unification 
of the classical domain; and, second, to implement the conceptual resources 
of Cartwright’s concretist epistemology to construct a positive argument for 
anti- fundamentalism, thereby shifting the burden of the proof in the debate.
Cartwright’s concretist epistemology is limited by her particularism, so it 
is difficult to generalize from her specific, detailed examples to a more gen-
eral concretist account of the epistemology of models. In order to overcome 
this difficulty, we analyzed Cartwright’s concretist approach and tried to 
extend it by sketching the form of a set of constraints that need to be satis-
fied in order for a model to be “principled”. These constraints include both 
criteria of formal and material adequacy. The resulting framework provides 
an excellent example to Neo- Aristotelian philosophers of how one can be 
critical of the excessive use of formalization and abstraction while remain-
ing faithful to actual scientific practice.
We started the paper by emphasizing the threat that fundamentalism may 
pose to Neo- Aristotelian ontologies. Let us conclude by drawing some gen-
eral morals that may give hope to ontological projects of a Neo- Aristotelian 
flavor. First, the arguments against fundamentalism presented in this paper 
give Neo- Aristotelians ammunition to resist the main threat from funda-
mentalism: The accusation that Neo- Aristotelian ontologies do not square 
well with contemporary scientific theories or the scientific consensus.
Second, it provides a prima facie reason to explore alternative ontologies 
to traditional fundamentalist ones. To the extent that fundamentalism is 
one of the central motivations for proposing fundamentalist ontologies of 
the world, the undermining of fundamentalism—through embracing a con-
cretist epistemology of models—also undermines the motivation for exclu-
sively focusing on fundamentalist ontologies. Thus, anti- fundamentalist 
creates room to entertain a plethora of alternative ontologies.
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Finally, the dappled view of science resulting from this concretist episte-
mology fits better with power ontologies than with traditional law ontolo-
gies (as noted by Cartwright 1994). Furthermore, a dappled view of the 
world leaves much more space for non- reductive accounts of causation and 
causal powers, thereby opening many more ontological possibilities to the 
Neo- Aristotelian, including different varieties of substance ontologies and 
hylomorphism.
Notes
1 For the introduction of the term “fundamentalism” into the philosophical lexi-
con, see Cartwright (1994).
2 See, for instance, Sklar (2003), Hoefer (2010), and Smith (2001).
3 Cartwright introduces anti- fundamentalism (or, as she calls it, the “patchwork” 
view of science) in Cartwright (1994) and further develops her anti- fundamentalist 
views in Cartwright (1999). For some responses to Cartwright’s work, see Bovens 
et. al. 2010.
4 For examples of this strategy, see Hoefer (2010) and Sklar (2003).
5 Many discussions about scientific fundamentalism tend to assume that theoreti-
cal unification comes about in a “vertical” way, i.e. through the reduction of 
less fundamental theories to a more fundamental theory. For instance, it has 
sometimes been thought that statistical mechanics presents evidence that the 
entities discussed in thermodynamics are ultimately or really nothing more than 
the entities which form the subject matter of some fundamental kinetic theory. 
But Cartwright observes, first, that theoretical unifications that involve reduc-
tion are not the only kinds of unifications that are relevant to scientific practice 
(many unifications are instead “horizontal” in the sense that the unified theory 
is supposed to apply at the same “scale” as the theories that are being unified), 
and, second, that the key question for fundamentalism is whether the unified 
theory really expands the domain of application of the theories that are being 
unified. We shall thus focus on this “domain- expanding” aspect of theoretical 
unification.
6 These constraints are introduced by Smith (2001: Sec. 4.1), who cites Truesdell 
(1991: 200–4) as the source.
7 Most of the central elements of her concretist approach to the epistemology of 
models can be found in Cartwright (1999: ch. 2 and ch. 8).
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I.  Introduction
The distinction between actuality and potentiality (or, in the more tradi-
tional jargon, act and potency) is fundamental to Aristotelian metaphys-
ics, especially as it has been developed in the Thomistic tradition. It is the 
heart of Aristotle’s account of how, contra Parmenides and Zeno, change 
is possible. The Aristotelian hylomorphic analysis of physical substances 
as composites of form and matter is an application of the distinction, with 
form corresponding to actuality and matter to potentiality. The Thomistic 
theory of the real distinction between essence and existence is another appli-
cation, with essence corresponding to potentiality and existence to actuality. 
The Aristotelian- Thomistic account of god as Unmoved Mover (or “purely 
actual actualizer”) of the world crucially depends on the distinction. And 
so forth.1
It might seem that the distinction has been rendered obsolete by einstein, 
and in particular by the Minkowski space- time interpretation of the Special 
Theory of Relativity (STR). Michael Lockwood sums up a common view:
To take the space- time view seriously is indeed to regard everything 
that ever exists, or ever happens, at any time or place, as being just as 
real as the contents of the here and now. And this rules out any con-
ception of free will that pictures human agents, through their choices, 
as selectively conferring actuality on what are initially only potentiali-
ties. Contrary to this common- sense conception, the world according to 
Minkowski is, at all times and places, actuality through and through: a 
four- dimensional block universe.2
Leave aside the question of free will, which is not my concern here. 
What is relevant is that Lockwood’s remarks suggest that there is, just as 
Aristotelians hold, an essential connection between time, change, and the 
actualization of potential, so that to deny one is to deny the others. The 
idea is that the block universe concept rules out the reality of time, or at 
least of temporal passage. But temporal passage follows upon change, so 





that if there is no temporal passage there can be no change either. Change, 
however (Lockwood’s implicit argument continues), is just the actualiza-
tion of potentiality, so that if there is no change, there is no actualization of 
potentiality. Hence, on the Minkowskian interpretation of STR, there is in 
the natural order no actualization of potentiality; everything in the world, 
whether “past,” “present,” or “future,” is all “already” actual, as it were. 
Thus, as Karl Popper noted, does einstein recapitulate Parmenides.3
So, the entire edifice of Aristotelian metaphysics might (given the cen-
trality to it of the theory of actuality and potentiality) appear to have been 
toppled by space- time physics. But as space- time physicists like to empha-
size, appearances can be deceiving. When the relevant issues are carefully 
disentangled and analyzed, it turns out that relativity by no means renders 
inapplicable the distinction between actuality and potentiality. At most it 
affects how we apply this distinction, but not whether we need to apply it. 
That, in any event, is what I will argue in this paper.
The plan of the paper is as follows. I will argue first that, even prescind-
ing from the details of the physics of relativity, we have good a priori reason 
to believe that it could not undermine the theory of actuality and poten-
tiality. For on the one hand (and as I argue in section II) we can know on 
independent metaphysical grounds—and in particular from the metaphysi-
cal presuppositions of any possible physics—that change, temporal passage, 
and thus the actualization of potential must be real features of the world. 
And, on the other hand (and as I argue in section III), we also have good 
a priori reason to believe that the appearance of a timeless and changeless 
world presented by relativity is merely an appearance, an artifact of the 
method by which physics studies physical reality rather than a discovery 
about the nature of physical reality itself. In particular, it is a byproduct 
of the mathematization of nature that is the hallmark of modern physics. 
While this method may capture important aspects of physical reality, it does 
not capture the whole of it, so that the absence of a feature from the math-
ematical picture of nature is not evidence of that feature’s absence from 
nature itself. This idea might be developed in either an instrumentalist or 
a structural realist direction, and the latter is my own preferred approach. 
Structural realism is itself susceptible of alternative interpretations, and sec-
tion IV spells out the sense in which the position defended in this paper is a 
structural realist one.
Of course, all of this still leaves us with the question of exactly how 
change, temporal passage, and the actualization of potential relate to the 
picture of the world presented by relativity if they are not actually at odds 
with that picture. This is a question usefully approached by way of consid-
eration of the various theories of temporal passage on offer in contempo-
rary philosophy of time and how their defenders have reconciled them with 
relativity—the topic of section V. To affirm that temporal passage, change, 
and the actualization of potential are real features of the world is to commit 
oneself to an A- theory or tensed theory of time. Reconciling any version of 
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the A- theory with relativity would suffice to reconcile the theory of actuality 
and potentiality with relativity, though Aristotelianism is traditionally asso-
ciated with presentism, the version of the A- theory which might seem most 
difficult to reconcile with relativity. But reconciliation is in fact defensible, 
even in the case of presentism.
Consideration is also given in section V to the B- theory or tenseless the-
ory of time, which is commonly thought to be the view most in harmony 
with relativity. Naturally, since temporal passage and thus (the Aristotelian 
argues) real change would be absent from the world as described by 
the B- theory, that theory cannot, to that extent, be reconciled with 
Aristotelianism. However, the actualization of potential need not be absent 
from such a world.4 To that extent, even an utterly static, four- dimensional 
Minkowskian block universe would be reconcilable with at least the core 
notion of Aristotelian- Thomistic metaphysics.
I do not say much, in what follows, about the details of the physics of 
relativity, or for that matter about the details of Aristotelian metaphysics. 
The reason is that in this case, the devil is not in the details, but rather in the 
big picture. As I will argue, the apparent conflict between relativity and the 
theory of actuality and potentiality has less to do with either theory as such 
than it has to do with general issues in the metaphysics of physics.
II. Time and Change
In Aristotelian metaphysics, the theory of actuality and potentiality is intro-
duced as necessary in order to make sense of the reality of change and tem-
poral passage (though it turns out to have applications beyond this). The 
way that relativity is supposed to pose a challenge to that theory is not by 
showing that it is mistaken as an analysis of the preconditions of change 
and temporal passage, but rather by showing that there are no such things 
as change and temporal passage in the first place. Accordingly, the focus 
in what follows will be on the question of whether change and temporal 
passage are real, not on whether the theory of actuality and potentiality is 
necessary in order to make sense of them.5
On an Aristotelian analysis, a real change (as opposed to a mere 
Cambridge change) involves the gain or loss of some attribute, but also the 
persistence of that which gains or loses the attribute.6 For example, when 
a banana goes from being green to being yellow, the greenness is lost and 
the yellowness is gained, but the banana itself persists. If there were no such 
persistence, we would not have a change to the banana, but rather the anni-
hilation of a green banana and the creation of a new, yellow one in its place.
Time, on the Aristotelian analysis, is just the measure of change thus 
understood. When we say that it took a certain banana four days to go from 
being green to fully yellow and then another eight days to turn brown, what 
this temporal description captures is the rate at which the events in ques-
tion succeeded each other. Absent such change, there would be nothing to 
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measure, and thus no time. The Aristotelian thus takes a “relational” view 
of time rather than the “absolutist” view associated with Newton. (That is 
not to say that the Aristotelian regards simultaneity as relative, but that is 
an issue I will address later on.)
Now, this understanding of time is, of course, controversial. For example, 
Sydney Shoemaker suggests that we can conceive of a world in which the 
inhabitants of three regions A, B, and C each occasionally observe the other 
regions go into a “frozen” or unchanging state for a period of a year.7 given 
that each region is observed by the inhabitants of the others to do so accord-
ing to a regular pattern (every three, four, and five years, respectively) they 
would have reason to conclude that every 60 years, the regions must all be 
“freezing” together, and thus that in their world, no change is occurring for a 
year’s time. Hence (it is argued), it is possible for time to exist without change.
But even leaving aside the tendentious assumption that we can deduce 
what is really possible from what is conceivable, this argument is problem-
atic in ways noted by e. J. Lowe.8 For one thing, it reasons from the claim 
that the inhabitants of Shoemaker’s imagined world would have evidence 
for time without change to the conclusion that it is possible that there could 
be time without change. But this gets things the wrong way around, for we 
first have to know that something really is possible before we can be con-
fident that there could be evidence for it. For another thing, if we suppose 
that A, B, and C really are all frozen or unchanging, then it becomes utterly 
mysterious what causes Shoemaker’s world ever to become unfrozen, or 
unfrozen after exactly a year’s time, rather than at some earlier or later time.
In any event, for present purposes, what matters is whether time is real 
in at least the sense the Aristotelian claims it is (again, as the measure of 
change), not whether time is real in at most that sense. And it is difficult 
to see how the reality of change, and thus of time in at least that sense, 
can coherently be denied. In particular, it is difficult to see how it could 
coherently be denied in the name of science, given the presuppositions of 
the very practice of science. Science involves perceptual activities like obser-
vation and experiment, and cognitive activities like entertaining concepts, 
formulating theories, inferring consequences from those theories, weighing 
evidence, and so forth. All of these activities entail the existence of change 
and time in the relevant senses.9
Hence, consider even the simplest observational or experimental situa-
tion, such as watching for the movement of a needle on a dial. When the 
needle moves from its rest position, it loses one attribute and gains another 
(namely a particular spatial location), and it is one and the same needle that 
loses and gains these attributes and one and the same dial of which the nee-
dle is a component. If there were no gain or loss of attributes, or if the needle 
or dial were not the same, the observation would be completely useless. For 
example, if what you are doing is testing a prediction about whether the 
needle which is at its rest position at t1 will be at a different position at t2, it 
would be completely irrelevant to such a test if the needle you observed at t2 
Actuality, Potentiality, and Relativity’s Block Universe 39
was a different needle from the one you observed at t1, and there would be 
nothing to watch for if it were not possible for this same one needle to gain 
or lose an attribute.
Naturally, this presupposes the realist assumption that the needle and 
dial are mind- independent objects, but the basic point would hold even on 
a phenomenalist interpretation of science. Hence, suppose that all you are 
really observing when you read the dial are certain sense data rather than 
any mind- independent objects, and suppose we interpreted scientific theories 
as mere descriptions of the relationships between sense data. Observational 
and experimental situations like the one we are considering would somehow 
have to be interpreted in a way consistent with this. But however that would 
go, you would still have to suppose that the person who has the initial 
sense data at t1 (namely you) is the same person who has the different sense 
data at t2, and that this same one person is capable of gaining and losing 
attributes (namely the sense data in question). The observation would be 
completely irrelevant if the person who has the sense data at t2 was a differ-
ent person from the one who had them at t1, or if that same one person was 
incapable of gaining of losing attributes like sense data.
Consider also even the simplest cognitive activity involved in science, 
such as reasoning from a premise to a conclusion via the inference rule 
modus ponens. When you reason from the premises If p, then q and p to 
the conclusion q, you lose one attribute (namely, the attribute of having the 
conscious thought that If p then q, and p) and gain another (namely, having 
the conscious thought that q). Moreover, it is one and the same person (you) 
who both loses the one attribute and gains another. If the person who had 
the second thought were not the same as the person who had the first one, 
there would not be any reasoning going on, any more than there would be if 
(say) Donald Trump had had the conscious thought that If p, then q, and p, 
and Hillary Clinton had, a moment later by sheer coincidence, the conscious 
thought that q. Nor would there be any reasoning going on if the same one 
person were incapable of losing one attribute (having the conscious that 
that If p, then q, and p) and gaining another (having the conscious thought 
that q).
A skeptic might object that the changes apparently involved in percep-
tion and cognition could be merely illusory. But the trouble is that, for all 
the skeptic has shown, this skeptical scenario itself presupposes change. The 
skeptic initially thinks that he has perceptual experiences and cognitive pro-
cesses that manifest change; then, he entertains arguments to the effect that 
this may all be illusory; then, he concludes that such changes don’t really 
occur after all. But all of that evidently involved changes of various sorts 
(for example, the skeptic first having one belief and then giving it up and 
coming to have another).10
Could the skeptic plausibly accuse such a response of merely begging the 
question against him? No, because the response is not a matter of simply 
dogmatically appealing to a premise that the skeptic denies (to the effect 
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that change exists) and then pretending to refute him on that basis. Rather, 
it is a matter of pointing out that the skeptic himself in fact seems implic-
itly to accept the premise in question, even in the very act of denying it. 
Hence, the only reply open to the skeptic is to show that he is not implicitly 
committed to the premise. That is to say, the skeptic needs to give some 
account of how it is possible for him to so much as entertain his skepticism 
given that change does not exist. In the absence of such an account, it is the 
skeptic, and not his critic, who is being dogmatic. Yet, no such account is 
forthcoming.
Anyone who claims that science has shown that change and temporal 
passage are illusory thus faces a dilemma. If he acknowledges the existence 
of the cognitive and perceptual states of scientists themselves, then he is 
implicitly committed to there being at least some change and temporal pas-
sage after all, namely the change and temporal passage that exist within 
these thinking and experiencing conscious subjects. This not only merely 
relocates rather than eliminates change and temporal passage, but opens 
up a Cartesian divide between the conscious subject and the rest of reality, 
with all of its attendant problems.11 (How does a temporal and changeable 
conscious subject arise within an atemporal and changeless natural order? 
Could there be causal interaction between two realities so radically unlike? 
Are we left with epiphenomenalism?) If instead, the skeptic about change 
and temporal passage takes an eliminativist line and denies the existence of 
the cognitive and perceptual states of scientists, then he will be throwing out 
the evidential basis of the scientific theory that led him to deny the reality 
of change and temporal passage in the first place. Into the bargain, he will 
face the further incoherence problems that notoriously afflict eliminativism 
about cognitive states, even apart from the problem of undermining the 
evidential basis of science.12
This argument for the incoherence of denying the reality of change is very 
simple, but, I think, utterly decisive. Yet, I suspect that its simplicity and 
decisiveness are, paradoxically, precisely why its force is not more widely 
seen. The thesis that change is an illusion seems to many (quite wrongly, 
but still, it seems to them) to have the full weight of modern physics behind 
it. Hence, the suspicion among such people (so I would wager) is that pre-
cisely because the argument about incoherence appears to be so obvious 
and decisive, there simply must be something wrong with it. Surely it can’t 
be that easy to refute what (they suppose) physics is telling us! Surely only 
an argument of great technical sophistication and complexity could do that! 
Thus does the argument about incoherence get put to one side without any-
one having actually answered it. The problem of how to fit the temporal 
and changeable world of the conscious subject into the wider timeless and 
changeless world purportedly revealed by physics is treated as a mere puzzle 
to be solved somehow, someday, by some future science.
But it is simply unreasonable either to suppose that the success of sci-
ence justifies ignoring the problem or to express glib confidence that science 
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will eventually solve the problem, because science is precisely what creates 
the problem. Or rather, what creates the problem is the mistaken assump-
tion that the scientific description of nature is an exhaustive description of 
nature.
III.  Mathematics and Method
In 1962, philosopher Max Black wrote:
But this picture of a ‘block universe,’ composed of a timeless web of 
‘world- lines’ in a four- dimensional space, however strongly suggested 
by the theory of relativity, is a piece of gratuitous metaphysics. Since the 
concept of change, of something happening, is an inseparable compo-
nent of the common- sense concept of time and a necessary component 
of the scientist’s view of reality, it is quite out of the question that theo-
retical physics should require us to hold the eleatic view that nothing 
happens in ‘the objective world.’ Here, as so often in the philosophy of 
science, a useful limitation in the form of representation is mistaken for 
a deficiency of the universe.13
Black’s characterization of change as “a necessary component of the scien-
tist’s view of reality” essentially sums up the point of the previous section. 
His characterization of relativity’s picture of a changeless world as “a use-
ful limitation in the form of representation” but also “a piece of gratuitous 
metaphysics” if taken to reflect anything more than a limitation in science’s 
form of representation, sums up the argument of the present section.
There are two key points here. The first is that the absence of change 
and temporal passage from relativity’s “representation” of the universe is 
plausibly regarded as an artifact of the methods of physics, rather than nec-
essarily reflective of the reality studied by means of those methods. That is 
to say, change and temporal passage could be there in nature even if they 
don’t show up in the physicist’s picture of the world, because the methods 
the physicist uses to paint that picture wouldn’t capture them even if they 
were there. The second point is that, for that reason, physics by itself cannot 
tell you one way or the other whether change and temporal passage are real. 
Physics could tell you that only if conjoined with an independent, philo-
sophical argument to the effect that the picture painted using the methods 
of physics is adequate as a metaphysics of nature. Let’s develop these points 
in order.
Suppose an artist produced images of a certain building using only black 
and white materials (pen and ink, wash, and so forth). Suppose the images 
were so vivid, detailed, and skillfully rendered that one could accurately 
predict from them what one would see when he entered the building and 
went down a certain hallway or walked into a certain room, could use them 
as a basis for designing furniture that would fit in the rooms, and so forth. 
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Obviously, there is nothing in this situation that would warrant the conclu-
sion that since red, green, blue, yellow, and other colors are not captured in 
the artist’s drawings, they must not really be there anywhere in the build-
ing itself either. In particular, the elegant simplicity, predictive success, and 
technological utility of the drawings would not warrant it. Nor would they 
warrant the conclusion that everything one sees in the images is actually 
there in the building. For example, it would obviously be a mistake to think 
that the walls, doors, tables, chairs, and other objects in the building must 
all have black lines around them, on the basis of the fact that the contours 
of the objects in the drawings are rendered by lines drawn in black ink. 
The absence of colors and the presence of black lines are byproducts of the 
method of representing the building and have nothing to do with the nature 
of the building itself.
That a similar phenomenon exists with mathematical representations of 
the world is obvious from everyday life. Consider, for example, the engineer 
concerned with designing a commercial aircraft, who wants to know how 
many passengers could be flown in it given that the engines have a certain 
thrust capacity, etc. He might determine that a passenger of average weight 
would be 152.5 pounds (or whatever), and he would ignore considerations 
such as the ethnicity of the passengers, their meal and entertainment prefer-
ences, and the like. Suppose that the airplane he designs works very well, that 
the design exhibits an elegant simplicity compared to those of other aircraft, 
etc. Obviously, that would not warrant the conclusion that actual airline pas-
sengers have no ethnicity or meal and entertainment preferences, or even that 
any of them weigh 152.5 pounds (since it could turn out that no actual pas-
senger has exactly that weight). The absence from the engineer’s description 
of the passengers of any reference to ethnicity, meal preferences, etc. and the 
presence of passengers of average weight are artifacts of the method of repre-
senting them and do not necessarily reflect the actual passengers themselves.
Now, the mathematical representation of nature is the hallmark of mod-
ern physics, and what is true of the humble examples just given is true also 
of the sophisticated mathematical models developed by the physicist. They 
too are bound to exclude features that exist in reality and add features that 
do not exist in reality, and their elegance and predictive and technological 
success do not show otherwise. As Jeffrey Koperski writes:
Continuum mechanics, for example, treats matter as if it were smoothed 
out and continuous across a region rather than atomic. Aerodynamics 
treats the airflow over a wing the same way, and these are perfectly 
good idealizations for the scale at which we normally deal with mate-
rials, especially fluids and gases. Spacetime theorists make this same 
move by ignoring [the] midscale structure [of the universe].14
It is important to put aside immediately an objection that might seem obvi-
ous but in fact has no force. The objection is that, unlike the representations 
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produced by the artist or the aircraft engineer, which capture only part of 
physical reality, the representation of nature produced by physics, especially 
space- time physics, captures all of physical reality. The reason this is a bad 
objection is that it blatantly begs the question. Whether the representation 
of physical reality produced by physics captures all of physical reality is 
precisely what is in question. The Aristotelian metaphysician—and not only 
him, as we will see—denies precisely that that is the case. Notice that I said 
“physical reality.” The point is not just that there might be aspects of reality 
beyond the physical which physics does not capture. The point is that from 
the Aristotelian point of view, physics does not capture everything there is, 
even in physical reality.
The point, as we will see, is also by no means limited to considerations 
about change and temporal passage, but let’s begin with those, since they 
are our main concern here. John Bigelow has noted the role that math-
ematics and formal logic have played in modern physics in suggesting the 
picture of a timeless and changeless world, even apart from relativity.15 The 
Newtonian analysis of motion represents the speed of a body in terms of 
the slope of a curve on a graph which measures time on one axis and space 
on another. Different times and different places are thereby represented in 
the same way, viz. as points on the graph, all of which exist at once, as it 
were. Then there is the use of calculus to characterize speed in terms of the 
limits of infinite sequences. To formulate statements about such sequences 
in modern predicate logic requires quantifying over past and future bodies 
and events no less than present ones. Again, this suggests a picture on which 
all times and places exist at once, as timeless and changeless Platonic math-
ematical objects.
Physicist Lee Smolin has also emphasized that a timeless picture of physi-
cal reality is a byproduct of the physicist’s mathematical manner of repre-
senting reality, noting that “the process of recording a motion, which takes 
place in time, results in a record, which is frozen in time—a record that 
can be represented by a curve in a graph, which is also frozen in time.”16 
Noting that the concept of four- dimensional spacetime is the result of a 
thoroughgoing application of this method of representing nature, Smolin 
warns against too quickly drawing metaphysical conclusions from the suc-
cesses of the method:
Some philosophers and physicists see this [method] as a profound insight 
into the nature of reality. Some argue to the contrary—that mathemat-
ics is only a tool, whose usefulness does not require us to see the world 
as essentially mathematical . . .
[They] will insist that the mathematical representation of a motion 
as a curve does not imply that the motion is in any way identical to 
the representation. The very fact that the motion takes place in time 
whereas its mathematical representation is timeless means that they 
aren’t the same thing . . .
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By succumbing to the temptation to conflate the representation with 
the reality and identify the graph of the records of the motion with the 
motion itself, [some] scientists have taken a big step toward the expul-
sion of time from our conception of nature.
The confusion worsens when we represent time as an axis on a 
graph . . . This can be called spatializing time.
And the mathematical conjunction of the representations of space 
and time, with each having its own axis, can be called spacetime . . . If 
we confuse spacetime with reality, we are committing a fallacy, which 
can be called the fallacy of the spatialization of time. It is a consequence 
of forgetting the distinction between recording motion in time and time 
itself.17
His proposed label for it notwithstanding, the error Smolin identifies 
here is not that of reducing time to a kind of spatial dimension—that may 
or may not make sense at the end of the day, but that is a separate issue—
but rather the fallacious inference involved in supposing that the usefulness 
of the mathematical representation all by itself justifies such a metaphysi-
cal reduction. That conclusion simply does not follow, any more than the 
parallel conclusions follow in the examples of the black- and- white drawing 
and the aircraft design. Or, to take another example from philosopher Craig 
Bourne:
[J]ust because something is represented spatially, we cannot draw the 
conclusion that it is a spatial dimension or that it is in anyway [sic] 
analogous to a spatial dimension. For consider . . . a three- dimensional 
colour space which illustrates the possible ways in which things can 
match in colour . . . [I]t would be misconceived to draw the conclusion 
that brightness, hue, and saturation were each spatial dimensions, just 
because they were represented spatially. And to go on to conclude that 
each of these dimensions must be alike just because they comprise the 
different dimensions of colour space would be equally fallacious, since 
they’re not. We should, then, be equally wary of drawing conclusions 
from Minkowski space- time diagrams.18
Propositions of mathematics and formal logic of their nature have a 
“timeless” Platonic character. Hence, representing something in purely 
mathematical terms or in the language of formal logic is bound to give it the 
appearance of something devoid of change or temporal passage. It doesn’t 
follow that the thing represented really is itself devoid of change or temporal 
passage, for that appearance may instead be a byproduct of the mode of rep-
resentation. The representation might thereby be adding something to the 
picture that isn’t there in reality, just as the black- and- white drawing adds 
in black outlines around the objects that aren’t really there in the objects 
themselves. Since the representation will also be unable to capture anything 
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not susceptible of mathematical or formal representation, it might also be 
leaving out aspects that are there in reality. The mathematical representa-
tion will necessarily abstract from those features even if they are really there.
Though Smolin’s remarks are very recent, his basic point is not a new 
one.19 It was often made during the first half or so of the twentieth century 
by thinkers of diverse interests and theoretical commitments. Process phi-
losopher Alfred North Whitehead gave the label “The Fallacy of Misplaced 
Concreteness” to the tendency to confuse an abstract mathematical repre-
sentation of reality with the concrete reality represented, and the error iden-
tified by Smolin is a special case of this fallacy.20 Phenomenologist edmund 
Husserl emphasized that the “mathematization” of nature results in an 
“idealization” which does not capture the whole of reality.21 Henri Bergson 
complained that the mathematician’s conception of nature leads us wrongly 
to think of time as a series of frozen moments, like the still photographs that 
make up a film strip.22 Historian of science e. A. Burtt lamented the ten-
dency of the modern scientist to “make a metaphysics out of his method.”23 
As we have already seen, analytic philosopher Max Black made a similar 
point. Unsurprisingly, Aristotelian- Thomistic philosophers raised such criti-
cisms as well. Jacques Maritain argued that mathematics captures only one 
of three “degrees of abstraction” from concrete physical reality,24 and other 
Aristotelian- Thomistic philosophers endorsed Whitehead’s “Fallacy of 
Misplaced Concreteness” objection.25 But as these various examples illus-
trate, one hardly need have an Aristotelian ax to grind to suppose that there 
might be more to physical reality than is captured in the mathematical rep-
resentation developed by modern physics.
So, we could be justified in deducing from that mathematical representa-
tion the conclusion that change and temporal passage are illusory only if we 
had a good independent, metaphysical argument to the effect that what can 
be found in that representation exhausts physical reality. (As Laurence Sklar 
has said, “one can extract only so much metaphysics from a physical theory 
as one puts in.”26) There also have to be no stronger independent metaphys-
ical arguments for the contrary conclusion than what can be found in that 
representation does not exhaust physical reality. Are there good arguments 
of the former sort? Are there any of the latter sort?
einstein had at least an implicit metaphysical argument for the conclu-
sion that change and temporal passage must be illusory if they don’t show 
up in physical theory. Unfortunately, that argument was essentially an 
appeal to verificationism, whose influence on einstein’s formulation of STR 
is well known. Needless to say, though influential at the time the theory was 
formulated, verificationism has fallen on hard times, and for good reason. It 
is difficult to formulate verificationism in a way that is not self- defeating; it 
does not fit all actual scientific practice (not even that of einstein, who later 
abandoned it); and it is incompatible with scientific realism, for which there 
are powerful arguments. What about that last redoubt of the verificationist 
manqué, the appeal to Ockham’s razor? The idea here would be that while 
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there might (contra positivist verificationism) in principle be something 
more to physical reality than what physics reveals, in practice we should not 
suppose that there is, because we simply do not need to postulate anything 
more in order to explain what needs to be explained.
The problem here is that we plausibly do need to postulate more, and we 
have already seen one reason why we do, in the previous section. Again, we 
cannot make sense even of the scientist’s own cognitive and perceptual states, 
on which the evidence for physical theory rests, unless we affirm the reality 
of change and temporal passage. If physics’ mathematical representation of 
the world doesn’t capture the latter phenomena, the very practice of phys-
ics nevertheless presupposes that they are real and thus presupposes that the 
mathematical representation doesn’t capture the whole of physical reality.
But more can be said. As Bertrand Russell (no Aristotelian or Thomist, 
and from the start an important expositor and advocate of relativity27) came 
increasingly to emphasize in his later work, the knowledge that mathemati-
cal physics gives us is essentially knowledge of structure rather than of the 
intrinsic nature of the concrete reality which has the structure (about which 
“physics is silent”).28 Indeed, it was precisely developments in physics like 
einstein’s relativity that led him to this position. Yet, there must be such an 
intrinsic nature to physical reality, for structure cannot exist without it, any 
more than the Cheshire cat’s grin can exist without the cat. (More on this 
below.) Since physics’ mathematical representation of nature does not give 
us that, we know it doesn’t tell us everything even about physical reality.
There is still more to be said in response to any facile appeal to Ockham’s 
razor. The early Russell had questioned the reality of causation, on the grounds 
that the physicist’s equations make no reference to it.29 Now, that this is a fal-
lacious inference should be evident from what has already been said. That 
some extra- mathematical feature is absent from the physicist’s mathematical 
representation of nature simply does not entail that it is absent from nature 
itself, any more than the absence of color from a black- and- white drawing 
entails that color is absent from the objects represented by the drawing. But 
what matters for the present point is that, as the later Russell himself came 
to emphasize, the notion of causation is in fact crucial to the epistemology 
of physics. For the only reason we have for supposing that observation and 
experiment provide evidence for physical theory is that our perceptual experi-
ences are causally related to actual physical reality. If they were not so related, 
then experience would float free of physical reality and thus provide no evi-
dence of its nature. But if the epistemology of physics requires causation, then 
that shows us yet again that physics’ mathematical representation of nature 
simply does not capture all there is to physical reality.
One further consideration. An immediate consequence of the mathema-
tization of nature inaugurated by galileo, Descartes, and the other early 
moderns was the introduction of the primary versus secondary attribute 
distinction. Color, sound, heat, cold, and the like as common sense under-
stands them, since they are qualitative rather than quantitative, were treated 
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as features merely of the mind’s perceptual representation of physical reality 
rather than of physical reality itself. This is the origin of the “qualia prob-
lem,” the problem of fitting the qualitative features of conscious experience 
into the physical world. For if color, sound, etc. as common sense under-
stands them do not really exist in matter, then it seems they do not exist in 
the brain, since the brain is one material thing among others. And yet, they 
do exist in the mind. So, it at least seems to follow in turn that the mind, and 
in particular consciousness, is not material. Accordingly, and as Thomas 
Nagel has been emphasizing for 40 years, it is modern science’s own concep-
tion of the physical that opens up this apparent gap and makes the mind- 
body problem so intractable.30 erwin Schrödinger made a similar point:
We are thus facing the following strange situation. While all building 
stones for the [modern scientific] world- picture are furnished by the 
senses qua organs of the mind, while the world picture itself is and 
remains for everyone a construct of his mind and apart from it has no 
demonstrable existence, the mind itself remains a stranger in this pic-
ture, it has no place in it, it can nowhere be found in it.31
Now, since conscious experience provides the observational evidence on 
which physics rests, physics presupposes the reality of conscious experi-
ence. Hence, if conscious experience is left out of physics’ mathematical 
representation of nature, then the epistemology of physics once again entails 
that there must be more to reality than is captured by that mathematical 
representation.
Obviously, the materialist will have much to say in response to all of 
this, but the point isn’t to take sides on the mind- body problem. The point 
is to offer a further consideration against any facile appeal to Ockham’s 
razor. given its reliance on the distinction between primary and secondary 
attributes, and the qualia problem that this seems to open up, the mathema-
tization of nature creates at least as many difficulties as it solves. Hence, a 
concern for parsimony would hardly justify us in supposing it to provide an 
exhaustive description of reality.
IV.  Structural Realism
Let’s pursue in a little more depth the reason why there must be more to 
physical reality than can be captured by mathematics. For someone might 
agree that physics captures only the mathematical structure of the natural 
world, but then go on to deny that there is anything more to that world to 
capture. To hold that physics captures the mathematical structure of physi-
cal reality but that there is more to physical reality than that is to adopt a 
version of epistemic structural realism. To hold that physics captures that 
structure and that there is not more to physical reality than that is to adopt 
a version of ontic structural realism. A critic could accept the basic thrust of 
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the idea that physics gives us only mathematical structure but still attempt 
to block the overall argument of this paper by opting for ontic structural 
realism rather than epistemic structural realism.32 So why prefer the latter 
to the former?
To be sure, the previous two sections have already indicated why there 
must be more to reality than mathematical structure. For I have argued that 
the existence of the experiences and cognitive processes of the conscious 
subject entails the existence of change and temporal passage; that there must 
be causal relations between the experiences of this conscious subject on the 
one hand and physical reality on the other if the former are to provide 
evidence about the latter; that the mathematical models of physics don’t 
capture this change, temporal passage, or causation; etc. But someone might 
accept all of this consistent with ontic structural realism. He might opt for 
a Cartesian picture according to which mathematical structure exhausts 
physical reality, but there is nevertheless a non- physical conscious subject 
distinct from that reality which is (somehow) causally related to it. Needless 
to say, contemporary naturalist philosophers wouldn’t be attracted to such 
a picture, but why rule it out?
A standard objection to ontic structural realism is that knowledge of the 
mathematical structure of the world is essentially knowledge of relations 
and that there cannot be relations without relata. Hence, it cannot be that 
the mathematical structure exhausts reality. There must be relata which are 
related by the mathematical relations described by physics. I think this is 
a good objection, though Anjan Chakravartty (who has put forward the 
objection himself) suggests that ontic structural realists might regard it as 
question- begging, on the grounds that their point is precisely that we need 
to revise our concept of a relation in such a way that it can exist without 
relata.33 But by itself, this is hardly a powerful response. If I assert that 
there could be round squares and offer nothing more in response to the 
charge that this is incoherent than the bare suggestion that we need to revise 
our concepts of roundness and squareness, I have hardy made my assertion 
more plausible. I need to give some positive account of exactly how such a 
revision might be accomplished.
James Ladyman has suggested that there are at least two ways in which 
we might be able to make sense of the idea of relations without relata.34 
To understand the first, consider a universal like the relation being larger 
than. We could grasp this universal even if we were to deny that there are 
any things that instantiate it, any two things such that one is larger than the 
other (just as we grasp the universal unicorn even though we know that it 
is not instantiated). Hence, we have a sense in which we might conceive of 
a relation without relata. An obvious problem with this suggestion, though, 
is that when talking about the natural world it is precisely instantiations 
and not universals we are interested in. even if we regarded the natural 
world as a single, four- dimensional object, we could distinguish between the 
world itself as a concrete particular and the universal that it instantiates—a 
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universal which, unlike the natural world itself and qua universal, is abstract 
rather than concrete, in principle multiply instantiable, causally inert, and 
so on. And the problem is that there is no way to make sense of concrete 
instances of relations without relata. Nor will it do for the ontic structural 
realist to try to dodge this problem by suggesting that the natural world 
really just is a kind of universal or Platonic object. Among other problems, 
this would make it utterly mysterious how physics is or could be an empiri-
cal science any more than mathematics is and would thereby threaten to 
undermine the very evidential basis of physics.
The second way Ladyman suggests we might be able to make sense of 
relations without relata is by thinking of the purported relata as themselves 
analyzable in terms of further relations, and those in terms of yet further 
relations, all the way down, as it were. But it is hard to see how this solves 
the problem. either relations require relata or they do not. If, as ontic struc-
turalists claim, relations do not require relata, then what is the point of 
positing an infinite regress of relations to serve as relata? Why not just stop 
with the top level set of relations and be done with it? But if relations do 
require relata, then how does positing an infinite regress of relations serve 
to identity those relata (as opposed to endlessly deferring an identification)? 
What non- question- begging reason could the ontic structural realist give 
for claiming that an infinite regress of relations is any less problematic than 
relations without relata?
It seems, then, that the “no relations without relata” objection stands, 
and ontic structural realism fails.35
To summarize the argument of this and the previous section: First, given 
its purely mathematical character, physics’ representation of nature is bound 
to leave out change and temporal passage even if they are really there in 
nature itself. Hence their absence from that representation has, by itself, 
no metaphysical implications. It could have metaphysical implications only 
if we had good independent reason to think that that representation is an 
exhaustive picture of nature, and no good independent reason to think that 
it is not exhaustive. Second, in fact there are no good reasons to think that 
the representation is exhaustive, and several independent reasons (the ine-
liminability of change and temporal passage from the cognitive and expe-
riential processes of the conscious subject; the argument from the need for 
intrinsic or non- structural qualities of some sort or other and the difficulties 
facing the ontic structural realist’s attempt to avoid them; the argument 
from causation; the argument from secondary qualities) to think that it is 
not exhaustive. So, we can conclude, even apart from a consideration of the 
details of relativity, that relativity qua purely mathematical description of 
nature cannot give us good reason to doubt the reality of change and tempo-
ral passage. And the argument of section II shows that change and temporal 
passage are in fact real.
The skeptical reader will, of course, nevertheless want to know exactly 
how the reality of change and temporal passage fit into the picture of the 
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world afforded by relativity, given that there at least seems to be a conflict. 
That is a perfectly reasonable question, but it is important to emphasize 
that answering it is first and foremost a problem for the physicist, not for 
Aristotelians and other defenders of the reality of change and temporal pas-
sage. The scientist who pretends that it is the latter who have the primary 
burden here is like the party guest who trashes the house and then demands 
of the host: “So how do you propose to clean this mess up?” For as we have 
seen, the physicist himself no less than anyone else ultimately has to affirm 
the reality of change and temporal passage. If he puts forward a theory that 
at least appears to deny them, then, he is the one who has some explaining 
to do. The predictive and technological successes of relativity are undeni-
able, but that must not blind us to the fact that metaphysically, it is some-
thing of a mess, and that the physicists are the ones who made the mess.
V.  Relativity and A- Theories of Time
On the other hand, a metaphysician is better placed to clean up a metaphysi-
cal mess, whoever made it. And there is a sizable philosophical literature 
on the issue of how relativity might be reconciled with an A- theory of time, 
i.e. a theory that affirms the objective reality of change and temporal pas-
sage. Now, presentism is the version of the A- theory which holds that the 
present alone exists, and thus that past things and events no longer exist 
and future things and events do not yet exist. This is the version of the 
A- theory which might seem most obviously at odds with relativity. For if, 
as STR holds, simultaneity is relative to frames of reference and there is no 
privileged frame, then whether or not a moment is present would be rela-
tive to a frame of reference, and there would be no frame by reference to 
which we could define an absolute present. Moreover, if the universe is a 
four- dimensional block, then all things and events (past and future no less 
than present) would seem to be equally real. So, if presentism can for all that 
nevertheless be reconciled with relativity, then it seems any A- theory could 
be. Let’s begin with presentism, then.
There are essentially four general approaches to reconciling presentism 
with relativity. They differ in what they take the physics of relativity to tell 
us about objective reality. The first and most obvious approach to recon-
ciliation would be to back away from even a structuralist brand of realism 
and hold that the physics of relativity does not really tell us anything about 
objective physical reality in the first place, but should be given a purely 
instrumentalist or other anti- realist interpretation. If a model of the uni-
verse on which there is no absolute present is merely a useful fiction, then 
naturally there is no incompatibility with the metaphysical claim that there 
nevertheless is in reality an absolute present moment. Nor can anti- realism 
be easily dismissed in this context given relativity’s historical and conceptual 
connections with positivist verificationism, which is itself a kind of anti- 
realism. As Sklar writes:
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Certainly the original arguments in favor of the relativistic viewpoint 
are rife with verificationist presuppositions about meaning, etc. And 
despite einstein’s later disavowal of the verificationist point of view, no 
one to my knowledge has provided an adequate account of the founda-
tions of relativity which isn’t verificationist in essence.36
One way to develop an anti- realist approach would be along the lines of 
Arthur Prior’s suggestion that relativity has merely epistemological signifi-
cance and in particular shows only that we cannot know, of some events, 
whether they are absolutely simultaneous with one another, but not that 
there is no fact of the matter about whether they are.37 Another way is pro-
posed by David Woodruff, who suggests that relativity seems inconsistent 
with presentism only if we think of Minkowski’s four- dimensional space- 
time manifold as a concrete substance in its own right.38 Thus understood, 
its future and past components naturally seem no less existent than its pres-
ent ones. But we can deny the existence of any such substance and hold 
instead that what exist are only present objects and events of the more ordi-
nary sort. The space- time manifold can then be thought of as a “geometric 
representation” of “what will happen to accelerated bodies and how it will 
affect measurements of time and space” as well as “what causal interactions 
are possible.”39 Since this makes of the manifold a tool for making predic-
tions about the behavior of things, Woodruff allows that his position might 
be seen as a kind of instrumentalism (though with an important qualifica-
tion to be noted presently).
An anti- realist solution has the merit of being simple and straightfor-
ward, though of course it inherits all the usual difficulties with anti- realism. 
But if this approach is rejected, there are still three remaining, more or 
less realist ways of attempting a reconciliation. This brings us to the sec-
ond approach to reconciling presentism and relativity, which would be to 
affirm that the physics of relativity really does capture objective physical 
reality, but to maintain that einstein and Minkowski simply got that phys-
ics wrong. This is the approach of William Lane Craig, who proposes a 
neo- Lorentzian relativity theory.40 Lorentz’s theory, which is empirically 
equivalent to einstein’s, affirms absolute simultaneity and thus allows for a 
privileged present moment. A famous difficulty with it is that it has to posit 
an empirically undetectable aether by reference to which to define a privi-
leged frame of reference. But there are, Craig argues, various alternatives 
to the aether as Lorentz understood it (for example, the cosmic microwave 
background radiation, or quantum non- locality).
A variation on this approach would be to criticize anti- presentist appeals 
to STR on the grounds that STR is even from an einsteinian point of view 
not strictly correct in the first place, but merely an approximation to the 
general theory of relativity (gTR).41 Moreover (this line of argument con-
tinues) even gTR is not the last word, but is itself merely an approxima-
tion to whatever the correct theory of quantum gravity turns out to be.42 
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Unlike Craig, who holds that einstein got the physics of relativity wrong, 
this line of argument holds that einsteinian relativity is not wrong so much 
as incomplete, that there is a larger framework of still developing physical 
theory in the context of which relativity must be interpreted, and that this 
larger framework might turn out to be more favorable to presentism.43
Of course, such proposals are highly controversial, and a completed 
physics may turn out not to favor absolute simultaneity any more than STR 
does. But this brings us to the third approach to reconciling presentism and 
relativity, which suggests that STR as it stands may in fact already be rec-
oncilable with presentism, or at least with a modified presentism. Theodore 
Sider suggests three ways this idea might be developed (though he does not 
endorse any of them and is not himself a presentist).44 They all involve the 
presentist affirming the existence of a part of the Minkowskian manifold. 
The first affirms the existence of some point in the manifold together with 
everything in its past light cone; the second affirms the existence of the point 
and everything in its future light cone; and the third affirms the existence of 
the point and everything spacelike separated from it. Because each of these 
options preserves at least part of the manifold, it is to that extent realist. 
Because each denies other parts, it preserves, to that extent, the presentist 
idea that all points of time are not equally real. Sider quite rightly notes that 
the first two options nevertheless depart considerably from presentism as 
usually understood, since the first allows (to use Sider’s examples) that dino-
saurs are still part of reality, and the second that future Martian outposts 
are part of reality. The third option, he suggests, most closely preserves the 
basic thrust of presentism.
Sider not implausibly objects to these sorts of proposals that they privi-
lege a particular point in space- time in a way that has no justification in 
relativity physics itself.45 They also privilege such a point in a way presen-
tists typically would not. For presentism, as usually understood, it is a class 
of points (or things and events) that exist in the present. Fitting this idea 
into relativity would require positing, within the Minkowskian manifold, 
a privileged hyperplane of simultaneity relative to some frame of reference, 
and taking that alone to be real. The problem, Sider argues, is that there is 
nothing in the geometry of Minkowskian space- time to justify taking any 
hyperplane to be privileged in this way.46
That brings us to the fourth approach to reconciling presentism and 
relativity. Suppose nothing in the geometry of space- time either as under-
stood within STR or even within the correct theory of quantum gravity 
reveals any point, region, or privileged slicing of the manifold with which 
the present might be identified. One could still argue (as, for example, Dean 
Zimmerman does) that physics, while correctly describing objective physi-
cal reality as far as it goes, nevertheless does not provide an exhaustive 
description and needs to be supplemented by metaphysics.47 Philosophical 
arguments for presentism, on this view, provide us with independent evi-
dence that there must be a privileged slicing of the manifold described by 
Actuality, Potentiality, and Relativity’s Block Universe 53
physics, even if physics itself cannot tell us what it is. Zimmerman takes the 
Minkowskian manifold to represent “the set of locations at which events 
could happen,” with the present amounting to a “wave of becoming” that 
moves through the manifold, as it were.48 The presentist can admit the exis-
tence of non- present points in the manifold and simply deny that there are 
any objects and events that occupy them.49 The presently occupied points 
constitute a privileged slicing of the manifold, and while Sider rejects such 
a slicing as too “scientifically revisionary,” Zimmerman responds that his 
position does not revise the physics of relativity—he is not claiming that it 
is wrong as far as it goes—but simply supplements it.50
Insofar as Zimmerman’s position allows for some kind of reality even to 
non- occupied points of the Minkowskian manifold, it is plausibly realist. But 
it is worth noting that even Woodruff’s view can, as he notes, be read as a 
kind of realism rather than instrumentalism.51 For one thing, the idea that 
the Minkowskian four- dimensional space- time manifold exists as a kind of 
concrete substance is not, Woodruff argues, actually part of the physics of 
relativity or strictly implied by the physics. Rather, it is a metaphysical inter-
pretation one may (or may not) wish to give the physics. Hence, to deny its 
existence as a concrete substance is not to take an anti- realist interpretation 
of the actual science. Second, in taking the manifold to represent what will 
happen to accelerated bodies, how they can interact causally, etc., he regards 
relativity as telling us something about the real features of actual things them-
selves, not merely about how reality appears to us or how we represent it. As 
Jeffrey Koperski suggests, we can think of Minkowski space- time as a kind of 
phase space representing the possible states of the evolving universe.52 And to 
affirm even that is to go beyond a purely instrumentalist positon, at least as 
instrumentalism is usually understood. Accordingly, Zimmerman’s position 
too would arguably remain at least minimally realist even if he discarded the 
notion of the reality of non- occupied points of space- time.
In summary, then, the four general approaches to reconciling presentism 
and relativity are, first, to deny that the physics of relativity really describes 
objective physical reality in the first place; second, to affirm that it does 
describe objective physical reality, but argue that existing models are mis-
taken or incomplete and that a correct and completed physics will end up 
vindicating rather than undermining presentism; third, to affirm that relativ-
ity does describe objective physical reality and to argue that existing physics in 
fact already contains sufficient resources to vindicate presentism; and fourth, 
to affirm that physics does describe objective physical reality and allow that 
neither current physics nor a future, completed physics suffices to vindicate 
presentism, but that physics nevertheless can and ought to be supplemented 
from outside by metaphysics in a way that will vindicate presentism. (These 
are, of course, idealized summaries of the four general approaches, and a pre-
sentist philosopher might combine elements from more than one of them.53)
But an A- theorist could also depart from presentism and mitigate the 
apparent conflict with relativity by conceding a kind of reality to things 
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and events other than present ones. One way of doing this is by opting 
for a “growing block” theory on which past things and events are as real 
as present ones, with the present constituting the growing edge of a four- 
dimensional universe.54 Another way is to go even further in a realist direc-
tion and concede the existence even of future events no less than past ones, 
while maintaining that present events are unique in being illuminated by the 
“moving spotlight” of the “now.”55 Aspects of some of the four approaches 
to reconciling presentism with relativity (anti- realism, appeal to a completed 
physics, appeal to STR as it stands, or supplementing physics with meta-
physics) might then be adapted to a reconciliation of either the “growing 
block” or “moving spotlight” versions of the A- theory with relativity.
Of course, each of these approaches has generated a large literature and 
the various arguments for and against them need to be carefully weighed. 
The point, however, is not to adjudicate the contemporary debate or to opt 
for any particular version of the A- theory. The point is rather simply to note 
that a wide variety of approaches to defending the reality of change and 
temporal passage in the face of relativity have been developed in contempo-
rary philosophy, entirely independently of any concern with upholding the 
Aristotelian theory of actuality and potentiality. They are already sitting 
there “on the shelf” for deployment by any neo- Aristotelian who wants to 
reconcile that theory to relativity. By no means, then, is such a reconciliation 
necessarily ad hoc or an exercise in anachronism.
Now, suppose it turned out that no variation on the A- theory was ulti-
mately defensible. Suppose it turned out that an eternalist or B- theory of 
time is correct, and that the universe really is a static four- dimensional 
block from which real temporal passage is entirely absent. even in this case, 
the Aristotelian theory of actuality and potentiality would not be refuted, 
though the range of its applicability would be severely restricted. The reason 
is that the existence of such a block universe would still be contingent. There 
would be nothing about its nature that requires that a block universe of pre-
cisely that sort, or any block universe at all for that matter, exists. It would 
in that sense be of itself potential and in need of actualization.
The way this idea would be spelled out in the Thomistic branch of the 
Aristotelian tradition is that a four- dimensional block universe, considered 
as one big substance, would have an essence distinct from its existence, 
where the essence of a thing is, considered by itself, a kind of potentiality 
and its existence is a kind of actuality.56 A natural way for the Thomist to 
extend this line of thought is to argue that what actualizes the potential 
existence of the universe is a divine First Cause the essence of which just is 
existence—an uncaused cause which is (as it is often put) Subsistent Being 
Itself. But whether one wants to go in this specific direction is irrelevant to 
the present point. One could instead opt for (say) an infinite regress of actu-
alizers of potential, with the four- dimensional block universe being actual-
ized by some cause C, C in turn actualized by some other cause, which is in 
turn actualized by another, and so on ad infinitum. Whether this alternative, 
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non- theological scenario is ultimately defensible can be put to one side for 
present purposes.
Whether interpreted in theological terms, in terms of an infinite causal 
regress, or in some yet different terms, it is important to stress that the 
Thomistic analysis is concerned with an atemporal or timeless kind of cau-
sation, and thus with a kind that doesn’t involve change in the strict sense.57 
If the position expressed in the passage from Lockwood quoted earlier is 
correct, there is no actualization of potentiality within the universe. The 
Thomist point is that the universe itself, as a whole, would still require 
actualization. Nor would the basic situation be changed if we thought of 
the universe as arising out of some other universe or as a part of some 
multiverse. For it would, in that case, nevertheless be the case (the Thomist 
argues) that this larger set of universes requires actualization. Naturally, this 
claim is controversial, but even if it is judged to be mistaken, there is noth-
ing in relativity theory or in the notion of a four- dimensional block universe 
that shows that it is mistaken.
So, even if relativity were to have the worst implications for Aristotelianism 
it is thought by some to have, it still would not refute the theory of actuality 
and potentiality. An atemporal, timeless, or eternal actualization of poten-
tiality would still be defensible, as a kind of limit case of the actualization 
of potentiality more familiar to common sense as everyday change. To be 
sure, the applicability of the theory would be very greatly reduced. It could 
no longer ground a hylomorphic analysis of everyday material substances. 
Perhaps its only application would be within natural theology.
But that the distinction would nevertheless survive even the worst case 
scenario reinforces the point that one ought to take with a grain of salt glib 
assertions to the effect that relativity has put paid to Aristotelian metaphys-
ics, or any other metaphysics for that matter. I have in this paper left many 
questions unsettled, such as exactly how the mathematical models of phys-
ics relate to concrete physical reality, which of the various contemporary 
theories of time to adopt, and how relativity ought to get interpreted in light 
of such a theory. No doubt some readers will think this a deficiency of my 
argument, but, in fact, it is a strength. What it reflects is not any weakness 
in the Aristotelian position, but rather how little the physics of relativity by 
itself actually tells us about metaphysics and how wide open is the range of 
possible interpretations. given this fact, and given also the incoherence of 
any attempt entirely to expunge change and temporal passage from our pic-
ture of reality, the question of how to work out the metaphysics of relativity 
is not the Aristotelian’s problem. It is everyone’s problem.58
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essence and existence, and to other aspects of Aristotelian- Thomistic metaphysics, 
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see Feser (2014). For exposition and defense of the theory’s application within 
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 2 Lockwood (2005: 68–9).
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ics. Cf. Barbour (1999: 1).
 4 As we will see, for Thomist Aristotelians, though change entails the actualization 
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 5 Again, for a defense of the theory, see Feser (2014), especially chapter 1. A cur-
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tinction between actuality and potentiality is temporal parts theory. (Cf. Quine 
1961; Lewis 1986; Heller 1990; and Sider 2001). From an Aristotelian point of 
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either temporal parts amount to a series of ephemeral things which are succes-
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Aristotelian- Thomistic metaphysics, a “property” is a “proper accident” or attri-
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 7 Shoemaker (1969).
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10 Cf. Dummett (1960) and Zwart (1975).
11 Cf. Mundle (1967).
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13 Black (1962: 181–2). emphasis added.
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cally privileged present moment whether or not this is empirically detectable, 
might wonder why these are to be regarded as different approaches rather than 
variations on the same theme. The answer is that the difference between the 
approaches lies, not in their own metaphysical implications, but rather in what 
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thing at all, including any substrate that might underlie change.
58 I thank the editors of this volume for helpful comments on an earlier version of 
this paper.
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1 Introduction
The so- called Many Worlds Interpretation of quantum mechanics has been 
extant now for nearly 60 years, beginning as H. everett III’s doctoral dis-
sertation in 1956 [everett 1956], with further contributions by B. DeWitt 
and N. graham in their 1973 book, The Many Worlds Interpretation of 
Quantum Mechanics [DeWitt and graham 1973]. The everett approach 
takes quantum mechanics both realistically and as a stand- alone, autono-
mous theory of the world, not in need of a separate theory of measurement 
to bridge the apparent gap between the deterministic evolution of the wave-
function in a highly abstract, probabilistic space, and empirically observable 
statistics in the laboratory. Instead, everett proposed that all of the appar-
ently contradictory macroscopic results assigned some finite probability 
by the theory are equally real, co- existing in distinct sets of relative states. 
DeWitt and others later identified these clusters of mutually consistent rela-
tive states with distinct and co- existing worlds or branches of the world.
These early versions of the interpretation faced a huge problem: there were 
no worlds or branches, describable in macroscopic terms, to be found in the 
formalism of quantum mechanics itself. We can find within the formalism 
something called superpositions, which are states that seem to attribute to par-
ticular systems (like particles) a plurality of mutually inconsistent properties, 
each with a certain amplitude, but there seems to be no way to recover macro-
scopic instruments and determinate measurement relations from these isolated 
superpositions. This problem is often described as the problem of finding a 
preferred basis, since the decomposition of the world into discrete branches 
can only take place relative to a selection of a certain set of orthogonal param-
eters. Any selection of such a basis seemed arbitrary and unprincipled, and so 
the objectivity of the co- existing branches was thrown into doubt. In addition, 
there is nothing in the wavefunction that corresponds to the persistence or split-
ting of branches. Probabilities of various states simply fluctuate over time: there 
is no way to trace where the probability that once belonged to a given state has 
moved (either as a unified packet or through fission).
In the 1970s, 80s, and 90s, a great deal of theoretical work commenced 
on the problem of giving a fully quantum- theoretic account of measurement. 
The Many Worlds 
Interpretation of QM
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This work comprises the programs of decoherence of W. Zurek 1982 and 
H. D. Zeh 1973 and the consistent histories approach of griffiths 1984, 
Omnès1988, and gell- Mann and Hartle 1990, 1993. The decoherence 
results show that under favorable circumstances a stable, approximately 
classical domain can be expected to emerge from the quantum- mechanical 
descriptions of a measuring system, its object, and the surrounding envi-
ronment (Wallace 2011). What decoherence left unsolved was why we see 
the emergence of just one such quasi- classical domain when interacting 
with quantum superpositions. A marriage of decoherence with the everett 
interpretation was inevitable, with the everett interpretation explaining the 
apparent uniqueness of result as a product of the relativity of our perspective 
in this or that branch, and the decoherence providing the missing preferred 
basis and explaining how to extract persistent and apparently “splitting” 
quasiclassical domains from quantum descriptions.
The consistent histories approach was even closer to the spirit of the 
everett interpretation, since it sought to extract approximately classical 
domains from the quantum function for the entire cosmos, rather than look-
ing at particular instrument- object- environment arrangements. Here again, 
the two approaches seemed designed to resolve each other’s deficiencies: with 
consistent histories providing the preferred basis, and the everett interpreta-
tion dissolving the worry about what to do about certain regions or phases 
of the cosmic history in which there are no consistent histories at all. On the 
everett interpretation, only the quantum wavefunction describes fundamental 
reality, so only it can be expected to have universal validity. Consistent his-
tories simply describe the approximate emergence of quasiclassical branches 
under favorable circumstances, including, presumably our own.
In recent years, the Many Worlds Interpretation has found a new home 
in Oxford, among both physicists and philosophers of science, including 
David Deutsch, Simon Saunders, David Wallace, Christopher Timpson, and 
Harvey Brown. The Oxford group has developed the idea of using decoher-
ence and consistent histories approaches to solve the preferred basis prob-
lem, explaining the emergence of approximately classical “domains” from 
the wavefunction. They have also, building on seminal work by Deutsch 
1999, attempted to solve the other central problem of the interpretation, 
which is that of making sense of the precise probabilities ascribed to differ-
ent outcomes by applying Born’s rule to the wavefunction.
In the next two sections, I will raise two objections to the new, Oxford- 
style everettian interpretation. First, in section 2, I will argue that Deutsch’s 
strategy cannot make sense of the probabilities that play such a central role 
in quantum mechanics. The Many Worlds Interpretation cannot explain the 
rational necessity of one of the crucial axioms (Savage’s Sure Thing Principle) 
upon which the modern theory of subjective probability depends. Then, in 
a much longer section 3, I will argue that the Oxford everettians attempt to 
use the philosophical framework of functionalism to elucidate the relation 
between the manifest world of scientific experiment and observation and 
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the underlying, fundamental quantum reality ends in failure. Specifically, I 
will idenify four failures of this account:
1. I will use Putnam’s paradox to demonstrate a radical indeterminacy of 
content that would afflict all of our scientific theories.
2. I will demonstrate that any consistent story of the world (no matter 
how fantastic) would count as equally real.
3. As a consequence, it would be impossible for any of our scientific theo-
ries to be wrong, making it equally impossible for them to be empiri-
cally confirmed.
4. This failure of empirical testability would deprive us of any reason for 
believing in quantum mechanics in the first place.
In section 4, I will critically examine seven possible strategies that Oxford 
everettians might rely on to solve the Putnamesque problems identified in 
section 3. These strategies are (1) appealing to the concept of emergence, (2) 
appealing to “our” actual language and theories, (3) relying on causal con-
straints to fix the interpretation, (4) appealing to natural or eligible proper-
ties, (5) using realism about spacetime, (6) appealing to simplicity, and (7) 
relying upon decoherence to solve the problem. I will argue that all seven 
strategies fail, although there is a version of the appeal to simplicity that 
might turn out to provide at least a partial solution. However, even this 
appeal to simplicity (if it were ultimately successful) would leave us without 
an adequate account of the reality of the manifest, macroscopic world, and 
it would still have the consequence that none of our theories in the special 
science (theories of the emergent, macroscopic world) can ever be false, with 
all of the epistemological catastrophe that such a result would bring
I turn in section 5 to sketching a neo- Aristotelian alternative to the 
Oxford everettian interpretation. This new interpretation adds the addi-
tional metaphysical constraints needed to solve the Putnamesque paradoxes 
in the form of a set of essences of macroscopic substances. This also enables 
us to use the actualization of these essences as a way of distinguishing the 
one actual branch from all the merely possible ones. Alex Pruss and I call the 
resulting interpretation the traveling branches interpretation. This interpre-
tation builds on both the realism about the quantum wavefunction and the 
results of decoherence theory, in exactly the same way as these are treated 
by the Oxford everettians, and yet it ends up in a metaphysical and seman-
tic position that is much more defensible.
2 Probability and the Oxford- Style Everett Interpretation
The basic problem can be stated quite simply: since all possible outcomes 
will in fact occur with probability one, what meaning can be assigned to 
the varying strengths of probability assigned by Born’s rule to different out-
comes? On the Oxford interpretation, it makes no sense to count branches, 
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since the very existence of branches is only a non- fundamental and inherently 
vague phenomenon, resisting any perfect precisification. Deutsch’s answer, 
developed further by Saunders and Wallace (Saundersa and Wallace 2008, 
Wallace 2007, Wallace 2011), is to use the pragmatic approach to subjective 
probabilities developed in the early 20th century by Frank Ramsey, Leonard 
Savage, John von Neumann, and others in order to argue that perfectly 
rational agents must, given certain constraints including perfect knowledge 
of the quantum state, act as if they assigned the appropriate probabilities to 
the various branches.
In a paper entitled “Truth and Probability,”[Ramsey 1988] Frank P. 
Ramsey sought to provide an operational or behavioral definition of the 
notion of degree of belief or degree of confidence of truth, as well as the 
correlative notion of desirability or utility or subjective value. Ramsey imag-
ined an idealized experimental setup in which both the degrees of belief in 
various propositions of the experimental subject (i.e., the subject’s subjec-
tive probability function) and the degrees of desirability that the subject 
attaches to the states of affairs represented by those propositions (i.e., the 
subject’s utility function) may be measured. Ramsey imagines that the sub-
ject is confronted by what he (the subject) believes to be an omnipotent 
and totally trustworthy Bookie, who offers the subject a series of choices 
between two options. Some of these options come in the form of simple 
bets: e.g., an option that might be offered to the subject could take the form: 
α if p is true; otherwise, β. If the subject’s choices conform to certain prin-
ciples of mutual coherency, then there exists a unique representation of the 
subject’s state of mind in terms of a probability function taking as its values 
real numbers in the interval from 0 to 1 (inclusive) and a utility function 
taking real numbers as values.2
In 1954, Leonard Savage [Savage 1988] provided a slightly different axi-
omatization, from which he was able to prove a representation theorem of 
the appropriate kind. Savage’s setup included the following elements:
1. A set of states of the world, S, with elements s, s′, s″,…. and subsets (the 
events) E, E′, E″,….
2. A set of consequences or outcomes C, with elements c, c′, c″,….
3. A set of acts 𝒜, with elements A, A′, A″,….
4. An assignment of a consequence from C to every act- state pair (A, s), 
designated A(s).
5. A binary relation  between pairs of acts that is interpreted to mean is 
preferred or equal to.
His axiom system included the following axioms:
Axiom 1 The relation  is a weak ordering of the acts: the relation is 
transitive, and any two acts are comparable (either A A ′ or ′A A , 
or both).
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Definition 1 A AE ′ if and only if: if acts A and A′ are modified so that 
their consequences are the same for every state not included in E, and 
they are not modified for any states in E, the resulting modification 
of A is preferred or equal to the modification of A′. The propriety 
of this definition depends on the next axiom, Savage’s Sure Thing 
Principle.
Axiom 2 The Sure Thing Principle If acts A, A′, B, B′, and event E are 
such that (i) A and B agree on all states outside of E, (ii) A′ and B′ also 
agree on all states outside of E, (iii) A and A′ agree on all states within 
E, (iv) B and B′ agree on all states within E, then: B A B A ↔ ′ ′.
Savage’s Sure Thing Principle asserts the irrelevancy of non- discriminating 
possibilities. That is, suppose that two actions A and B are known to have 
exactly the same consequences (as far as things are concerned that mat-
ter to the agent) on the assumption of E: then, if B is preferred to A, then 
B would still be preferred to A regardless of what those irrelevant conse-
quences would be (regardless of what the common consequences are that 
would follow from either A or B on the supposition of E). The Sure Thing 
Principle (in conjunction with the other axioms) has a further consequence: 
the agent will also prefer B to A regardless of whether the agent knows E to 
be true or false or is left in some state of ignorance about E. The probability 
of E, given its irrelevance to the comparison of A and B, must be irrelevant 
to the preferability of B over A.
On the basis of his axioms, Savage was able to prove the following rep-
resentation theorem, demonstrating that any reasonable agent must act as if 
guided by both a utility and probability function (with maximizing expected 
utility as the decision criterion):
Theorem 1 Representation Theorem
There exists a unique real- valued function P defined for the set of 
events, and a unique (up to positive linear transformations) real- valued 
function u defined over the set of consequences such that:
1. P(E) ≥ 0 for all E.
2. P(S) = 1.
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3. If E and E′ are disjoint, then P E E P E P E( ) = ( ) ( )∪ ′ + ′ .
4. E is not more probable than E′ if and only if P(E) ≤ P(E′).
5. If the Ei’s are a finite partition of S, and A is an act with conse-
quence ci on Ei, and if the ′Ei ’s are another finite partition on S, and 
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2.1 The Failure of Savage’s Principle in a Many- Worlds Setting
Deutsch [Deutsch 1999] and Wallace [Wallace 2010] argue that the formal 
results of Ramsey and Savage can enable the everettians to make sense of 
the varying probabilities of the various branches of the wave function. If we 
assume that our ideally rational agent must satisfy Savage’s axioms (with 
states now identified with branches) and must also respect certain physically 
symmetries, then we can prove a representation theorem similar to Savage’s, 
but with the added feature that the probabilities assigned to the branches 
must mimic the probabilities assigned to those branches by Born’s rule. In 
particular, Wallace incorporates Savage’s Sure Thing principle into his con-
dition of diachronic consistency.
I share the doubts about the cogency of the argument expressed by Huw 
Price [Price 2010]. Price points out that by adding multiple worlds to our 
inventory of reality, we give rational agents new things to care about, things 
that can’t be captured by any probability- weighted averaging of world- 
bound utilities. For example, a rational agent might assign a certain finite 
amount of utility to the degree of equality of outcome enjoyed or suffered 
by persons across the span of branches. Wallace [Wallace 2010, pp. 256–
7] argues that we can capture such cross- world utility considerations by 
tinkering with the various world- bound measures, but it is easy to prove 
that giving a positive weight to transworld equality will necessarily vio-
late Wallace’s diachronic consistency condition (by violating Savage’s Sure 
Thing Principle), despite the obvious rationality of that principle in a one- 
world setting.
A core principle of Savage’s axiomatization of decision theory is his Sure 
Thing Principle, which is incorporated into Wallace’s axiom system (in the 
form of his diachronic consistency condition). As we have seen, the Sure 
Thing Principle asserts the irrelevancy of non- discriminating possibilities. 
That is, suppose that two actions A and B are known to have exactly the 
same consequences (as far as things are concerned that matter to the agent) 
on the assumption of E: if B is then preferred to A, then B would still be 
preferred to A regardless of whether the agent knows E to be true or false. 
This makes sense in a normal, one- world decision setting: if I know that 
the world will end up either in E or in E′ (exclusively), and I am indifferent 
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between A and B on the assumption of E (because I know that A and B 
would produce exactly the same results in that case), then my preference 
for A over B must be concerned exclusively with what would happen on the 
assumption of E′.
However, in a many- worlds setting, I have to imagine that both E and 
E′ will become actual (albeit in different branches), and I might care about 
certain trans- branch facts. We can no longer assume that my utility func-
tion is simply a weighted sum of intra- branch values. For example, suppose 
that there are two people affected by my action, person 1 and person 2. In 
the E′ branches, person 1 and person 2 will each receive zero units of value, 
regardless of whether I perform A or B. However, in the E branches, persons 
1 and 2 get one unit of value if I do A, but if I do B instead, then person 1 
gets 0.4 units of value and person 2 gets 2 units. Now suppose that I value 
outcomes on the basis of the total utility (across all branches) minus the 
average deviation from the mean (representing my dislike for interpersonal 
inequality). My desire to avoid overall inequality applies equally well to 
inter- branch inequality as to intra- branch inequality. Here is the resulting 
table:
E E′ Expected value 
A 〈1,1〉 〈0,0〉 2–0.5 = 1.5
B 〈0.4,2〉 〈0,0〉 2.4–2.8/4 = 1.7 
Note that if we eliminate E′ from consideration, then I would definitely 
prefer action A, since it provides perfect equality and that outweighs in this 
case the somewhat greater total utility of action B. In contrast, however, if 
we take branch E′ into account (as a genuine part of reality), the total value 
of action B now outweighs its somewhat lower average deviation from the 
mean, and B is now preferable to A. This is all perfectly reasonable in a 
many- worlds setting, in which all of the outcomes are equally real (enjoyed 
or suffered in reality in one branch or the other), but it clearly violates 
Savage’s Sure Thing Principle (and, consequently, also Wallace’s even stron-
ger diachronic consistency condition). No amount of tinkering with utility 
functions can overcome this difficulty.
We can see that, in the Many Worlds setting, we can turn this exam-
ple into a straightforward violation of Savage’s Sure Thing Principle (and 
thereby, also, a violation of Wallace’s diachronic consistency axiom). Let’s 
add two new actions A′ and B′ to the setting. A agrees perfectly with A′ on 
condition E, and B agrees with B′ on that same condition. The two actions 
A′ and B′ produce exactly the same result under condition E′. Therefore, 
the Sure Thing Principle requires that the agent prefer A to B just in case 
she prefers A′ to B′. However, considerations of equality that are germane 
in the Many Worlds setting lead the agent quite reasonably to prefer B to 
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A but also to prefer A′ to B′. The Savage- style justification of the Born rule 
collapses.
E E′ Expected value 
A 〈1,1〉 〈0,0〉 2–0.5 = 1.5
A′ 〈1,1〉 〈1,1〉 4 
B 〈0.4,2〉 〈0,0〉 2.4–2.8/4 = 1.7
B′ 〈0.4,2〉 〈1,1〉 4.4–1.8/4 =3.95
Why doesn’t this possibility of violating the Sure Thing Principle apply 
with equal force to those who reject the Many Worlds Interpretation? 
Because it is irrational to let what might have happened but did not actu-
ally happen influence one’s evaluation of a particular possible outcome. We 
could express this idea by means of a slogan: Value Supervenes on Being. 
The value of an outcome is a function of what does or does not happen if 
that outcome were actual. It cannot depend on what happens in other, mutu-
ally incompatible outcomes. In the Many Worlds Interpretation, all of the 
branches are equally real, equally partaking of existence. Hence, Deutsch 
and Wallace have no grounds for excluding trans- branch values and so no 
way to validate Savage’s axioms.
Ironically, the technical results of Deutsch and Wallace do provide strong 
grounds for accepting a One World Interpretation of quantum mechanics. 
Since any One World interpretation will satisfy Savage’s axioms, the symme-
try considerations cited by Deutsch and Wallace make it reasonable to sup-
pose that any rational agent in a one- world setting must attribute objective 
chances to events in a way that corresponds to the Born rule, given certain 
knowledge of the actual quantum function. Thus, Deutsch and Wallace’s 
hard work was not wasted: they simply deployed it on behalf of the wrong 
interpretation!
2.2  A Second Failure: Retrospective Probability  
and Anti- Darwinian Branches
There is a second critical gap in the Deutsch- Saunders- Wallace program: 
namely, its inability to justify purely retrospective uses of probability, 
including the grounds for our conviction that we do not inhabit any of 
the low- probability anti- Darwinian branches (branches in which highly 
maladapted populations have managed to survive despite that maladaptive-
ness). An anti- Darwinian branch is one in which the typical populations of 
organisms are very badly adapted to their environment, a world in which 
empedocles’ half- ox- half- man and other unfit monstrosities predominate. 
There is good reason to think both (i) that there are very many such anti- 
Darwinian branches lurking in the world’s quantum- wave function, under 
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some suitable interpretation function and (ii) that all such anti- Darwinian 
branches have extremely low quantum amplitudes.
One- world theorists can hold that all branches with extremely low ampli-
tudes are approximately impossible—that is, close enough to being impossi-
ble as to be practically negligible. However, such a notion of “approximately 
impossible” is unavailable to many- world theorists. each branch is, for a 
many- worlds theorist, just as real as any other. They are all equally far from 
being impossible, since all actual events are equally possible. It makes no 
sense to say that some are so close to being impossible as to be practically 
indistinguishable from it.
Many- worlds theorists (Deutsch, Saunders, Wallace) have focused their 
attention on two issues concerning probability: (i) arguing that it could be 
a constraint on rational action that the rational weight expected utilities 
of future branches proportionally to the square of the branches’ ampli-
tudes, and (ii) arguing that it could be rational for an investigator to treat 
sequences of observations that match those expected on relatively high- 
amplitude branches to count as confirming a statistical theory. Both of these 
issues concern agent- bounded uses of probability, in the sense that it is only 
the probabilities of events actually observed by the agent, either in his or her 
past or expected in the future, that are relevant.
However, when we use natural- selection arguments to exclude the pos-
sibility that we and other extant organisms are terribly maladapted to our 
environment, we are using probabilities in a way that extends far beyond 
our own past or present experiences. The arguments about decision theory 
and about statistical inference are irrelevant. We would be faced, on the 
Many Worlds Interpretation, with a problem of pure self- location, and there 
would seem to be no grounds for rationally assuming that we must be ab 
initio located in one sort of branch rather than other. I cannot say that it is 
virtually impossible for me to be located in a low- probability branch when 
there are in fact many counterparts of mine who are in fact located there. 
For example, Richard Dawkins has often stated, quite reasonably, that he is 
certain a priori that natural selection will have shaped the evolution of liv-
ing organisms on any planet in the cosmos, no matter how remote. To have 
any validity, such a priori appeals to natural selection must embrace the 
whole of reality, or none of it. The alternative branches of the Many Worlds 
Interpretation are simply remote regions of reality, and yet there is no doubt 
that such a priori confidence in the validity of natural selection in all such 
branches would be profoundly misplaced. But charity begins at home: if 
we cannot apply the principle of selection to remote branches a priori, we 
would be unjustified to do so for our own world.
What cost do we pay if we forego such a priori appeals to natural selec-
tion? A very profound cost to the foundations of epistemology. Our natural 
reliance on our senses and memories is undermined if we cannot count on 
natural selection to ensure their reliability. Such undercutting of confidence 
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in empirical knowledge will, in turn, deprive scientific theory (including the 
theory of quantum mechanics) of objective warrant.
3 Recovering the Manifest Image Through Ramseyfication
Leaving probability aside for the moment, the central problem for the Many 
Worlds Interpretation is that of bridging the gap between the scientific image 
of the quantum wavefunction and the “manifest image” (to use Sellars’s 
phrase from Sellars 1962) of our approximately classical, macroscopic 
world, the world occupied by all experimenters, their instruments, and the 
results of their experiments. David Wallace’s solution is an admirably simple 
one: all features and entities of the “manifest image” (macroscopic objects, 
organisms, sensible properties) are to be reduced to functional roles realized 
in some way by the quantum wavefunction—where these functional roles 
can either be identified with second- order, functional properties, or with the 
quantum- mechanical role- fillers corresponding to those properties (in style 
of David Lewis 1966, 1972, and 1980).
The functional properties can be identified with the result of Ramseyfying 
([Ramsey 1929]) our ordinary folk ontology and our special sciences 
(including, perhaps, classical mechanics) in the language of pure quantum- 
mechanics (infinite Hilbert space, unitary Schrödinger evolution). There are 
three historical precursors to the kind of functionalization of the manifest 
image that Wallace has in mind: the phenomenalistic project, as typified 
by John Stuart Mill and the early Carnap, Bertrand Russell’s functional- 
structural account of physics in The Analysis of Matter [Russell 1927], and 
the late- 20th- century, behaviorism- inspired accounts of the mind, especially 
the Analytic Functionalism of David Lewis [Lewis 1966, 1972, 1980]. The 
ideal formal machinery for each attempted functional reduction is F. P. 
Ramsey’s account of scientific theories [Ramsey 1929], well explained by 
Lewis in Lewis 1972.
In both the phenomenalist project and in Russell’s 1927 structuralism, 
there was a significant epistemological dimension, based on the idea that we 
have privileged and certain access only to our own conscious states (a kind 
of Cartesian starting point for knowledge). That epistemological element is 
much reduced in Lewis’s functionalism and entirely absent from Wallace’s 
project, so I will, at the risk of some anachronism, present all four programs 
as if they were concerned solely with ontological issues, that is, with identi-
fying the correct truthmakers or truth grounds for the reduced theory.
In this paper, I will use a model- theoretic version of Ramseyfication, in 
which, instead of introducing second- order variables and quantifiers for the 
predicates, we simply extend the interpretation function of a given model 
in order to turn a model of the original, base language into a model of the 
emergent theory in an appropriately expanded language.
We must also make use of a set of possible worlds, because all versions 
of functionalism require that we make some reference to the dispositions 
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of things to respond or behavior in specified ways, even if the things never 
actualize these dispositions. The simplest formal semantics for such dispo-
sitions makes use of the subjunctive conditional: if P were true, Q would 
be true. We can represent the truth of such a subjunctive conditional at the 
actual world w* by supposing that w is surrounded by a system of spheres 
of worlds, representing degrees of closeness or similarity of those worlds to 
w. The subjunctive conditional (P □→ Q) is true at w* if the material condi-
tional (¬P ˅ Q) is true in all of the worlds contained by some P- permitting 
sphere.
For the sake of simplicity, I will assume that each of the individuals exists 
in only one world. Our interpretation function must assign to each constant 
(proper name) an individual in each world, and to each n- ary predicate, a 
set of n- tuples of individuals from that world. This will enable us to assign 
truth- values at each world to all logically complex formulas, using the usual 
clauses of Tarski’s truth definition. That is, a negation ¬ϕ is true in a world 
w just in case ϕ is not true there, and a disjunction ϕ ˅ ψ is true in w just in 
case either ϕ or ψ is true there. We can interpret the existential and universal 
quantifiers in the usual way, using at each world the domain of individuals 
that exists there.
1. A model frame F consists of a set of worlds W, a designated actual 
world w* ∈ W and, as in David Lewis’s semantics [Lewis 1973], a sys-
tem of spheres S, consisting of nested subsets of W, centered on w*. I 
will assume that the sphere- system S is dense (between any two concen-
tric spheres there is always a third) and that the number of worlds in 
every sphere- membership equivalence class is equal to the number of 
sets of atomic formulas of the language.
2. A model M consists of a model frame F plus a domain of “world-
bound” individuals D (each existing in just one world) and an 
interpretation function I, which is used to interpret the predicates, 
function symbols, and simple singular terms (names or constants) of 
the language.
3. The set of individuals D is partitioned into disjoint cells, one for each 
world in W. We can think of D as a function from W into a set of 
disjoint sets, with D(w) designating the worldbound individuals of 
world w.
4. For any n- ary predicate F, I(|F|) is a function whose domain is W, and 
for each world w ∈W, I (|F|)(w) is a set of n- tuples of the members of 
D(w).
5. For any constant c, I (|c|) is a function whose domain is W, and for each 
world w ∈W, I (|c|)(w) is a member of D(w).
6. For any atomic sentence F(c1, c2,…, cn), I (|F(c1, c2,…, cn)|) is a set of 
worlds in W, where each world w belongs to I (|F(c1, c2,…, cn)|) if and 
only if the n- tuple 〈I(c1)(w), I(c2)(w),…, I(cn)(w)〉 belongs to I(|F|)(w).
7. I I I(( & )) = ( ) ( )φ ψ φ ψ∩ , and similarly for the other sentential connectives.
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8. I(|∃x ϕ (x)|) = the infinite union of the sets I (|ϕ(c)|), for each constant c 
in the language L. (We’ll assume that the language L has been enriched 
with enough constants to provide a witness for every existential gener-
alization true in M.)
9. I (|(ϕ□→ ψ)|) = W if there is an I (|ϕ|)- permitting sphere s in S such that 
every world in I s( )f ∩  is also in I (|ψ|)). Otherwise I (|(ϕ□→ ψ)|) = Ø.
A model M = 〈F, D, I〉 is a model of a theory T just in case, relative to I and 
D, the actual world w* belongs to I(|T|), where I(T) is the intersection of the 
sets I(|ϕ|), for each formula ϕ in T. As usual, a theory is defined as a set of 
formulas closed under logical implication.
Let’s suppose that we start with a model Mbase = 〈F, D, I〉, defined for 
our base language Lbase, which represents the fundamental level of reality. 
Now suppose that we extend the language Lbase to a language Lbase+emergent, by 
adding constants, function symbols, and predicates that signify an emergent, 
non- fundamental level of reality. A theory Temergent of this emergent world is 
realized in our base model M just in case the interpretation function I can 
be extended to a new function Irealizer, defined for Lbase+emergent, such that the 
model Mextended = 〈F, D, Irealizer〉 is a model of Temergent. In such a case, we can 
say that the function Irealizer is a realization of the emergent theory Temergent in 
the original base model Mbase. This model- theoretic version is a generalization 
of Ramsey’s original idea, since it applies even to theories that are not finitely 
axiomatizable. Instead of taking a single formula that axiomatizes the emer-
gent theory and replacing all the emergent terms and predicates with first- and 
second- order variables, we extend the interpretation function of the original 
model in order to provide extensions to all the terms and predicates of the 
emergent theory. In cases in which a theory can be axiomatized by a single 
formula, the two methods are exactly equivalent: the base model will verify 
the second- order Ramsey formula if and only if the model’s interpretation 
function can be extended to produce a model of the corresponding theory.
3.1 Classical Phenomenalism and Russell’s Structuralism
Using this model- theoretic approach to realization, classical phenomenalism 
could be seen as postulating that all truths about the existence and character-
istics of physical objects are realized by truths about the private and subjective 
sense- experience that human observers have or would have under specified, 
counterfactual conditionals. As Mill put it, physical objects are “mere per-
manent possibilities of perception.” So, we start with a base language Pphen, 
which includes terms for subjects of experience, terms for sense- data, and 
predicates that define sense experiences in terms of the locations of sense data 
in the egocentric spaces of subjects (with properties like up and down, left 
and right, forward and back), at times in private, egocentric time lines. The 
language will also include the subjunctive conditional. We will then consider a 
class of models for this language, consisting of a set of worlds W, a designated 
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actual world w*, an interpretation function I for evaluating atomic sentences 
in each world, and a system of concentric spheres S for the interpretation 
of subjunctive conditionals. For simplicity’s sake, I will treat all sense- data 
and subjects as worldbound individuals (in Lewis’s sense). We can then select 
the model Mtrue− phen that incorporates all the actual truths about actual and 
counterfactual experiences. The set of formulas true in Mtrue− phen is the set 
TRUEphen, the set of all truths expressible in the vocabulary of Lphen.
Throughout this paper, I’m going to assume that the structure of the true 
model of fundamental reality is rich enough that there is a homomorphism 
from any canonical model for Lewis’s subjunctive conditionals into that 
model, which, in the case of phenomenalism, we’ll call Mtrue− phen.3 If this were 
not the case, we would have little reason to believe that any of our theories of 
the emergent world have even approximate models in the true model of fun-
damental reality. Furthermore, we have good reason to think that the model 
of fundamental reality is very rich representationally, with a very large num-
ber of worlds, with a very rich set of relations of comparative similarity. There 
is every reason to think that the canonical model for any language using the 
subjunctive conditional can be mapped into such a rich model.
We now enrich the language by adding terms referring to physical 
objects, which will now be assigned locations and trajectories in a single 
three- dimensional (public) space, indexed by universal time. Since we still 
retain the subjunctive conditionals, we can now express conditional rela-
tionships between sentences expressed in purely phenomenal terms and sen-
tences expressed in purely physical terms, and between pairs of sentences 
both of which are purely physical in form, as well as between sentences that 
mix both vocabularies.
•	 Call	the	resulting	language	Lphen+phys.
•	 Consider	each	theory	expressible	in	Lphen+phys that is consistent with the 
set of phenomenal truths, TRUEphen.
•	 Let	T0 be one such a theory.
•	 Since	T0 is consistent with the set of phenomenal truths, we can extend 
the interpretation function Iphen to a function Iphen+phys in such a way that 
theory T0 is true in the model Mtrue− phen relative to Iphen+phys.
The extended interpretation accomplishes exactly the same thing as would be 
accomplished by Ramseyfying the physical vocabulary in a finite axiomatiza-
tion of T0, if there is a such a thing. That is, Iphen+phys assigns some property- 
intension or individual- concept- intension in Mtrue− phen to every predicate and 
individual constant in the physical vocabulary of T0 in such a way as to verify 
T0. The model- theoretic approach that I’ve sketched is actually more general 
than Ramseyfication, since it will apply to any consistent theory, whether or 
not that theory can be finitely axiomatized. In addition, it means that we can 
keep everything in first- order logic. each interpretation function I relative to 
which T0 is true in Mtrue− phen constitutes a distinct realization of T0.
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Russell’s structuralist program in The Analysis of Matter is exactly iso-
morphic to the classical phenomenalist program. The only difference is 
that Russell does not use subjunctive conditionals, as Mill did, but instead 
speaks of causal relations, both in the phenomenal and in the physical world. 
However, he does not offer a substantive account in the 1927 book of what 
causation consists in, so this is a difference we can, at least for the moment, 
set aside. In addition, of course, instead of speaking about phenomenal sense- 
data, Russell in 1927 speaks instead about perceptions, which he takes to be 
events in the brain with which we are immediately acquainted.
In general, there will be many realizations of any theory T0 in the model 
Mtrue− phen, and there will be many other theories in the enriched language 
besides T0 that are consistent with the set of all phenomenal truths (and 
which therefore have realizations in Mtrue− phen). In order to cut down the 
number of theories and realizations, we need some further constraints both 
on our theory T0 and on the permissible realizations of that theory. We can 
accomplish both of these at once simply by restricting the interpretation 
function. We can then hope to pick out the one true theory of physics that 
has a unique permissible realization in the model Mtrue− phen.
In the case of both the phenomenalist and Russellian- structuralist pro-
gram, these constraints consist in the laws of perspective that link geometri-
cal properties described in terms of public, four- dimensional spacetime with 
properties described in terms of egocentric phenomenal space and time. We 
can put a constraint an any acceptable interpretation function, requiring that 
when it identifies a physical object in a world with a set of sense data associ-
ated with subjects in that world, the interpretation function must assign a 
shape and size to the physical object that corresponds to the shape and size 
of each of the corresponding sense- data, with the correspondence relation 
fixed by the laws of perspective as applied to the physical location assigned 
to the relevant subject of experience. That is, the physical primary qualities 
of bodies must correspond to sense- data and subject- locations in such a way 
that each sense- datum accurately records the shape of the body, as it would 
appear to a subject at the location to which the subject is assigned.
This is quite a severe constraint—in fact, too severe, since it fails to take 
into account the existence of illusions and hallucinations. It is reasonable to 
suppose that only one theory- interpretation pair will maximize the degree 
of fit between the bodies and the corresponding sense- data, and we can take 
this pair to give us both the set of truths about the physical world and the 
corresponding truthmaker in the phenomenal world for each truth.
3.2 Analytic Functionalism About the Mind
David Lewis’s version of Analytical Functionalism is exactly isomorphic to 
the phenomenalist or structuralist model sketched in the preceding subsec-
tion. The differences are these: first, the base model with which we begin 
is a model of something like classical physics and chemistry, including facts 
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about overt behavior, sensory- organ stimulations, and neural structures and 
patterns of firing. The true model of the world Mtrue− phys yields a set of phys-
icalistically acceptable truths, TRUEphys in a language of purely physical 
(and chemical, biological, and neurological) vocabulary Lphys. We want to 
extend this language to a language Lphys+psy that includes the vocabulary of 
psychology, with predicates that assign beliefs, desires, and sensory experi-
ences to a class of sentient and rational bodies (the human beings). Lewis 
assumes that we are already given not only the vocabulary of Lphys+psy, but 
also a fairly rich theory of folk psychology Tfolk that specifies a large number 
of connections between psychological and physical states. This will include 
facts about the sensory experiences resulting from sensory- organ stimula-
tions, coordinated in such a way that experiences are veridical under normal 
conditions. It will also include connections between belief- desire pairs and 
overt behavior, and certain kinds of overt behavior that result directly from 
certain experiences or desires, like wincing from pain.
•	 Let’s	 assume	 that	 Tfolk is consistent with the set of physical truths, 
TRUEphys.
•	 If	so,	we	can	find	an	interpretation	function	Iphys+psy, relative to which 
Tfolk is true in the true model of the physical world, Mtrue− phys.
•	 If	there	is	such	a	function,	it	will	be	a	realization (in Ramsey’s sense) of 
the folk theory of psychology.
•	 If	there	is	a	unique	such	function,	then	we	can	use	it	to	define	the	set	of	
all psychological and psychophysical truths by simply identifying it with 
the set of sentences TRUEphys+psy in the language Lphys+psy that are veri-
fied by the model Mtrue− phys as extended by the interpretation function 
Iphys+psy.
Lewis is entitled to help himself to the psychophysical language Lphys+psy 
and the folk theory Tfolk in that theory, since the facts about what language 
humans speak and what sentences in that language they assert can be recov-
ered with a high degree of determinacy from the physicalistically and behav-
ioristically acceptable set of facts, simply by consulting users’ overt verbal 
behavior (including their counterfactual behavior under all possible circum-
stances). This is the sort of task that Donald Davidson described as radical 
interpretation. [Davidson 1973] In any case, overt linguistic behavior (as 
described in TRUEphys) would place very severe constraints on acceptable 
candidates for the language Lphys+psy and the folk theory Tfolk.
In addition to or as an alternative to reliance on the folk theory Tfolk, we 
could rely, as Donald Davidson recommended, on a Principle of Charity, 
which could serve as a constraint on acceptable interpretation functions. 
We could require that the interpretation of sentences that attribute the belief 
with content ϕ be assigned intensions in which ϕ is also verified, at least, 
to as great an extent as possible. We could also apply a similar Principle 
of Charity to the assignment of sensory and mnemonic contents to human 
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subjects, along with a Principle of Humanity or Reasonableness that 
requires that beliefs be reasonable, given a subject’s sensory and mnemonic 
information.
3.3 Wallacian Functionalism
In a sense, Wallace’s functionalism, inspired by Daniel Dennett’s Real 
Patterns [Dennett 1991], is a combination of phenomenalism and ana-
lytical functionalism, with mental properties reduced to macroscopic (and 
chemical and biological) properties in something the form of Analytical 
Functionalism, and macroscopic properties reduced to states of the quan-
tum wavefunction, in something like Russell’s structuralism. The difficulty 
with this strategy, as we’ll see, is that this leaves us trying to lift ourselves 
by our own bootstraps, with too little basis for constraining the kinds of 
emergent domains that can emerge.
It’s reasonably clear what the reducing or fundamental model is sup-
posed to be. We can take the language of pure quantum mechanics (with 
its description of the cosmic wavefunction and its deterministic Schrödinger 
evolution) and supplement it with a counterfactual or subjunctive condi-
tional. This will require a model that contains a domain of worlds, each of 
which consists of a single quantum wavefunction evolved through time, one 
world designated as actual (which picks out the world’s actual wavefunc-
tion), and a system of spheres S for the evaluation of subjunctive condition-
als (the worlds of these models will not be everettian branches, but different 
versions of the underlying quantum wavefunction). The system of spheres 
could be based, as in David Lewis’s semantics [Lewis 1973], on a relation of 
comparative similarity between quantum worlds. This would require some-
thing beyond pure quantum theory, and in that sense, Wallacian functional-
ism does, like other interpretations of quantum mechanics, require some 
substantial supplementation to the theory. However, we might hope that 
the mathematics of the Hilbert space would provide us with a unique, natu-
ral measure of distance between possible wavefunctions, or at least a fairly 
small family of such measures. We would still have to decide whether to fol-
low David Lewis’s proposal, in which we must include among the possible 
worlds those with small, localized “miracles,” to be preferred in closeness to 
worlds that verify the antecedent of the conditional that are non- miraculous 
but otherwise quite far from the actual world. Deciding how many such 
miraculous worlds to include and how to weigh their comparative similar-
ity will introduce a large measure of subjectivity or conventionality to the 
project. However, for the sake of argument, I will waive objections along 
these lines.
In Wallace’s proposal, the only constraint on the Ramsey realization of 
the emergent theory is this: all fillers of functional roles in the emergent 
theories must be entities and sets of entities to be found in the correct model 
of the formal language of pure quantum mechanics. In particular, there are 
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no constraints on the extended interpretation function that can be expressed 
in terms of causal connections between emergent and quantum- mechanical 
entities or pure semantic conditions (such as metaphysically correct refer-
ence or truth- conditions for the emergent language) or metaphysical prior-
ity (no degrees of naturalness or eligibility that apply to sets of n- tuples 
quantum- mechanical entities), as I will argue in sections 3.4 and 4.1 below.
There is, however, another difficult choice for the Wallacian functional-
ist to make: is the high- dimensional space (3N, where N is the number of 
particle- systems) of the quantum wavefunction the whole of fundamental 
reality, or is there in addition a four- dimensional spacetime upon which the 
higher- dimensional space is defined? Wallace and Timpson [Wallace and 
Timpson 2010] prefer the latter, but this seems ad hoc and artificial, given 
their wavefunction Puritanism. Why posit the four- dimensional manifold, if 
there are no fundamental entities located there? The Schrödinger dynamics 
doesn’t depend in any way on the familiar four- dimensional structure. In 
addition, this position seems inconsistent with the attempt to use decoher-
ence to explain all of classical physics: see Halliwell’s attempt to generate 
three- dimensional space as an emergent by- product of quantum cosmology.
In fact, by moving from a pure quantum wavefunction (in its 
3N- dimensional state space) to the wavefunction plus a four- dimensional 
manifold, Wallace and Timpson are moving in exactly the right direction. I 
will simply argue that they should move still further in that direction, admit-
ting still more to the fundamental ontology of the world. By embracing 
spacetime realism, Wallace and Timpson are admitting that there is at least 
one entity, spacetime, with fundamental existence and a real essence that 
stands over and above the austere mathematics of pure quantum theory. 
Since this is a move in the right direction, I will allow the inclusion of space-
time in the base model Mtrue− QM.
So, let’s turn now to the emergent domain. Our first problem is a very 
basic one: what language do we use, and what theory in that language? 
In the case of phenomenalism, we had the common vocabulary of geom-
etry and the necessary laws of perspective to constrain the language and 
theory of the emergent domain of physical objects. In the case of Analytical 
Functionalism, we had a folk theory of psychology and psychophysics that 
could be recovered from, or at least powerfully constrained by, the overt 
verbal behavior of human beings, all of which was contained within the 
base model of fundamental things. In addition, the beliefs and sensory states 
attributed by the emergent theory have contents that match the vocabulary 
of the base theory. Now, we have only the language and theory of pure 
quantum mechanics to begin with, which by itself tells us nothing about the 
languages and beliefs of the denizens of an emergent world, and which lacks 
the direct access to our beliefs and concepts of the physical environment, as 
was available for the phenomenalist.
So, it seems that we must use every possible language and every pos-
sible theory. There are no languages or theories and no language users or 
78 Robert C. Koons
believers explicit at the level of quantum reality. Any constraints we place 
on these theories (besides their sheer interpretability in the model of quan-
tum mechanics) are going to be constraints of internal coherency. That is, 
we might reasonably demand of any theory Temergent of the emergent world 
that, according to Temergent itself, the human beings speak the language of 
Temergent and have beliefs and sensory and mnemonic experiences that mostly 
accord with Temergent. We can also require that Temergent have the theoretical 
virtues valued by most people (as depicted in Temergent), and that Temergent be 
well- confirmed, according to itself. Call the theories that meet these con-
straints the internally ideal or coherent theories.
3.4 Putnam’s Permutation Argument for Semantic Indeterminacy
I will argue, in a way inspired by Putnam’s argument for metaphysical anti- 
realism [Putnam 1978, 1980, 1981, Lewis 1984], that there is a radical 
indeterminacy of meaning and intension for all the names, predicates, and 
function symbols of the languages of our emergent theories. This isn’t sur-
prising, since all of the entities and properties posited by such theories are, 
from the point of view of Wallacian functionalism, mere useful fictions. In 
Wallace’s picture, all that matters is that we find an interpretation of those 
theories in the true model of quantum mechanics that makes all of the for-
mulas of that theory come out true (or at least approximately true) under 
that interpretation. The meaning of the emergent theories, the theories of 
the world’s manifest image, is utterly holistic in character.
Suppose that Temergent is a theory of a world that is emergent relative to 
the model Mtrue− QM = 〈F, D, I〉. That means that there is an interpretation 
function, call it Iintended that extends I to the language of Temergent, resulting 
in a new model MQM+emergent = 〈F, D, Iintended〉, with the theory Temergent true 
in MQM+emergent. It is immediately obvious that there are an infinite num-
ber of alternative extensions of I that will also produce an extension of 
Mtrue− QM relative to which Temergent is true. Take any permutation π(w) for 
any world w ∈W of the objects in D(w). Now apply the permutation π(w) to 
the interpretation Iintended with respect to the interpretation of all constants 
and predicate symbols at w. The resulting interpretation Iintended− π(w) will also 
be a realization of Temergent. Apply similar permutations to every world in W, 
resulting in the thoroughly scrambled interpretation Ibizarro. The extension 
of Mtrue− QM by Ibizarro will also be a model of Temergent, and so Ibizarro will be a 
realization of Temergent in Mtrue− QM.
So, for example, it is completely indeterminate what a predicate like 
‘is human’ or ‘is conscious’ is true of or realized by. In the interpretation 
function Ibizarro, the intension of human beings might be the intension of 
kumquats in Iintended, and the interpretation of is conscious might be con-
tains vitamin B. In fact, as Alexander Pruss [Pruss 2015] has pointed out, 
all the predicates that apply truthfully to the emergent world as it exists 
today (including mental- property predicates) could be interpreted in such 
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a way that they apply truthfully only to the cosmos as it was 12 billion 
years ago.
Any two worlds that are isomorphic under an isomorphism of the quan-
tum structure (i.e., of the Hilbert spaces and the operator algebras) have 
the same functional properties. Now consider two worlds w1 and w2. 
Both are short- lived worlds: the temporal sequence of each is only a bil-
lion years long. each world is an exact duplicate of a temporal portion 
of our world. Thus, w1 is an exact duplicate of the temporal portion of 
our world from 13 billion years ago to 12 billion years ago, while w2 is 
an exact duplicate of the temporal portion of our world from a billion 
years ago to the present. Then w2 has the same kind of mental proper-
ties that obtained in our world over the last billion years. And w1 has 
the same kind of mental properties that obtained in our world from 13 
to 12 billion years ago. But there is a quantum- structure preserving iso-
morphism from w1 to w2. This isomorphism is simply given by the time- 
evolution operator U12 (where we measure time in billions of years). 
This operator is an isomorphism of the quantum structure. Hence w1 
and w2 are exactly alike with respect to mental properties. Hence our 
world had exactly the same mental properties in the early 13- to- 12 
billion- years- ago period as in the last billion years. That’s absurd. (For 
one, it makes us question how we could possibly know that the world 
is as old as we think it is.) [Pruss 2015]
Here is the key difference between Wallacian functionalism and the phe-
nomenalistic functionalism of a Mill or Carnap, or the behavioristic func-
tionalism of David Lewis. In the case of a phenomenalistic functionalism, 
the fundamental or base theory is a theory of our phenomenological expe-
rience, and the target or reduced theory is one of the “external” world. In 
this case, there is arguably some constraint on the content of the reduced 
theory that is non- holistic. For example, in the case of the primary qualities, 
we could insist that the geometrical properties assigned to physical objects 
in our external theory resemble the geometrical properties of the corre-
sponding inner phenomena. So, if the external theory asserts the existence 
of something tetrahedral in shape, we could insist that the corresponding 
model of the phenomenal world include something that at least appears 
tetrahedral (perhaps, a two- dimensional projection in visual space of a tet-
rahedron). However, in the case of Wallacian functionalism, there are no 
phenomenal qualia on either side of the equation. There are only sentences 
in our folk psychology assigning certain geometrical experiences to subjects, 
and so long as the interpretation of these sentences preserves their truth and 
their counterfactual inter- connections, we have met every constraint on a 
successful interpretation.
In the case of behavioristic functionalism, we have real connections 
between the subjects of psychological states on the one hand and the subjects 
80 Robert C. Koons
of behavior on the other. We assign beliefs and desires to x in a way that cor-
responds rationally to the behavior of x. In the case of Wallacian functional-
ism, we have only the universal wave function on the side of the base theory. 
All real or fundamental behavior is ultimately behavior of that function, and 
so there are no localized constraints on the connections between belief and 
desire and behavior. It is the theory of the folkish world as a whole (with 
both human belief and behavior contained in a single package) that con-
fronts the model of pure QM as a whole.
In addition, as I will argue in sections 3.4 and 4.1 below, Wallacian func-
tionalists lack any of the resources used by metaphysical realists to meet the 
challenge of Putnam’s argument: causal ties between emergent terms and 
their quantum- mechanical referents, specially eligible or natural properties 
(at a phenomenological level), so- called “reference magnets,” or metaphysi-
cally primitive facts about semantics or reference.
There is one particular case of referential indeterminacy that is especially 
devastating to the everettian interpretation: namely, it is indeterminate 
whether a particular emergent world is assigned to quantum states with a 
high or low amplitude. Thus, there is no objective fact of the matter about 
whether the quantum probability associated with a given “branch” is high 
or low. Thus, the problem is not just that of finding a reason for believing 
that we are in a high amplitude branch. The problem is that we cannot give 
any real meaning to the question itself. If a given emergent world is realiz-
able in a low- probability segment of the wavefunction at a given time, there 
is another interpretation function (and thus, another realization of that 
world in that wavefunction) that assigns it to a high- probability segment, 
and vice versa. It is all a matter of performing the appropriate permutation 
of quantum objects.
If there is no objective matter of fact about the quantum probabilities 
corresponding to the various emergent realities, then the Deutsch- Saunders- 
Wallace strategy for defending the reliability of observed statistics is further 
undermined. emergent realities in which the statistics radically disconfirm 
quantum mechanics will be, not only as real as our own, but possessing the 
same status in regard to the underlying quantum probabilities. They will 
have just as much right to claim to be realized in the high- amplitude sectors 
of the quantum wavefunction as do the QM- confirming branches.
3.5  Model- Theoretic Indeterminacy Guarantees the Truth of Our 
Emergent Theories
Let Temergent be one of our target theories of the world: folk psychology or 
a scientific theory of “emergent” phenomena. We can suppose that Temergent 
is internally ideal and that it has a realization in the model of quantum 
mechanics, Mtrue− QM. Let Iintended be the “intended” interpretation of the the-
ory Temergent in the model Mtrue− QM, with a domain consisting of the space-
time regions and quantum subsystems of the quantum world and with the 
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predicates of the language Lemergent assigned appropriate intensions in the 
corresponding model Mtrue− QM.
Now consider a theory Tbizarro, whose intended model includes the same 
interpretation function Iintended but includes a different, counterfactual model 
of the quantum world, Mcounterfactual− QM. Both Mtrue− QM and Mcounterfactual−QM 
have infinite models, and both Temerge and Tbizarro are semantically consis-
tent with the hypothesis of a domain of infinite cardinality. By the Skolem- 
Löwenheim theorems, there is an interpretation Ibizarro of Tbizarro in the actual 
model of the quantum world, Mtrue− QM. Thus, the bizarro emergent world 
represented by Tbizarro is realized in the actual quantum world in just the 
same way as Temergent is.
In fact, all possible theories of emergent domains are actually true: if 
they are logically consistent (in the logic of quantified counterfactual con-
ditionals), and they contain no quantum- mechanical vocabulary and make 
no claims about the finite size of reality, then (by the Skolem- Löwenheim 
theorems), they have a model that extends Mtrue− QM.4 In fact, just this point 
was made by H. A. Newman in 1928, as a criticism of Russell’s structural-
ism.[Newman 1928]
In fact, the situation is even worse than this, since Wallace doesn’t require 
perfect realization in Mtrue− QM—just a reasonable degree of approximation 
to such perfect realization. So, even inconsistent theories or theories that 
entail the existence of a finite domain or that entail falsehoods about the 
structure of spacetime will nonetheless have quantum realizations and so 
will be actually true theories of a world that emerges from the quantum 
world.
The upshot is this: we are free to believe and say whatever we want 
about the emergent world of macroscopic objects, and we are guaranteed 
to believe and speak the truth (so long as our stories are internally coherent 
and not massively inconsistent). As a result, every consistent story corre-
sponds to a real, emergent world, on par with our own. This includes the 
world of Tolkien’s mythology or that of H. P. Lovecraft, the world of Harry 
Potter or greek mythology. They are all just as real as our own. And, even 
more importantly, our own theory of the emergent world is true by a kind of 
stipulation: true simply by virtue of satisfying our demands for its internal 
coherency.
But that is surely wrong. If our theory of the emergent world is true by 
a kind of stipulation, then it can’t be interpreted realistically. To interpret 
it realistically is to take seriously the metaphysical possibility that it could 
be wrong. For example, all of the evidence we have for classical mechan-
ics could be misleading (“could” metaphysically, not epistemically): it 
could have been produced by some other quite unknown mechanism. For 
example, the planetary orbits that led to Kepler’s laws and ultimately to 
Newton’s laws of motion could actually have resulted from the fact that 
the planets move on gigantic rails built by ancient aliens. For the theory of 
classical mechanics to be a substantive theory of the world, it must have the 
82 Robert C. Koons
metaphysical possibility of being wrong. But Wallace’s functionalism denies 
it that chance.
3.6 Epistemological and Pragmatic Consequences
If classical physics is understood as true by stipulation, this undermines any 
rational confidence we might have in quantum mechanics, since a large part 
of our evidence for QM consists in its agreement with classical mechanics 
when interference terms are small.
In fact, Wallace’s functionalism leads quickly to an epistemological catas-
trophe: if we cannot interpret our theories of the emergent world realisti-
cally, then no belief in such a theory can count as objective knowledge. 
And yet, all of our knowledge of the truth of quantum mechanics depends 
on our having objective knowledge of experimental data that belong to an 
emergent domain. So, in the end, Wallacian functionalism is epistemologi-
cally self- defeating, destroying the only grounds we have for believing that 
quantum mechanics is true at all, to say nothing of believing that it exhausts 
the fundamental level of reality.
In fact, we couldn’t even interpret our emergent scientific theories as 
instrumentally valuable in an objective way, since any theory of our future 
experiences would be equally true (just one more realizable emergent the-
ory). In addition, what counts as the same qualitative properties of experi-
ence is itself up for grabs via the interpretation function. By choosing a 
suitable function, we can make any set of predictions about future experi-
ence come out true.
Thus, pragmatism itself is inconsistent with radical indeterminacy of 
meaning, as Plato recognized in the Theaetetus:
SOCRATeS But, Protagoras (we’ll say), what about the things which 
are going to be, in the future? Does he [the individual human being] 
have in himself the authority for deciding about them, too? If someone 
thinks there’s going to be a thing of some kind, does that thing actually 
come into being for the person who thought so? Take heat, for example. 
Suppose a layman thinks he’s going to catch a fever and there’s going 
to be that degree of heat, whereas someone else, a doctor, thinks not. 
Which one’s judgment shall we say the future will turn out to accord 
with? Or should we say that it will be in accordance with the judgments 
of both: for the doctor he’ll come to be neither hot nor feverish, whereas 
for himself he’ll come to be both?
THeODORUS. No, that would be absurd.
[McDowell 2014, p. 56, 178c1–10]
every claim about the future, practical consequences about believing and 
acting on an emergent theory of the world will itself be part of some emer-
gent theory of the world. I have shown that every such theory, so long as it 
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is not massively inconsistent and doesn’t entail the finitude of the universe, 
will be realizable in Mtrue− QM and so will be true. Thus, we cannot appeal to 
pragmatic considerations (like avoiding being eaten by a tiger) as grounds 
for preferring some theories over others.
3.7 The Argument’s Upshot in a Nutshell
To sum up, there are four disastrous consequences for Wallacian functionalism:
•	 Radical	indeterminacy	of	content,	via	Putnam’s	paradox:	there	an	infi-
nite number of alternative interpretation functions mapping our actual 
theory of the world into MQM. In particular, there is no fact of the mat-
ter as to the quantum probability associated with any given emergent 
world.
•	 Every	 consistent	 and	 internally	 coherent	 story	 (more	 precisely,	 every	
story consistent with an infinite domain) represents an emergent reality 
in MQM, on a par with our current best theories about the macroscopic 
world.
•	 So,	we	can’t	go	wrong	in	proposing	theories	about	the	emergent	world	
we inhabit, so long as our theories are consistent with an infinite 
domain, and so long as they are internally coherent from a semantic 
and epistemological point of view.
•	 These	 facts	 undermine	 any	 claim	 to	 know	 that	 quantum	 mechanics	
is true, on the basis of experiments and observations that depend in 
any way on the emergent. The impossibility of objectively false theo-
ries of the emergent domain makes objective knowledge of that domain 
impossible, including objective knowledge of the data and observa-
tions upon which we ground our claims to know the truth of quantum 
mechanics itself. Therefore, Wallacian functionalism is epistemologi-
cally self- defeating.
4  Putnam’s Paradox: The Problem of the Missing External 
Constraints
The central problem for Wallace’s proposal is that we are missing all the con-
straints that were available for phenomenalism or Analytic Functionalism. 
We have no counterpart to the laws of perspective that rigidly tied the physi-
cal world to the phenomenal data (in the case of Phenomenalism) or to the 
overt verbal behavior that rigidly tied (via a principle of charity) the accept-
able psychophysical theories to the physical facts. All the constraints we 
have are constraints of consistency and coherency, but as Putnam’s paradox 
shows, these are not sufficient to delimit the range of emergent worlds to 
any significant degree. These considerations demonstrate that no function-
alist theory can bridge the gap between the quantum and emergent levels. 
What is needed is some additional, metaphysical constraint.
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In this section, I will argue that the Oxford everettian approach lacks 
the resources to build in such constraints. I will proceed by a process of 
elimination, showing that each of six plausible candidates cannot supply 
the necessary constraints on the interpretation of emergent theories in the 
everettian setting. There are two possible constraints that we can eliminate 
quite quickly: an appeal to the concept of emergence itself, and a brute pref-
erence for the emergent theories that we actually endorse.
1. Can the concept of emergence fix the interpretation?
 Could we hope that the concept of emergence itself could somehow 
provide powerful constraints on what counts as an acceptable interpre-
tation function for a candidate theory of an emergent world? It doesn’t 
seem so: all that we can say is that the emergent world must be realized 
by some such interpretation function. There just aren’t any a priori or 
analytic constraints on what that function must be like.
2. Can we use “our” actual language and folk theory?
 No, because first we would have to establish that such things exist, and 
that they are relatively determinate and well- defined. But that’s just the 
problem. It seems that any coherent theory about what language we 
do in fact speak and what beliefs we do in fact hold will turn out to be 
equally true.
In the following subsections, I consider four additional candidates: (1) causal 
constraints plus the category of natural or especially eligible properties, (2) 
an appeal to facts about spacetime locations and trajectories, (3) the use of 
the simplicity of our emergent theories or of their quantum interpretations 
(or both), and (4) the use of facts about decoherence.
4.1  Can Causal Constraints or Natural or Eligible Properties Fix 
the Interpretation?
One standard realist approach to the Putnam paradox, defended by Michael 
Devitt [Devitt 1983, 1991] and Hartry Field [Field 1998], is to appeal to a 
causal theory of reference. Such a causal theory could constrain the range 
of acceptable interpretation function by requiring that the atomic truths 
including a given predicate be assigned to a property in the model of such 
a kind that an appropriate causal mechanism can be found between occur-
rences of that property in the world and uses of the predicate by speakers 
of the language. To apply this idea to Wallace’s functionalism, we would 
have to require that there exist causal connections of the right kind between 
language use (or concept deployment) on the one hand and the emergent 
properties that we language users are supposed to be representing.
However, this strategy just won’t work here, for three independent rea-
sons, two having to do with the base theory and the other to do with the 
emergent theories. First, human language and concepts do not even exist in 
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the quantum world to begin with, so the question of whether our language 
use or concept deployment is causally connected to anything at all cannot 
arise, independently of assuming the truth of a given emergent theory and 
the correctness of a given interpretation function. In contrast, classical phe-
nomenalism and Russellian structuralism included concepts and concept- 
use within the base theory, and so the issue of what properties that concept 
use could be causally connected to could constrain the interpretation of 
emergent theories. And, although Analytic Functionalism did not include 
concept- use within the base theory, it did include language users and their 
overt linguistic behavior, which could be used to tie concepts to fundamen-
tal causal connections. In Wallace’s functionalism, any causal connections 
that involve concepts must be inextricably part of the emergent story itself. 
Hence, they can be of no help whatsoever in linking the language of the 
emergent theory to the underlying quantum world. The emergent causal 
connections that exist occur entirely within the story or theory that defines 
the emergent world. And so, at best, we can simply add another coherence 
condition to our emergent- world stories: namely, that in the story there are 
the right sort of causal connections between (emergent) environmental con-
ditions and (emergent) language- and concept- use.
Second, there are no causal connections between facts in Wallacian func-
tionalism in the base model: all we have are counterfactual conditional 
dependencies. There is good reason for this, since the pure formalism of 
quantum mechanics contains no non- Humean information about causation 
over and above the facts about what counterfactually depends on what. But 
counterfactual dependence is not sufficient to fix reference determinately, as 
we have seen.
Third, emergent theories did not historically and still do not generally 
include any information about the quantum realm. Hence, we cannot even 
require ideal or coherent emergent theories to include causal connections 
between concepts and underlying quantum processes.
A standard approach to resolving Putnam’s paradox, championed by 
David Lewis [Lewis 1983], is to appeal to perfectly natural or eligible prop-
erties that can serve as “reference magnets” for the interpretation of predi-
cates. However, to qualify as perfectly natural a property must be one of the 
fundamental properties of the world. In the case of Wallacian functional-
ism, this would not enable us to move far enough away from the austere 
properties of pure quantum mechanics to define the properties and relations 
of macroscopic branches, to say nothing of biological and psychological 
properties.
4.2  Can We Use Spacetime to Restrict the Interpretation Function?
As I mentioned above, I am willing to embrace, for the sake of argument, 
the Wallace- Timpson theory of spacetime realism.[Wallace and Timpson 
2010] So, there will be some common vocabulary between many emergent 
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theories and the theory of quantum mechanics: both will have the vocabu-
lary and the axioms needed to characterize the spacetime continuum.
However, beyond the vocabulary of space and time, there will presum-
ably be no other overlap between our quantum and emergent vocabulary. 
It’s clear that there is no such overlap in “our” emergent world (if it exists). 
This still leaves us with a very weak constraint on true emergent theories: 
they must not entail anything false about the structure of spacetime. This 
is very unlike the situation in the case of classical phenomenalism, where 
we could assume a common vocabulary about what regions of space are 
occupied by bodies at what points in time. We could use simple laws of 
perspective to link bodies in public space with sense- data in private spaces.
Couldn’t we restrict the interpretation function by requiring that mac-
roscopic properties assigned to regions of spacetime must be interpreted by 
quantum properties assigned to the same region? But the problem of cosmic 
entanglement ensures that there are no quantum properties that are local-
ized to any finite region. If we take spacetime seriously, we must understand 
the quantum wavefunction to be what Peter Forrest calls a polyfield, in 
which fundamental magnitudes are assigned to N- tuples of widely separated 
spacetime points (for a very large N, representing roughly the number of 
fundamental particles in the universe). [Forrest 1988] There is, therefore, 
no simple function from quantum events in a space- time region and macro-
scopic object- events or phenomenal appearances.
Furthermore, appeals to spacetime won’t help to blunt the Putnam- style 
argument for referential indeterminacy. We can still get complete indeter-
minacy for every term and predicate except for the geometrical ones. For 
example, Pruss’s argument based on the 12- billlion- year time- shift will still 
work. We can insist that the events of the emergent world be located some-
how in the real spacetime continuum of Mtrue− QM, but there is no way to 
ensure that they line up in any fixed or determinately intended way with the 
pattern of quantum events in that same continuum.
Here again, the contrast with classical phenomenalism is instructive. A 
classical phenomenalist could, in effect, locate phenomenal qualia in regions 
of public spacetime and then stipulate that the sensory qualities of any phys-
ical object located in that same region by the emergent theory correspond 
to those of the qualia. However, for the Wallacian functionalist qualia are 
themselves just parts of the emergent theory. Moreover, they are parts that 
presumably share no intrinsic features with the underlying quantum events.
4.3 Why Not Simplicity?
Wallace can legitimately complain that I have ignored the constraint that he 
mentions explicitly: the constraint of simplicity. Wallace could impose on the 
extended interpretation function a condition related to Lewis’s condition of nat-
uralness [Lewis 1983] by requiring that the function map emergent predicates 
onto relatively simple sets of n- tuples of relatively simple quantum entities.
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But before we examine the utility of a simplicity requirement, we must 
ask a more fundamental question? Why should simplicity be of any rel-
evance to the metaphysical and ontological question of defining emergent 
reality? Simplicity is plausible as an epistemological constraint: other things 
being equal, the fact that one theory with wide scope and a high degree of 
accuracy is much simpler than all of its competitors with comparable scope 
and accuracy seems a good (if defeasible) reason for thinking that the sim-
pler theory is objectively true. Simplicity may be an indicator of probability 
of truth, but it does not seem to be a criterion of existence or reality. How 
could the real existence of an entity be a function of its simplicity?
The metaphysical deployment of simplicity is especially implausible once 
we remind ourselves that the very definition of simplicity is difficult and 
contentious. Simplicity, like beauty, seems to be in the eye of the beholder. 
Different theories of the emergent world will attribute different standards of 
simplicity to the scientific community. More fundamentally, we can ask: what 
is the truthmaker for the “correct” account of simplicity here? And what is 
the metaphysical ground for imposing any simplicity constraint at all?
There are two independent parameters of simplicity to consider: (1) the 
simplicity of the theory of the emergent world (is it, for example, finitely or 
recursively axiomatizable, or at least approximately so?), and (2) simplicity 
of the interpretation function that interprets the non- quantum vocabulary 
in the quantum model.
4.3.1 Maximizing Simplicity
It might seem that simplicity provides a solution to Putnam’s paradox: take 
the correct interpretation function to be the simplest extension of the base 
interpretation that verifies the emergent theory Temergent. However, this will 
only work if we are given the complete theory of some emergent reality. The 
problem is that there is at the quantum level no set of privileged theories of 
emergent domains. And any consistent theory, no matter how bizarre, will 
have some realization in the quantum model and so, in all likelihood, some 
simplest realization.
Can we pick out the privileged emergent theories by focusing on the sim-
plest theories that are realizable in the quantum model? We can’t maxi-
mize simplicity of both theory and interpretation simultaneously, since the 
simplest possible interpretation function is just the original interpretation 
function of the quantum model (with no addition), and the simplest pos-
sible theory is the just theory of the original quantum model (the totality of 
purely quantum truths, including the theorems of logic).
In other words, the simplest emergent theory is just the null theory: the 
theory consisting of nothing but the theorems of logic. That will obviously 
give us no help in fixing the interpretation function. The simplest extension 
of the interpretation function is just identity, and that will give us no help in 
fixing the emergent theory. Maximization is futile in either case.
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Maximizing the simplicity of one parameter or the other might be useful 
if we could first fix the metaphysically correct value of the other parameter. 
For example, if we could independently fix the true theory (and language) 
of the emergent world, it might make sense to try to maximize the simplic-
ity of the extended interpretation used to realize that theory in the model of 
quantum mechanics. Or, if we could independently restrict the set of inter-
pretation functions to a very narrow class, we could then use the degree of 
simplicity of the resulting emergent theories as a way of selecting the “best” 
emergent world. However, we have been unable to find any independent 
constraint. How, for example, do we select the right emergent theory to use? 
For any consistent theory of the emergent world, no matter how bizarre, 
there will be some interpretation that maximizes the simplicity of its truth-
makers in Mtrue− QM.
4.3.2 Setting a Minimal Degree of Simplicity
Perhaps instead of maximizing the simplicity of one or the other, the Wallacian 
functionalist could just require that the simplicity of one or the other (or both) 
has to meet a certain fixed standard, allowing any theory whose realization 
meets that standard to count as really emergent. Let’s focus on the simplicity 
of the interpretation function. I see three problems here.
1. Any requirement of relative simplicity will have to be quite loose and 
permissive, since we know that the entities and properties of the emer-
gent manifest image are, under the most optimistic assumptions, far 
from natural. See recent work on color and color- experience, for exam-
ple ([Hardin 1993, Pautz 2014, Tye 2000]). Neurological and other 
biological properties will be highly disjunctive and gerrymandered from 
the viewpoint of fundamental quantum mechanics, and phenomenolog-
ical, intentional, and semantic properties even more so. If the require-
ment of simplicity is too strong, it would give us no emergent worlds at 
all; if too weak, it would give us far too many.
2. What could be the truthmaker or metaphysical ground of the correct 
standard of minimum simplicity? How are we supposed to explain the 
connection between complexity and unreality?
3. There has to be some counterweight to simplicity, or we should embrace 
an eliminativist theory (a no- emergence theory), in which our theory of 
the “manifest” world just is fundamental quantum mechanics. We need 
some reason not to set the standard at the maximum level of simplicity. 
So, what is the counterweight? Usefulness? Apparent truth? But these cri-
teria only make sense given a manifest theory. We need people, organisms, 
perceptions, beliefs, purposes, etc. in order to make these judgments.
Again, Plato’s Theaetetus point applies again. Usefulness cannot be both 
part of the emergent picture and the criterion for which picture is really 
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emergent. If there’s nothing to balance against simplicity, then simplicity 
becomes either too strong a constraint (eliminating all emergent worlds) 
or a completely vacuous one. If we are going to be pragmatists, there has 
to be some kind of bridge between the emergent world we posit and our 
actual experiences and beliefs (how the world appears to us—in both a non- 
epistemic and epistemic sense of the phrase). But the phenomenal world, as 
we might call it, is also part of the emergent world, and so just another part 
of the theory it is supposed to be used in evaluating.
4.3.3 Degrees of Reality
Could we talk about degrees of reality, as measured by the simplicity of the 
isomorphism into the wavefunction? Instead of requiring maximum simplic-
ity of our emergent reality, and instead of arbitrarily setting some minimum 
standard of simplicity, we could adopt a kind of sliding scale: the simpler 
a theory and the simpler its realization in the one true quantum model, the 
more real the corresponding emergent world would be.
But can we make any sense of one world being more real than another? 
Isn’t reality (whether emergent or fundamental) always a simple matter of 
Yes or No? In addition, why should we accept any level of reality short of 
the highest one? What counter- pressure could make us prefer a theory that 
is to any degree unreal? As we have seen, neither conservatism nor pragma-
tism provide any such independent counter- pressure.
Finally, there would still be a huge number of alternate emergent realities 
that will count as equally real (by this standard) as our own world. In fact, 
each of the bizarro permutations of the “intended” interpretation function 
Iintended will be just as simple, considered as mathematical functions, as the 
original interpretation function.
4.3.4 The Best Option for Everettian Functionalists
There might be some emergent theories that have a uniquely simplest real-
ization in the quantum model: a realization that is much simpler than the 
second- best realization. We could stipulate that it is exactly such theories 
that represent an emergent reality.
However, as Wallace has pointed out, it is unlikely that any of our quasi- 
classical branch theories have a uniquely simplest realization. They are all 
afflicted with a significant degree of vagueness and indeterminacy. Still, we 
might hope that such theories have a relatively compact class of simplest 
realizations, each of which is significantly simpler than any realization out-
side of the class. In other words, there might be a fairly sharp peak of sim-
plicity associated with certain realizations of the theory. We could stipulate 
that only such theories represent emergent realities and that only interpreta-
tions at or near the unique peak of simplicity count as correct interpreta-
tions of the theory. To be more exact, we should look at the class of simplest 
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near realizations of the theory: extensions of the interpretation that verify 
most of the sentences of the emergent, or most of the most important ones.
There will be some considerable amount of work to be done to show that 
the quasi- classical theories of the everettian branches actually meets this 
new, more stringent condition of emergence. First, the condition might be 
too broad. For all we know, there are many fantastic theories that have a 
simplest interpretation at the quantum level (nota bene: this simplest inter-
pretation could be horrendously complex, so long as all the others are even 
worse). Imagine a panpsychist or even pan- voluntarist theory, according 
to which all physical entities have sensations and make free choices. This 
would count as a real emergent world, so long as there is one interpretation 
function for the fantasy that is significantly simpler than the others. Second, 
the condition might be too narrow. We know very little about the class of 
possible interpretations of our emergent theories. We know that in many 
cases the intended interpretation of the emergent theory (e.g., geology, ther-
modynamics, psychology) is extravagantly complex. Is that intended inter-
pretation always uniquely simplest of all the possible interpretations? It is 
hard to tell. In fact, Alexander Pruss’s argument (recounted in section 3.4 
above) shows that the intended interpretation for our theory of astronomy 
is not significantly simpler than an alternative interpretation that shifts our 
descriptions of the current state of the cosmos backward 12 billion years.
But perhaps the technical viability of this solution can be verified. There 
remain three philosophical difficulties. First, the criterion of simplicity is 
highly subjective and variable, probably even conventional. Simplicity is in 
the eye of the beholder, but the beholder is part of the emergent world, and 
so simplicity cannot provide an independent, exogenous constraint on the 
identification of real emergence. There are possible theories of the world in 
which the conscious inhabitants have radically different standards of sim-
plicity from our own, and so the simplest interpretations of the emergent 
theories by their lights will be quite different from our own.
Second, this solution raises severe epistemological worries. How could 
we know that our current theories of the emergent world satisfy the con-
straint of having a uniquely simplest interpretation in the quantum field, 
without having independent access to the level of quantum reality? We can 
presumably know that the truths, both categorical and subjunctive, of our 
favored emergent theories are verified somehow or other by the quantum 
level, but how could we know whether they are verified according to an 
interpretation that is substantially simpler than any alternative?
Finally, the criterion of simplicity is inherently vague and indeterminate. 
How could reality itself select one precise version of simplicity as the ground 
of determinate interpretation? It seems that we would have to look for that 
property of simplicity that is uniquely natural or eligible. But, the simplic-
ity of emergent theories is not a feature of the underlying quantum reality, 
and so the everettian have no grounds for attributing extreme degrees of 
naturalness or eligibility to such emergent realities. We could always pick 
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out that precise form of simplicity that favors our current theories of emer-
gent science, but such a tactic would be evidently ad hoc and metaphysically 
unmotivated.
4.4 What About Decoherence?
I haven’t said much yet about decoherence. Surely that’s a problem, given the 
prominent role that decoherence plays in Wallace’s account of the emergence 
of the macroscopic world. What exactly does decoherence tell us? It tells us 
that under certain circumstances, quantum systems can mimic the dynamics 
of classical mechanics, because of the way in which environmental interac-
tions suppress the interference terms in the systems’ Hamiltonian operators.
How is that relevant to our theories of the emergent world? It’s relevance 
seems to depend on two assumptions:
1. The dynamics of the emergent world must be (approximately) that of 
classical (Newton- Maxwell) mechanics.
2. The dynamics of the emergent world should closely mimic those of the 
underlying quantum reality.
given these two assumptions, decoherence would indeed be crucial, since 
it would be needed to explain how and why the emergent world can exist, 
given that the underlying quantum reality does not generally obey classical 
mechanics. Decoherence gives us reason to believe that, under most nor-
mal circumstances, the dynamics of actual quantum systems will effectively 
approximate those of classical mechanics.
But what metaphysical grounds do we have for accepting either of these 
assumptions? It seems clear, in fact, that they are both false. It has never 
been obvious that the emergent world of everyday macroscopic objects 
obeys Newton- Maxwell dynamics. If it had been obvious, it would not 
have taken scientists millennia to transcend the limitations of Aristotelian, 
Archimedean, and galilean mechanics. even today, most physical phenom-
ena do not apparently obey classical laws, as Nancy Cartwright pointed out 
in How the Laws of Physics Lie. [Cartwright 1983] In addition, there are 
many special sciences, including especially social sciences like politics, eco-
nomics, and sociology, in which classical mechanics plays little or no role.
In addition, why should we assume that any possible emergent world 
must be classical in its dynamics? What basis is there for such a stipulation? 
It doesn’t seem to be built into the concept of emergence in any way.
Turning to the second assumption, there seems again to be no reason to 
suppose that the dynamics of the emergent systems must mimic those of 
the underlying physical reality. Surely, it is sufficient if they are functionally 
realized by that reality.
In any case, even if we grant both assumptions and thereby limit the 
emergent world to conditions in which decoherence obtains, this is still 
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going to result in constraints that are far too weak. Any theory whatsoever 
that is consistent with classical mechanics and which entails substantive 
content only under conditions under which decoherence would obtain will 
have an acceptable interpretation in Mtrue− QM and so will represent a genu-
ine emergent world, as real as our own world. This would include bizarre 
Dan- Brown or John- Bircher conspiracy theories, theories of Aryan racial 
supremacy, the alternative histories of Philip K. Dick, UFO realism—so long 
as these respect classical dynamics in ordinary conditions, there will be a 
real emergent world corresponding to each.
Of course, if we keep loading up conditions on a proper emergent world, 
we will eventually isolate the theory we want. The following five conditions 
might work:
1. extend the model Mtrue− QM of quantum mechanics to a model MQM+branches 
with a branch parameter, each branch being assigned a probability 
weight, a period of time, and a set of particles in each world.
2. Privilege the basis consisting of position and momentum by having the 
extended model MQM+branches assign definite but branch- relative position 
and momentum to each particle that belongs to the branch and at each 
time assigned to the branch.
3. Require that the sum of branch- probabilities corresponding to a 
set of particle positions (or momenta) be a good approximation to 
corresponding sum of probability amplitudes in the original model 
Mtrue− QM.
4. Require that the dynamics assigned to particles by branches approxi-
mate a dynamic theory that is both simple and relies on highly localized, 
separable quantities (i.e., very like classical mechanics) .
5. Require that the branch structure include as many particles and as much 
time as possible, given the other constraints.
We can then stipulate that the only real emergent worlds correspond to the 
set of truths verified by some such extended model MQM+branches. In addition, 
we could count as an emergent theory a theory that is expressed in a reduced 
language of Labsolute, reduced by the replacement of each branch- relativized 
predicate with an absolute version of the same predicate (including location 
and momentum predicates). A theory Tabsolute in the reduced language could 
count as realized by MQM+branches just in case there is a consistent assignment 
of branch- parameters to the formulas of Tabsolute results in a theory that is 
verified by MQM+branches.
However, such a move has four disadvantages:
1. The account is no longer tied to and no longer provides a general theory 
of emergence. Consequently, we would have to deny the emergent real-
ity of other special sciences, like chemistry, thermodynamics, biology, 
psychology, and the social sciences.
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2. We would be offering no account of why these conditions are of great 
metaphysical significance. Why must an emergent world satisfy just 
these conditions to count as real?
3. We would give up the claim that decoherence generates the privileged 
basis by itself. Instead, we would simply be stipulating what we shall 
count as the correct basis. If we try to get around this by deleting con-
ditions (2) and (3), we will be unable to dissolve the Putnam paradox, 
since permutations of the intended model of the emergent world will 
meet the other three conditions. This would leave Pruss’s time shift 
argument, with the superfluity of minds in obviously mindless regions, 
untouched.
4. We would be making the many- worlds or many- branches structure of 
emergent reality true by stipulation.
5  The Solution: Real Essences and Extra- Conceptual 
Grounding
5.1 Two Forms of Grounding
My real complaint is with Daniel Dennett’s “Real Patterns” [Dennett 1991], 
which is the original inspiration for Wallace’s functionalism. I believe, in 
fact, that my arguments in section 3 above would apply with almost equal 
force to any functionalist account of the emergent world, including Bohmian 
interpretations of quantum mechanics. And the deterministic version of 
Bohm’s theory (in which everything occurs with probability 1 or 0) also has 
difficulty accounting for the quantum probabilities. (I leave this extension 
as an exercise for the reader.)
The problem for Dennett is this: what makes a pattern real? As we have 
seen, mere realizability in the true quantum model of the world does not 
suffice. Here is the crux of the problem: we have to construct both the 
theory and its semantics simultaneously, with an aim toward maximizing 
simplicity (in both dimensions). What, then, keeps us from simply collaps-
ing into the identity isomorphism and the trivial theory? If we had a fixed 
theory and had to find the simplest semantics, or if we had a fixed semantics 
and had to find the simplest theory, the problem would be well defined and 
constrained.
We need some top- down constraint. It also has to be an ontological con-
straint: a set of natural kinds of emergent entities, each with a fixed real 
essence. These essences can then constrain both the story and the story’s 
semantics. But to carry this out, we can’t be eliminativists or physicalists—
we can’t limit the fundamental structure of reality to what can be described 
exclusively in quantum- mechanical terms. When things have real essences, 
they must be real.
In The Atlas of Reality, my co- author Tim Pickavance and I argue 
for a distinction between conceptual grounding and extra- conceptual 
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grounding. [Koons and Pickavance, pp. 62–5] On our view, grounding 
is an explanatory relation between truths or facts. Along with Kit Fine 
[Fine 2012] and gideon Rosen [Rosen 2010], we take all grounding facts 
to be underwritten by facts about some real essence or essences of enti-
ties involved. When we say that one truth is grounded in another, there 
are two importantly different cases to consider. First, it could be that the 
truth of p is grounded in the truth of q because of relations between the 
essences of some of the concepts or logical operators appearing in the two 
propositions. So, for example, the truth of a disjunction (p∨q) is grounded 
in the truth of the atomic proposition p (if both are true) by virtue of the 
essence of the logical operator of disjunction, ∨. Similarly, the truth of 
John is a bachelor may be grounded in the truth of the proposition John 
is a never- married adult male human being by virtue of the essence of the 
concept bachelor. In other cases, however, we must appeal to the essences 
of extra- conceptual entities, entities that are not essentially part of some 
abstract object of thought. For example, the existence of the singleton 
{Socrates} is wholly grounded in the existence of Socrates, but this ground-
ing relation depends on certain facts about the essence of a singleton set 
like {Socrates}. Thus, the grounding of the existence of the singleton set in 
the existence of its member gives us no reason to eliminate sets from our 
ontology. We explain the distinction further in The Atlas of Reality:
The distinction between conceptual and extra- conceptual grounding 
turns on a very subtle difference. Compare the following two claims, 
where ‘[Fa]’ abbreviates the proposition a is F and ‘[Ga]’ abbreviates 
a is G:
•	 [Fa]’s truth is grounded in [Ga]’s truth.
•	 [Fa]’s truth is grounded in a’s being F, and a’s being F is grounded 
in a’s being G.
In both cases, the truth of [Ga] is in some sense prior to, more fun-
damental than the truth of [Fa]. In the first case, the dependency is 
propositional or conceptual, in the latter case, extra- conceptual. To dis-
tinguish between the two, we have to look carefully at what licenses 
or justifies the explanatory connection between a is F and a is G: is it 
licensed by the essence of the property designated by the predicate F or 
the concept the predicate expresses? Is the essence involved in some-
thing in the mind- independent world, or is it merely in the mind?
[Koons and Pickavance 2017, pp. 63–4]
The two kinds of grounding have very different ontological import. 
Conceptual grounding gives us reason to think that the entities putatively 
designated by the concepts in the proposition whose truth is grounded in 
other propositions (lacking those same concepts) do not really exist. We 
can safely eliminate them from our ontology. However, as Pickavance and I 
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explain, the eliminativist option breaks down in the case of extra- conceptual 
grounding: if the entities in the grounded fact didn’t exist, they couldn’t have 
an essence, and without an essence, the relation of extra- conceptual ground-
ing between that fact and its ground could not exist.[Koons and Pickavance 
2017, p. 64]
It would be incoherent to say both that all grounding is conceptual and 
that reality is purely quantum- mechanical, because concepts and proposi-
tions do not appear at the fundamental level of quantum mechanics. And yet, 
they must have non- trivial essences if the project of conceptual grounding is 
to work. This simple fact explains the incoherence of Dennett’s attempt to 
reduce our existence to the reality of patterns in things as they appear to us. 
It’s impossible for us concept- wielders to be both the grounds of emergent 
reality and merely another component of that emergent reality.
What’s needed in a coherent account of a world that emerges from QM 
is the extra- conceptual grounding of emergent entities in the model of 
quantum mechanics. And the very existence of extra- conceptual ground-
ing falsifies the claim that the quantum- mechanical exhausts the funda-
mental structure of reality. The real essences of emergent entities must be 
co- fundamental with the quantum- mechanical facts. These essences must 
themselves be ungrounded or perhaps zero- grounded, to use Fine’s term. 
[Fine 2012]
Once we posit new entities with their own essences that can explain (in 
a top- down fashion) those entities’ grounding in the quantum domain, we 
open up the possibility that these composite, macroscopic entities (and 
not just their essences) are also ontologically fundamental: metaphysi-
cally dependent on but not wholly grounded in (not fully explainable in 
terms of) the micro- quantum realm. In particular, there could be a dia-
chronic and causal component to the answer to van Inwagen’s Special 
Composition Question [van Inwagen 1990, pp. 21–2]: the existence of a 
composite macro- object on a certain branch of the cosmic wavefunction 
might be causally dependent on the prior existence of composite objects 
in that branch in the immediately preceding period, that is, partly depen-
dent on composite objects in that branch with the required fundamental 
causal powers. This would, of course, fit well with Aristotle’s vision of 
the world, in which the generation of new composite substances is always 
the result of the “corruption” of pre- existing substances, with the pro-
cesses of corruption and generation being explainable in terms of the exer-
cise of active and passive causal powers by participants in the processes. 
On a hylomorphic interpretation of everettian quantum mechanics, the 
state of the quantum wavefunction (in particular, the presence of decoher-
ent branches) is the material cause of the existence of certain composite, 
macroscopic entities. But the quantum function by itself is not a meta-
physically sufficient ground or explanation: in addition, there must be a 
formal cause, reflecting the real essence of a natural kind of macroscopic, 
composite object. The presence of such a substantial form in a branch 
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of the cosmic wavefunction at a particular place and time would have a 
diachronic causal explanation, which could make reference to earlier facts 
at the emergent scale in the branch in the spatial neighborhood of the per-
sisting or newly generated composite substance.
To put the point more formally, we must enrich our base model, rep-
resenting fundamental reality, by supplementing Mtrue− QM with a set of 
natural- kind essences K and a fundamental composition relation COMP. 
The new model, MQM+HM (HM for “hylomorphism”) would be defined 
over a language that contains constants for each of the natural kinds in 
K along with a four- place part- of predicate P, where P(k, p1, p2, t) repre-
sents the fact that both particles p1 and p2 are at time t proper parts of a 
substance of kind k. The truth- conditions for the P predicate will be given 
by the fixed COMP relation in the model, with the stipulation that, for 
fixed time t, each particle can be part of at most one substance. That is, a 
particle cannot satisfy the P predicate at the same time for two different 
natural kinds, and the binary relation of being two parts of a substance of 
a given kind will be an equivalence relation on particles (reflexive, sym-
metric, and transitive).
The natural kinds will make a real difference by virtue of constraining 
acceptable models to connect substances of each kind with appropriate 
branches in the branching- extension of MQM defined by the five conditions 
in section 3.7 above.
MQM+HM is an acceptable model of the emergent world if and only if 
there is a branch extension of the base model MQM+branches meeting the 
five conditions in 3.7 such that, for any kind k in K, for any world w in 
W, for any particles p1 and p2 and time t in D(w), if MQM+HM  |= P(k, p1, 
p2, t), then there is a branch b in MQM+branches such that p1 and p2 belong 
to b in w at t, and the tuple 〈p1, p2, t, b〉 satisfies all of the metaphysical 
conditions associated with natural kind k.
The appeal to natural kinds of substantial forms enable us to overcome the 
four problems we identified at the end of section 3.7:
1. The account is a general theory of emergence. every emergent domain 
depends on an appropriate set of natural kinds (macrophysical, thermo-
dynamic, chemical, biological, etc.).
2. It is the fundamental existence of the emergent natural kinds that lends 
metaphysical significance to the constraints.
3. The essences of the natural kinds select the privileged basis of operators, 
by requiring a range of values for the corresponding parameters.
4. The essences of the natural kinds provide the ground for the truth 
of the multiple- branch structure within the wavefunction, since each 
essence requires the existence of a branch of an appropriate kind for its 
actualization.
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5.2 Bonus: Restoring the Real World’s Unity
Once we have real essences at the macroscopic level, we have the real pos-
sibility of diachronic, horizontal causation at that same level. In particular, 
we can consider positing a dynamic element to the solution of van Inwagen’s 
Special Composition Question. We can call the result the traveling forms 
interpretation of quantum mechanics. This interpretation has some simi-
larity to Jeffrey Barrett’s single- mind interpretation [Barrett 1995], except 
where Barrett has a cohort of conscious minds traveling through the 
branching structure of the Many Worlds Interpretation, the traveling forms 
interpretation has instead a cohort of composite macroscopic objects. In 
Barrett’s interpretation, all branches but one are occupied by zombies, by 
living human bodies that lack consciousness. In Barrett’s picture, it is the 
presence of real consciousness that picks out the uniquely actual branch.
On my traveling forms interpretation, in contrast, all branches but one 
are occupied by pluralities of particles that fail to compose anything at all. 
We might call these pluralities of fundamental quantum particles “compo-
sitional zombies.” Although they have, from the microphysical perspective, 
everything that is needed for the potential existence of macroscopic objects 
(stars, planets, organisms, macro- molecules), no actual composite entities 
correspond to these branches. They are occupied wholly be compositional 
zombies.
Thus, the traveling forms version is not committed to anything like sub-
stance dualism: it is consistent with the supervenience of the mental on the 
physical, so long as the physical includes facts about which particles com-
pose larger physical wholes. It does, however, deny that the compositional 
facts about physical entities supervene on the microphysical or quantum 
facts alone. Whether a branch corresponds to a domain of actual compos-
ite physical objects will depend on two factors: (1) does the branch satisfy 
decoherence to a sufficient degree of exactitude (a degree determined by the 
real essences of composite physical kinds)? And, (2) has the branch been 
occupied by composite objects in the immediate past, composite objects that 
are disposed either to persist in time or to generate new composite objects? 
In addition, there is a third, indeterministic factor: whenever a branch splits 
into two potential macro- worlds, the substantial forms responsible for 
composition jointly actualize macroscopic composition in just one of the 
new branches, with a probability normally determined by Born’s rule (i.e., 
a probability proportional to the square of the amplitude of each branch).
I talk of traveling forms because I want to relate this interpretation to the 
Aristotelian theory of substantial forms. A substantial form is something (a 
principle or process) that is responsible for making what would otherwise 
be a mere cloud or heap of smaller entities into a single composite substance. 
For Aristotelians, a substance is an entity that is primary in the order of exis-
tence, an entity that has unity to the highest degree (per se unity) and which 
is the bearer of fundamental causal powers. It is an axiom of Aristotelian 
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metaphysics that no substance is composed of other substances. Substances 
stand at the top of the compositional hierarchy. (For more details, see the 
chapter in this book by Alexander Pruss and the appendix below.)
6 Conclusion
Clearly, what’s needed to rescue Wallace’s picture is some further constraint 
on the interpretation function. Wallace’s intention is surely that this extra 
constraint should have something to do with decoherence, with a linkage of 
some kind between macroscopic and quantum dynamics. However, as we 
have seen, the functionalist model that Wallace adopts, following the lead 
of Dennett’s “Real Patterns” [Dennett 1991] won’t deliver what is needed.
Ultimately, the extra constraint must have a top- down salient to it: it 
must derive somehow from the real essences of macroscopic substances 
(in Aristotle’s sense, primary beings). But once we add these new elements 
of constraint, it will be hard to resist the temptation to move still farther 
away from the everettian picture. The essences of macroscopic substances 
can give rise to novel causal powers at that level, causal powers that can 
determine which branch of the quantum wavefunction is really occupied 
by composite substances of the appropriate kind, restoring a single, unified 
world to the picture and thereby avoiding the twin problems of possible 
trans- world values and of anti- Darwinian branches.
Notes
1 I would like to acknowledge the support during the 2014–15 academic year of the 
James Madison Program in American Ideals and Institutions at Princeton Univer-
sity (for a Visiting Fellowship) and the University of Texas at Austin (for a faculty 
research grant).
2 Strictly speaking, the function isn’t unique, but any two acceptable functions will 
be such that each is a linear transformation of the other.
3 Let A be a set of formulas that is logically consistent (in Lewis’s conditional logic). 
extend A to a maximum consistent set C. given our assumptions about the model 
(namely, that the system of spheres is dense, with a sufficient number of worlds 
in each sphere- membership equivalence class), we can find an interpretation func-
tion I that verifies all of C (and, therefore, also A) in Mbase. We can use C to impose 
a partial ordering on the formulas of the language: φ ψ≤  iff ‘ (( ) )φ ψ φ∨ → ’ ∈C. 
We can then use the Axiom of Choice to find a 1- to- 1 function from this order-
ing into the system of spheres S in such a way that the smallest sphere containing 
a ψ- world contains the smallest sphere containing a ϕ- world iff ϕ ≤ ψ. Now take 
every set G of atomic formulas such that for every χ consisting of a conjunction 
of members of G and of negations of atomic non- members of G, the formula 
‘¬ → ¬( )φ χ ’ belongs to C. Select a world from the designated set of closest ϕ 
worlds and place it in the extension of exactly the members of G. By repeating this 
for every formula  and every set of atomic formulas G, we will build the appropri-
ate interpretation function I.
4 Remember: I assumed above that Mtrue− QM has a sufficiently rich structure that we 
can embed in it the canonical model for the logic of counterfactuals. That means 
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that any consistent theory in that language has an interpretation in Mtrue− QM, aside 
from issues of the cardinality of the world.
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A The Traveling Forms Interpretation
My version of the Traveling Forms interpretation draws heavily upon the 
decoherence program and the work of the Oxford everettians. I take deco-
herence as defining a set of branches, each of which constitutes the potential 
existence of an emergent realm of composite objects. The potential exis-
tence of emergence objects is a product of two things: the decoherence of a 
branch of the wave function, and a fixed inventory of macroscopic essences. 
However, the combination of these two is not sufficient for existence of 
any composite physical entity. In addition to the material cause (the branch 
of the wave function) and a formal cause (the macroscopic essences) there 
must also be an efficient cause at the emergent level: some pre- existing com-
posite substances whose causal powers are responsible for jointly actual-
izing the potential of one of the branches to be the material substrate of 
further emergent composite substances.
When the actualized branch of the world splits into two or more potential 
successors, the substances making up the actual branch determine, through 
the exercise of indeterministic active and passive causal powers, which one 
of the successor branches shall be actual. each exercise of such a causal 
power is a thoroughly local affair, but by actualizing one of the potential 
successor- states in its environment, each substance contributes to choosing 
a single branch for the entire cosmos. Hence, all of the substantial forms 
travel together through the branching structure of the decohering quantum 
world.
A.1 Traveling Forms and Ontic Vagueness
There is an obvious objection to this wedding of the Oxford everettian 
QM with Aristotle’s hylomorphism. The processes of decoherence produce 
branches that are only approximately classical. The emergent entities occu-
pying each branch are only approximately localized in a spacetime region, 
and, in fact, the very number of branches is indeterminate, depending on 
how fine- grained a set of macroscopic descriptions we deploy. How, then, 
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can it be a metaphysically fundamental fact that only certain macroscopic 
substances exist and exist in a way that corresponds to just one branch? 
The emergent entities of the Oxford school’s version of everettian QM are 
irreducible vague, and vague things cannot be fundamental.
There are two possible responses. First, one could hold that the sub-
stantial forms added to the theory by the traveling forms interpretation are 
able, in and of themselves, to fill in the indeterminacies left by the quantum 
wavefunction. So long as something sufficiently branch- like exists in the 
quantum wavefunction, the wavefunction is enabled to play its role as the 
material cause of the existence of macroscopic objects, with the substantial 
forms supplying definite locations for composite wholes, locations that are 
more determinate than the sum of the locations of their parts.
But there is a second solution that I think is preferable: simply assert 
that vague objects can be fundamental. Many philosophers have defended a 
thesis of ontic vagueness, vagueness in the world that is not merely the by- 
product of ambiguity or linguistic looseness. We could, for example, model 
such ontic vagueness by postulating that there can be more than one actual 
world: see Barnes 2010 or Koons and Pickavance 2017, pp. 275–9. These 
multiple actual worlds must be “bunched” together pretty tightly (at least, 
at the macroscopic scale): no cases of cats that are both alive and dead are 
allowed. Indeed, as Pickavance and I argue, ontic vagueness seems unavoid-
able, since linguistic or conceptual vagueness entails ontic vagueness (since 
meanings and thoughts are things).
A.2 Three Bonuses for Traveling Forms
First, the traveling forms interpretation ensures that everything a rational 
agent could care about exists in only one branch. Hence, Savage’s Sure Thing 
Principle applies with exception, given the supervenience of value on being. 
Consequently, we can explain why rational agents must assign probabilities 
to the various possible branches in a way that respects classical probability 
theory. We can then appeal, quite legitimately, to the sort of physical sym-
metries noted by Deutsch and Wallace, as grounds for identifying objective 
chance with the square of the quantum wave amplitude.
Second, the traveling forms interpretation solves the problem of anti- 
Darwinian branches. Once we return to a one- world interpretation of 
probability, we can again treat possibilities that have astronomically low 
probabilities as close to impossibility. We don’t have to imagine that they 
are all equally denizens of reality. This feature of one- world probability 
is equally applicable to retrospective and prospective uses of probabilities. 
Hence, we can justify our a priori confidence that we do not inhabit a madly 
anti- Darwinian branch.
Third, the traveling forms interpretation enables us to ground scientific 
knowledge in the interaction with thoroughly local causal powers. Scientific 
knowledge is possible only because objects have active causal powers 
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and we (and our instruments) have corresponding passive causal powers. 
Actually, experimentation depends on causal powers running in both direc-
tions, so we can suitably prepare the experimental situation by undertak-
ing the appropriate interventions or manipulations. (See Nancy Cartwright, 
Nature’s Capacities and their Measurement [Cartwright 1989], and Brian 
ellis, Scientific Essentialism [ellis 2001].)
The multi- world everettian functionalist has no room for localized 
causal powers. The quantum wave function is essentially non- separable. It 
can perhaps simulate localized causal powers, but simulation is not realiza-
tion. Simulated experimentation is not experimentation. It can yield only 
the simulacrum of knowledge, not real knowledge. If simulated experiments 
were as good as real experiments, we could save a lot of money by aban-
doning our laboratories with their expensive equipment and just run all our 
experiments in CgI!

1  From Quantum Mechanics to Many- Worlds to  
Many- Minds
Interpretations of quantum mechanics divide into two classes: no- collapse 
interpretations where the wavefunction always evolves deterministically 
according to the Schrödinger equation (i.e., there is a unitary family of time- 
evolution operators) and ones where this evolution is interrupted by “col-
lapse”. No- collapse interpretations have the benefit that they have a simple 
and precisely defined dynamics for the evolution of the wavefunction, with 
a minimum of free parameters. Collapse interpretations, on the other hand, 
need to have an additional account of (a) the mathematics of the collapse 
phenomenon and (b) what triggers it. Copenhagen- style collapse interpre-
tations say that collapse is triggered by measurement, but it is famously 
difficult to give a precise account of what counts as a measurement. Newer 
collapse theories like the ghirardi- Rimini- Weber (ghirardi et al. 1986) the-
ory give a precise stochastic dynamics for what triggers collapse, but this 
both complicates the physics and introduces a new free parameter that con-
trols the frequency of collapse.
Of course, our epistemic preference for simpler theories can be overrid-
den by other considerations, such as predictive or explanatory power, but 
it is at least worth seriously exploring simpler theories to see where they 
lead. For this reason, in this paper I will focus on no- collapse theories. As 
regards the evolution of the wavefunction, no- collapse theories are simplest. 
However, some no- collapse theories supplement the simple account of the 
evolution of the wavefunction by some additional dynamics. Most famously, 
Bohm’s no- collapse theory supplements the account of the wavefunction 
with a deterministic account of the movements of particles. The “Traveling 
Forms” theory that I will explore in this paper is in this vein: it accepts a 
simple Schrödinger dynamics for the wavefunction, but supplements it with 
a story about the dynamics of Aristotelian forms. I will leave it to the reader 
to judge how the additional complexity in this story measures up against the 
additional complexity in the collapse theories.
A Traveling Forms 
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The “Traveling Forms” interpretation will be explored with a line of 
thought that starts with the very simplest of no- collapse theories. Where 
it ends isn’t all that simple, with the notable exception of maintaining the 
simple Schrödinger dynamics of the wavefunction. But I hope that the step- 
by- step development of it will be plausible at least to those with Aristotelian 
sympathies.
Throughout this paper, I will assume that something like quantum mechan-
ics, appropriately interpreted, provides a comprehensive global descrip-
tion of physical reality. One could instead take a view like Cartwright’s 
(Cartwright 1983, 1999) that our laws of physics describe special and fairly 
localized situations. I have no new argument for this comprehensiveness: 
I am just more sympathetic than Cartwright to taking aesthetic consider-
ations like elegance and simplicity as a guide to truth. Readers not sympa-
thetic to this such considerations may take the project to be Quixotic.
I am putting off the question of what the metaphysics of the wavefunc-
tion or quantum state is until Section 6. Until then, as is common practice, 
I will often ignore the difference between the wavefunction considered as a 
mathematical object—a function (i.e., a set of ordered pairs) from an inter-
val of real numbers to vectors in a Hilbert space—and the time- varying 
physical reality that is represented by this mathematical object.
The physically and mathematically simplest of the no- collapse theories 
is everett’s many- worlds interpretation (MWI). On this interpretation, the 
wavefunction evolves deterministically over time in accordance with the 
Schrödinger equation, and encodes the whole truth about physics. After an 
electron in a superposition of spin- up and spin- down states passes through 
a magnetic field in the Stern- gerlach experiment, the wavefunction encodes 
it as being in a superposition of two different positions, say, an upper posi-
tion corresponding to the spin- up state and a lower position corresponding 
to the spin- down state. When an observer then checks whether the electron 
is in the upper or lower position, the wavefunction encodes the observer 
as being in a superposition of a state of observing the upper position and a 
state of observing a lower position.
But in fact, we never perceive ourselves to be in a superposition of two 
different observational states. To explain that, the everett interpretation 
notes that the final state can be described as split into two superimposed 
branches: one where the electron has spin- up, is in the upper position, and 
is observed as being in the upper position, and the other where it has spin- 
down, is in the lower position, and is observed to be in the lower position. 
These branches can be thought of as worlds inside a multiverse, and so there 
is an observer in one branch who unambiguously observes the upper posi-
tion, and an observer in the other branch who unambiguously observes the 
lower position.
A standard objection to MWI is that it does not do justice to prospec-
tive probabilities. Suppose that the initial electron state is so prepared that 
the spin- up state has significantly higher weight than the spin- down state, 
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which nonetheless has non- zero weight, and that I am the observer. Thus, 
the state is
a b| |↑〉+ ↓〉  (1)
where | | | |> 0a b  and |a|2 + |b|2 = 1. Then, according to the Born rule, 
which is empirically central to quantum mechanics, I should assign prob-
ability |a|2  > 1/2 that I will observe the electron as being in the upper posi-
tion and that I will not observe the electron as being in the lower one. But it 
seems that there are two final branches: one with an observer observing the 
upper position, and one observing the lower position. The two observers are 
ontologically on par, and they each derive from me.
It seems that given the metaphysics of the situation, I should make one of 
four predictive judgments:
(1) each observer is a future me, so I should assign probability one to both 
observations.
(2) Neither observer is a future me, so I should assign probability zero to 
both observations.
(3) By indifference, as the observers are metaphysically on par, I should 
assign probability 1/2 to each observation.
(4) This is a situation where probability assignments make no sense, so I 
should take each observation to be a probabilistically non- measurable1 
event.
But none of these are what the Born rule requires of us, which is an 
asymmetrical assignment of a high probability to the upper position obser-
vation and a low probability to the lower one. granted, the wavefunction 
assigns a higher weight to the branch with the upper position observation. 
But this weight does not describe either an objective chance or an uncer-
tainty of any proposition (whether de dicto, de re, or de se). Imagine that 
you were going to branch into two future persons, one of whom had liter-
ally a higher weight—i.e., was fatter—than the other. You wouldn’t epis-
temically privilege the events that will happen to the fatter one. Why should 
you epistemically privilege the events that will befall the one with the higher 
wavefunction weight?2
Defenders of MWI have two main answers to this. The first is to say 
that in reality the branches are not neatly delineated, and we cannot say 
that there are only two relevant branches. That challenges option (3), but 
strengthens option (4), and leaves (1) and (2) unaffected. And (3) was 
already the weakest of the options, because of its reliance on the dubious 
principle of indifference.
The second response is to offer axioms of decision theory and prove, 
given the axioms, that probabilities should be attached in accordance with 
the Born rule (the pioneer is Deutsch 1999). This response suffers from two 
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serious difficulties. The first difficulty is that it assumes that if we were to 
find ourselves in the metaphysical scenario described by MWI, there would 
be a rational decision theory available to us giving rational ways to assign 
values to uncertain future outcomes. But the plausibility of (1) undercuts 
that assumption.
The second difficulty is a reliance on axioms that are dubious in fission 
situations. For instance, consider the principle that adding an additional 
payoff v2 to each outcome of a game E1 with value v1 results in a game with 
value v1 + v2.3 But now suppose that playing E1 results in a metaphysically 
symmetric fission of the player into n branches, where n > 1. Then, by sym-
metry, the player either survives in all branches or in none. If the player sur-
vives in all branches, then the value with the extra payoff will be v1 + nv2, as 
the player will get the extra payoff twice. If the player survives in no branch, 
then the value with the extra payoff will be just v1, which will be the value 
of certain death. Only in the special case where v2 = 0 does the composite 
game have value v1 + v2. And if we add that there is no fact of the matter as 
to what the number n of branches is, then things only get worse: there is no 
fact of the matter about the total value received.
In order to solve the probability problem, Albert and Loewer introduced 
the many minds interpretation (MMI) of MWI (Albert and Loewer 1988). 
The idea is that there are infinitely many minds associated with each branch 
and (conscious) brain pair in the branching multiverse. When branching 
occurs, infinitely many of the minds go into each outgoing branch. However, 
each individual mind has objective chances of going into a particular out-
going branch defined by the Born rule. Thus, in the above spin case, each 
of my infinitely many minds independently has chance |a|2 of going into a 
branch where it observes the upward position and chance |b|2 of going into a 
branch where it observes the downward position. If I am identified with one 
of these minds, my credence in the two observations should be |a|2 and |b|2, 
respectively, as the Born rule requires. Nonetheless, equal infinite numbers 
of these minds populate the outgoing branches.4
However, even though MMI solves the problem with prospective prob-
abilities, it suffers from a different problem. The uncollapsed wavefunction 
of the universe includes many strange branches. The brains in some of these 
branches inhabit sceptical scenarios. For instance, there will be brains in 
vats and Boltzmann brains—brains that appear suddenly out of thermo-
dynamic chaos, live for a short time, and go back to chaos. Some of these 
brains will have phenomenal states exactly like ours. And because of the 
infinities involved in MMI, infinitely many of the minds with phenomenal 
states exactly like yours right now inhabit a sceptical scenario and infinitely 
many of them do not. Moreover, the infinities are supposed to all be of the 
same cardinality, that of the continuum. So it seems that you cannot say that 
it’s more likely than not that your mind is in the non- skeptical scenario set.
Moreover, one can find a pair of sets of continuum- many minds phe-
nomenally indistinguishable from yours, such that (a) your mind is in one of 
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these sets, (b) no two minds ever occupied the numerically same brain but 
instead the sets pick out minds from completely separate branches, and (c) 
all the minds in one set are associated with skeptical scenarios and none of 
the minds in the other set are. Because of (b), one cannot use the branch-
ing chances that MMI uses to solve the prospective probability problem to 
say that it is more likely that your mind is in the non- skeptical set than the 
skeptical set. It thus appears that MMI leads to skepticism.5
There are also ethical problems with MMI. Suppose Alice, Bob, and Carl 
are suffering from an equal pain, and only one full dose of a painkiller is 
available. However, Alice and Bob will gain complete relief from a half dose, 
while a full dose is needed to give Carl relief. If all three are innocent strang-
ers, and I am choosing between giving a half dose to each of Alice and Bob 
or a full dose to Carl, I should choose to relieve two people’s suffering rather 
the suffering of one. But on MMI, whether I give (a) a half dose to Alice and 
Bob each, or (b) a full dose to Carl, the same infinite number of minds have 
relief from pain, since c + c = c, where c is the cardinality of the continuum. 
So, it seems, I have no moral reason to give the half dose to Alice and Bob 
over the full dose to Carl, which is absurd.
2 From Many Minds to Traveling Minds
What if instead, we suppose that there is at most one mind per brain, so that 
when branching happens, that mind goes to one of the outgoing branches, 
with chances given by the Born rule? This is called the single- mind view, 
and it is rejected by Albert because it leads to the “mindless hulk” problem 
(Albert 1992: 130). When branching occurs, all but one of the branched 
brains will be mindless hulks. As the minds spread out through the branches, 
eventually only one brain in the vicinity of a given mind’s brain will be 
minded, and all the other brains around will be mindless hulks. Thus, on 
this view, we are probably surrounded by zombies, which is absurd, and 
makes much of ethics useless.
There are at least two ways of fixing this problem. One way is to sup-
pose that when branching happens and a mind goes along a branch, new 
minds come into existence to populate the brains in the other branches. 
Prospective probabilities will still be given by the Born rule, but there are no 
more mindless hulks around us.
But this leads to two problems. First, it means that probably we (or at 
least our minds) are much younger than we think we are. given the expo-
nential explosion in minds on this picture, most minds come into existence 
at some point well advanced in life. Second, it means that although the 
brains around me aren’t the brains of zombies, their minds are probably not 
the same ones that I met with yesterday. And this may well create ethical 
problems by undercutting promises.
The second solution to mindless hulk problem is to say that while there 
are many mindless hulks, there are none around here. The idea is that the 
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minds are fellow- travelers. When one goes down a branch, the others all come 
along. So our friends and family (and strangers and enemies) all go with us. 
The brains around us have minds, and indeed the same minds that we encoun-
tered in the past. This traveling minds (TM) view was first offered by Squires 
(Squires 1990) and then by Barrett (Barrett 1995). It avoids the mindless- hulk 
problem, without creating the diachronic identity problems that the constant 
creation of minds view faces. It solves the probabilistic problem facing the 
MWI. It is not subject to MM’s skepticism problem, as there no longer guar-
anteed to be infinitely many minds, some in skeptical scenarios and some not, 
with the same phenomenal state as me. Nor is this subject to the ethical prob-
lems of MM, as Alice, Bob, and Carl each have exactly one mind.
There are two apparent costs of TM as a version of MWI. The first is that 
the law of nature requiring the minds to travel together may seem ad hoc. In 
Section 5 we will see that this is a merely apparent difficulty: there is a very 
natural way to develop TM out of modal views.
The second is that TM is a dualist theory, and hence more ontologically 
complex than plain MWI. Moreover, it is more seriously dualist than MM. 
For on MM, facts about the states of minds supervene on the wavefunction: 
each brain in each branch is occupied by the same cardinality of minds. But 
on TM, some branch- brain pairs correspond to one mind and some to none. 
However, as is well known, MM is still a pretty seriously dualist theory. For 
although global facts such as that a cardinality κ of the minds transitioned 
from state A to state B supervene on the wavefunction, there are primitive 
facts about the identities of minds such as that mind m20 will transition from 
state A to state B, which do not supervene on the wavefunction.
And TM is a surprisingly attractive theory, filling a niche in logical space 
that has largely been assumed to be unavailable. It can be elaborated to be 
a dualist theory where the physical world is causally closed, but yet there is 
robust and non- overdetermined mental causation, thereby solving the inter-
action problem. It can likewise be elaborated to yield robust libertarian free 
will together with a causally deterministic physical universe.
Here is how these tricks are done. The physical basis of the story is MWI: 
a causally deterministic physical multiverse. If one so wishes, one can fur-
ther specify that this physical universe is causally closed: no physical state is 
even partly caused by any non- physical state. But in addition to the physics 
of the physical multiverse, there is a mental dynamics. The minds are con-
nected to particular portions of the multiverse, and travel through it follow-
ing the Born rule. We can then specify that what portion of the multiverse 
a given mind is connected to at a given time is at least partly determined by 
its mental state (and maybe some additional primitive relation). The current 
mental state of your mind together with the wavefunction of the multiverse 
then causally affects where in the multiverse your mind will be attached in 
the future, with a dynamics obeying the Born rule.
But because our minds are constrained to travel together, when your 
mind takes a branch, mine comes along. Thus, your mental states affect 
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which portion of the multiverse my mind is connected to, and vice versa. 
Which portion of the multiverse my mind is connected to affects my expe-
rience. But it also affects my bodily state. It does this by affecting which 
three- dimensional body slice in the multiverse counts as my current body 
slice. Hence, your mental states can robustly causally affect what my mental 
and physical states are. This causation does not contradict the causal closure 
of the physical, and does not overdetermine any physical states. Rather, it 
affects which physical states are whose if anybody’s.
Furthermore, the mental dynamics are indeterministic. We can suppose 
them to be under the agent’s control but nonetheless in accord with Born’s 
rule. This control could either proceed through agent causation (with chances 
of action corresponding to the probabilities in Born’s rule) or using a vari-
ant of Kane’s non- causal libertarianism (Kane 1996). Thus, we have robust 
libertarian free will together with a causally deterministic physical universe.
Of course, one does not have to accept causal closure of the physical along 
with TM. One might suppose, for instance, that there is a non- physical first 
cause of the universe, making an initial- state exception to causal closure. Or, 
one might allow the minds to affect the wavefunction of the universe, but of 
course, then one no longer has a solution to the interaction problem and the 
simplicity benefits of not having wavefunction collapse largely disappear.
3 From Traveling Minds to Traveling Forms
In Aristotelian hylomorphism, human minds are forms of bodies. But all 
material substances have forms, not just human bodies. So if we are to build 
an Aristotelian version of MWI, we will need to decide what happens to the 
forms of other substances. Bare MWI doesn’t have forms in it, so it is not 
satisfactory from an Aristotelian point of view.
each of the dualist views building on MWI has an obvious analogue 
where the claims about minds are extended to all forms. Doing this does 
not, however, resolve any of the difficulties we saw facing MM, single- mind 
or one- mind- per- brain. If anything, the difficulties multiply.
For instance, the Aristotelian analogue to MM will say that there are 
infinitely many forms associated with each appropriately shaped chunk of 
matter. But in addition to the epistemological and ethical problems, which 
are in no way helped by extending the theory beyond minds, we now may 
have the problem of multiple forms informing the same matter, something 
that Aristotelians tend to deny. Or, once the single- mind view is extended 
to include forms, we have the problem that not only most of the human- 
shaped chunks of matter around us are mindless hunks, but the chunks of 
matter that would seem to fit other forms are mere formless heaps. Quite 
likely, the earth has no elephants or oak trees, but only heaps shaped like 
them but literally formless. But then the Aristotelian apparatus is not very 
useful for studying the world around me—perhaps the only biological sub-
stance I ever met is myself.
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We resolved the problems facing MWI and other dualist extensions of 
MWI by going with TMs. We can now craft an Aristotelian analogue to 
TM: the traveling forms (TF) interpretation. In addition to there being 
minds—i.e., forms of thinking animals like us—that travel together through 
the branching multiverse, there will be other forms, and all of these will 
travel together, sticking to the same branch.
In this picture, in all but one branch of the multiverse, the macroscopic 
chunks are formless chunks or heaps or waves rather than substances. 
These formless quantum systems may correspond to the same aspects of 
the global wavefunction that a donkey or an oak tree does, maybe even 
having an exactly similar effective system wavefunction, but because of the 
lack of form all there is is the wavefunction. Only here, in our branch, does 
the wavefunction come together with an asinine or quercine form and pro-
duce a donkey or an oak, with its distinctive biological function, and, in 
the case of the donkey, its mental life. In the other branches, eliminativism 
about the biological and the mental holds sway.
One might also consider a more ontologically austere version of the view, 
where reference to forms is replaced by composition (cf. Koons 2016). There 
are primitive facts about which pluralities of particles compose a whole. 
And these facts are so arranged that non- trivial wholes travel together, 
while compositional nihilism holds in all the other branches of the universe. 
This is akin to Markosian’s view that facts about composition are brute 
(Markosian 1998).
I am cautious, however, about the sense in which the constituents of the 
“macroscopic chunks” can correctly be identified. What there fundamen-
tally is at the level of the physics is the wavefunction. One can talk as if 
there were particles in a branch (though the exact identification of branches 
is itself problematic), but it is far from clear that the particles are there in the 
ontology to be composed into wholes. One might do better to talk of partial 
constitution. Some facts about the wavefunction may be partially consti-
tutive of the existence of substances. But only partially: what substances 
there are does not supervene on the wavefunction. There are fundamental 
contingent facts about which “aspects” of the wavefunction partially consti-
tute a substance, with relevantly similar aspects in one branch (namely, our 
branch) giving rise to a substance but not so in another.
Nonetheless, plausibly there are metaphysically explanatory benefits of 
the full Aristotelian apparatus of forms, and so I shall develop the view in 
terms of traveling forms rather than, say, traveling constitution. But the 
interested reader can try to adapt the ideas to the more austere view.
It is essential to this view that forms be taken seriously as fundamental 
constituents of substances rather than as grounded in the arrangement of 
the matter. The forms are responsible for the characteristic behaviors of the 
substances that they are the forms of, rather than being a mere summing 
up of those behaviors (for more of what I think about forms, see Pruss 
2013). The Aristotelianism of TF is a serious dualism, even though it is not 
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a substance dualism because form is not a substance, but a central constitu-
ent of substance. given an Aristotelianism that takes forms seriously in this 
way, and given that we have good reason to think that substances, and 
hence their forms, can persist even if their matter completely changes, one 
needs a dynamics that explains what chunks of matter each form is attached 
to at various times. If we have—as I think we do—independent reasons to 
accept such a strong Aristotelianism, the addition of a dynamics for forms 
to the base MWI story is a necessary addition and hence not a serious cost 
to the theory.
4 What Has Form?
It is uncontroversial in Aristotelian metaphysics that all living organisms 
have form. But does anything else? Aristotle attributes form to artifacts in 
a derivative way. Instead of a house having an intrinsic form like a donkey 
does, a house’s form is found in the mind of the architect. Since the TF pic-
ture has minds in it, it can take up this story about the forms of artifacts.
It is only our branch of the multiverse that has human (or alien) artifacts. 
In other branches, there will be quantum systems whose effective wavefunc-
tions behave much6 like the effective wavefunctions of people, and, corre-
sponding to that behavior, there will be quantum systems whose effective 
wavefunctions behave much like those of houses. But there won’t be any 
people in these other branches. Thus, there won’t be any designers in these 
branches with forms of houses in their minds. And hence, there won’t be 
any houses, unless they are made by immaterial substances, like god or 
angels, that are not localized to a branch.
What about individual fundamental particles, like electrons or quarks? 
Do they have form? This way of asking the question is potentially mislead-
ing, as it suggests that there are such things as particles, and then queries 
whether they have form. But as we saw when considering the “traveling 
composition” view, it is far from clear whether bare MWI should be read as 
implying that particles are in the ontology. The wavefunction could be the 
whole ontology, and talk of the existence of particles could be a convenient 
façon de parler akin to talk of average plumbers, holes, and shadows.
If there are no particles in the bare MWI ontology, then insofar as TF 
builds on that ontology, the question is whether TF will suppose parti-
cle forms, which combine with aspects of the wavefunction to constitute 
particles.
It is simplest to say that there are not, and hence develop a version of TF 
in which the ontology does not include particles.
If, on the other hand, we allow for particle forms in TF and suppose that 
bare MWI does not have particles, then it will be most elegant to suppose 
that just as the forms of larger things travel together, the forms of particles 
travel with them. On this version, the formless branches have no particles 
at all, just a wavefunction. There is something rather attractive about this 
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picture, since it means that we do not have the strange spectacle of heaps of 
particles that behave just as donkeys and oaks but are mere “zombie” don-
keys and oaks. On this view, instead, it is only in our branch that there are 
particles, and hence there are no “zombie” donkeys and oaks in any other 
branch—and presumably none in our branch either.
This picture has much in common with Bohmian interpretations of quan-
tum mechanics. On Bohmian interpretations, there is an uncollapsed wave-
function, with many branches, but only one branch has real particles (often 
called “corpuscles” in the Bohmian literature) with fully defined positions, 
and the particles travel together through the multiverse. The motion of the 
particles then is governed by the wavefunction through a “guiding equa-
tion”. This guiding equation is carefully chosen so that if the arrangement 
of the particles initially satisfies some statistical constraints, the evolution 
of the system will match the Born- rule predictions of orthodox quantum 
mechanics. Traditionally, the particular guiding equation that is chosen is 
also deterministic. However, the constraint that the evolution of the system 
should match the empirical predictions of orthodox quantum mechanics 
appears to be consistent with other guiding equations, and Bell has given 
an indeterministic one (Bell 1987: 173–80). An indeterministic Bohmian 
interpretation has a certain advantage over a deterministic one: quantum 
mechanical explanations are statistical in nature, and extracting statistical 
explanations from an underlying deterministic dynamic is always at least 
prima facie problematic. The indeterministic Bell- Bohm interpretation is 
very similar to a TF with particle forms, except that the Bell- Bohm interpre-
tation privileges particles over other substances.
If, on the other hand, there are particles in the bare MWI ontology, then 
we can ask whether on TF (a) all (in all branches), (b) some but not all, or 
(c) none of these particles have forms. Supposing that all particles, through-
out all the branches, have forms makes for an inelegant system, given that 
this is not true of other substances on TF. Moreover, on this view, we will 
have heaps of formed particles making up “zombie” donkeys and oaks in 
other branches, and perhaps it is a slightly lesser departure from common 
sense if the “zombie” donkeys and oaks are made from more “metaphysi-
cally shadowy” formless particles, ones wholly constituted by aspects of 
the wavefunction. given TF, the view that some but not all of the particles 
have forms—presumably with the specification that the particle forms travel 
together with other forms—makes for greater elegance, and I will dismiss 
the “all” view. But if formless particles have physical behavior indistinguish-
able from that of formed particles, it may seem needlessly complex to saddle 
some particles with form, and so the “none” view appears simplest.
Whether or not there are formless particles in the bare MWI ontology, 
then, we have a choice to make between two views of formed particles: 
either there are none, or they travel along with formed macroscopic things.
While it is in an important sense simpler to suppose that there are no 
formed particles, formed particles help solve a problem that faces TF as well 
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as TM. On TM, minds came into existence in correlation with the brains in 
one particular branch out of many. What process selected that branch and 
destined the others to be full of zombies?
An initially attractive hypothesis would be that the first branch to get a 
brain got a mind. But that doesn’t seem right. For presumably, there were 
some extremely low- weight branches where, very early on in the universe, 
particles (at least in a manner of speaking, if they aren’t in the MWI ontol-
ogy) quantum- tunneled into a Boltzmann brain. It seems implausible to sup-
pose that that freak accident was what ensured that billions of years later, 
non- Boltzmann brains, like human ones, would get minds in our branch. 
And it is not clear what would happen if there were no earliest brain in the 
multiverse (say, because before each Boltzmann brain, there was an earlier, 
or because there was a tie).
Now, TF can solve the branch selection problem for the initial minds that 
TM faces. Minded animals evolved from mindless animals. But mindless 
animals are still organisms and hence have forms. The law of nature that 
ensures that forms stick together in a branch could be taken to ensure that it 
is in a branch that already has forms—say, of plants and mindless animals—
that the forms that are minds of minded animals would arise. We might even 
say that the forms of plants and mindless animals causally contributed to 
the existence of the forms of minded animals.
Of course, this only pushes the problem back. Why did forms of plants 
and mindless animals arise in our branch but not in others? Now if we have 
formed particles in TF, then we can answer that question: for the same rea-
son that minds only came into existence where there are forms of plants and 
mindless animals, the forms of primitive organisms only came into existence 
where there were forms of particles.
If there were particles from the beginning of the universe, this pushes 
the problem to the beginning of the universe. Moreover, at the beginning of 
the universe it need not be a selection problem. For it may well be that at the 
beginning there is only one branch. granted, there would still be a problem 
of explaining the origins of the universe and of a one- branch wavefunction 
at the beginning. But that’s not an additional problem: the problem of initial 
or boundary condition faces every physical theory. But a mysterious branch 
selection in media res seems more problematic.
We don’t know much about the very, very early universe. Maybe there 
were no particles there. But even if there were no particles, perhaps there 
were other primitive entities that had a form—maybe a field, say—and 
perhaps a similar solution can be invoked then. But if only the entities of 
higher- level sciences like biology have form, then we are stuck with form 
appearing late in the history of the universe, and it is puzzling where it 
appears.
It is natural to think that forms could causally contribute to other forms’ 
existence, and so pushing the existence of forms to the (admittedly mysteri-
ous) beginning of the universe will reduce the mystery over the rest of time.
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The best version of TF so far, thus, holds that particles need forms to 
exist and that they exist along with other forms once the other forms come 
into existence during cosmic evolution.
There is, however, a further question about particles. Particles with forms 
are substances. But Aristotelian metaphysics holds that no substance has 
substantial parts. Are there, then, particles that are parts of macroscopic 
substances like donkeys and oaks?
There are three interesting options. First, we could simply answer in the 
negative. On this view, defended by Scaltsas (Scaltsas 1994) and Marmodoro 
(Marmodoro 2013), particles cease to exist when accreted into a substance, 
and the excretion of a particle by substance is an instance of the generation 
of a new particle. Second, we could answer in the affirmative, denying the 
maxim that substances are never composed of substances.
Third, and perhaps most interestingly, we could answer in the affirmative 
while maintaining the maxim. This may initially seem impossible, but there 
are at least three ways of telling this story. On all three stories, the particle’s 
categorial status changes from being a substance to being something else, 
say an accident. On the first way, the particle’s particle form perishes, but 
the metaphysical work done by its form is taken over by the form of the 
larger substance. On the second way, the particle loses its particle form, 
but the metaphysical work done by its form is taken over by a new acci-
dental form within the larger substance. On both of these two ways, the 
post- intake particle is constituted by aspects of the wavefunction relevantly 
just as in the case of the pre- intake particle, together with a different form 
from the previous. We can further subdivide these two ways as to whether 
the particle can survive such a change of form. The third way is that when 
the particle becomes a part of the larger substance, its form remains, but 
changes from being a substantial form to being some other kind of form, 
say an accidental form.
We leave for further investigation which option to take.
5 Values of Observables
Let me sketch a way of making the TF story more precise. Modal interpreta-
tions of quantum mechanics are no- collapse interpretations that single out 
a collection of privileged mutually commuting observables and posit that 
the privileged observables have definite values. Which observables are privi-
leged can vary over time.7 The evolution of the values of the observables 
over time is guided by the wavefunction.
Bohmian mechanics is a modal interpretation where particle positions are 
privileged, but where the evolution of the values of the privileged observ-
ables is deterministic. The determinism in Bohmian mechanics requires that 
the probabilistic nature of quantum predictions be grounded in our igno-
rance and track back to the statistical features of the initial conditions of 
the universe. Such a deterministic ground for probability is philosophically 
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problematic and can be avoided by combining the privileging of positions 
with an indeterministic wavefunction- guided dynamics given by Bell (Bell 
1987: 173–80). Bacciagaluppi and Dickson then extended this indeter-
ministic dynamics to other sets of observables and adopting an indetermin-
istic dynamics appears to be more typical among modal interpretations 
(Bacciagaluppi and Dickson 1999).
Now, the Aristotelian form of a substance defines the kind of thing the 
substance is, its metaphysical species. We can then think of a substance of 
a certain kind as having certain determinables in virtue of being the sort of 
thing it is. For instance, in virtue of being the sort of thing they are, con-
scious animals have the determinable being phenomenally some way (the 
determinate might be “null”, when the human is unconscious), many organ-
isms have the determinable sex, spiders have eight leg- state determinables 
(with a null determinate when the leg is detached), and so on. Call these 
species- based determinables.
We can then suppose that a given species- based determinable D of a sub-
stance x then corresponds to a physics observable O(x, D), in such a way 
that x’s having a particular well- defined maximally specific determinate C 
of D requires O(x, D) to have a particular value o(x, D, C). In the simplest 
case, O(x, D)’s having the value o(x, D, C) is sufficient to nomically or caus-
ally ensure that D has the determinate C. But perhaps there are higher- level 
properties that do not nomically or causally supervene on values of physics 
observables. In that case, OD’s having the value O(o, D, C) will only be a 
necessary condition for the substance to have C, and there will be no more 
specific physics observable that yields such a necessary condition.
Further, we shall suppose that there is a null value of the determinable 
D at times t at which the substance x doesn’t exist. Hence, Alexander’s war 
horse Bucephalus now has null sex, null leg- states, etc. This simplifies the 
story a little by not requiring the relevant observables to vary with time, 
though modal interpretations can handle such variation.
We finally suppose that the observables O(x, D) will always commute, 
and choose a modal interpretation on which they always have well- defined 
values. And then we choose an indeterministic dynamics for the values of 
the observables, say that of Bacciagaluppi and Dickson (Bacciagaluppi and 
Dickson 1999).
I now claim that this modal theory is actually a precisification of TF. It 
has the uncollapsed wavefunction in it, which constitutes the multiverse 
part of TF. It has forms in it. The only thing more it needs is for the forms 
to travel between branches.
And they do. Consider the set 𝒪 of all the observables O(x, D) that cor-
respond to the substances x and their determinables D. “Branches” of the 
multiverse now correspond to eigenvectors of all the observables in 𝒪. At 
any given time t, the actual values of the observables in 𝒪 define a vec-
tor |at〉 in the Hilbert space corresponding to the wavefunction. This vector 
uniquely defined by these two properties: (a) it is an eigenvector of all the 
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observables in 𝒪 corresponding to the values that these observables actually 
have at t, and (b) its projection on the orthogonal complement E𝒪
⊥ of that 
eigenspace E𝒪 equals the projection of the actual full- state vector on E𝒪
⊥. 
Then, |at〉 corresponds to a particular branch of the multiverse.
Then, what makes it be the case that a particular form inhabits a branch 
is that the actual maximally specific determinates of all the species- based 
determinables pick out a set of values of all the observables in 𝒪, and a set 
of values of all the observables together with the actual value of the wave-
function picks out a joint eigenvector vector |at〉 of the observables in 𝒪 that 
corresponds to a “branch”.
It now trivially follows that the forms travel together. No additional law 
of nature, besides the dynamics of the values, is needed to get the forms’ 
togetherness. Rather, the togetherness is simply a consequence of the fact 
that the determinates of the species- based determinables of all the sub-
stances jointly pick out the branch (with the help of the wavefunction).
6 The Ontology Behind the Wavefunction
There is one final gap in the story: what is the metaphysics behind the 
wavefunction itself? We can think of the wavefunction as a mathematical 
object, namely a function ψ from an interval I of real numbers to a Hilbert 
space H. Thought of that way, the question of the metaphysics of the 
wavefunction is a question in the philosophy of mathematics rather than 
of physics. But assuming a realist philosophy of science, this mathemati-
cal object represents some aspect of reality. The interval of real numbers 
represents a sequence of times, while the value ψ(t) of the function ψ at a 
given real number t represents some feature of the physical configuration 
of the universe at a time represented by the real number t. I will call the 
feature of the physical configuration of the universe represented by ψ(t) 
the “physical wavefunction”.
The physical wavefunction affects the dynamics. Plausibly, this requires 
the physical wavefunction either to have fundamental causal efficacy or to 
be grounded in something else that has fundamental causal efficacy (e.g., 
winning a game does not have fundamental causal efficacy, but is grounded 
in the activities and potentialities of agents that do have fundamental causal 
efficacy, and so it can still cause one to be happy). Moreover, even though 
the evolution of the physical wavefunction itself is deterministic, the physi-
cal wavefunction appears contingent: the initial conditions surely could be 
other than they were (e.g., the universe could have started in some pure state 
that always remained static).
In an Aristotelian picture, causal efficacy comes from substances and 
their accidents. We now have a choice. either the ordinary formed sub-
stances—oak trees, people, and maybe particles—ground the physical wave-
function, or else the physical wavefunction is grounded in or identical with 
some other substance.
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One could certainly have a theory on which, in addition to the deter-
minables that correspond to observables, the ordinary substances had 
determinables which jointly determined the wavefunction (both physical 
and mathematical). Thus, facts about the physical wavefunction would 
be grounded in a miscellany of facts about determinables of ordinary sub-
stances, which facts would then be jointly represented by the mathematical 
wavefunction. For instance, one could suppose that I have determinables 
whose determinates encode the first ten components of the wavefunction 
(considered mathematically), while you have determinables whose deter-
minates encode the rest of the components of the wavefunction, and that 
jointly you and I exercise, by virtue of the causal powers bound up with these 
determinates, all the causal power involved in the traveling form dynamics. 
This is not a plausible theory: first of all, you and I are not that special, and, 
second, we still have to answer which ordinary substances’ determinates 
encoded the wavefunction before you and I appeared on the scene.
Presumably, thus, the theory would have to say that each ordinary sub-
stance encodes some aspect of the wavefunction—perhaps aspects that are 
particularly relevant in the vicinity of the substance. Sadly, this makes our 
theory become ungainly through many degrees of freedom as to how the 
information about the wavefunction is distributed among the ordinary sub-
stances. We could, for instance, suppose a Leibnizian story in which every 
single substance carries full global information, so that each substance has 
sufficient information to reconstruct the value of the wavefunction at any 
given time and, by two- way determinism, throughout time. On this view, 
the value of the wavefunction is overdetermined by the information carried 
by the individual substances. Or, we could have the radical opposite, in 
which at any given time, one of the ordinary substances carries information 
about the global wavefunction, and then we have an arbitrary choice as to 
which substance that is. Or we could have something in between, whereby 
different particles carry different portions of information that allow the 
wavefunction to be reconstructed. There are many ways of setting this up. 
The degrees of freedom involved here make TF less elegant—but also give 
hope that there may be multiple solutions.
It seems to be overall more elegant simply to suppose a special global sub-
stance whose state grounds the wavefunction. given that the state changes, 
this state will presumably be an accident of the wavefunction, though we 
might think that the special substance essentially has a time- varying deter-
minable but the wavefunction state comes from the determinates of that 
determinable, and these determinates are accidents (compare how a horse 
essentially has mass, but the particular determinate of mass that it has is 
an accident). Then, the causal influence of the physical wavefunction is 
grounded in the causal powers bound up with these accidents.
Then, this special substance will causally affect the dynamics of all the 
ordinary substances. On the simplest version of the TF view, this interac-
tion is unidirectional. One can also generate a more complex version on 
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which some higher- level substances can affect the wavefunction in ways that 
violate the Schrödinger equation, but then we lose the main benefit of not 
having collapse.
7 What Is Matter?
There is a further and very difficult question for TF: what is matter? I have, 
after all, talked of “chunks of matter” in explaining the theory. It is tempting 
to think—as an anonymous reader suggests—of the quantum state or physi-
cal wavefunction as the matter corresponding to the form. But the TF story 
requires there to be a vast unoccupied region of the physical wavefunction—the 
region of what I called the “formless chunks”. And yet the physical wavefunc-
tion has definite properties and causal powers, while unformed matter does not.
If the physical wavefunction is grounded in features of individual ordi-
nary substances, without a special global substance to ground the wave-
function, then these features could perhaps be identified with the matter of 
these substances. But, first of all, this leaves the question of what grounds 
the unoccupied portions of the wavefunction. Maybe there is one special 
substance that does that, in addition to the ordinary substances grounding 
the occupied portions. The view on which the physical wavefunction was 
grounded in features of individual ordinary substances seemed more com-
plex, and this is a yet further complexity. That doesn’t rule out the view, but 
let’s explore what we could say if take the view that there is only one special 
substance that grounds the whole wavefunction.
One move, then, is to depart from historical Aristotelianism and not take 
the matter particularly seriously. What there is are forms and the physi-
cal wavefunction. The forms have a certain relationship to features of the 
physical wavefunction, by picking out a branch of it as in Section 5, and 
the forms in their relationship to the wavefunction constitute substances. 
Standing in such a relationship to something is what plays the role in TF 
of the forms’ “informing matter” (whether the “special substance” that I 
suggested might ground the physical wavefunction counts as having matter 
on this story is not clear), but there is no such thing as matter (this last is a 
statement that historical Aristotelianism will be friendly towards). “Chunks 
of matter” is, then, just a façon de parler for features of the physical wave-
function, and “formless chunks” for those features that are connected to the 
forms of ordinary substances.
Alternately, one might allow features of the physical wavefunction to 
serve as matter for the ordinary substances. This also departs from histori-
cal Aristotelianism by making a feature of one substance—the “special sub-
stance” grounding the physical wavefunction—be a constituent of other 
substances. What I called “formless chunks”, then, are not literally form-
less—they correspond to features that, while not informed by the forms 
of the ordinary substances, are nonetheless structured by the form of the 
special substance.
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There are no doubt other options. There is significant room for further 
research here.
8 Conclusions
The Traveling Forms account is a no- collapse interpretation of quantum 
mechanics that lets us take seriously non- microscopic levels of reality, as 
well as—we might add—higher- level laws, like biological ones, grounded in 
the forms of things. The account can be seen either as arising from many- 
minds interpretations via a generalization of the Many Minds interpretation 
which solves problems for the everett interpretation, or as a natural modal 
interpretation of quantum mechanics that takes seriously the determinables 
that figure in higher- level laws.
The theory allows for an elegant story about how higher- level causes—
including our will, but not limited to our will—can be genuinely and robustly 
efficacious, even if the microphysical level—the level of the wavefunction—
is entirely closed. It is a story of robust higher- level causation that neither 
supervenes on lower- level causation nor requires downward- causation. At 
the same time, more fully accounting for Aristotelian matter will take fur-
ther research—I’ve only sketches some possible avenues—and this part of the 
story is not at present elegant.8
Notes
1 In fact, saturated nonmeasurable, i.e., with neither a lower nor an upper 
probability.
2 Here’s a potential answer: perhaps personal identity goes along the higher weight 
path. But on that view, you are certain to make the upper position observation 
and certain not to make the lower one, which does not match the Born rule when 
the spin- down state has non- zero weight.
3 In Deutsch’s setting (Deutsch 1999: 3133), this principle is a direct consequence of 
his understanding of additivity, so an argument against this principle is an argu-
ment against additivity as he understands it.
4 It turns out that there is a technical problem here. In order to allow for uncount-
ably many branchings, Albert and Loewer suppose that the infinity of minds 
associated with a branch- brain pair is the uncountable infinity of the continuum. 
However, there is no guarantee that if continuum many minds each independently 
has a non- zero chance |a|2 of going into an up- branch and a non- zero chance |b|2 
of going into a down- branch, then continuum many will go into each branch. 
Not only is there no guarantee of this, but on the standard product probability 
measure model one cannot even say that the probability that each branch will get 
continuum many minds is non- zero—the event of each branch getting continuum 
many minds is non- measurable in the product measure. Perhaps the probability 
measure can be extended to solve this problem. (For more discussion, see Pruss 
2016).
5 A possible solution is to say that there is no fact of the matter as to which brain—
one of the skeptical or non- skeptical brains—your mind is attached to. But in that 
case, we have another problem: there is no fact of the matter whether you are or 
are not in a skeptical scenario. And that destroys realism.
122 Alexander R. Pruss
6 Or maybe even exactly. This depends on whether minds might not have some 
special ability to affect the wavefunction or whether an appropriate causal closure 
doctrine holds.
7 And, in some versions, with context. But that is not an approach I will take.
8 I am grateful to Robert C. Koons for many discussions that have greatly helped 
to improve TF, as well as to an anonymous reader and William Simpson for com-
ments that have enriched this paper.
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1.  The Resurrection of Causal Powers
Causal powers are considered to be certain features of reality that bring 
about change with some kind of natural necessity. A power is typically indi-
viduated by reference to a characteristic manifestation and depends upon 
certain stimuli for its activation: for example, hot water has the capacity to 
dissolve lumps of sugar.1 However, a power may also exist independently of 
its manifestation: water retains its power to dissolve sugar, even when it is 
not being exercised by dropping sugar- lumps into a cup of tea.
The concept of causal power that arises within Aristotle’s account of 
change is receiving increasing attention in contemporary metaphysics,2 and 
has been adapted in different ways in other areas of philosophy besides, 
including the philosophy of science, of mind and of perception.3 For many 
philosophers, this renewed preoccupation with powers proceeds from a per-
ceived failure of Humean metaphysics to offer a satisfactory account of the 
natural world and of scientific practice. However, these concerns have not 
been confined to card- carrying Aristotelians. Toby Handfield has recently 
propounded a doctrine of Humean dispositionalism that claims to recon-
cile causal powers with broadly Humean convictions, allowing modern 
Humeans to put powers to work in good conscience and embrace necessary 
laws of nature.
In this paper, I offer some critical reflections concerning Handfield’s 
account of causal powers,4 partly because I wish to resist a form of disposi-
tionalism I believe to be mistaken, and partly because I suspect there may be 
more general lessons to learn from the problems that arise in attempting to 
pour the neo- Aristotelian wine of causal powers into corpuscularian wine-
skins that philosophers have been carrying since the seventeenth century.5 
According to corpuscularianism, the natural world is composed of a single 
set of basic constituents that are characterised by the fundamental laws of 
our best physics. This view is widely held by other dispositionalists besides 
Handfield, who typically reject Hume’s ontological austerity.6 For this rea-
son, I think Humean dispositionalism may supply a convenient control in 
testing a variety of modern power ontologies.
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I begin by presenting Humean dispositionalism as an attempt to construct 
a theory of causal powers without adopting the modal relations between 
powers and their manifestations that are commonly supposed to be required 
by contemporary dispositionalists (Section 2). Handfield suggests we should 
identify the manifestations of causal powers with types of causal processes 
discovered by the natural sciences, whilst identifying powers with properties 
that are parts of the structures of these processes. In so doing, he believes 
we can give an account of how causal powers may be connected to their 
manifestations without appealing to any objectively modal features that are 
incompatible with Humeanism.
I argue against the coherence of this compromise in the light of quan-
tum physics (Section 3): Humean dispositionalism is unable to isolate causal 
processes in a world with quantum entanglement, and therefore unable to 
individuate causal powers. I think this problem persists across a wide vari-
ety of ontologies (Section 4). Insofar as physical reality is conceived in terms 
of a set of basic constituents that are completely characterised by quantum 
physics, it makes little odds whether Humeans adopt holism (Section 4.1), 
structuralism (Section 4.2), atomism, ‘gunk’, or an ontology of events 
(Section  4.3) in their dealings with quantum entanglement. In each case 
there seems to be small prospects for advancing an account of dispositions 
on the basis of causal structures.
I conclude that, whilst Handfield may be right to reject the claim that 
causal powers are connected to their manifestations by modal relations, 
Humean dispositionalism misconstrues the nature of causal powers, and 
that both Humeans and Aristotelians should reject Handfield’s proposed 
compromise (Section 5).
2.  Humean Dispositionalism
2.1 In Search of Humean Dispositions
Consider again the case of a sugar- lump that is dissolved when it is dropped 
into a cup of hot tea. This is a type of change that appears, under cer-
tain conditions, to be brought about by some kind of natural necessity. 
Dispositionalists claim that water has a capacity to dissolve sugar, whether 
or not any sugar- lump is dropped into a cup of hot tea. This capacity is part 
of the nature of water and renders this change intelligible. Handfield would 
like for Humeans to be able to say the same.
According to standard Humean accounts, however, it is a contingent 
fact that most instances of sugar being wet are followed by instances of 
sugar being dissolved. The world consists of many such regularities, and 
whilst general ‘laws’ may be formulated to account for particular ‘disposi-
tions’, there are no natural necessities that need to be explained. Handfield 
is dissatisfied with this approach to laws and dispositions. He thinks such 
an account gets ‘the order of explanation entirely the wrong way round’.7 
Half- Baked Humeanism 125
Like David Hume, Handfield believes there are no necessary connections in 
nature. Unlike most Humeans, he does not believe that the absence of any 
objectively modal facts rules out an ontology of causal powers.
2.2 A Neo- Humean Theory of Composition
Hume’s anti- modal convictions are compatible with a variety of views con-
cerning the plurality and composition of what exists, including different 
kinds of atomism and holism. However, David Lewis has provided a way 
of translating Hume’s philosophical intuitions into a theory of composi-
tion that is often identified with contemporary Humeanism. His strict neo- 
Humean account turns on two principles:8
Recombination: there are no objectively modal connections in nature 
between distinct existences; any combination is possible.
(Rec) 
Humean Supervenience: the whole truth about the world supervenes upon  
a spatiotemporal distribution of perfectly natural properties localised at 
point- instances.
(HS)
Together, Recombination and Humean Supervenience atomise reality 
into a mosaic of local and contingent matters of fact. There are distinct exis-
tences, but there is no modal glue to bind them together. There is structure, 
but it consists only of spatiotemporal relations. Fundamentally, the natural 
order is an arrangement of ‘just one little thing and then another’,9 without 
any necessary connections between them.
It is a wide- spread belief among Anglophone philosophers in the analytic 
tradition that scientific explanations in general succeed only by reducing 
complex things to the sum of their atomic parts, down to the microphys-
ical level (and beyond). This conviction has likely had much to do with 
the prevailing influence of neo- Humean principles. However, Handfield 
believes we have good reason for rejecting the second of these two prin-
ciples (HS) on the basis of quantum entanglement.10 According to Humean 
Supervenience, material reality is supposed to divide into arbitrarily small 
portions located at separate points in space, such that whatever may be true 
of our world must be true of any duplicate arranged with the same spa-
tiotemporal relations. Two quantum- entangled particles, however, can be 
arbitrarily separated in space whilst remaining interdependent with respect 
to their measurable properties, such that a change in one will invariably be 
accompanied by a change in the other.11 In such cases, the physical state of 
the ‘entangled’ system cannot be decomposed into a product of the constitu-
ent states associated with its spatially separated parts. The two particles 
appear to enjoy some kind of necessary connection.
For Handfield, the heart of classical Humeanism does not lie in the spatial 
separability of natural properties (HS), but rather with the rejection of irreduc-
ibly modal relations demanded by the principle of Recombination (Rec). By 
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contrast, the principle of Humean Supervenience seems to him less motivated 
and less worth the effort of saving—a misnomer whose popularity may have 
more to do with the fact that many philosophers have not progressed beyond 
classical physics and secondary- school chemistry. Where spatial separability 
fails, Handfield seems to suggest fusion instead: whenever ‘someone attempts 
to demonstrate a necessary connection between distinct things’, he explains, we 
are free to posit instead that ‘the putatively distinct things are not really distinct; 
the world is less loose and separate than you thought’.12
The principle of Recombination, however, appears to oppose any com-
mon sense account of causal powers. Whilst different theories of disposi-
tions vary in the details, there is broad agreement that a power ϕ to R will 
require the truth of some non- trivial and objectively modal proposition con-
cerning the power ϕ and its manifestation R—for example, a non- material 
conditional of the form:
Whenever something instantiates the power ϕ to R when S, it is true that 
if it were the case that S, then it would be the case that R.
In our example, it seems the power of water to dissolve sugar and the mani-
festation of a sugar- lump dissolved in hot tea are connected by some form 
of natural necessity.13 Yet by insisting on Recombination, Handfield sides 
with Humeans concerning the absence of any ‘metaphysical glue’ between 
distinct existences.14 Nonetheless, he would like to permit causal powers a 
non- vacuous role in explaining necessary laws of nature that involve dif-
ferent things. In this sense, Humean dispositionalism is only half- Humean: 
Handfield wants to keep an ontology of powers without attributing any of 
the objectively modal features that characterise neo- Aristotelian approaches.
2.3 A Humean Theory of Structure
Handfield believes a distinctly Humean form of dispositionalism is feasible, 
just so long as we are able to distinguish certain causal processes in the 
world as natural kinds. In his opinion, it is the structures of these processes, 
uncovered by our best natural sciences, that can be used to vindicate the 
peculiar characteristics of causal powers.
In launching his theory of compositional structure, Handfield defends the 
rights of Humeans to implement Kripkean intuitions concerning a posteriori 
necessities, such as the claim that having six protons is a necessary property 
of Carbon, or the widely accepted belief that water is necessarily identical to 
H2O.15 Where such necessities exist in nature, they are amenable to expla-
nation in terms of identity and rigid designation.16 These kinds of necessi-
ties are not the sort that Humeans need deny: instead of saying there could 
be a world in which water is not H2O, we should say that a world without 
H2O is a world without water.17 The particular coinstantiation of properties 
that comprise water can still be conceived as an accidental arrangement of 
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determinate constituents: it is not grounded in anything else. However, both 
designators in the identity, water ≡ H2O, must pick out the same entity in 
every possible world, in order for it to be an essential property of water that 
it has the composition of H2O.
This Kripkean kind of essentialism is integral to Handfield’s ‘richer con-
ception’ of structure, which includes more than external relations between 
spatiotemporal parts: for any complex entity with this kind of structure, 
‘there exist relations between the property of being that sort of structure 
and the properties of the constituent parts’.18 Necessarily, anything that has 
the structural property of being H2O, for example, has a part that has the 
property of being a hydrogen nucleus. Such relations are essential to being 
the type of thing that it is. However, Handfield insists that these ‘internal 
relations’ need not add anything to the basic ontology, but may be seen to 
supervene upon the intrinsic nature of the relata taken separately. ‘There is 
nothing else that is involved in grounding the relation’.19
Handfield recognises two kinds of internal relations. Just as a property 
like ‘being H2O’ implies the presence of a part that is ‘being a hydrogen 
nucleus’, so a property like ‘being NaCl’ implies the absence of any such 
part. We can thus distinguish between ‘relations of accommodation’ and 
‘relations of eviction’. His central claim is that we should apply these rela-
tions to causal processes. Just as a composite entity like water is a natural 
kind with an essential structure that includes relations of accommodation 
and eviction, so a causal process may be said to constitute a natural kind 
with the same kind of structural elements. The process of sugar dissolving in 
water, for example, is a type of process that accommodates the property of 
being sugar. The property of being polythene, on the other hand, is evicted 
by all dissolution process- types.
2.4 A Humean Theory of Powers
Handfield seeks to persuade us that causal powers and their manifesta-
tions can be understood in terms of causal processes possessed of essential 
structure. His strategy is: (1) to identify certain types of manifestation with 
certain types of causal processes, and (2) to analyse the modal nature of a 
power in terms of an internal relation between the property identified as 
a power and the property of being the process- type in which this power is 
manifested. More schematically:
given a manifestation- type M for a power ϕ, a necessary condition of an  
intrinsic property P’s conferring the power ϕ is that P be accommodated by M.20
(HP) 
For example, salt has the causal power to dissolve in water because it 
instantiates the intrinsic property of being an ionic compound that is accom-
modated by a distinct causal process- type. On the other hand, the property 
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of being polythene confers no such causal power because no such process 
accommodates this property as one of its essential parts. These types of 
processes and manifestations are supposed to be identified a posteriori. In 
this way, a necessary connection between a power and its manifestation is 
secured, without appealing to any primitive modality, because a process- 
type that is a natural kind necessarily accommodates this property within 
its structure. The independence of a power from its manifestation is secured 
by insisting that the process- type is not always instantiated: the property of 
being salt is not invariably accompanied by the process of dissolving.
There is a certain ingenuity to Handfield’s approach: by identifying mani-
festations with certain types of causal process, he circumvents the problem 
of deviant causal chains that has plagued other attempts to analyse powers. 
For example, an army of nanobots collecting molecules of sucrose involves 
a different process to the sort that takes place when water acts as a solvent 
for sugar by forming hydrogen bonds with the molecules in each crystal; 
however, it is only the latter process that Handfield identifies as the mani-
festation of water’s power to dissolve sugar. Likewise, the problem of mask-
ing is similarly averted: two protons that fail to repel because of the strong 
nuclear force are caught up in a different process than simple Coulomb 
repulsion, but a process involving two contributions that explain the resul-
tant manifestation. Moreover, the internal relation between a power and a 
process- type does not involve the kind of ‘Meinongian’ relation between a 
power and a possible manifestation that has often been criticised, in which 
powers that have not been exercised must somehow ‘point’ toward non- 
existent manifestations.21
There are doubtless a number of other features of this account concern-
ing which we may be inclined to raise questions. I mean to occupy myself 
here, however, with certain types of causal processes that are identified with 
the manifestation of powers, and the robustness of their physical structures. 
As it stands, (HP) affords the potential for multiplying powers ad infinitum, 
since the set of processes involving a stimulus and a manifestation may be 
as large and gerrymandered as one might care to imagine. For example, 
adding sugar to tea might result in the release of burning hydrogen gas, if a 
proverbially mad scientist has configured a mechanism for electrolysis and 
oxidation that activates under this condition. Yet, it is surely false to say 
that a cup of tea has the power to ignite when exposed to lumps of sugar. 
To prevent the multiplication of spurious powers, Handfield is obliged to 
associate power- conferring with a sparse set of causal processes that are 
structurally ‘pure’.22 The full criteria need not concern us here, but a neces-
sary condition of purity is the possibility of isolation:23
Any causal process M is isolated if and only if neither M itself nor any part of 
M is connected causally to any entity which is not itself a part of M.
(IS) 
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This qualification, however, introduces a marked tension in Humean dis-
positionalism that I should like to examine in further detail.
3.  The Problem of Individuating Powers
Handfield is apparently concerned that his account should apply to examples 
in physics: for instance, he discusses possible examples of causal processes 
in quantum field theory and gestures toward the notion of their conserving 
a quantity as a way of getting a grip on them.24 Handfield motivated his 
decision to drop Humean Supervenience- by appealing to the phenomenon 
of entanglement (Section  2.1). If there are physical processes that are sup-
posed to confer causal powers, on this account, they must be analysed as 
physical structures. It is revealing to apply Handfield’s account to a simple 
case of quantum correlations. In what follows (Sections 3–4), I mean to 
demonstrate that Humean dispositionalism fails to offer a coherent way of 
individuating causal powers.25
3.1 A Simple Case of Quantum Entanglement
Consider the following Stern- gerlach experiment involving two electrons,26 
each characterised in quantum mechanics by a spin state: spin- up |↑〉, or 
spin- down |↓〉.27 Both particles are passed simultaneously through an inho-
mogeneous magnetic field, where their quantum states evolve according to 
the Schrödinger equation. In this case, the dynamics is characterised by a 
Hamiltonian with an interaction term that depends both upon the magnetic 
field and the direction of the particle’s spin. It is known that a particle with 
spin- up will be observed as deflecting in the opposite direction to a particle 
with spin- down, but the electron beam is mixed between spin- up and spin- 
down states. Our apparatus has been calibrated so that particles in state |↑〉 
are deflected to the upper- half of a suitably positioned screen, where their 
impact is duly registered.
Suppose particle 1 is in state |↑〉1. According to Humean disposition-
alism, we might say that particle 1 has a power to deflect upwards in 
the magnetic field. It has this power in virtue of instantiating a physical 
property spin- up, which is accommodated in a pure process M- Up1 that 
manifests upwards- deflection, yielding the response Up1 on the detector. 
We can tell a similar story about particle 2. Suppose we assign to one 
person the task of reporting the deflection of particle 1, using one such 
apparatus, whilst another reports on particle 2, using an exact duplicate of 
this setup. In this way, each person can distinguish two outcomes for their 
particle tied to two different processes (Table 5.1), totalling four combined 
outcomes. It is clear that the property and response fields are derivable 
from the set of manifesting processes; it is these facts, if you will, that are 
carrying the story.
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The situation can be complicated by the introduction of superposition 
states, in which distinct states are combined to form new states. For exam-
ple, a particle can be in a superposition of spin- up and spin- down states:
| φ〉 = 1/√2 (|↑〉 – exp(iφ)|↓〉) (Eq. 1)
A particle in state |φ〉 possesses an equal probability of being measured as hav-
ing deflected up or down: it is in an indeterminate state. Nonetheless, such 
a state is distinguishable from spin- up or spin- down simpliciter through the 
observable phenomenon of interference.28 A Humean dispositionalist might 
conceivably delimit the particle’s powers by positing additional processes. 
However, suppose the two electrons, emerging from their common source, 
are anti- correlated with respect to spin in an entangled superposition:
| ψ〉 = 1/√2 (|↑〉1 ⊗ |↓〉2 – |↓〉1 ⊗ |↑〉2). (Eq. 2)
For a system in state | ψ〉, if particle 1 is measured to be spin- up, particle 2 
must be measured to be spin- down, and vice versa.29 However, persons 1 
and 2 were not involved in producing the entangled state. Unless they com-
municate their results, they have no way of knowing that their particles are 
entangled and will record the same results. Nonetheless, the total number 
of outcomes for a system in state | ψ〉 is no longer four but two: Up1 and 
Down2 or Down1 and Up2. What shall we say of the processes and powers 
in this case?
The uninitiated might reasonably question why the correlation described 
in (eq. 2) should be taken to imply the kind of nonlocal connection physicists 
have typically associated with the state of being ‘entangled’. For example, 
one occasionally encounters students in Cambridge who persistently wear 
odd socks: either red on their left feet and blue on their right, or vice versa; 
the choice is random. Suppose that, during a laboratory demonstration in 
the Chemistry department involving such a group, an unfortunate explosion 
takes place in which the feet of each participant becomes space- like sepa-
rated, before their socks can be removed and their colours noted. Whilst the 
anti- correlations that emerge might well be put down to some sort of social 
signalling, we have no cause to attribute the redness of one sock and the 
blueness of the other to any kind of ‘spooky’ connection spanning the gap 
Table 5.1 Measurements for particles 1 and 2.
P1 Response Process P2 Response Process
1 |↑〉1 Up1 M- up1 1 |↑2 Up2 M- up2
2 |↓〉1 Down1 M- down1 2 |↓〉2 Down2 M- down2
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between them. Why should we view the case of our two particles as involv-
ing something essentially different?
There is an important distinction that must be made between these 
two cases. Once the devices being used to detect the spin of the two par-
ticles in our example are rotated in relation to their axis of polarisation, 
the probabilities of measuring Up or Down will fall somewhere between 
one or zero. Significantly, the ‘classical’ assumption that the spin of each 
particle is locally determined prior to measurement—like the colour of 
each sock—results in one set of statistical predictions concerning their 
correlations, but quantum mechanics produces another, and it is the quan-
tum mechanical predictions that are born out in experiments. John Bell 
famously demonstrated that the quantum theory diverges from the clas-
sical theory in predicting the dependence of the correlations upon the 
relative angle between the two polarisers—a fact which neither of the 
particles, considered separately, should be in a position to ‘know’. In its 
simplest form, Bell’s theorem states that any theory in which the particles 
are locally assigned separate spins cannot reproduce the predictions of 
quantum mechanics.30 This theorem and its implications continue to be 
debated, but quantum nonlocality is now a widely accepted feature of 
modern physics.
3.2 The Fusion of Causal Processes
What can we say about causal processes and their powers in this case? 
Humean dispositionalism leaves little room for manoeuvre: the principle 
of Recombination requires that connected properties cannot be treated as 
distinct existences. Suppose we take Handfield at face value, and insist that 
these properties must be fused. Let us assign the states of particles 1 and 2 
to properties P1 and P2, and their power- conferring manifestation- processes 
to M1 and M2. We may then argue as follows:
i. If P1 and P2 are entangled, then P1 and P2 are instances of the same 
property.
ii. If P1 and P2 are instances of the same property, they are part of the same 
process.
Therefore:
iii. If P1 and P2 are entangled, they are part of the same process.
(By i. & ii.)
Alternatively, we might adopt the more conservative approach of assuming 
these properties to be caught up within the activity of the same quantum 
process, rather than numerically identical, and posit premise (iii) directly. A 
pure causal process, however, is supposed to be isolated (IS): its properties 
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cannot be caught up in another process, if that process is to confer causal 
powers (HP). We might capture this uniqueness as follows:
iv. If P is part of a pure process Mi, then P belongs uniquely to Mi.
v. P1 is a part of a pure causal process M1.
vi. P2 is a part of a pure causal process M2.
vii. P1 and P2 are entangled.
Therefore:
viii. P1 belongs uniquely to M1. (By iv. & v.)
ix. P2 belongs uniquely to M2. (By iv. & vi.)
x. P1 and P2 are part of the same process Mi. (By iii. & vii.)
xi. Mi=M1=M2. (By viii., ix., & x.)
The conclusion of this line of argument is that the structures of processes 
involving entangled properties must be fused: properties P1 and P2 are 
accommodated by the same causal process (Table 5.2).
The fusion of causal processes has obvious implications for this account 
of causal powers. If process M- up1–down2 accommodates a property that 
confers a power, it is arbitrary to attribute that power as an intrinsic feature 
of either particle 1 or 2; it should belong rather to the delocalised quantum 
state, however far the two particles may be separated in space, since the pro-
cess must be identified with the manifestation of the total system. A policy 
of fusion and isolation, then, together with entanglement, can only lead to 
a reduction in the number of Humean powers and their delocalisation in 
space, as the various structures upon which these powers depend leak into 
each other. This appears to be in conflict with Handfield’s claim that ‘there 
may exist causal powers which are both local and intrinsic properties’.31
3.3 The Limit of Global Entanglement
The Humean dispositionalist may have hoped to idealise the world described 
by physics simply as ‘one little process and then another’, like a crow’s nest 
woven together from separate twigs that can be pulled apart. The quantum 
physicist, by contrast, sees such structures fusing to form something less 
separable. From her perspective, the world looks more like an anthill in 
Table 5.2 Total outcomes and processes.
Quantum state Manifesting process Response
1 1/√2 (|↑〉1 ⊗ |↓〉2 – |↓〉1 ⊗ |↑〉2) M- up1–down2 Up1 Down2
2 M- down1–up2 Down1 Up2
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which one passage leads into another (Figure 5.1). If the universe as a whole 
began in a quantum state, as many theorists have surmised, there is nothing 
within the dynamics of the Schrödinger equation that can disentangle it into 
separable states.32 I shall refer to this theoretical possibility as the limit of 
global entanglement. To escape it, it seems we must either modify the quan-
tum dynamics, or deny that the world is made of one set of fundamental 
constituents that are characterised solely by quantum physics.33
Of course, my example concerns only a simple case of correlations in 
nonrelativistic quantum mechanics (Section 3), which is now commonly 
regarded as a low- energy approximation of a relativistic field theory. One 
might hope to solve the problem of individuating powers by uncovering sep-
arate structures in quantum field theory. Handfield has argued, for instance, 
that (sets of) Feynman diagrams might be associated with distinct causal 
processes and their essential structures.34 However, I think this suggestion 
is unlikely to receive sympathy from philosophers of physics: Handfield is 
aware that Feynman diagrams are used as heuristic calculating devices in 
perturbation theory, but fails to note that they are limited in their applica-
tion to the case of weakly interacting fields. It is also unclear how such 
‘processes’ could be deemed to confer the status of a power on any property 
that is supposed to be part of their structures.35
I mean to maintain my discussion, for the most part, at the level of non- 
relativistic quantum mechanics, making occasional comments regarding 
any relevant features of quantum field theory. The phenomenon of entan-
glement has been shown to be even more deeply entrenched in axiomatic 
Figure 5.1
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formulations of quantum field theories, but our difficulties may be discussed 
more simply using basic quantum mechanics.36
4.  Quo Vadis, Dispositionalism?
Humean dispositionalism seeks a basis of pure processes for conferring 
causal powers (HP), which are identified by their manifestations. Yet its 
practice of fusing processes together to accommodate quantum entangle-
ment is in tension with its theory for telling causal powers apart. I shall refer 
to this as the problem of individuating powers. Insofar as Handfield con-
ceives physical reality in terms of some arrangement of fundamental constit-
uents that is characterised by quantum physics, I think the phenomenon of 
entanglement poses a difficulty for Humean dispositionalism that needs to 
be redressed: its basic building- blocks do not seem to be the sorts of things 
that could be structured as processes that can be identified as the manifesta-
tions of powers. In what follows, I argue that this problem is invariant with 
respect to a number of physical ontologies that are compatible with quan-
tum mechanics. For instance:
i. We might accept a single causal process and embrace a type of cosmic 
holism.
ii. We could add some kind of structure to account for quantum 
entanglement.
iii. We might restore locality by endorsing a modified form of Humean 
Supervenience, and choose between atomism, ‘gunk’, or an ontology of 
events.
I discuss how to conceive of physical constituents in each of these ways, in 
the light of quantum entanglement. In each case, I express doubts concern-
ing the prospects of Humean dispositionalism.
4.1 The Holistic ascent
Some dispositionalists will be willing to bite the bullet: if the fate of causal 
powers is tied to processes that merge across space- time, then we must 
embrace global dispositions. We should note, before proceeding, that such a 
move involves reconsidering at least one of the motivations for dispositions 
suggested by some philosophers of science. Nancy Cartwright, for example, 
has argued that a capacity plays a well- defined role in marking the perma-
nence of a contribution to the phenomenon under scrutiny.37 The better the 
shielding we can afford a capacity from its environment, the better it manifests 
its nature. On this account, scientists proceed on the assumption that there is 
some signal amidst the noise, pulling things apart in an attempt to secure the 
set of special circumstances in which the feature in question can be studied. 
These circumstances are salient because they are the conditions in which other 
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hindrances are stripped away, and we are able to see what something can do 
in virtue of having that capacity. For nonlocal dispositionalists, however, this 
cannot be a constitutive feature of causal powers in general: shielding cannot 
literally separate global powers from the noise of the environment, because 
they are constitutionally spread across space and time.
Whilst some dispositionalists may be willing to embrace global powers, 
I have two problems with Humean dispositionalists adopting the notion of 
a cosmic process. My first difficulty is this: I do not see how a single cosmic 
process could possess an essential structure that is robust against recombi-
nation, in the way in which natural kinds supposedly achieve robustness by 
rigidly designating the same compositional structure across different pos-
sible worlds. If the structure of the cosmic process is essential, then any 
recombining of the properties that comprise it in a possible world could 
not be identified with the same causal process. If such a process is truly 
cosmic, then recombinations could not be contrived without changing the 
cosmic manifestation with which this process has been identified. Yet if an 
entity cannot survive any form of recombination, it is confined to only one 
possible world. This being the case, it is hard to see how it could have an 
essential structure or satisfy the criteria for being a natural kind.
In weighing this objection, we should recall that Humean dispositional-
ism attempts to derive the modal force of a causal power from an identity 
conceived between a type of process and a manifestation (Section 2.2). The 
two relata that comprise this identity must rigidly designate their referents 
across every possible world generated by recombination. For the global dis-
positionalist who embraces a cosmic process, however, there can only be 
one such identity. Any powers in such a world must be accommodated as 
essential parts of a single process.
It might be argued that the structure of a cosmic process could survive 
some recombinations by being assumed as part of a possible world that is 
‘large’ enough to contain it. Yet I fail to see any coherent way of advancing 
this position. Simply embedding the same distribution of whatever natural 
properties comprised a cosmic process in one world as a subset within some 
‘larger’ world would not guarantee the transworld identity of this type of 
process and its manifestation. If global dispositionalism is true in this larger 
world, then this distribution of properties would be subsumed as part of a 
different cosmic process. Alternatively, if global dispositionalism is false in 
this larger world, then this process would be but one among many processes 
that comprise the sum of its cosmic behaviour. In either case, it is unclear to 
me how the identity between a single process and a cosmic manifestation is 
supposed to be held fixed across more than one possible world.
If cosmic powers are to derive any modal force from their being parts of 
a global process, there appear to be only two possibilities for maintaining 
dispositionalism: either the distinct elements that comprise the structure of a 
cosmic process cannot be freely recombined, or the structure of such a pro-
cess contains no distinct elements at all. The second option is not without 
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motivation: if the ontological fusion of entangled properties were to go so far 
as to condense reality to the point at which there were no distinct existences, 
there would be nothing distinct within the structure of a cosmic process to 
‘recombine’ into a set of possible worlds, and the principle of Recombination 
would be vacuous.38 On the other hand, to own the first option would be to 
accept something about the nature of the cosmic process that prevents the ele-
ments that comprise it from being freely recombined. It is hard to see how this 
could be regarded as anything other than an objectively modal fact. either 
way, global dispositionalism seems to threaten to mutate into some form of 
Spinozistic necessitarianism, in which the entire cosmos is necessarily com-
pelled to be the way that it is—hardly a Humean hypothesis. In short, I do 
not see how the modal features of causal powers could be explained in terms 
of internal relations between a power and a cosmic process type.
My second difficulty with Humean dispositionalists adopting the notion of 
a single cosmic process can be stated more succinctly: if powerfulness consists 
solely in having the potential to act, this would not be a world in which pow-
erful properties could ever be exercised. Consider the example of a stick of 
dynamite sitting idly in a quarry: it has the power to explode, even though that 
power has not been exercised. A cosmos that is identical to the manifestation of 
a power, however, would be like a stick of dynamite that is always exploding: 
for the cosmos to exist, such a power must necessarily be manifested. Yet for a 
process- type to count as the manifestation of a power, according to Handfield, 
it must be possible for it to be uninstantiated.39 Indeed, Humean dispositional-
ism is no different from many kinds of dispositionalism in this respect: it associ-
ates powerfulness with the potential to act in some way, and identifies a power 
ϕ to R with one entity (in this case, a natural property) and its manifestation 
with another (for Handfield, the structural property of being a particular type 
of causal process). It does so in order to account for the distinction between 
the potential to R and the actual manifestation R. It follows that, if the world 
is identical to such a process, it is not a world in which causal powers can be 
exercised to produce numerically distinct manifestations.
4.2 An Appeal to Structure
Humean dispositionalism is threatened by quantum entanglement: the 
more Humeans like Handfield exercise fusion to save Recombination 
(Section 3.2), the less likely they are to isolate a basis of pure processes that 
can be used to account for causal powers. Yet perhaps there are stones as 
yet unturned in tackling the problem of individuating powers. The move 
toward holism involved the claim that the total history of the world is inter-
connected. If causal powers are to avoid going fully global, dispositional-
ists must qualify this move with the claim that there are causally separable 
islands in space- time. Instead of fusing entangled systems, they might sepa-
rate some of these islands by introducing some kind of structure within 
the supervenience base instead. We might then reconceive entanglement in 
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terms of the instantiation of extrinsic connections between distinct exis-
tences. This approach is advanced in Darby (2012).
It has been argued that this solution is only achieved by adopting a weak-
ened version of Recombination (Rec*) in which we must make a special 
exception for the case of quantum entanglement.40 given the extent of 
entanglement suggested by quantum physics, however, such a move would 
involve severely restricting free combinatorialism. If that is so, it is hard 
to see how such constraints could avoid committing Humeans to objec-
tively modal facts, in the form of objectively modal relations, and difficult to 
defend this strategy from the charges of being ad hoc and superfluous. Why 
should physicalists in a reductive mood seek to preserve an ontology of local 
entities with intrinsic powers, if quantum processes do not need them? Why 
should dispositionalists seek an elaborate analysis of powers in non- modal 
terms, if primitive modality is no longer deemed objectionable? In what 
sense could any kind of dispositionalism constructed along these lines still 
be regarded as authentically Humean?
It may be retorted that the relations that comprise the structure of 
entanglement could be conceived nomologically instead, without injecting 
any causal glue into our ontology or implicating Humean dispositionalism 
with objectively modal commitments. I think it makes little difference to 
the doctrine of dispositionalism either way, since I do not believe adding 
structure of any sort will produce a satisfactory solution to the problem of 
individuating causal powers. We should recall that powers are supposed 
to be properties that are identified by their manifestations. For Handfield, 
these manifestations are supposed to be isolated by our best sciences as 
causal processes. If it were impossible for these manifestations to be isolated 
in principle, however, then such powers would be inseparable from the rigid 
nexus of relations in which they are embedded. In that case, we should not 
be able to distinguish them as powers, since we could not assign any defini-
tional content to what they are supposed to manifest. Yet if causal structure 
is to be deployed at the base- level to accommodate an unlimited degree of 
entanglement, and powers are individuated by causal structures, it seems 
such relations will be rigid in precisely this sense. It follows that the addi-
tion of relational structure cannot preserve an ontology of causal powers, 
but only an ontology of hidden quiddities. It safeguards its properties only 
by burying them beneath a scaffolding of global structure. We may consider 
ourselves justified in dropping these properties altogether and following 
James Ladyman in adopting some ontic form of structural realism instead.41 
In any case, I think we should stop calling them ‘powers’.
4.3 Back to Local Constituents via Humean Supervenience
We still have one card left to play in our search for Humean dispositions: 
we might dispute the assumption that quantum entanglement must be a 
fundamental feature of the natural world, as Handfield seems to suppose. 
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Perhaps Humean dispositionalism is guilty of giving up on neo- Humeanism 
too quickly. The principles of Recombination and Humean Supervenience 
have turned out to be more intimately connected than Handfield imagined: 
without the power of Humean Supervenience to atomise reality into dis-
tinct existences, Recombination has been left in danger of having nothing 
to recombine. In fact, quantum entanglement does not pose the insuperable 
barrier to full- blown neo- Humeanism that Handfield supposes.
One way to reinstate a modified form of Humean Supervenience is by 
reifying the mathematical configuration space in which the wavefunction 
of the quantum system is defined. Such a strategy—adopted, for example, 
in Loewer (1996)—involves treating the entangled state | ψ〉 as a field that 
assigns complex numbers at each point in a high dimensional space, and 
regarding basic properties as intrinsic qualities of points in this space, thus 
restoring locality. Humean Supervenience is then redefined to apply to con-
figuration space instead of space- time.
However, this strategy is objectionable on several counts. As a low- 
energy approximation of quantum field theory, the configuration spaces of 
different wave functions may be viewed as derivative of structures in quan-
tum field theory that are defined on ordinary spacetime. Viewed from this 
vantage, the value assigned to a point in configuration spaces is not a local 
fact about that point, but rather depends on the global state of the quantum 
field.42 This move, by itself, does not succeed in restoring locality. Perhaps 
more troublingly, such a slide into mathematical Platonism is in danger of 
dissolving a real distinction between an abstract model and the reality it is 
supposed to be modelling, and in so doing shifting the entire theatre of actu-
ality away from space and time to a mathematical world of abstract proper-
ties. As Michael esfeld observes, this strategy seems to involve giving up ‘a 
central tenet not only of common sense realism, but also of all working sci-
ence’—a move most would only make with cringing reluctance.43 Moreover, 
such a strategy may prove to be only a Pyrrhic victory for dispositionalism. 
If the high dimensional configuration space in which the wave function is 
defined is to be regarded as fundamental, superseding the world of space 
and time, then none of the objects probed by the empirical sciences could 
be supposed to have causal powers, being but shadows cast by the ‘Platonic 
forms’ (if you will) of a reified configuration space.
As esfeld has argued, there are more promising options available for 
reaffirming Humean Supervenience via so- called ‘primitive ontology’ 
approaches to quantum mechanics. Such theories are characterised by an 
ontology consisting of one distribution of fundamental constituents in 
physical space, and a physical law for its temporal development.44 Its basic 
elements are ‘local beables’, which are fully actual and precisely localised 
in ordinary space- time: they do not admit superpositions, entangled or 
otherwise.45
The de Broglie- Bohm theory, more recently conceived as Bohmian mechan-
ics, affords one example of an alternative theory of quantum phenomena 
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that is amenable to this kind of treatment.46 The primitive ontology, in this 
case, consists of particles localised in a classical three- dimensional space 
following continuous trajectories. The theory includes two basic laws: one 
that determines the temporal development of the position of a particle with 
a certain velocity, and the Schrödinger equation, which fixes the velocity of 
each particle at any time t, given the position of all the particles at t. The 
wave function, however, can be nomologically conceived as being part of 
this law,47 thus avoiding any reification of configuration space. An obvi-
ous Humean adaptation of this theory is to insist that this law does not 
correspond to anything extra in the ontology, in addition to a fundamental 
arrangement of physical constituents, but supervenes upon the particles that 
compose it. To make this work, the law must be made to supervene upon 
the distribution of matter throughout the whole of space- time.48
It is also possible to construct primitive ontologies based on the quan-
tum dynamics proposed by ghirardi, Rimini, and Weber, which includes 
the textbook postulate of the collapse of the wavefunction, and posits a 
mechanism for spontaneously localising quantum systems, thus avoiding 
the spectre of a globally entangled cosmos.49 Again, the mechanism involved 
need not be taken to correspond to anything extra in the ontology, over and 
above a distribution of fundamental constituents. One option is to consider 
the primitive stuff as a continuous distribution of matter (also known as 
‘gunk’). Using this ontology, the temporal development of the wave function 
can be encoded as variations in density of this primitive stuff at each point 
in space and time, and the spontaneous collapse of the wave function can 
be represented as contractions in the density around certain regions. The 
chief difference between this conception of reality and a Bohmian particle 
ontology is that all the points in space- time are occupied but admit differ-
ent densities, instead of tracing out worldlines in a void. Alternatively, it 
has been suggested that we should conceive the localisations of the wave 
function using an ontology of events (called ‘flashes’) occurring at certain 
points in physical space. In this case, the points at which the primitive stuff 
is instantiated are separated by gaps in space- time.50
In all these accounts, the principle of Humean Supervenience can be 
reclaimed, but must be restated with greater stringency: the mosaic of local 
matters of fact, upon which the whole truth about the world supervenes, 
may no longer be conceived in terms of ‘perfectly natural intrinsic proper-
ties which need nothing bigger than a point at which to be instantiated’,51 
but must be pared down to space- time points that are either occupied by 
primitive stuff or empty. esfeld describes this position as ‘physicalism with-
out properties’.52 Since one cannot attribute any natural properties indepen-
dently of some context of measurement, such predications cannot refer to 
anything intrinsic to any fundamental constituents. Instead, their truthmak-
ers must supervene upon the total distribution of featureless stuff, like the 
law that describes its evolution. Natural properties are simply predicable 
ways in which quantum objects behave in different measurement contexts.53
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Ironically, conceiving physical properties in this way gives rise once again 
to an effective form of holism that is likely to produce some curious results 
outside of the philosophy of physics. It may come as an unwelcome sur-
prise to some philosophers of mind, for example, for whom mental proper-
ties have generally been supposed to supervene upon physical properties, 
that every mind must consequently supervene upon nothing less than the 
entire cosmos.54 Nonetheless, esfeld regards these qualifications as entirely 
in keeping with the spirit of Humean parsimony, producing a kind of super- 
Humeanism, freed from ‘stock objections . . . from quidditism and humil-
ity’. However, there appears to be no prospect for any compromise with 
dispositionalism along this route. A metaphysic without properties can 
hardly be expected to support an ontology of causal powers, nor can local 
beables plausibly be construed as parts of an essential structure that confers 
causal powers (cf. Section 4.1).
4.4 Reflections
None of the strategies I have considered are clearly viable options for 
Humean dispositionalists who wish to espouse a doctrine of causal powers, 
whilst conceiving of physical reality in terms of some fundamental arrange-
ment of constituents that are characterised by quantum physics. Holism 
threatens Handfield’s account of causal processes with modal necessities 
whilst depriving the cosmos of causal powers (Section 4.1). The super- 
Humean bid to restore locality, on the other hand, comes with a similar 
price- tag: Humeans following esfeld must adopt a stringent formulation of 
Humean Supervenience (HS*) that expels any natural properties that might 
serve as powers from its supervenience base (Section 4.3). To many dispo-
sitionalists, Humean or otherwise, this may seem too high a price to pay: 
we may be tempted to appeal to additional structure instead. Yet this move 
must be made at the cost of reducing causal powers to hidden quiddities by 
engulfing their manifestations (Section 4.2).
In short, whilst Humeanism is compatible with a variety of views concern-
ing the plurality and composition of what exists, it seems the compromise 
of Humean dispositionalism cannot be coherently sustained in the light of 
quantum mechanics. Whichever way we turn, we are left with the problem 
of individuating causal powers. Moreover, this difficulty is not obviously 
redressed by abandoning Recombination (Rec) as a metaphysical dogma 
and injecting modal glue.
5.  Concluding Remarks
In this paper, I have considered a recent attempt to render the doctrine of causal 
powers compatible with broadly Humean convictions (Section 2), using the 
concept of quantum entanglement to probe the ontological commitments of 
Humeans and dispositionalists (Section 3–4). Metaphysical compromises are 
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often problematic, and so it has proven in this case: Humean dispositionalism 
assumes a corpuscularian conception of nature in which reality consists of a 
single set of basic constituents characterised by quantum physics that must 
somehow be related to one another in order to be powerful. In attempting to 
preserve the explanatory virtue of powers, Handfield seeks a basis of causal 
structures, supposedly isolated by our best natural sciences, for the purpose of 
connecting powers to their manifestations (Section 2). However, the compul-
sion to fuse causal processes together, arising from quantum entanglement, is 
opposed to the pressure to keep their physical structures apart, for the sake of 
individuating powers (Section 3). This tension remains unresolved, whatever 
ontology of constituents is adopted (Section 4). I suspect that this is the stress 
that arises from trying to have one’s cake and eat it.55 Half- Humeanism may 
turn out to be half- baked.
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 1 I shall use the terms power, disposition, and capacity interchangeably, since I 
am interested in what these notions may have in common metaphysically, rather 
than any technical distinctions between them.
 2 See Marmodoro (2010), Tahko (2013), greco and groff  (2013), Novotný and 
Novák  (2014).
 3 eg. Cartwright (1999) (science), Heil (2013) (mind), and Marmodoro (2014) 
(perception).
 4 I shall be focussing on two papers: Handfield (2008, 2010).
 5 Concerning the displacement of Aristotelian metaphysics by corpuscularianism, 
see Pasnau (2011).
 6 This view is rejected as ‘fundamentalist’ by neo- Aristotelians like Cartwright. See 
Cartwright (1999).
 7 Handfield (2010: 108).
 8 Ibid.: 107.
 9 Lewis (1986: ix).
10 Handfield states: ‘Humean supervenience is almost certainly false’. See Hand-
field (2010: 107).
11 For the original thought experiment, see einstein et al. (1935). See also the dis-
cussion in Bell (1964).
12 Handfield (2010: 107).
13 The modal strength of this type of necessity has been conceived in different ways, 
eg. as ‘conditional necessity’ in Marmodoro (2015), or ‘modal tending’ in Mum-
ford and Anjum (2011: Sec. 8.1).
14 ‘Metaphysical glue’ is a term of art, taken here to refer to some kind of relation.
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15 For critical reflections concerning commonly asserted identity claims in the sci-
ences, see Chang (2012).
16 Kripke’s theories are discussed in detail in Kripke (1980).
17 Handfield (2008: 114).
18 Ibid.: 116–7.
19 Handfield (2008: 117).
20 This condition is defined in Handfield (2008: 118).
21 For example, see Armstrong (1997).
22 Whilst Handfield does not require that only pure processes should count as 
manifestations, he does demand that any process in nature that confers a power 
should ‘resemble’ a pure manifestation- type. His account therefore depends on 
establishing a ‘delimited class of pure processes’ in Handfield (2008: 123).
23 Handfield refers to this as ‘closure’. I have adopted the term ‘isolation’ instead, 
to avoid confusion.
24 See Handfield (2010). Cartwright has argued that Dowe’s notion of conserva-
tion has little application outside of fundamental physics. See Dowe (1992) and 
Cartwright (2004).
25 It will be sufficient for my purposes to focus primarily on nonrelativistic quan-
tum mechanics, thus avoiding the technical complexity of more fundamental 
theories in which the same problems are present.
26 For the original Stern- gerlach experiment, see gerlach and Stern (1922a, b).
27 These states are mathematically represented as vectors in separate Hilbert spaces: 
|φ〉1 ∈ H1, |φ〉2 ∈ H2.
28 Interference occurs in this state in virtue of the phase relation exp(iϕ) between its 
two component- states.
29 The Hilbert space of the composite system H12 is the tensor product of the sepa-
rate Hilbert spaces, H1 and H2, and the vector |ψ〉 ∈ H12 that jointly describes the 
two particles in the composite system cannot be factored into the product of two 
constituent states |ψ〉1 ⊗ |ψ〉2.
30 Bell (1964, 1987).
31 Handfield (2008: 114).
32 According to James Hartle, ‘the central question of quantum cosmology’ can be 
formulated as follows: ‘The universe has a quantum state. What is it?’ See Hartle 
(2003: 615).
33 We may, for instance, live in a nomologically ‘dappled world’. See Cartwright 
(1999).
34 See the discussion in Handfield (2010: 123–7).
35 We should not take the language of ‘particles’ in contemporary physics liter-
ally (unless we are adopting a Bohmian or Bell- type approach to quantum field 
theory): the particles posited by the standard model are excitations (or ‘quanta’) 
of spatially extended quantum fields.
36 For further discussion of entanglement in the context of algebraic field theory, 
see Clifton and Halvorson (2001) and Ruetsche (2011).
37 See Cartwright (1992).
38 Schaffer argues for priority monism, as an alternative to existence monism. On 
this view, there are many concrete objects, but they only exist derivatively. See 
Schaffer (2009, 2010).
39 See Handfield (2008: 119).
40 esfeld (2014).
41 For pioneering work on ontic structural realism, see Ladyman and Ross (2009).
42 Myrvold (2015).
43 esfeld (2014). See also Monton (2006).
44 Allori et al. (2008), Allori (2015).
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45 I take a local beable to be an element of a physical ontology that exists in a 
bounded spacetime region.
46 de Broglie (1928), Bohm (1951).
47 See Dürr et al. (2013: Sec. 11.5 and 12).
48 esfeld et al. (2013), Miller (2013).
49 ghirardi et al. (1986).
50 See esfeld (2014) and Allori et al. (2014).
51 Lewis (1986: ix).
52 esfeld (2014).
53 See the theorems of gleason (1957) and Kochen and Specker (1967).
54 For a recent work that rejects microphysical assumptions in the philosophy of 
mind, see goff (2017).
55 A suspicion, since I do not suppose myself to have exhausted every possible 
rejoinder. For example, one line of argument Humean dispositionalists may wish 
to develop is that causal processes, whilst ‘impure’ because of entanglement, 
might still resemble (in some sense) possible causal processes that are ‘pure’ (cor-
respondence with Handfield).
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In the neo- Aristotelian tradition, the category of substance is typically 
regarded as the most fundamental of the ontological categories. Substance is 
the starting point of neo- Aristotelian ontology, the root of being qua being.1 
The neo- Aristotelian can claim the support of common sense for this com-
mitment to substance: the idea that there are such individual substances like 
people, cats, and trees is certainly part of everyday ontology. On the face of 
it, science might seem to support the view too, at least while we remain at a 
fairly high level of generality. As Hoffman and Rosenkrantz put it, a plausi-
ble understanding of ‘thing’ is just that it means ‘individual substance’.2 But 
it is well known that this type of common sense approach to ontology faces 
serious challenges from contemporary science and especially from those phi-
losophers of science who defend ontic structural realism. A central tenet 
of this approach is exactly that science has shown the ‘folk ontology’ to 
be misleading, as nothing corresponding to the neo- Aristotelian substance 
can be found; every ‘thing’ must go.3 Perhaps that’s not exactly right. After 
all, even if the individual substances that we typically postulate have to go, 
there would still be one potential candidate: the world, the universe, the 
cosmos, the spacetime as a whole.4 This would lead us towards some type 
of monism, an approach which is enjoying something of a revival, especially 
due to Jonathan Schaffer’s influential work.5
How should the neo- Aristotelian friend of substance react to these devel-
opments? At the very least, the neo- Aristotelian should examine the relevant 
arguments. Some of the most influential arguments build on quantum theory 
and the phenomenon of quantum entanglement in particular. examining 
these arguments and their consequences for the idea of substance is precisely 
what I will aim to do in what follows. The focus is on one of Schaffer’s cen-
tral arguments, which will be outlined in the second section. We will then 
proceed to look at the underlying science in some more detail in the third 
section and highlight some open questions, which put Schaffer’s argument 
in new a light. It will become apparent that the upshot of Schaffer’s argu-
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poses a challenge for the dialectic of the argument. In the fourth section, 
a reconciliation is sought and a novel way of understanding substance is 
proposed, where primitive incompatibility is introduced as a necessary con-
dition for substancehood. Finally, in the fifth section, we will examine how 
primitive incompatibility might be traced to quantum ontology, with special 
attention to wave function realism.
2.  Schaffer’s Monism and the Argument from Entanglement
The type of monism that Schaffer defends is priority monism. This is a less 
radical view than monism understood as the view that exactly one thing 
exists, sometimes called existence monism, which Schaffer takes to be an 
uncharitable understanding of monism—he in fact refers to Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz and associates this type of uncharitable approach with them.6 
Hoffman and Rosenkrantz write as follows:
Monism [. . .] is inconsistent with something that appears to be an evi-
dent datum of experience, namely, that there is a plurality of things. We 
shall assume that a plurality of material things exists, and hence that 
monism is false.7
But recall that by ‘thing’, Hoffman and Rosenkrantz mean ‘individual sub-
stance’, whereas Schaffer’s view is that there is exactly one substance, be it 
spacetime, the cosmos, or whatever we might want to call it.8 For Schaffer, 
‘substance’ is a fundamental entity9, but Schaffer’s monism does not deny 
that there could be other ‘things’ in the world, it’s just that those ‘things’ are 
not (fundamental) substances, but rather mere arbitrary parts of the cos-
mos.10 So, the view is that the cosmos, the integrated whole, is ontologically 
prior to these arbitrary parts.11 Nevertheless, Schaffer thinks that there is 
exactly one substance and indeed exactly one ‘thing’, if ‘thing’ is understood 
to refer to substances: material objects are not a second, distinct kind of 
substance.12 To be clear: Schaffer is not denying that there is a plurality of 
dependent ‘things’, but for him these ‘things’ cannot be substances, because 
substances are fundamental entities. Yet, the type of pluralism that, e.g., 
Hoffman and Rosenkrantz favour, requires that individual substances are 
not dependent on the cosmos in Schaffer’s sense: they are to be regarded as 
ontologically independent.13 In fact, Hoffman and Rosenkrantz note that 
Aristotle’s view was precisely that individual substances are fundamental 
and everything else depends on them, not vice versa.14 So on this view, 
pluralism about ‘things’ is a pluralism about the fundamental ‘things’ and 
hence in direct opposition to Schaffer’s view.
Leaving aside these complications, we can proceed to what is clearly sup-
posed to be one of Schaffer’s central arguments for priority monism: the 
argument from quantum holism. We can approach the idea via Quantum 
Field Theory (or Theories) (QFT), as Schaffer himself does.15 QFT is 
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sometimes presented as if it is a natural ally for the monist, since it paints a 
picture of the cosmos as one consisting of fields rather than particles. This 
may seem like an immediate challenge for the pluralist, because if the mate-
rial things that we typically associate with individual substances are just 
something like excitations of an underlying field,16 then they would seem to 
be only an idealization, not something with sharp boundaries.17 It should 
be noted that this may be a bit of a simplification, since there could be more 
than one fundamental field. Moreover, one might question the assumption 
that QFT is a fundamental theory.18 It is often thought that some quantum 
theory is true and universal, and hence, all fields would be quantum fields.19 
In any case, there is little doubt that this type of view—that modern science 
and QFTs in particular should drive us to abandon pluralism about indi-
vidual substances—is present in physics, and perhaps even more widespread 
among philosophers of physics. Schaffer himself mentions several examples, 
such as H. Dieter Zeh, who claims that the formalism of QFT has always 
suggested that we ought to abandon the ‘primordial particle concept’ and 
replace it with fields.20 So Schaffer’s argument has at least some support 
among the practicing scientists—we will return to this in the next section. 
What is the actual argument, though? It proceeds from the phenomenon of 
quantum entanglement to quantum holism and then straightforwardly to 
priority monism.21 Here is a reconstruction:22
1. The quantum state of an entangled system contains information 
over and above the information carried by the quantum states of its 
components.
2. The cosmos forms one vast, entangled system.
3. entangled systems are fundamental wholes.
4. The cosmos is a fundamental whole.
Premise 2 requires further support. Schaffer suggests that it can be sup-
ported by physics or mathematics.23 Firstly, if the world begins with the 
Big Bang, where everything interacts, this initial state of entanglement is 
preserved if we assume that the world evolves in a linear fashion, e.g., in 
terms of Schrödinger’s equation. Secondly, if we assume that there is a uni-
versal wave function, then ‘it is virtually certain that it will be entangled 
since measure 1 of all wave- functions are entangled’.24 Now, it is worth 
noting, as Schaffer does, that these reasons in favour of premise 2 are only 
plausible if wave function collapse is ruled out as a form of the universe’s 
evolution. This clearly rules out collapse approaches to quantum theory, but 
since Schaffer is quite aware of these limitations, I will set them aside as well 
(although we will refer to collapse approaches later on).25 So let us assume 
that premise 2 is true.
What about premise 3? Schaffer argues that ‘Democritean pluralism’—
the idea that there are particles that have intrinsic physical properties and 
stand in external spatiotemporal relations—cannot account for properties 
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of the entangled system. In fact, this idea is already implicit in premise 1 
(which Schaffer himself does not list as a separate premise). The idea is that 
the entangled system is ‘emergent’ and cannot be reduced to its proper parts: 
‘The physical properties of the whole are not fixed by the total intrinsic 
properties of any subsystems’.26 This idea is elaborated on by Ismael and 
Schaffer, who propose that entanglement is analysed in terms of nonsepa-
rability.27 This leads towards the type of quantum holism that we’ve seen 
Schaffer to favour, with some form of emergence as the upshot: the compos-
ite system seems to be more than the sum of its parts. As a potential plural-
ist rejoinder, Schaffer considers the possibility of introducing fundamental, 
external entanglement relations, which might enable the pluralist to retain 
particles (and hence individual substances). However, he rightly points out 
that it’s not at all clear that particles could be retained in such a theory, for 
as we already saw there is no clear place for them in the ontology of QFT 
(this is assuming that QFT is a fundamental theory, of course). Assuming 
that external entanglement relations will not help in saving pluralism, the 
conclusion follows from premises 2 and 3.
3.  A Tangled Argument
Let us now take a moment to consider the dialectic of Schaffer’s argument 
for priority monism in more detail. In particular, I’d like to highlight the 
commitment to emergence, which is evident from premise 1 of the recon-
structed argument. The background of the idea is in fact something that we 
can see in the physics literature as well, and since Schaffer draws on this 
literature, we ought to acknowledge this. One way to introduce the idea is 
via decoherence, which concerns the appearance of classicality when quan-
tum coherence is removed.28 As our starting point, we can take the double- 
slit experiment. To get the correct result for the probability of an electron 
passing through a particular slit, we have to take into account interference, 
which depends on both components of the wave that splits when it encoun-
ters the slits. This produces the familiar interference pattern. Now, decoher-
ence becomes evident when this trademark feature of quantum systems, the 
interference, is not observed, and instead, we have a system that appears 
to conform to a classical interpretation. But the reason for this appearance 
of classicality is that a system will also interact with its environment and 
indeed it will become entangled with its environment. This phenomenon can 
be produced simply by performing the double- slit experiment and observing 
the slits. So decoherence gives us the appearance of wave function collapse 
without requiring that such a collapse really occurs. But decoherence can 
also emerge spontaneously, because the system unavoidably interacts with 
stray air particles, etc.
This produces a general problem: the world appears to be classical and 
to consist of individual and distinct macro- objects, but if there is classical-
ity in appearance only, then can we have even ‘emergent’ macro- objects? If 
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the answer is supposed to be ‘yes’, then at the very least, we need a story 
about how this works, ultimately, about how the facts about the ‘emergent’ 
macro- objects are grounded in the wave function of a system.29 We will 
return to this in section 5, where we discuss the notorious macro- object 
problem in more detail.
Let me tie this idea back to Schaffer’s argument. In his most recent work, 
with Jenann Ismael, one possible approach being considered is wave func-
tion realism, i.e., the view that ‘the wave function is a fundamental object 
and a real, physical field on configuration space’.30 This is also a topic that 
will be discussed in more detail in section 5, but the context of the discus-
sion is the following idea:
[Q]uantum mechanics seems to allow two entities—call them Alice 
and Bob—to be in separate places, while being in states that cannot be 
fully specified without reference to each other. Alice herself thus seems 
incomplete (and likewise Bob), not an independent building block of 
reality, but perhaps at best a fragment of the more complete compos-
ite Alice- Bob system (and ultimately a fragment of the whole intercon-
nected universe).31
The quantum holist faces precisely the type of problem that we saw above 
with respect to the phenomenon of decoherence, namely, in what sense, 
besides in appearance only, are Alice and Bob individual and distinct at all, 
if they are fundamentally nonseparable? Ismael and Schaffer entertain vari-
ous ways in which we might consider Alice and Bob to emerge as ‘modally 
connected non- identical events’ from a common portion of reality.32 For the 
sake of brevity, I will here discuss just one of these, based on wave function 
realism. Ismael and Schaffer suggest that: ‘For the wave function realist, 
assuming that there is even such a thing as familiar three- dimensional space, 
it is to be treated as a derivative (or emergent) structure, and not a funda-
mental aspect of reality’.33 We should note here that even though the quan-
tum holist may prefer to talk about ‘derivativeness’ rather than ‘emergence’, 
the basic problem—how do we explain the appearance of classicality and 
the apparent distinctness of three- dimensional macro- objects such as Alice 
and Bob—is nevertheless the same.
Returning to Schaffer’s original argument, recall that a crucial—although 
implicit—premise of the argument is that the whole, the cosmos, is somehow 
emergent and contains information over and above the information carried 
by the quantum states of its components. It is important for Schaffer’s proj-
ect that even though the emergent whole is prior to its parts, the whole does 
indeed have parts, and hence, we can get the classical objects, Alice and 
Bob, out of priority monism: ‘the monist can guarantee a complete inven-
tory of basic objects’.34 Schaffer’s various allusions to decoherence suggest 
that it may be via decoherence that Schaffer hopes to guarantee—or at least 
motivate—the possibility of maintaining the inventory of basic objects.35 
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The work on decoherence has made it clear that ‘nonseparable quantum 
systems nevertheless typically approximate separable closed classical sys-
tems very closely’.36 even if nonseparable quantum systems are ultimately 
holistic, they nevertheless seem to have features very similar to those of 
classical systems. But one might argue that this is not taking nonseparabil-
ity and the project of quantum holism to its logical conclusion. This line of 
thought requires tackling the underlying quantum ontology in more detail.
To give an example of an attempted explanation of quantum holism with 
the required level of detail, one might endorse something like the Bohm- 
Hiley project for an ‘undivided universe’, which ‘requires not only a listing 
of all its constituent particles and their positions, but also of a field associ-
ated with the wave- function that guides their trajectories’.37 This is the idea 
of a ‘pilot- wave’ postulated in the de Broglie- Bohm theory, which connects 
again with the phenomenon of decoherence—although as Bacciagaluppi 
notes, in the de Broglie- Bohm theory, we effectively have two mechanisms 
connected to apparent collapse and hence the emergence of classicality.38 So, 
the Bohmian project as well will have to answer the question of where the 
classicality emerges from, but the reason why it might appear attractive is 
that the de Broglie- Bohm theory can refer to decoherence when it comes to 
the emergence of classical structures and also provide an interpretation of 
quantum mechanics that ‘explains why these structures are indeed observa-
tionally relevant’.39
The upshot for Schaffer’s project is that none of the intriguing work 
inspired by decoherence is going to give the priority monist the objectivity 
that the account needs—not without a completed quantum ontology. One 
source of the problem specifically for Schaffer is that he wishes to avoid 
committing to existence monism as it has been traditionally understood, 
i.e., that there is just one thing. As we saw, Schaffer favours priority monism 
instead, and he takes it that there is a plurality of ‘things’, albeit only as 
parts of the whole—the cosmos. Chris Fields has recently challenged this.40 
Here is a representative passage from Schaffer:
[Q]uantum entanglement is a case of emergence, in the specific sense 
of a property of an object that has proper parts, which property is not 
fixed by the intrinsic properties of its proper parts and the fundamental 
relations between its proper parts.41
The worry is that Schaffer’s account of quantum entanglement as a case of 
emergence will not get off the ground without an objective sense of ‘proper 
part’—essentially, to view parts as localized ‘systems’.42 Fields suggests that 
what would be needed here is some reason to think that ‘the notion of 
universal entanglement is consistent with any coherent mereotopology that 
yields elementary particles or any other proposed propertied fundamental 
objects as persistently identifiable, localizable parts’.43 The challenge, due to 
Fields, is that the phenomenon of decoherence appears to be of no help in 
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achieving anything but the illusion of such objective sense of ‘proper part’. 
Fields insists, quite correctly, that an explanatory gap remains, since the 
classical world is a ‘world of discrete, identifiable, time- persistent objects’; 
decoherence does not give us any principled reason to regard some collection 
of elementary particles as this type of a discrete object over any other.44 But 
some such reason—an account of when and which proper parts compose 
an object—would be needed if we are to, as it were, reconstruct the classical 
world. There have of course been attempts to do so in the literature. Fields 
considers Wojciech Zurek’s idea of ‘quantum Darwinism’, where classicality 
emerges due to the environment encoding information about a system dur-
ing the process of decoherence.45 Zurek suggests that the process is based 
on a ‘Darwinian’ mechanism that is ultimately responsible for the fact that 
only some of the potential collections of elementary particles are recognized 
(by us, the observers) as objects. But we need not dwell on such speculative 
ideas, for Schaffer himself does not rely on anything of the sort. This should, 
at any rate, be enough to highlight that a further story is needed here.
The more general upshot is that given Schaffer’s premises, there would 
appear to be reasons to favour a much more extreme version of monism 
than Schaffer hoped. This is due to the tension identified by Fields, i.e., 
taking the cosmos to be an emergent, entangled whole does not appear to 
be consistent with objective proper parthood. So, if Schaffer holds on to 
the idea of ‘universal entanglement’, then he may end up back with the 
‘uncharitable’ interpretation of monism, i.e., that only one thing exists46:
[I]f quantum effects such as entanglement do not disappear at large 
scales, then the “classical world” is not an approximation but an illu-
sion, and our ordinary notions of objecthood, locality, independence 
and causation are not approximately right but rather straightforwardly 
wrong. Such a conclusion flies in the face of all of our intuitions, and is 
difficult even to consider as a theoretical option.47
It is worth highlighting that we seem to have ended up with a posi-
tion equivalent with the version of monism that we saw Hoffman and 
Rosenkrantz dismiss as evidently inconsistent with experience. This is the 
view according to which there are ‘no particles, pebbles, planets, or any other 
parts to the world’.48 even Schaffer admits this to be potentially as implau-
sible as Fields suggests in the passage quoted above: ‘Perhaps monism would 
deserve to be dismissed as obviously false, given this interpretation’.49 The 
challenge is that Schaffer’s argument, at least on the present interpretation 
of decoherence, may lead us towards this very view. If this is right, then the 
choice we face is between existence (rather than priority) monism and some 
version of genuine pluralism. Yet, we have seen that it’s difficult to under-
stand how genuine pluralism could be reconciled with quantum mechanics, 
at least if we assume a non- collapse approach. Let us see if we can make 
some progress.
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4.  Substances Disentangled: Primitive Incompatibility
Having observed the tangles in the argument for priority monism from 
quantum entanglement, one might think that the options are clear: either 
we should bite the bullet and endorse existence monism rather than 
Schaffer’s priority monism, or we should follow Hoffman and Rosenkrantz 
and dismiss monism as altogether unpalatable. But perhaps this is unchari-
table. After all, Schaffer has plenty of other arguments in favour of pri-
ority monism, and even the case presented above is far from conclusive. 
This is not the place to attempt an assessment of all the arguments in 
favour of priority monism. Instead, let us approach the issue from the 
opposite end, by trying to reconstruct a pluralist, neo- Aristotelian sub-
stance ontology, given the challenges raised by quantum theory. The goal 
here will be primarily just to motivate the idea—apparently challenged by 
some approaches to quantum theory—that there could be such things as 
individual substances: things, objects, entities with objective boundaries. 
I shall not attempt to be faithful to Aristotle or even the neo- Aristotelian 
tradition in what follows. I am merely interested in the basic idea of joints 
in nature, joints that distinguish one kind of thing from another kind of 
thing. The existence of such joints would not be a sufficient condition for 
the existence of individual substances, but their existence does at least 
seem to be a necessary condition.
In fact, the strategy that I propose is to focus on properties rather than 
substances, for if we have some reason to think that there are properties 
that cannot be had by one thing at the same time—simultaneously instanti-
ated incompatible properties—then we would already have at least a prima 
facie reason to postulate more than one thing and hence some boundary or 
distinguishing feature between these two (or more) things. As a matter of 
fact, Aristotle’s work is a natural starting point when it comes to this theme, 
even though he discusses the theme of incompatibility also quite separately 
from that of substance.
In Categories, Aristotle discusses a distinctive feature of substances: that 
they are able to receive contraries.50 By this he means that a substance, 
like an individual man, can be hot at one time and cold at another time. 
The existence of contraries—properties like hotness and coldness—does not 
itself in any way imply that there is more than one substance. But it may 
help to get us started to think about the difference between contrariety and 
incompatibility, as we see it in Aristotle’s work. The important idea is that 
if contrary properties are instantiated at the same time, then it would seem 
that they cannot be instantiated by one and the same substance. It is pre-
cisely this idea of incompatibility that I wish to draw on. I will propose that 
by taking incompatibility to be primitive and worldly, we can motivate the 
acceptance of a plurality of individual substances.
The idea of primitive incompatibility is certainly traceable to Aristotle, 
but I should note that the idea has crept up repeatedly in more recent 
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literature, especially in well- known attempts to define negation and to come 
up with truthmakers for negative truths.51 I will not discuss these attempts 
here, interesting though they are. All we need for the argument at hand is 
the idea of primitive incompatibility. In Aristotle, the idea of incompatibility 
is at its clearest in some of his formulations of the law of non- contradiction 
(LNC). The following is my personal favourite:
The same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to 
the same subject in the same respect.52
This formulation of LNC focuses on attributes, which make for a par-
ticularly intuitive example of primitive incompatibility: it seems plausible 
that, say, a particle cannot at the same time both be charged and not be 
charged. Once we have grasped this idea, we can expand on it to the case 
of mutually exclusive properties. A particle cannot only both have and not 
have a charge at the same time, it also cannot both have a negative and 
a positive charge at the same time—these properties are incompatible. In 
Categories, Aristotle writes about ‘contrariety’ rather than ‘incompatibil-
ity’, but as I noted, it is in fact the latter which will be our focus here. It 
may nevertheless be helpful to compare the two notions. There is an aspect 
of contrariety that differs significantly from incompatibility: the former 
would seem to come in degrees, whereas the latter does not. We might ask: 
how many contraries can a proposition have? Following the Aristotelian 
formulation of LNC, it would seem that any incompatible attributes are 
also contraries. But even if incompatibles are also contraries, contrariety 
clearly comes in degrees: saying of something black that it is not white is 
different from saying that it is not grey, even though whiteness and grey-
ness are just as incompatible with blackness—we might think that being 
grey is closer to being black (and closer to being white) than blackness 
and whiteness are to each other. Or, if colours are confusing here, think of 
properties like being tall and being short. The idea is clear from Aristotle 
himself:
Since things which differ from one another may do so to a greater 
or a less degree, there exists also a greatest difference, and this I call 
“contrariety”.53
It seems that in defining contraries of every kind men have recourse 
to a spatial metaphor, for they say that those things are contraries 
which within the same class, are separated by the greatest possible 
distance.54
Here it seems that Aristotle in fact suggests to use ‘contrariety’ to describe 
absolute dissimilarity—at least sometimes. But simply the suggestion that 
there could be a spatial metaphor of contrariety distances the notion from 
the understanding of primitive incompatibility that I have in mind.
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Based on Figure 6.1, we can define polar contraries (white and black) and 
immediate contraries (white and not- white), where immediate contraries are 
incompatible precisely in the sense that we are interested in.56 If we wish to 
insist that primitive incompatibility itself does not come in degrees, which is 
indeed central to our argument, I now suggest to set contrariety aside and 
focus on incompatibility proper. This happens fairly naturally if we try to 
adapt the previous illustration to a case like charge:
WHITE GREY BLACK
Neither white nor black
Not-white
Figure 6.1
We might illustrate contrariety as follows:55
e- no charge? e+
Neither electron nor positron
Not-electron
Figure 6.2
In Figure 6.2, there are no degrees of contrariety. electrons have a unit 
negative charge (the elementary charge), which has an interesting role: all 
freely existing charged particles have a charge similar in magnitude either 
to the unit negative charge or an integer multiple of it. So it appears that 
the route from electron to positron could only involve neutral charge as an 
intermediate contrast; there are no degrees. Moreover, a neutral particle 
is a very different kind of thing than a charged particle (it is subject to 
different laws, for one thing), so it doesn’t really perform the same job as 
‘gReY’ does in Figure 6.1. This simple case of electron vs. positron gives 
us an easy example of incompatible properties. Since we are dealing (sup-
posedly) with fundamental particles, this gives us at least a preliminary 
reason to think that incompatibility could be a fundamental feature of 
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reality.57 The case is really not that different from charge: macrophysi-
cal objects don’t tend to manifest charge in the same way that subatomic 
particles do, even though their existence requires bonding behaviour that 
is enabled exactly by the charges of their constituent particles. When we 
study charge, it’s exactly the unit negative charge of electrons—also known 
as the fundamental unit of charge—that turns out to be the most interest-
ing. I will not attempt to construct a further argument here in favour of 
taking incompatibility as a primitive, worldly feature, but let me note that 
the idea has been (re- )gaining popularity. Francesco Berto’s recent account 
is a good example; he thinks that there’s evidence that incompatibility 
‘carves nature at its joints’.58 Berto himself focuses on the semantic and 
logical aspects of the account and is interested in incompatibility as a basis 
for negation, but for our purposes, it is precisely the idea that incompat-
ibility is a genuine feature of reality that is important. Does this idea sur-
vive when we move on to quantum ontology?
5.  Substances Disentangled: Incompatibility and  
the Wave Function
So far, I’ve been speaking quite loosely about the idea of primitive incompat-
ibility. One might, for instance, question the previous example concerning 
electrons, since it was assumed that electrons are particles—individual sub-
stances. But all this was just to get an initial understanding of incompatibil-
ity. In order to use the idea of incompatibility in an argument in favour of 
pluralism, we of course better not assume at the outset that there is a plural-
ity of things. So, let us get back to quantum theory, which is what motivated 
Schaffer’s argument in favour of monism. As we have seen, the key issue 
here is how classicality emerges at the macroscopic level, for the macro-
scopic world at the very least looks and feels as if it is classical and contains 
a plurality of objects with objective boundaries. Not that I propose to solve 
this problem here; we are effectively dealing with one of the central inter-
pretive problems concerning quantum mechanics, what Alyssa Ney calls the 
macro- object problem: ‘the problem is to explain how the wave function 
of a system could ground facts about macroscopic objects’.59 One thing 
that is important to note here is that the solution to this problem—or more 
specifically, the possibility of pluralist substance ontology—does not neces-
sarily depend on which approach to quantum mechanics is adopted. This 
is because there are versions of all the major approaches that may enable 
the type of ontology that the neo- Aristotelian seeks. In fact, it seems that 
we might be able to classify approaches to quantum mechanics that could 
do the trick on the basis of a single feature: whether or not the approach 
favours wave function monism.60 This is the view that, fundamentally, a 
wave function is all there is; this view also assumes wave function realism, 
a view which we already mentioned in passing above: ‘the wave function 
is a fundamental object and a real, physical field on configuration space’.61 
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However, as I will go on to speculate, even wave function monism may 
leave room for primitive incompatibility as it was introduced in the previ-
ous section.
According to wave function monism, there are no particles, except per-
haps as derivative, emergent entities, in the sense that decoherence may sug-
gest. But we have seen that there are reasons to think that this is, at best, an 
illusory sense, and if this is right, then wave function monism would really 
seem to amount to a type of existence monism. Note that, on the face it, the 
Bohmian approach, which we mentioned in passing above, will not be com-
patible with wave function monism. This is because the Bohmian approach 
does hold that there are, in addition to the wave function, particles with 
determinate locations in three- dimensional space.62 But Ney observes that 
there are also versions of the everettian and ghirardi- Rimini- Weber (gRW) 
approach to quantum mechanics (although we will not discuss them here; 
gRW is a collapse approach) that are compatible with the denial of wave 
function monism.63 However, there are similarly different versions of the 
Bohmian approach and it may be that only some of them would be compat-
ible with a pluralist view—after all, we saw earlier that there is a clear ele-
ment of universal ‘connectedness’ in the Bohm- Hiley version in particular. 
Regarding the gRW approach (and other collapse theories), David Albert 
notes that the world will consist of just one physical object, namely, the 
universal wave function.64 While I cannot hope to analyse the ontologi-
cal status of the wave function in detail here—partly because I simply lack 
the competence to do so and partly because the story will differ depending 
on the interpretation in question—I do hope to make it clear that the neo- 
Aristotelian pluralist has not yet been driven to a corner, whereby only some 
speculative approach to quantum mechanics would save the day.65 All of the 
options mentioned here are live.
Let us take a closer look at what the wave function might tell us about 
incompatibility. Specifically, what does the wave function tell us about the 
case of seemingly distinct, objective ‘particles’ that at least look as if they 
could motivate pluralism about individual substances? Consider a two- 
particle wave function for a system of identical, indistinguishable particles. 
Quantum theory tells us that the probability density of the two particle wave 
function must be identical to the wave function in a situation where the par-
ticles have been interchanged. There are two ways that this can happen: the 
symmetric and the anti- symmetric case. In symbols, the symmetric case is 
ψ(r1, r2) = ψ(r2, r1), and the anti- symmetric case is ψ(r1, r2) = – ψ(r2, r1). Details 
of wave- function symmetry aside, it turns out that particles with symmetric 
wave functions in this scenario have integer or zero intrinsic spin—they are 
known as bosons—whereas particles with anti- symmetric wave functions 
have half- integer intrinsic spin—they are known as fermions. So, here we 
have what seems like a relatively simple but quite general case regarding the 
incompatibility of two types of fundamental particle, fermions and bosons. 
If this is correct, then it looks like the fermion vs. boson distinction is one of 
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the best candidates for a distinction that ‘carves nature at its joints’. If such 
fundamental incompatibilities do exist, then they may be seen as tracking 
worldly incompatibility in Berto’s sense.66 In other words, if incompatibility 
itself is fundamental, then fundamental incompatibilities like the fermion vs. 
boson distinction could be seen as grounded in this worldly incompatibility.
In the fermion vs. boson case, the incompatibility concerns the repre-
sentations of the wave function, so one might still doubt whether we have 
arrived at genuinely incompatible properties that must be possessed by 
two distinct ‘objects’ (if we consider the wave function in the lines of wave 
function monism). So the problem is that those who favour wave function 
monism in particular might regard this story to be inherently misleading: we 
do not really have closed systems like the two- particle system described in 
this example. All we have is the universal wave function and fermions and 
bosons are just aspects of the universal entangled web, loosely speaking. 
Still, the incompatibility featured in this story about fermions and bosons 
must be rooted in something, and since it can be modelled with the wave 
function, even the wave function monist should be able to appreciate this. 
Forget about ‘particles’, what I wish to suggest is that they can be under-
stood as a placeholder for features of the wave function that are ultimately 
responsible for the possibility of macro- objects. But insofar as one thing 
cannot possess two incompatible properties at the same time, it seems as if 
the wave function monist must either insist that this incompatibility itself 
is only an illusion, admit that there are at least two distinct things, or try 
to reduce the distinctness into something else. If the friend of substances is 
right, then we would also have the beginnings of a potential solution to the 
macro- object problem. On this approach, what grounds facts about macro- 
objects (and we can here think of any appearance of a ‘particle’ to be a 
macro- object) is the incompatibility that can be traced to the wave function 
itself.67
It is worth noting that the speculative approach being developed here 
assumes a form of wave function realism. I don’t wish to make any commit-
ments in this regard myself, but since the universal role of the wave func-
tion understood in a realist fashion is typically adopted in arguments that 
are causing trouble for neo- Aristotelian substance ontology, it seems that 
for the sake of argument it would be best to adopt this approach and see 
if we can deal with it. This type of realism about the wave function could 
be considered to suggest that the wave function is at least ‘quasi- material’, 
i.e., something close to what we regard as ordinary material reality, even if 
not quite the same thing.68 As goldstein and Zanghì note, it turns out to be 
quite tricky to determine the ontological status of the wave function—we 
would first need to know what quantum theory says. I cannot hope to make 
much progress with this issue here. Instead, I’ve focused on tracing the idea 
of incompatibility all the way down to the wave function, since I posited 
incompatibility as a necessary condition for pluralism about substances. But 
even if we regard the wave function as ‘real’—presumably, as a field69—part 
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of the problem that we now face is how to express incompatibility in terms 
of the ‘parts’ of one universal field. It might be suggested that this simply 
means that if this part of the wave function has a certain peak, then that 
part of the wave function cannot have a certain peak. Simplistic as this 
description is, it may be the only way that we can ‘solve’ the macro- object 
problem. Note that this would seem to apply even in the case of wave func-
tion monism. Ney herself suggests something quite similar, although with-
out explicitly referring to incompatibility:
Somehow the wave function grounds the existence of, for example, 
my desk. This is not because my desk is spread out all over the con-
figuration space with parts corresponding here to a leg and there to a 
top. Rather, the persistence of peaks of the wave function grounds the 
existence of my desk. Point- sized regions of these peaks correspond to 
slightly different (classical) ways of there being a desk there, slightly 
different configurations of particles that could make up a desk, among 
other things. If instead, the peaks of the wave function were centered in 
a disjoint region of configuration space, then my desk would not have 
existed, or there would have been a very different kind of desk.70
This is certainly a controversial story about how we might reduce ordi-
nary three- dimensional objects to a wave function in configuration space, 
but it seems clear that in order to address the macro- object problem, some-
thing on these lines is a promising way to go. By ‘something on these lines’, 
I simply mean the requirement that there are persistent peaks in one region 
of the wave function that will rule out certain other peaks, just like Ney 
describes. Consider another passage, from Jill North:
For example, there being a table in three- space consists in nothing but 
the wave function’s having a certain shape in its high- dimensional space. 
It’s true that there is a table in three- space; it’s just that this holds in vir-
tue of some other, more fundamental facts. The truth about three- space 
(the grounded) is not a further fact beyond the truth about the wave 
function’s space (the grounds)—that is, it isn’t a fundamental fact—
even though it is distinct from the grounds and is itself a real fact.71
This passage may remind someone of the earlier reconstrual of Schaffer’s 
strategy to get a plurality of entities via the nonfundamental parts, while the 
cosmos as a whole is fundamental. We have seen that this strategy is problem-
atic. Ney and North both appear to be in the business of explaining how we 
might get our beloved ‘things’ (why is it always tables?) back as nonfunda-
mental entities that are grounded in or reduce to the universal wave function 
in 3N- dimensional space. On any such view, one will have to postulate some 
structure that corresponds with the classical ways of being. North suggests 
that this structure could be specified, e.g., by the dynamical laws.72 In Ney’s 
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story, the relevant structure seems to come from the persistence of the peaks 
of the wave function. If some story of this type turns out to be correct, then 
my thesis about primitive incompatibility is corroborated: you don’t get even 
emergent, nonfundamental ‘things’ without fundamental incompatibility, 
because something like this must always be built- in to the relevant structure. 
Otherwise there could be no correspondence to the classical ways of being that 
Ney alludes to. I wish I could say more about what that fundamental, primi-
tive incompatibility amounts to, but the problem here is that, being primitive, 
we might not be able to specify it very much beyond the type of stories that 
I’ve quoted above. Instead, we might attempt a reductio ad absurdum: con-
sider what the world would be like if there were no incompatibility. I think 
that the best illustration of this might be something like Dummett’s ‘amor-
phous lump’, a view according to which the world is structureless ‘dough’.73 
We do not need to dwell on the anti- realist aspects of this idea—the point is 
simply that any kind of structuring will require some limiting principles, be 
it the dynamical laws or something else, and this immediately introduces an 
element of incompatibility. If this is right, then on any view where there is an 
underlying structure, there is also incompatibility. Presumably, Schaffer him-
self would not deny this, but the question is: who can give the most plausible 
explanation of this incompatibility?
Do we get the typical neo- Aristotelian conception of substance out of all 
this? Probably not. But nor do we get any other very clear ontological pic-
ture: the jury is still out on quantum ontology. Of course, we do know some 
things. For instance, it seems undeniable that on all the major approaches, 
some kind of holism will be present in quantum ontology. However, this 
does not necessarily entail monism, it only entails that there may be more 
dependence in the world than we once thought. To be sure, pluralism will 
need to be qualified at the end of the day, but if we can trace the source of 
incompatibility to quantum ontology, then there is at least some hope to 
settle the macro- object problem in a manner that preserves the key aspects 
of neo- Aristotelian pluralist substance ontology.74
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Part 2




Each biological denizen that populates our humble neighbourhood of the 
cosmos is a veritable world unto itself whose complex construction auton-
omously navigates the development and maintenance of its own intricate 
machinery. And although composed of an uncountable number of constit-
uents, each of these multi- layered microcosms is a fundamentally unified 
being—each is in some way one, rather than many. But in virtue of what, 
metaphysically, are organisms more than merely bundles of biological bits 
whose diachronically disparate collections are continually washed away in 
a Hericlitean flux? In other words, what secures, metaphysically, an organ-
ism’s continued persistence as one over time?
In this chapter, we present an account of organismal unity centred on a 
neo- Aristotelian conception of causal powers, introducing a novel type of 
power—a ‘structural’ power. In examining the empirical data of contem-
porary developmental biology, we make a transcendental case to show that 
structural powers are no mere philosophers’ fancy, but rather are an integral 
ontological feature of unified, living beings—hypothesising their existence 
fills what would otherwise remain a glaring explanatory gap. The unique 
teleological nature of these powers, we argue, enables them to function as 
the proper metaphysical ground of the unity of organisms. According to our 
account, that unity is displayed not in the capacity of an organism to sustain 
the diachronic stasis of its morphological features (and their constituents), 
but in the persistence of its specified capacity for the dynamically adaptive 
re- organisation of those features.
2.  To Be One: A Dynamic Disposition
If the mereological complexities involved in determining whether and under 
what conditions artefacts possess sufficient unity to be admitted into our 
ontology are overwhelming, the question of in virtue of what biological 
organisms enjoy that metaphysical status is even more so. The composition 
of something as simple as a common fruit fly, for instance, consists in an 
intricate hierarchy of causal- cum- functional dependence that holds among 
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a multitude of anatomical and eidonomical levels of organisation. And 
what is perhaps more puzzling is the fact that whatever complex relation 
or set of relations is ultimately responsible for grounding the synchronic 
unity of these compositional elements—that is, at any particular point in 
time during an organism’s existence—is plausibly incapable of performing 
that role diachronically, and for an important reason: those constituents, 
and, thus, whatever their relations’ putative contribution in establishing the 
unity of an organism may be, are largely temporally transient. For living 
entities, characteristically, are loci of constant material exchange, their bod-
ies never remaining strictly mereologically identical even over the smallest 
time- scales.1
Thus, the problem of accounting for the diachronic unity of organisms is 
one importantly distinct from that of accounting for their synchronic unity. 
The unity which organisms possess at any time might be grounded in the 
obtaining of a specialised spatial- cum- causal relation (or set of relations) 
which holds among the members of its constitutive mereological makeup 
or, perhaps in a more sophisticated account, by those members’ unified 
achievement of a particular functional organisation. But the problem of 
accounting for the unity of an organism over time concerns the significantly 
more complex issue of determining what the unity of those synchronically 
unified temporal stages consists in. To our minds, the hurdle at which exist-
ing accounts of the unity of organisms fall is that they fail to recognise that 
there is an important distinction between the unity which materially consti-
tuted mereological sums—elaborately and complexly structured as they may 
be—possess and that which belongs to organisms: the diachronic unity of 
the former, but not the latter, consists in nothing more than the temporally 
successive invariance of whatever it is that grounds its synchronic unity—
its mereological members retaining the same spatial- cum- causal structure, 
or functionally oriented organisation, etc. Organisms, on the other hand, 
diachronically persist in spite of the alteration over time of the structural 
organisation, or functional orientation of their mereological make up: what-
ever it is that grounds their being one at a time therefore cannot also ground 
their being one over time.
We know, however, that certain sets of temporally successive synchronically 
unified mereological collections do make up single organisms—but in virtue 
of what? In order to provide an answer here, a natural preliminary question 
is: on what are our judgements of the diachronic unity of organisms based? 
Prima facie, we make those judgements because although the compositional 
elements of organisms may be transient, their morphological profiles—that 
is, their general anatomical and eidonomical structures—are surprisingly dia-
chronically stable. Plausibly, then, the ontologically privileged status which 
we recognise that organisms enjoy is one conferred upon them primarily in 
virtue of their being invariantly disposed to continually maintain the causal 
production of their particularised morphology. It is in this respect, then, that 
organisms remain one even in the face of multiplicity: they exhibit a singular, 
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dynamically coordinative impetus which shapes the compositional character 
of a multitude of distinct, synchronically unified mereological collections over 
time. Thus, in the case of organisms, we propose that the diachronic unity 
which a set of those collections possesses consists in their members being sub-
sumed within the operation of a complex teleological structure which we call 
a ‘structural power’.2 In the account we will offer, the unity of an organism 
consists in the persistence of the activity of its structural power which, in spite 
of the continual flux of its mereological makeup and so, the continual altera-
tion of its synchronically unified composition, consistently causally conforms 
the shape and structure of its morphology.
More specifically, the function this power performs consists in continu-
ally organising the constituents of an organism (both anatomically and eido-
nomically) in a specific structural arrangement to produce and maintain 
the complete morphological profile particular to the natural kind to which 
it belongs.3 Structural powers, to put it another way, are causally respon-
sible for the developmental specifications of an organism’s parts (which 
ones get produced, and by what means), and the structural complexities 
of their arrangement (the three- dimensional architecture of their modular 
components, and their spatio- functional relational hierarchy). Importantly 
however, although the particularised organisational complexity of an organ-
ism’s morphology at any time certainly results from the causal operation of 
a structural power, it would be a mistake to identify any specific structural 
relation (or complex set thereof) among an organisms constituents with the 
manifestation of that power.4 Instead, we propose that the manifestation 
of a structural power consists in a kind of self- directed activity: the goal 
toward which they are teleologically directed just is the performance of 
their unification role in the structural organisation of an organism’s elemen-
tal constituents over time, the natural result of which is those constituents 
(synchronically) composing a particular morphological profile. Structural 
powers are therefore intrinsically dynamic—like any dispositional property, 
they are defined by what they do, but unlike most causal powers which are 
individuated by their role in the production of some further state, what they 
do is doing.5
But what exactly do structural powers do in order to function as the ground 
of the diachronic unity of organisms, and in what sense is that function self- 
directed?6 We propose that the self- directed unifying role of structural powers 
consists in a kind of specialised cyclopoietic (literally “cyclically- productive”) 
activity:7 in traversing a kind of causal loop among the constituents of an 
organism, each is tied together in a continual diachronic cycle of co- production 
and maintenance.8 According to our account, the manifestation of a structural 
power is the causal integration among an organism’s constituents wherein 
each contributes to the generation and proper functioning of one another in 
the service of their cooperative construction of a particular organismal mor-
phology. The self- directedness of structural powers therefore consists in the 
recursive nature of this unifying activity—they are “self- oriented” precisely 
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because the goal of that activity is to establish the cyclical perpetuation of its 
own operation.9 This operationally dynamic conception of organismal unity, 
now enshrined in the tenets of ‘systems biology’,10 has long been recognised 
as a mark of the unique ontological status which organisms qua living beings 
possess.11 In giving a metaphysical analysis of organismal unity, we propose 
then that the ontological boundaries of the causally iterative processes of gen-
eration, regeneration, and auto- regulation which sculpt the joints of the deni-
zens of the natural world are themselves carved out by the dynamic activity 
of structural powers.
Nowhere is the teleological dynamism of structural powers more preva-
lent than in the homeostatic phenomenon of generative robustness, where 
the constituents of an organism are diachronically redirected toward the 
reproduction of a particular morphological structure in response to per-
turbation. As a homeostatic phenomenon, the processes which character-
ise generative robustness are both persistent—able to maintain the causal 
production of an end- state by means of compensatory changes within the 
system—and pleonastic—able to bring about an end- state via a number of 
alternative pathways.12 ‘Generative robustness’, a phenomenon acknowl-
edged to be both nearly ubiquitous in the biological realm13 and a sine quo 
non of the evolutionary process,14 encompasses two closely related types of 
homeostatic processes: redundancy and degeneracy.15 In the event that the 
causal architecture of a biological system malfunctions due to the (ontologi-
cal or functional) uncoupling of one of its constitutive members from the 
others, its proper functioning in producing a particular end- state can be 
restored in virtue of its possessing isomorphic ‘redundant’ elements which 
take- up the slack of the missing/disabled ones.16 More interesting perhaps 
are cases of degeneracy,17 where homeostasis is achieved without the aid 
of duplicate elements, but by biological systems “re- wiring” their causal- 
cum- regulatory architecture in such a way that its non- isomorphic elements 
become isofunctional (with respect to the “missing” element), thereby caus-
ally mirroring the required role within the perturbed network.18
As we see it, properly accounting for the phenomenon of generative 
robustness—one wherein while the constituents of an organism (and thus 
the character of its synchronic unity) may undergo significant variation over 
various timescales, the causal orientation of its organisation toward the pro-
duction and maintenance of a particular morphology does not—is a job 
which requires the resources of our metaphysical toolbox: the continual 
binding together of the compositional elements of an organism toward a 
particular anatomical and eidonomical organisation over time is an expres-
sion of the causal architecture established by the cyclopoietic activity of 
structural powers. It is our claim that it is the persistence of this goal- 
directed activity which metaphysically grounds the diachronic identity of an 
organism: it is in virtue of the stability of its specialised dynamic operation 
that an organism remains one throughout the continual flux of its mereo-
logical makeup.
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Importantly, the phenomenon of generative robustness suggests both 
what the metaphysics of the diachronic unity of organisms cannot and must 
consist in. With respect to the former, given that organisms persist, and 
persist as one throughout the exercise of such phenomena, its prevalence 
suggests that any metaphysical account of the diachronic unity of organisms 
founded on an extension of the grounds of their synchronic unity—that is, 
on either the persistence of a specific set of their compositional elements 
or some particular structural arrangement thereof—must ultimately be 
untenable. With respect to the latter, and given the former, the phenom-
enon suggests that the ontological ground of the homeostatic capacities of 
organisms must be extra- compositional—that is, grounded in neither the 
compositional elements of an organism, nor in any of their functionally 
unified synchronic configurations.19 In light of this, and because the nature 
of structural powers is principally programmatic—in that their activity pro-
vides a directive structure which specifies the temporal situation- sensitive 
succession of an organism’s synchronic states—we propose that we ought 
to conceive of them as being encoded within organisms: present, though 
irreducible to any physical element, or the functional coordination of a set 
of such elements. We picture the structural power of an organism as its 
symphonic software: its conductorial activity ensures that each collection 
of notes (compositional elements) which are harmonised in each measure 
(synchronically unified, both causally and functionally) flow together over 
time to compose a coherent set of thematic movements (morphological fea-
tures).20 While we acknowledge the novelty of this conception of the ontol-
ogy of causal powers, we maintain that providing the proper ground of the 
homeostatic phenomena exhibited by organisms and subsequently account-
ing for the diachronic unity of organisms via an appeal to the teleological 
directedness of their morphology requires it.21
3.  Morphological Variability and the Nature  
of Structural Powers
According to our account, the diachronic unity of an organism is secured 
by the persistence of the active functioning of a causal power—a ‘structural 
power’—which is dynamically directed toward the continual productive 
organisation of its mereological constituents according to a particular mor-
phological profile. We have suggested that the causal consequences of this 
power’s activity within an organism are exhibited most clearly in the phe-
nomenon of generative robustness, where the intransience of the tendency 
of an organism’s mereological makeup to be reconfigured on the occasion of 
perturbation toward the restoration of that profile reflects the persistence of 
that power, and thus, of that organism as a unified being.
In our account, then, an organism’s remaining one over time is intimately 
linked with the diachronic stability of its morphological profile: the activ-
ity of one and the same structural power over time is evidenced by the 
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invariance of a teleological directedness toward the same morphology. In 
other words, in our account, the diachronic unity of an organism is dis-
played in (though not strictly identified with) the unchanging specificities 
of its homeostatic activity. However, here we must confront an important 
complication for, according to contemporary research in developmental 
biology, there is a significant sense in which the particularities of an organ-
ism’s capacity for robust re- organisation are themselves capable of chang-
ing over time. This is perhaps most strikingly illustrated in the well- studied 
phenomenon of ‘phenotypic plasticity’, exhibited in the ability of organisms 
to adopt a wide range of morphological variability in response to intra- /
inter- /extra- cellular “environmental” signalling, or causal influences.22 Such 
morphological variability ranges from being relatively minor, as when, for 
instance, butterflies adopt distinct wing patterning in response to seasonal 
weather signals,23 to rather extreme, as displayed in water fleas’ (Daphnia) 
development of large, helmet- like spikes in response to receiving chemical 
signals from nearby predators,24 or in the caste system of ants, where hor-
monal signals distributed among a population produce radical changes in 
the morphology of its members, creating everything from winged and wispy 
drones to the thickly carpaced, reproductively charged queens.25
Given that the phenomenon of phenotypic plasticity is no conceptual 
outlier, but is instead acknowledged to be not only ubiquitous in the bio-
logical realm, but central to our understanding of both developmental and 
evolutionary processes, we must treat its theoretical consequences with 
ontological sincerity.26 With respect to this discussion, one in particular 
stands out: organisms don’t have a single and unchanging homeostatically 
maintained morphological profile but are instead equipped with an entire 
‘morphospace’ consisting of multiple such profiles which may be adopted 
and robustly maintained at various points in their lives in response to extrin-
sic stimuli.27 For an account of the diachronic unity of organisms like ours, 
in which oneness is intimately correlated with the persistence of a particula-
rised impetus toward morphological stability, the reality of morphospaces 
poses a potential problem—for if the homeostatic phenomena displayed in 
the directedness of an organism’s constituents toward the productive main-
tenance of a particular morphology is transient, then it seems so too must be 
the existence of the structural power whose cyclopoietic activity is causally 
responsible for that phenomena. And if that were the case, structural pow-
ers would be no more temporally stable than the constituents of an organ-
ism, and hence, no more able to ground the diachronic unity of an organism 
than they are.
Of course, this is only a problem for our account if a shift in an organ-
ism’s exhibited morphology, and thus a corresponding alteration of its 
homeostatic maintenance toward a particular morphology, amounts to the 
corruption or loss of its structural power. Is this a plausible inference? We 
think not. While we certainly don’t wish to deny that there are cases where 
this sort of alteration is a consequence of the loss of a diachronic structural 
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power, we recommend caution in making that judgement—for not every 
instance of this sort of alteration is such a case. What, then, are the criteria 
to be used in properly discerning these cases? True to our Aristotelian roots, 
we suggest that temporal variation in an organism’s morphological profile 
and the homeostatic maintenance thereof amounts to the change in, or loss 
of its structural power just in case that variation is not “of the nature” of 
that power.28 Discerning what’s “of the nature” of a power is no esoteric 
enterprise—it merely requires an appeal to the same standard we utilise in 
judgements of this sort in the empirical sciences: namely, non- random regu-
larity. The thought here is simple: if, for any particular case, with respect to 
a particular structural power, the morphological divergence in question can 
be shown to be a non- random, repeatable occurrence, we have pro tanto 
justification for the judgement that such divergence isn’t a genuine deviation 
from the “nature” of that power. And in phenomena of phenotypic plastic-
ity, we can show precisely that.
In studying that phenomenon, contemporary research in developmental 
biology is actively engaged in discovering not only the scope and breadth 
of the plasticity of organismal morphology, but also the detailed map-
ping of the causal conditions under which that plasticity occurs within 
the morphologies of particular organisms. These mappings are known as 
‘norms of reaction’, (or ‘reaction norms’): drawing on a wealth of empiri-
cal data, these rather precise graphs detail the connections repeatedly and 
regularly observed between specific qualitative variations in an organism’s 
morphological profile and various specific intra- /inter- /extra- cellular envi-
ronmental conditions which that organism may be subject to.29 That one 
can experimentally investigate and quantifiably catalogue in a rigorous 
fashion the ‘plastic potential’ of an organism’s morphology, we suggest, 
lends credence to the notion that a sizable set of the “atypical deviations” 
from the characteristic morphological profiles associated with organisms 
are, strictly speaking, neither ‘atypical’, nor ‘deviations’.30 Rather, in the 
parlance of our account, they ought to be understood as the non- random 
and regularly repeatable exhibitions “of the nature” of their structural 
powers.
4.  Stability Redux: Homeostasis vs. Homeodynamism
One might reasonably ask why, as we have just suggested, one should hold 
that it is “of the nature” of structural powers to diachronically organise the 
constituents of an organism toward the generation and continual mainte-
nance of not only a single morphological profile, but of a wider, more fine- 
grained set of qualitatively diverse profiles. Given the diversity inherent in 
plastic phenomena, would it not be just as coherent to suppose, for instance, 
that the lesson we ought to learn from the repeatability and regularity of 
these morphological variations is that a single organism reliably possesses 
multiple distinct structural powers at distinct times, and in distinct causal 
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contexts? Of course, adopting such a position would call into serious ques-
tion our account of the diachronic unity of organisms, wherein the temporal 
persistence of a single structural power functions as its ontological ground. 
However, we think that would be the wrong lesson to draw—and show-
ing why that is so will allow us to further elucidate a central aspect of our 
account.
The reason we think one ought to hold that it is “of the nature” of a 
single structural power to developmentally direct the synchronic states of 
an organism toward multiple teleological goals is that it is the view strongly 
suggested by two important features which characterise this multiplicity. 
The first is that the various morphologies that an organism is capable of 
exhibiting (and robustly maintaining) as adaptive displays of their pheno-
typic plasticity, qualitatively dissimilar as they may be, are causally “reach-
able” from one another via some series of transformations—e.g., changes in 
chemical thresholds, genetic expression levels, etc. Indeed, in experimental 
morphospace modelling,31 the exhaustive collection of these particularised 
morphological possibilities is conceptualised as composing a single ‘land-
scape’ whose sub- regions’ distance relations reflect their relative degree of 
transformational accessibility from one another.32 The second feature stems 
from the fact that the regions of this landscape are not all created equal: 
some regions of that space are more heavily weighted than others. Some 
regions of that space, for instance, are “surrounded” by a kind of pleonas-
tic pathing in virtue of which they have a higher probability of becoming 
occupied than others: the morphologies they represent are ponds into which 
many possible developmental tributaries flow.33 Other regions “carve out” 
deep valleys which, once occupied, have a higher probability of remaining 
occupied: deviation from the morphology they represent via traversal to 
other regions on that landscape can only done with some degree of dif-
ficulty (if it all, in some cases). As we hope should by now be clear, the 
relative weights assigned to various regions in morphospace are measures of 
the robustness of the morphologies those regions represent.34 Importantly 
however, the degree to which each of these morphologies is generatively 
robust—and so the extent to which they are homeostatically maintained in 
the event of perturbations, and thus represent significantly distinct available 
morphological states of an organism—can only be established as the inverse 
of the measure of the relative causal “strength” which the organism’s com-
position must exhibit in order to achieve the aforementioned transforma-
tion to some other morphological state.
Taking both of these features of an organismal morphospace seriously 
inclines us to think that the plastic potential it enshrines characterises a 
single structural power. For the morphological forms which comprise it are 
only superficially separated from one another, as no particular form within 
that space is an inaccessible island, but rather, in forming a continuous, 
dynamically connected landscape, the regions which they occupy are, in a 
certain sense, only so many permutations of a single morphological type. We 
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suggest then that the manifestation which defines a structural power ought 
to be understood as being metaphysically ‘multifaceted’—that is, as consist-
ing of a wide variety of quantitatively and/or qualitatively distinct permuta-
tions of a single manifestation- type within a wide range of causal contexts35. 
Of course, these permutations, and indeed, the entirety of that multifaceted 
landscape is only a static reflection of the dynamics which characterise the 
cyclopoietic activity of a structural power, mapping out, as it were, the full 
spectrum of its contextually sensitive teleological tendency to produce and 
maintain the production of an entire class of morphologies. Thus, meta-
physically, the manifestation- type of a structural power is defined by an 
entire landscape of distinct, though dynamically united morphologies, each 
region of which (statically) represents a contextually particularised exhibi-
tion of its characteristic cyclopoietic activity. To return to our earlier meta-
phor: while each particularised morphology which an organism may adopt 
is a kind of self- contained harmony within its own set of measures—in that 
each is a quasi- independent instance of its constituents conforming to a 
particular functionally unified and robustly stable configuration—each is 
nonetheless fundamentally a derivative expression of the thematic overture 
of a single symphony.
Because in our account, it is the persistence of the continual activity of 
a structural power which serves as the metaphysical ground for the dia-
chronic unity of an organism, and given the nature of the manifestation- 
types which characterise those powers we have just elucidated, a central 
aspect of our account can now be cast in greater relief. As we have argued, 
fully capturing the nature of the cyclopoietic activity of structural pow-
ers requires the conceptualisation of their morphologically multifaceted 
manifestation- types as the emanation of the teleological texture of their 
dynamics. In this way, we offer a novel type of account of the diachronic 
unity of organisms—one which is fundamentally homeodynamic, rather 
than merely homeostatic. For while our account certainly recognises the 
importance of the homeostatic capacity of organisms to maintain a par-
ticular morphology in the face of various perturbations of their constitu-
ents, it nonetheless views that phenomena as a kind of ‘special case’ of 
the dynamic nature of organisms: various regions in a particular mor-
phospace will certainly be substantially weighted (in the aforementioned 
sense), but only relatively, and only in the context of and as a result of the 
dynamics of the landscape as a whole. Thus, according to our account, 
what “remains the same” over time in properly unified organisms their 
robust preservation not of a single morphological form, but rather of the 
dynamic specificities of their teleologically textured morphospace which 
encompasses the potentiality for the expression of many such forms. The 
diachronic preservation of that dynamic topology, we suggest, is the exhi-
bition of the continued presence and activity of the multifaceted manifes-
tation of a structural power and functions as the ontological ground of the 
unity of organisms.
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5.  Conclusion
As Aristotle recognised, as ‘substances’ par exellance, organisms enjoy 
a unique and privileged ontological status in our world—one for which 
our metaphysics must account. According to Aristotle, that status is con-
ferred on them in virtue of their possessing ‘principles of activity’ which 
allow them to persist as unified beings, metaphysically unfettered from 
their mereological moorings. In line with this fundamental insight, we have 
offered a contemporary neo- Aristotelian metaphysical account of the dia-
chronic unity of organisms according to which that unity is conferred by 
the diachronic possession of a special type of causal power—a structural 
power—whose dynamic manifestation consists in the teleologically directive 
impetus toward the organisation of the temporally fluctuating members of 
its mereological makeup according to the specifications of a multi- faceted, 
contextually correlative morphological repertoire. On our view, although 
that unity is exhibited in the persistent capacity of an organism to remain 
morphologically static over time, it is more fully so in the persistence of its 
rich dynamic capacity for a specified range of morphological variability. In 
this way, organisms are homeodynamic unities whose privileged position 
upon the ontological hierarchy is one afforded them by their possession of 
structural powers.36
Notes
 1 Incorporating the ontological consequences of this phenomena into our organ-
ism concept is a central motivation for adopting a ‘process ontology’ in the phi-
losophy of biology, a framework which is currently experiencing a slight revival. 
See Dupré (2013) and Jaeger and Monk (2015).
 2 The notion of a ‘structural power’ was first introduced within a synchronic con-
text by Marmodoro (2017).
 3 For the application of some of the concepts discussed in the later sections of this 
paper to a discussion of biological ‘natural kinds’, see Austin (2016).
 4 If it were, an organism with a divergent morphology (on account of a deformity 
caused by a developmental deficiency, for instance) would therefore fail to mani-
fest its structural power and so fail to properly unite its constituent constituents 
into one entity—but this is false: abnormality does not a multiplicity make. Fur-
thermore, this sort of view would also plausibly entail that the full exhibition 
of its causal role would amount to it ceasing to function at some point. But this 
cannot be, for, as Aristotle recognised, when that activity ceases, so too does the 
entity it belongs to; see, for instance, On the Parts of Animals I.1, 641a18- 21, 
Barnes (1984).
 5 These powers thus encapsulate the central sense of Aristotle’s notion of ‘actual-
ity’/ ‘energeia’ (literally, “being in work”) in Metaphysics T, Barnes (1984). See 
Charles (2010) for an excellent recent discussion.
 6 It’s worth noting that Rea (2011), too, offers an account of the diachronic unity 
of entities which is grounded in the activities of causal powers. However, it is one 
fraught with substantial difficulties of various kinds—see Marmodoro (2013).
 7 The term ‘cyclopoietic’ is meant as a nod toward Maturana and Varela’s (1980) 
influential coinage of the term ‘autopoietic’, used to describe organisms as “self- 
building”. We note in passing that Aristotle made use of this same criterion for 
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distinguishing between organisms and ‘artefacts’, claiming that only the former 
possessed a ‘principle of its own production’—see Physics II.1, 192b29- 34, 
Barnes (1984).
 8 The function which structural powers perform is thus the embodiment of Aris-
totle’s illustrative description of the distinguishing activity of ‘natural beings’—
their operation is like doctors doctoring themselves. See Physics II.8, 119b30- 2, 
Barnes (1984) .
 9 In being self- directed in this fashion, these powers are perpetually manifesting: 
their manifestation provides the sufficient stimulus conditions for their subse-
quent manifestations. See Marmodoro (2017) for more detail.
10 Huang and Wikswo (2006), Jaeger and Monk (2015), Bich (2016).
11 Arguably, it was this very sense of unity that Kant had in mind when discussing 
the intrinsic ‘natural purpose’ that sets organisms apart from matter in the Cri-
tique of Judgment; see Weber and Varela (2002) for a comprehensive historical 
discussion, and Walsh (2006) for a contemporary application of this Kantian 
schema. For more generalised contemporary discussion of ‘living beings’ as uni-
fied dynamically, see Ruiz- Moreno et al. (2004), Cornish- Bowden (2006), and 
Razeto- Barry (2012).
12 These characteristics are derived from the influential account of Sommerhof 
(1950). See also Nagel (1977) and, more recently, Walsh (2012).
13 Greenspan (2001), Kitano (2004), Mason (2010).
14 Edelman and Gally (2001), Whitacre and Bender (2010).
15 Occasionally the phenomenon of ‘buffering’, wherein a developmental sys-
tem’s production of a particular morphological feature is insensitive to a 
wide variation of alterations in some of its input values, is understood as an 
exhibition of generative robustness—e.g., in the segment polarity network 
(von Dassow et al. 2000; Ingolia 2004). However, as robustness via causal 
parameter insensitivity isn’t relevant to our discussion, we have refrained 
from including it here.
16 Zhenglong et al. (2003), Frankel et al. (2010), MacNeil and Walhout (2011).
17 This type of ‘degeneracy’ is, of course, importantly distinct from the variety that 
holds between DNA codons and amino acids, which refers to the merely static 
measure which reflects the fact that the number of unique possible combinations 
of the former outstrip the number of unique possible types of the latter.
18 Edelman and Gally (2001), Conant and Wagner (2004), Whitacre and Bender 
(2010).
19 This reflects the practice of contemporary developmental systems biology, where 
‘robustness’ is often conceptualised as an irreducibly holistic and “distributive” 
feature of complex systems. See Wagner (2005) and Whitacre and Bender (2010).
20 We aren’t the first to characterise the intricate operations of living organisms via 
musical metaphors—see principally the famed systems biologist Denis Noble’s 
The Music of Life (2006).
21 We’re acutely aware that there is a lot more that both could and should be said 
about the philosophical implications of these ontological claims, but as a more 
full discussion would take the present paper too far off course, we leave their 
consideration and explication for future work.
22 Whitman and Agrawal (2009), Gilbert and Epel (2015).
23 Gibbs et al. (2011).
24 Laforsch and Tollrian (2004).
25 Miura (2005).
26 Pigliucci (2005), Fusco and Minelli (2010).
27 Rasskin- Gutman (2005), McGhee (2006).
28 The intimate connection between non- random regularity and ‘nature’ is dis-
cussed at length in Aristotle’s Physics, Barnes (1984).
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29 Schlichting and Smith (2002), Windig et al. (2004), Aubin- Horth and Renn 
(2009). For some recent insights into the complexities of the reaction- norm map-
ping of the aforementioned Daphnia, see Colbourne et al. (2011).
30 This idea that even regularly produced so- called morphological “monsters” are 
the results of an intrinsic generative ‘logic’ was championed in the context of 
developmental biology by Alberch (1989). We note in passing that Aristotle 
prefigured this reasoning in On the Generation of Animals (IV.4, 770b13- 24, 
Barnes 1984): “Even in the case of monstrosities, whenever things contrary to 
the established order but still always in a certain way and not at random, the 
result seems to be less of a monstrosity because even that which is contrary to 
nature is in a certain sense according to nature . . . for instance, there is a vine 
which some call ‘smoky’; if it bears black grapes, they do not judge it a monstros-
ity because it is in the habit of doing this very often. The reason is that it is in its 
nature intermediate between white and black; thus the change is not a large one 
nor, so to say, contrary to nature; at least, it is not a change into another nature”.
31 This type of modelling has recently been extensively utilised in the study of the 
morphological potential of pluripotent cells—see, for instance, Bhattacharya et 
al. (2011) and Li and Wang (2013).
32 Wagner and Stadler (2003), Rasskin- Gutman (2005), McGhee (2006), Wagner 
(2014).
33 The conception of morphospace as contoured in this fashion, first proposed by 
Waddington (1957), is now a central pillar of the theoretical research project of 
evolutionary developmental biology in the form of ‘developmental constraints’ 
or ‘generative bias’ (Arthur 2002; Amundson 2005; Hallgrimsson et al. 2012; 
Brigandt 2015). For recent empirical case studies, see Young et al. (2010) and 
Rasskin- Gutman and Esteve- Altava (2014).
34 The representation of the probability measure of states via topological mappings 
is central to the now widely employed methodology of dynamic systems theory 
analyses in theoretical developmental biology (Wang et al. 2011; Huang 2012; 
Davila- Velderrain et al. 2015), within which system state robustness is often 
given a topological interpretation (Kitano 2004; Huang 2009; Huneman 2010).
35 We intentionally refer to the manifestation of structural powers as ‘multi- 
faceted’—reflecting the fact that the context- sensitive manifestations it may 
exhibit are facets of a single surface—rather than referring to the powers them-
selves as ‘multi- track’ (Martin 2007; Williams 2011; Vetter 2013). As evidenced 
from the discussion below, the two conceptions are radically distinct, though we 
don’t have the space to explore the distinctions here.
36 This collaborative research has been made possible by funding from the Temple-
ton World Charity Foundation. We are also grateful for the feedback from the 
audience of our presentation of an earlier draft of this paper at Corpus Christi 
College, Oxford.
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There’s no denying that contemporary metaphysics is experiencing an 
Aristotelian revival of sorts wherein dispositions, or ‘causal powers’ are no 
longer regarded as scholastic superfluities, ideally to be explained away, but 
are instead being put to work in everything from theories of colour to theo-
ries of modality. But while the Aristotelian doctrine of ‘potentiality’ is now 
widely understood as being fairly innocuous and even theoretically advan-
tageous, there has been a recent notable rise in the defenders of a much 
more contentious Peripatetic postulate—the doctrine of hylomorphism. 
According to the ontological principle of hylomorphism, the natures of enti-
ties are in some sense metaphysically, or conceptually bipartite: they have 
both a material and a formal aspect. Thus, fully “grasping the nature” of 
an entity requires understanding it as the conceptual union of both aspects.
The minor surge of the defence of this doctrine notwithstanding, it’s cer-
tainly safe to say that hylomorphism isn’t currently en vogue, even amongst 
the most ardent defenders of a neo- Aristotelian metaphysic. To my mind, 
there’s a simple reason for this: while the contemporary defenders of this 
doctrine have done quite a lot of work in precisely explicating what the 
conceptual notion of ‘form’ amounts to, comparatively little has been done 
toward showing that this is a concept with empirical content. If we believe, 
as I do, that an effectual impetus to join a particular philosophical church 
must consist in more than simply being given a conceptual dissection of its 
characteristic complex metaphysical doctrine, the paucity of practitioners in 
the hylomorphic pews should come as little surprise.
With this in mind, this paper is a kind of altar call—its aim is to show 
that the hylomorphist’s claim that fully grasping the nature of entities is a 
“two concept job” can be given firm empirical footing. To do so, I bring 
the conceptual focus back to its Aristotelian origin—the biological realm. 
My claim is that recent advances in developmental systems biology afford 
us an empirically tractable picture of the hylomorphic nature of biological 
entities by way of elucidating what the formal aspect of that nature con-
sists in. The hope is that, having been enriched by an empirically informed 
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conception of form, hylomorphism might once again be seen as good news 
for metaphysics.
2.  Hylomorphism: A Matter of Definition
Taken generally, hylomorphism is the doctrine that fully capturing the meta-
physical ‘nature’ of an entity requires an appeal to two distinct (though 
ultimately intimately interrelated) concepts—matter and form. Or, to put it 
another way, according to hylomorphism, any adequate metaphysical defi-
nition of an entity must be two- fold—it must encompass the nature of the 
entity qua matter and qua form. But what does this bipartite distinction 
amount to? Let us say that to define the nature of an entity qua matter is 
to define it as an organised, connected collection of discrete parts; here, 
‘organisation’ and ‘connectivity’ are to be understood, at the very least, 
both spatially and causally (and perhaps temporally), and ‘discrete’ denotes 
their being ontologically, or existentially independent from one another. To 
define the nature of an entity qua form, on the other hand, is to define it as 
a holistic, dynamically directed structure; more on this momentarily.
The claim of hylomorphism is that both of these concepts must be put to 
use in successfully “capturing the nature” of an entity—but what is involved 
in this task? Clearly, “capturing the nature” of an entity is to be understood 
as getting a grip on what that entity is in some metaphysically fundamen-
tal sense. In line with the now- popular Lockean understanding advocated 
in contemporary metaphysics, let us say that “capturing the nature” of an 
entity amounts to understanding why and how that entity possesses its 
characteristic set of properties: getting a grip on the nature of a clump of 
gold, for instance, plausibly involves understanding why it has such- and- 
such surface- level properties (reflective surfaces, malleability, conductivity, 
etc.), which involves understanding how it comes to have them (through its 
molecular structure, or electron count, or etc.)—thus, Kripke’s appeal to its 
“periodic” nature.1 On this line of thinking, citing the nature of an entity 
affords one rich explanatory power with respect to its possession of a set of 
typical features—why those features are there (or why they could be there), 
and how they got there (or how they would have gotten there), etc.2
Defining the nature of an entity qua matter then is to cite an entity’s 
organised, connected collection of discrete parts as explanatory with respect 
to its possession of a characteristic set of features.3 I take it that this sort of 
definitional methodology won’t be unfamiliar to the reader—it is, after all, 
representative of the prominent philosophical project of reductionism—and 
so it’s probably unnecessary to spend too much time on it here. What’s 
more important for present purposes is to flesh- out precisely what it means 
to define the nature of an entity qua form. My approach here will be to 
trace the Peripatetic thread as it has weaved through contemporary hylo-
morphic accounts by distilling a set of shared criteria for a formal definition 
present in the literature.4 Though I’ve already briefly mentioned a putative 
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description of such a definition, it’s instructive to consider it in more detail. 
To do so, I’ll distinguish three aspects of a ‘formal definition’; though, as we 
will see, these three are in some way intertwined.
Firstly, to define the nature of an entity qua form is to offer an explan-
atory basis for its characteristic features in something “over and above” 
its mereological constituents. Formal definitions are often understood as 
demarcating higher- order facts about an entity’s constituents—typically, 
they either pick out some privileged relation of those constituents,5 or else 
some sort of process of,6 or metaphysical operation on,7 those constituents. 
Importantly, in virtue of referring to something appropriately higher- order, 
formal definitions are taken not to refer to any extra mereological part of 
those entities,8 nor are they understood as being reducible to any competing 
material definitions which might concern those parts.9
Secondly, a formal definition of an entity’s nature picks- out some irreduc-
ibly higher- order fact about that entity and its constituents precisely because 
to define that nature qua form is to represent the entity as an ontological 
unity—as metaphysically one. In contrast to a material definition, wherein 
appeal is made to a collection of various discrete mereological parts and 
pieces, a formal definition’s explanatory prowess is grounded in a holistic 
conception of an entity.10 The unity that formal definitions are meant to 
appeal to is understood as being importantly distinct from the “mere togeth-
erness” that characterises the content of a material definition: to be sure, the 
latter cites an organised, connected collection of parts, but the former cites 
that collection as one.
The last aspect of this type of definition makes clear what this distinction 
really amounts to, as defining an entity’s nature qua form involves an appeal 
to an entity as a causally unified system. This is typically cashed- out by the 
claim that a formal definition picks- out a higher- order causal activity of the 
entity as a whole,11 or else one that is in some sense an emergent, irreducibly 
cooperative activity of an entity’s constituents.12 The causal unity implicit in 
a formal definition doesn’t consist simply in the fact that a particular entity 
performs a particular higher- order activity which involves each of its parts 
operating in causal unison, but also that this structure orients these parts, as 
a whole, toward a particular causally privileged end, or ends. As one might 
expect of an Aristotelian account, to define the nature of entity qua form 
is to cite as explanatory (in the relevant sense) its holistic causal “directed-
ness” toward some end- state(s).13 In some sense, then, a formal definition 
represents the entity’s constituents as non- autonomous participants in a sin-
gularly directed, dynamically continuous structure.14 Thus, we see again, 
now more clearly, the higher- order unity that a formal definition is meant to 
capture—namely, a holistic, goal- directed activity, ontologically attributable 
to an entity only as a singular causal system.15
As I understand it then, to define the nature of an entity qua form 
is to demarcate its holistically higher- order, dynamically directed causal 
structure as uniquely explanatory with respect to its possession of a set 
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of typical features. Now that we’ve a better grip on what a formal defini-
tion amounts to, the pertinent question is, given this conception, what’s 
required in order to give a plausible defence of hylomorphism? For our 
purposes, as the more contested aspect of the doctrine, let us ask: what’s 
required in order to give a plausible defence of the applicability of a for-
mal definition of an entity’s nature? To answer that question requires get-
ting clearer about the nature of the defence I want to offer. As I’ve said, 
my aim is to display and defend an empirical incarnation of the conceptual 
framework of hylomorphism. Thus, in explicating that framework, I have 
focused on the doctrine’s core definitional claims, rather than any of its 
purported ontological commitments. As it happens, precisely what those 
commitments are is widely disputed, even among its adherents. If an enti-
ty’s nature admits of a formal definition, does this entail, for instance, that 
we must reformulate our account of mereological composition16 or that 
we must countenance a novel ontological category whose members are 
imbued with unique, “downwardly directed” causal powers?17 Or does 
such an admission merely require helping ourselves to a non- ontological 
free lunch, delivered simply via a process of abstraction?18
Rather than taking a particular stance on this issue, my aim is to focus 
on the widely accepted definitional project: after all, every defender of hylo-
morphism presumably agrees that the doctrine is committed to the claim 
that fully capturing the nature an entity requires an appeal the dichotomous 
descriptive machinery of matter and form, irrespective of whatever the 
ontological underpinnings or consequences of those descriptions are taken 
to be. With the account laid out above then, the project of this paper is to 
show one way in which this definitional project may be vindicated; such 
vindication might be taken to entail particular ontological consequences for 
the doctrine, and although I won’t be defending them in detail here, I will 
briefly address them in the final section. As already mentioned, to do so, 
the paper will focus on the clearly more contested aspect of the doctrine—
formal definition. For my defence to have succeeded, it will have to have 
shown that the concepts invoked in this type of definition have a plausible 
empirical instance. Importantly, with the above discussion in mind, the suc-
cess of this defence requires (a) showing that form is conceptually indepen-
dent of matter, and (b) showing that form plays a unique explanatory role 
with respect to matter: (a) is satisfied if a formal definition of an entity, as 
explicated above, can be made without explicit appeal to its material defini-
tion, while (b) is satisfied if such a definition is able to play an explanatory 
role with respect to the possession of a characteristic set of an entity’s fea-
tures which is uncapturable by appealing to its material definition.19
My claim is that if we focus on the biological realm, itself once the fount 
of Aristotelian inspiration, a contemporary defence of the principles of hylo-
morphism is available: recent advances in developmental systems biology 
have shown, or so I will argue, that fully capturing the nature of biological 
entities is a job which requires both matter and form.
A Biologically Informed Hylomorphism 189
3.  Back to Biology: Building an Organism
Aristotle’s argument that the principles of his hylomorphic metaphysic were 
truly in rei was primarily grounded in the physical principles he believed to 
be in natura—that is, in the biological realm. If you’re after a robust under-
standing of that metaphysic, then, you’d be better off examining starfish, 
rather than statues.20 Accordingly, most philosophers who’ve since taken 
up the hylomorphic mantle have placed biological entities as paradigms of 
that metaphysic—and rightly so. However, although few deny that the doc-
trine naturally dwells in the “land of the living”, even fewer have taken 
on the project of providing a detailed account of how, and in what way, 
that realm is to be characterised by its metaphysical principles. Typically, 
at best, these philosophers merely suggestively cite practicing biologists’ 
rather vague delineations of characteristic phenomena of life—homeostasis, 
emergence, etc.—as empirical undergirding for the doctrine’s metaphysics.21 
More commonly, however, is the simple, though unexamined posit of bio-
logical entities as hylomorphic exemplars—one often finds ‘humanity’ atop 
the candidates for form, for instance.22 In what follows, I want to offer a 
more empirically specific focus, by examining in detail the particularities of 
an important class of biological entities.23
Rather than taking on the “big picture” task of providing a hylomorphic 
account of the nature of biological entities tout court, I want to take up 
the more minute and more manageable task of providing a hylomorphic 
account of the nature of the biological individuals which make up biological 
entities. Why? One reason is practical: in my view, providing an empirically 
robust hylomorphic account of the nature of a biological entity—a starfish, 
for instance—is a complex and complicated affair, requiring a perhaps unap-
preciated amount of philosophical subtlety. Better, then, for the purposes of 
this paper, to make an attempt at the more practical task of providing such 
an account for the individuals which compose biological entities; ideally, the 
account I offer will be generalisable, “upwards” as it were, though I won’t 
be arguing for that here.24 Another reason is principled: the focus of my 
examination may not be best conceptualised as full- fledged entities in their 
own right, but they are most certainly biological individuals; more on this 
in a moment. And being biological individuals, it’s reasonable to expect that 
a hylomorphic account ought to apply to them just as equally as it does to 
the larger individuals they compose.
That said, the individuals I want to focus on are called developmental 
modules, currently on the centre stage of research in the field of developmen-
tal systems biology. Developmental modules are discrete biological systems 
causally responsible for the development of particular morphological fea-
tures. A foundational fact upon which the edifice of systems biology is built 
is that the morphological development of organisms is a rather piecemeal 
affair. More specifically, that an organism’s development is controlled dis-
cretely, by individualised organismal sub- systems which initiate and direct 
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the formation of its various body parts—eyes, legs, and the like. These sub- 
systems—or developmental modules—are treated as individuals in part due 
to their relative causal autonomy during the process of development: they 
are characterised equally by an extremely high causal connectivity among 
their constituents and an extremely low causal connectivity with other parts 
of the organism.25 They are, in other words, discernible bundles of tightly 
knit causal loops whose activities are responsible for an organism’s develop-
ment of a particular trait. But developmental modules are also individuals 
in perhaps a stronger sense, as recent advances in evolutionary developmen-
tal biology (evo- devo) have made clear: they are able to be generationally 
inherited and so are traceable (with modification) throughout evolutionary 
history,26 a fact which may even merit them a place at the ground- floor of 
the elusive, proper “level of selection”.27 In a perfectly respectable sense, 
then, developmental modules, the organismal sub- systems causally respon-
sible for the production of particular morphological traits, are biological 
individuals—and ontologically important ones at that, as it is their activities 
which give shape to the fully featured biological entities we’re more directly 
acquainted with.28
The pertinent question then is: what is the nature of a developmental 
module? Recall that citing the nature of a thing is meant to provide rich 
explanatory import with respect to its characteristic feature(s). To answer 
that question then, we must know which feature(s) the citation of the nature 
of a module might purport to aid in explaining. The obvious answer seems 
to be that citing the nature of a module should help shed explanatory light 
upon the development of its associated morphological trait: it should, as I 
earlier put it, importantly aid in explaining the why and how of that pro-
cess. Thus, providing an answer as to the nature of a developmental module 
requires some knowledge of what that process amounts to. If we consider 
that a fully developed morphological feature is nothing more than a particu-
larised spatial configuration of various cell- types, we can get a preliminary 
grip on the process in question—put simply, it involves putting the correct 
things in the correct places. The process of “building” a morphological fea-
ture is thus two- fold: it requires the creation of a certain set of cell- types 
particular to the feature in question, and the arrangement of this set in a 
particular three- dimensional configuration. More specifically, the operation 
of that process involves not only that the genomes of a set of cells take on 
particular expression profiles which determine their individual developmen-
tal fates, but also that these specifically expressed cells are spatially coordi-
nated in a particular configuration.
We now know that the process which begins with a collection of cells 
whose genomes are not in any particular expression state (i.e. pluripotent 
cells), known as an imaginal disc, which over time take on specific expres-
sion profiles in a coordinated fashion, requires the activity of an entire net-
work of genes.29 It requires a certain set of genes that act intra- cellularly to 
produce the proteins that determine the particular cell- types which “build” 
A Biologically Informed Hylomorphism 191
the morphological feature in question and a set of genes whose protein 
products (known as transcription factors) act inter- cellularly to regulate 
the intra- cellular expression profiles of other genes in neighbouring cells, 
thereby controlling which genes are expressed in which cells throughout the 
disc, as well as when and where that expression takes place during the devel-
opment of a morphological feature. Thus, we can model the process of the 
development of an imaginal disc by mapping out a genetic regulatory net-
work (GRN), which includes the set of genes whose expression determines 
particular cell- types, the set of genes which controls their expression, and 
the particularities of the causal, regulatory relationships among them (acti-
vation, repression, etc.)
Understood in this way, the development of a particular morphologi-
cal feature can be seen as the temporal succession of a series of expression 
profiles of the GRN elements in the cells which compose an imaginal disc. 
Importantly, this is a process governed by the “regulatory logic” of that 
GRN, as the expression profile of each cell within the disc evolves over time 
according to the particularities of its regulatory structure: if G1 is highly 
expressed at t because it is up- regulated by G2 at t - 1, then at t + 1, G3 and 
G4 will be barely expressed, due to G1 highly down- regulating both, etc.30 
Over time, then, due to the specific regulatory logic of a particular GRN, 
the cells of an imaginal disc take on a controlled and continuous series of 
expression profiles via a series of patterning processes ultimately resulting 
in the collectively stable state of a various collection of particular cell- types 
arranged in a particular spatial configuration—that is, in a fully developed 
morphological feature.31
It should by now be clear that if we wish to “capture the nature” of a 
developmental module, we must have recourse to its associated GRN, as 
knowledge of its elements and the relations among them sheds explana-
tory light upon the development of its associated morphological trait: if we 
Figure 8.1  Schematic two- dimensional representation of the early developmen-
tal stages of a multi- cellular imaginal disc constituting a module: ‘A/P’ 
denotes the anterior and posterior regions of the module, distinct bubble 
colours represent distinct cell- types, and arrows represent the causal/
regulatory influence of one cell- type upon neighbouring cell- types. Over 
time, the cellular constitution of a module becomes increasingly compart-
mentalised and spatially discrete.
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want to explain the why and how of that process, we must appeal to the 
structural- causal mapping of its GRN. In doing so, we are citing its organ-
ised, connected collection of discrete parts as explanatory with respect to 
the possession of its characteristic feature. We are, in other words, showing 
the validity of defining the nature of a developmental module qua matter. 
But does such a definition fully capture the nature of a developmental mod-
ule? That is, is there something yet left to account for with respect to offer-
ing the relevant explanatory utility which this definition fails to deliver? 
The answer, I think, is yes, for, as I argue below, the material definition 
of a developmental module leaves one uninformed about its nature in an 
important respect.
4.  Modules and Morphospaces
Although I have been preliminarily modelling the causal output of a devel-
opmental module rather rigidly as a singular, fully specified morphological 
feature, a complication must now be made, as the full picture admits of 
rather more flexibility. For we now know that the morphological structure 
produced by a single developmental module, being underwritten by a spe-
cific genetic regulatory network, is capable of a wide variety of intra- and 
inter- cellular environmentally induced phenotypic variation—this is the phe-
nomenon of phenotypic plasticity, attested to by the reality (read: quantifi-
ability) of reaction norms.32 As a result of “upstream” alterations consisting 
mainly of heterochronical and heteropical changes in inter- cellular signal-
ling, a single developmental module is capable of producing a wide range of 
“downstream” qualitative alterations in its associated morphological feature 
with respect to its precise shape, size, pigmentation, etc.33 Thus, the mor-
phological feature generatively specified by a single developmental module 
cannot be fully characterised by a single, particularised instance with respect 
to these qualitative and quantitative factors, but must instead be understood 
as a generalised collection of various qualitative and quantitative variations 
on that feature—this set of possible permutations is known as the feature’s 
morphospace. For this reason, capturing the generative capacity of a single 
developmental module with respect to its associated morphological feature 
must involve modelling its “variational tendencies”,34 or its set of “devel-
opmental trajectories, [correlated with] the particular set of environmental 
conditions to which [it] is exposed”,35 to construct an “idealised type . . . 
constructed from ample and acknowledged variation”.36
With this in mind, it’s clear that “fully capturing the nature of a devel-
opmental module” must involve capturing its rich generative capacity to 
produce its entire morphospace. The pertinent question for our purposes 
is: can the material definition we’ve provided accomplish this? In order to 
answer this, we must look again to the causal story of development. We’ve 
already seen that one can model a fully developed morphological feature as 
a specific spatial arrangement of a collection of cells with specific genetic 
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expression profiles. We’ve also seen that the developmental process involved 
in generating such a feature can be modelled as the temporal succession of 
states of the overall expression profile of the imaginal disc (itself composed 
of a number of individual cells’ profiles), the transitions of which are gov-
erned by the regulatory logic specified by its GRN. Of course, we have thus 
far only modelled a single developmental trajectory towards the genera-
tion of a single variant of a morphological feature, and the phenomenon 
of developmental plasticity shows that many such trajectories are possible.
However, accommodating this involves no further complication—using 
the same GRN and its constitutive regulatory logic, we can model each 
of these trajectories as the developmental consequence of its “generative 
rules” being applied in the context of distinct initial developmental input 
conditions.37 In other words, the phenomenon of developmental plasticity 
reflects the fact that a single regulatory network is capable of delivering a 
variety of distinct morphological end- states according to a variety of dis-
tinct initial developmental conditions, as altering the initial network- state 
of a module has regulatory consequences (specified by the generative rules 
of that network) on the expression states of its cells which ripple “down-
wards” and “outwards” throughout an imaginal disc during the process of 
development.
So, modelling a module’s flexibility with respect to its capacity to pro-
duce various developmental trajectories by defining it materially—that is, 
via its associated GRN—is easily done. However, a further complication 
arises when one considers that the morphospaces associated with develop-
mental modules are not merely reflections of their developmental plasticity, 
but also of their generative constraints: for these systems are not wholly 
flexible, causally subject to every incoming environmental influence dur-
ing the process of development, but instead reliably and repeatedly end 
that process within a well- demarcated range of particular states.38 In other 
words, no module’s morphospace consists of an ontologically exhaustive 
set of every possible qualitative and quantitative permutation on its associ-
ated morphological feature. Rather, the morphospace which characterises 
a developmental module is composed of a select set of generatively priv-
ileged permutations which arise within a wide range of distinct environ-
mental (read: causal) contexts. In this way, the character of a morphospace 
associated with a developmental module shows that nature delights in vari-
ety without indulging in it—morphological variation is allowed, but only 
within certain limits.
If “fully capturing the nature of a developmental module” involves cap-
turing its rich generative capacity to produce its entire morphospace, then 
any adequate definition of that nature must be explanatorily relevant with 
respect not only to its generation of a certain amount of morphological 
variation, but also with respect to the specified constraints on that varia-
tion. What we require, in other words, is not only explanatory power with 
respect to a module’s capacity to produce various distinct developmental 
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trajectories, but also with respect to the limitations on that capacity. 
Importantly, note that understanding the latter allows us to understand, 
for any particular module, why these morphologies are privileged, and why 
they are so—something that cannot be achieved by simply appealing to any 
single developmental trajectory, nor to the entire set of privileged trajecto-
ries. Capturing this fact, I suggest, is crucial to capturing the nature of a 
developmental module.
Accomplishing this, as I will show, requires conceptualising these organ-
ismal sub- systems in a radically novel fashion, via the conceptual frame-
work of dynamic systems theory (DST). Indeed, in doing so, it requires, as 
I argue below, that we conceptualise developmental modules holistically, as 
higher- order, dynamically directed systems.
5.  Dynamic Systems Theory: A Formal Science
The desire to more fully understand the developmental constraints of organ-
ismal systems was perhaps the founding motivation for the development 
of DST, a project begun in spirit by Waddington’s posit of an ‘epigenetic 
landscape’,39 and subsequently fleshed- out with insights from Kaufmann’s 
Boolean modelling40 of GRNs.41 DST, as a novel modelling technique of 
such systems, has afforded researchers a set of unique conceptual resources 
with which to understand the process of development, and is now rather 
widely applied42 in analyses of everything from sub- organismal cell- fate43 to 
the evolvability of organism populations.44
In order to show the utility of DST in this respect, and in application to 
our current project, let us take stock. We have seen that the developmental 
process involved in a module’s generation of a morphological feature can be 
modelled as the temporal succession of states of the overall expression profile 
of the imaginal disc (itself composed of a number of individual cells’ profiles), 
the transitions of which are governed by the regulatory logic specified by its 
GRN. This fact forms the foundation of DST modelling, and the thought is: 
if we construct an abstract multi- dimensional state- space whose individual 
points represent particular disc- wide expression profiles (where each speci-
fies the expression- state of each GRN element within each cell in the disc), 
arranged continuously (according to cellular expression values) on axes 
which represent a particular cell- type in a particular spatial region, we can 
model a particular instance of the development of a morphological feature as 
a temporal trajectory through this state- space, ending in the expression- state 
representing that feature; the figure below illustrates this type of model with 
respect to a simplified GRN, represented on a two- dimensional state- space.45
Accordingly, utilising the data derived from experimental evidence of 
the phenomenon of phenotypic plasticity, we can represent the generative 
progression of a variety of the module’s possible developmental routes by 
tracing- out distinct trajectories through a single multi- dimensional state- 
space. The resulting picture provides a representation of the multiple 
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developmental pathways, each defined by distinct trajectories through GRN 
expression- value space, which are responsible for the production of the vari-
ous morphological permutations which comprise the morphospace of a par-
ticular module.
As theoretically interesting as this model may be, it yet fails to offer us 
a comprehensive understanding of the structural limitations on a module’s 
capacity to produce these permutations. In other words, as I earlier put it, 
this representative framework doesn’t offer any elucidation with respect to 
why these permutations are privileged, or why they are so. I think it’s clear 
that examining more closely any single trajectory corresponding to such 
a permutation isn’t going to do the requisite work, but nor will a similar 
scrutiny of the entire set—in the end, we’re still left in the dark as to what 
singles these trajectories out from among many possible ones, and thus, this 
collection of disc- wide GRN expression values from among many possible 
multi- cellular expression configurations. However, a natural way forward 
should suggest itself: if we want to see why these pathways are privileged, 
we ought to compare them to a set of less developmentally fortunate ones.
Figure 8.2  Schematic representation of a single developmental trajectory of a mod-
ule through a (truncated) abstract state- space, in reference to Figure 8.1. 
On either side, the ‘module at t’ and ‘module at t + 2’ depict the spatial 
arrangement of two cell types (β and ε) within the imaginal disc with 
respect to its anterior (A) and posterior (P) regions. Each cell- type is rep-
resented as consisting of the module’s GRN elements (depicted as ellipti-
cal bases), their regulatory connections (depicted by arrows), and their 
particular expression levels (depicted as stacked elliptical elements). In the 
middle of the figure, the temporal transition of the spatial arrangement 
of β and ε with respect to P is modelled as a trajectory through a two- 
dimensional plane whose edges represent unique disc- wide cellular GRN- 
expression states, arranged such that the distance between any two edges 
reflects quantitative similarity with respect to spatially specific cellular 
expression. The ‘module at t + 2’ here represents the expression levels 
of the module’s GRN which constitute its developmental end- state.
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Given the representative machinery of our multi- dimensional state- space, 
we can do just that, as mapping out a trajectory on this space only requires 
our picking a state (a disc- wide cellular GRN expression profile) and itera-
tively applying the associated GRN regulatory logic to derive its tempo-
rally successive states. In other words, “determining the next move” of a 
developmental trajectory within state- space from any state requires a simple 
conditionalising process: for any particular regulatory network, by plugging 
in a specific set of expression values for the members of that network, and 
applying the activities of the causal connectives which constitute its regula-
tory logic, we can derive its members’ subsequent expression values. Thus, 
because the regulatory logic of a GRN effectively acts to assign a Boolean 
function to each state within this state- space, we can vectorise any single 
state and trace the directionality of temporally successive states within that 
space.46 We can, in other words, plot any possible developmental trajectory 
for a particular imaginal disc.47
If we do so, after a significant number of iterations, we find that the col-
lection of these trajectories exhibit interesting properties. Firstly, we find 
that localised collections of trajectories follow similar curvatures through 
state- space: they appear to “stick together”, bending around similar regions 
of that space. Secondly, we find that multiple trajectories end in the same 
general areas in state- space: these regions appear to “attract” trajecto-
ries from various originating points within that space. As one may have 
guessed, these regions correspond to the disc- wide expression states that 
define the various morphological permutations which comprise the mod-
ule’s morphospace.
Notice that taking a “bigger picture” look at the characteristics of this 
state- space reveals precisely the features we were interested in, for here we 
see privileged permutations qua attractor- regions (e.g., φ in Figure 8.3) and 
constraints on possible permutations qua curvature structures on that space. 
What we want to know then is: what explains this shaping of state- space? 
We’ve seen that the developmental transition from any particular point in 
state- space to the next is determined by a kind of Boolean function which 
utilises the GRN’s regulatory logic operating on the particular expression 
profile of the GRN elements which define that state. However, the transi-
tions between states in this space is not reflective of merely simple analytical 
operations—for note that the transition- function in question is a regulatory 
one, and so each step within a single trajectory is a step toward disc- wide 
regulatory stability. In other words, although the state- to- state transitions 
within that space take place according to the aforementioned Boolean 
model, each step throughout developmental time is in fact a transition from 
a less stable disc- wide expression profile to a more stable one, given the 
relevant regulatory structure. So, from any origination point within that 
space, the subsequent state- transitions which comprise its trajectory follow 
the multi- cellular expression profile of the disc’s “search” for regulatory 
stability, where the relevant GRN elements’ expressions “even- out” in such 
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a way that their collected values no longer cause further significant inter- 
network expression alterations.
With this in mind, we can add another aspect to our state- space: each 
state can be given a stability measure which specifies the GRN elements’ 
expression values tendency to substantially shift (given the relevant regula-
tory logic) to a subsequent state; in effect, in this process, we are properly 
vectorising the state- space, in that the arrows we earlier assigned to each 
state now have a direction and a kind of magnitude.48 In DST modelling, 
this aspect is represented by assigning each state a particular elevation value 
(along another dimension), where the higher the elevation value, the rela-
tively higher level of expression instability of the state—i.e. the more likely 
the disc- wide expression values of its GRN elements will shift (again, given 
the relevant regulatory relations in operation).49 Once we have done so, our 
abstract state- space is now a structured topology complete with high hills 
and low- lying basins with various gradient measures connecting them.
Figure 8.3  Schematic representation of a simplified, two- dimensional state- space 
depicting a small selection of a module’s developmental trajectories. This 
truncated state- space represents the disc- wide cellular expression levels 
of the module with respect to two cell types (β and ε) in a particular 
spatial region (posterior, P). Multiple individual trajectories (depicted as 
arrows) from distinct initial conditions converge on a general region (φ) 
of developmental end- states with quantitatively similar, spatially specific, 
disc- wide cellular expression values (with respect to ε and P).
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With this stability- based topological mapping of our state- space in hand, 
we can now understand the process of the development of a particular mod-
ule in a novel fashion: if we depict the state of the module as a kind of 
frictionless orb, we can model the temporal succession of various distinct 
states of the module throughout the process of development as the dynamic 
trajectory of that orb through a pathway geometrically constrained by the 
topological ridges and valleys of the system’s Boolean regulatory configura-
tion. This novel modelling puts us in the position to understand more clearly 
why, for the corresponding morphospace of a particular module, these mor-
phological permutations are privileged, and why they are so: they represent 
disc- wide patterns of regulatory stability with respect to intra- module cellu-
lar expression states which “carve out” wide, low- lying basins in the topol-
ogy of state- space, and their privilege consists in the fact that the dynamics 
of the process of development is shaped and constrained by the geometric 
curvature of that topology.50 In this way, the framework of DST affords us 
a more complete picture of the rich generative capacity of a developmental 
module—for it not only allows us to understand a module’s ability to pro-
duce the varied morphological permutations which comprise its associated 
morphospace, but, importantly, also the causal- cum- structural “shape” of 
that capacity with respect to both the developmental privileging of and con-
straint on those permutations. Thus, by utilising the conceptual resources 
Figure 8.4  Schematic topological representation of the state- space from Figure 8.3. 
The third dimension (U) reflects the elevation level of any particular 
disc- wide spatially- specific expression profile for any specific coordinate, 
itself a measure of the relative regulatory stability; here, a higher U- value 
and warmer colouration are inversely correlated with regulatory stability. 
φ, denoting a set of quantitatively similar developmental end- states with 
respect to ε- type expression profiles within the posterior compartment 
of a module (P), is shown as a low- lying basin within state- space. NB. 
although representing a complete such topology for a particular module 
would require a rather complex, multi- dimensional state- space, the same 
principles at play in this schematic would apply.
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of DST we are able to more fully “capture the nature” of a developmental 
module, having been equipped with the explanatory resources necessary to 
account for the multi- faceted character of the developmental process of its 
associated morphological trait.
Importantly, however, note that in order to have this rich understanding 
of the nature of a developmental module, we have had to abstract away 
from its compositional particularities and their mechanistic interactions 
in an appeal to a higher- order structure which is neither a compositional 
part of the module, nor strictly reducible to any such part (or set of such 
parts).51 Of course, this process of abstraction required an initial appeal to 
its compositional elements and their mechanistic arrangement in order to 
define a network and its associated regulatory logic, but the resulting topol-
ogy from which we have drawn the aforementioned explanatory prowess 
(a) is itself constructed purely from a set of functionally defined, weighted 
Boolean connectives which (b) form a continuous mapping over an exhaus-
tive set of various iterations on the values of those compositional elements 
and their causal connectives. In as much as functionally defined operators 
are unable to qualify as “proper parts” of a biological system, (a) entails 
that this topology cannot be strictly understood as a contributing to the con-
stitution of a module. Furthermore, given that a highly abstract, functional 
mapping which plots the interrelation of every possible configuration of an 
entire system is incapable of being bijectively assigned to the set of elements 
which compose that system, (b) illustrates the irreducibility of a topology to 
such a set; here, you might say, ‘the possible’ outstrips ‘the actual’.
Note further that, in utilising the explanatory resources afforded by 
our topological understanding of a developmental module, we have had 
to conceptualise it as a higher- order, dynamically holistic system: these are 
resources granted to us only by modelling the system’s causal activity as an 
iterative operation on a continuous, integrative mapping of its entire col-
lection of possible system- wide state- values. Indeed, each point in the col-
lection that comprises a complete state- space is intimately connected to its 
neighbouring points to form a smooth gradient contour so that the result-
ing geometry of that topology—and thus, its dynamic “flow”—cannot be 
attributed to any particular GRN element, nor the entire GRN, but only to 
the system as a whole, by taking into account its exhaustive set of possible 
disc- wide expressions states.52 For within that topology, each individual vec-
tor is merged into a holistic dynamic structure, and it is this integrated flow 
(and not the specification of any underlying operating mechanisms) which 
plays an explanatory role with respect to the multi- faceted developmental of 
the module’s characteristic morphological feature via system- wide stability 
measures and their resulting topological curvature.
What’s more, the flow which characterises this higher- order structure 
doesn’t just represent the dynamic activity of the system acting as a whole 
(as “one”), but as a whole with respect to its directedness toward certain 
states: the flow of the system, characterised by its vector- summed stability 
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measures, presents a topology whose geometrical configuration directs a 
module’s process of development toward certain morphological end- states 
qua disc- wide expression patterns of regulatory stability.53 For the system’s 
causal progression, represented as the temporal traversal of that process 
through the two- dimensional state- space of disc- wide expression profiles, is 
no random walk—it is guided by (and restricted by) the three- dimensional 
contours of its holistically defined topology toward certain developmen-
tally privileged morphologies. Importantly, this “goal- directedness” which 
bestows explanatory utility with respect to morphological development is 
attributable only to that topology, and thus to the system as a whole—as 
we have seen, the stability- measure which defines that topology cannot be 
gleaned from the mere specification of the module’s GRN, or any single 
iteration of that GRN within a possible disc- wide expression state, or even 
any particular developmental trajectory guided by the regulatory strictures 
of that GRN.
6.  Hylomorphic Modules: Explanation and Ontology
With all of the above in mind, the point I wish to make ought to be clear: in 
order to have a sufficiently rich understanding of the nature of a develop-
mental module and its associated generative capacity, we have had to appeal 
to a holistic conception of its system- wide causal structure in which its vari-
ous possible developmental trajectories toward particular morphological 
end- states are dynamically united.
Importantly, although this higher- order causal structure to which we 
must appeal is in an intimate way metaphysically tied- up with the mereo-
logical makeup of a developmental module, as its constitutional elements 
specify the module’s possible expression profile (which define its corre-
sponding state- space) and the regulatory logic which governs the temporal 
transitions between them, the preceding discussion has strongly indicated 
that this abstracted causal structure is importantly conceptually indepen-
dent of that make- up, in that each state which comprises its space is defined 
functionally (as a weighted Boolean function), and the resulting topological 
structure, qua functional mapping, is conceptually independent of the mech-
anistic particularities of the activities of the module’s GRN elements. This 
is further evidenced by the fact that a wide variety of permutations in the 
mereological makeup of a module which are nonetheless causally connected 
by the same regulatory architecture will result in that system’s higher- order, 
topological structure being unchanged:54 thus, a particular geometrical- 
cum- dynamical mapping cannot be conceptually wed to any particular set 
of constitutional elements.55 Indeed, the now popular evo- devo project of 
individuating homologue- specifying developmental modules via proces-
sual definitions, itself grounded in the overwhelming evidence that distinct 
GRNs have underwritten the same developmental modules over time,56 
depends upon this fact.57
A Biologically Informed Hylomorphism 201
Furthermore, although this higher- order structure is conceptually distin-
guishable from the diverse array of its mereological underpinnings, it can-
not for that reason be regarded as a mere heuristic artefact, as an appeal to 
its nature licences unique explanatory and predictive power with respect 
to the causal structure of the process of morphological development.58 As 
we have seen, understanding the process of the development of a particular 
morphological feature as a dynamic traversal through a topological map-
ping of expression stability affords a novel, non- mechanistic explanation 
of the shape and structure of a module’s developmental capacity: this is 
an explanatory oblation purchased by an appeal to a module as a higher- 
order, dynamically integrated system, rather than by its mere characterisa-
tion as a specific set of “entities and activities”.59 But this understanding 
also provides novel, non- mechanistic predictive power with respect to that 
process, for the particularities of the higher- order, pseudo- kinetic curvature 
of the system’s stability topology licences inductive inferences regarding 
both the probability of the module following particular developmental tra-
jectories (under certain conditions, and more generally) and the probabil-
ity of the module producing particular morphological permutations (under 
certain conditions, and more generally). This prowess is exhibited perhaps 
most prominently in cutting- edge cell biology, where the regulation and 
re- programmability of cell fate is analysed via the higher- order topological 
dynamics of stem cells,60 but it is present (and increasingly so) in the study 
of everything from plant morphology61 to carcinogenesis.62
Thus, in satisfaction of the twinned goal I earlier introduced, I have 
shown not only (a) that a higher- order, holistically dynamic, goal- directed 
structure can be conceptually distinguished from the particular vagaries of 
a developmental module’s mereological underpinnings, but also (b) that by 
appealing to this structure, one is afforded a wealth of unique explanatory 
resources with respect to the generative capacity of that module and its 
associated morphospace. In other words, to return to our original formula-
tion, I’ve shown that fully “capturing the nature” of a developmental mod-
ule requires not only having a grip on its specific constitutive collection of 
genetic elements and the particular arrangement of their causal connectives, 
but also on the dynamically directed topology of its higher- order causal 
structure. Or, to put it yet another way: it is a job which requires an appeal 
to both matter and form.
While providing a plausible, empirically informed vindication of the 
Lockean definitional project of hylomorphism in the biological realm—
which has been the sole aim of this paper—is no trivial task, one might yet 
wonder what the metaphysical worth of this toil is: what does a successful 
defence of (a) and (b) tell us, for instance, about the ontology of organisms? 
In line with the purpose of this paper, as stated in §1, I have intentionally 
remained silent on this issue in the hope that the results of the discussion 
might be of applicable value to a wide variety of specific accounts (of the 
kind earlier mentioned), and not stand or fall on the posits of any particular 
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ontology. And although for that reason, I have refrained from giving those 
results any ontological gloss, I think it’s instructive to end by briefly more 
explicitly noting the ways in which they aren’t in any way inimical to, and 
in fact offer conceptual support to, the typical ontological claims of contem-
porary hylomorphism.
Note first that showing that (a) is true is a prerequisite for attempting to 
defend the truth of the central claim of hylomorphism—that fully capturing 
the nature of an entity requires an appeal to both matter and form: whatever 
your particular ontological commitments, if the nature of entities cannot be 
shown to be at the very least conceptually bipartite, that claim is clearly off 
the table. Of course, (a) being true only secures the conceptual independence 
of form from matter, and one might reasonably expect a project which aims 
to aid the cause of hylomorphic ontologies to do better: wouldn’t showing 
that form is also existentially independent from matter be of more use? In 
this instance, the answer is no. For although hylomorphism conceptualises 
entities as ontological unities of form and matter, this is a unity which is not 
taken to be established by metaphysically tying together—either through 
composition or connection63—two existentially separate sub- entities. And 
because hylomorphism denies the very possibility of the existence of unin-
formed matter, or immaterial form, a call for the truth of something more 
robust than (a) betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of the doctrine.
That said, however, vindicating the conceptual independence of form 
aids in supporting the ontological claims of hylomorphism in only a limited 
fashion—namely, by securing a metaphysical foundation for them. Showing 
that (b) is true, on the other hand, may go some way further in that task. If 
(b) is true, and the higher- order dynamic structure of developmental modules 
licenses irreducibly novel explanatory power with respect to the ontogenic 
processes of its mereological makeup, then, plausibly, given that explana-
tion often traces causation, we may have prima facie reason for thinking 
that structure possesses irreducibly novel causal power. Importantly, while 
this sort of move is certainly defeasible, any proposed annulment of it on the 
grounds that “existential dependence entails causal ineffectuality” ought to 
be dismissed.64 Not only would this sort of objection beg the question against 
hylomorphism, but as its defenders have been at pains to point out,65 the 
emergent properties of entities which are typically acknowledged to existen-
tially depend upon their ‘realisation bases’ are often assigned causal roles, 
and treated with ontological sincerity—a practice now widely adopted in 
contemporary developmental biology.66
If the holistically higher- order dynamic structure of developmental 
modules can be understood as a causal structure then, in line with the 
‘Eleatic Principle’ (“to be is to be powerful”)—widely adopted among 
neo- Aristotelians in the defence of dispositional realism—we have good 
reason for thinking it represents a fact about the ontology of those mod-
ules.67 Indeed, the recent surge in support for adopting a Whiteheadean 
‘process ontology’ in the philosophy of biology68 can be seen as a reflection 
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of the growing consensus that such mechanistically irreducible, higher- order 
causal structures must be understood as genuinely “carving at the joints” 
of organisms.69
Putting particular ontologies aside however, the more general lesson I 
wish to draw from the preceding discussion is that both (a) and (b) being 
true not only reflects the assumption in contemporary developmental biol-
ogy that this formal structure is no mere metaphor, or philosophical phan-
tasm, but also functions as the conceptual soil in which a neo- Aristotelian 
hylomorphic ontology might flourish. That said, though the further ques-
tion as to whether and to what extent any of the ontologies currently on 
offer bear philosophical fruit is no doubt an important one, it is an enquiry 
I leave for another time.
7.  Conclusion
Though the neo- Aristotelian congregation has grown considerably in recent 
years, most of its members have hesitantly refrained from adopting a doc-
trine historically central to its metaphysical catechism, and understandably 
so—for while many have demonstrated its theoretical plausibility, few have 
offered a compelling account of its empirical viability. Throughout this 
paper, by focusing on the biological realm, and appealing to recent theo-
retical advances therein, I have attempted to do just that. To that end, I’ve 
argued that the hylomorphic claim that fully “capturing the nature” of a 
biological individual requires an appeal both to it qua an organised, con-
nected collection of discrete parts and qua a dynamically directed higher- 
order holistic structure can be given empirical content. In doing so, I’ve 
focused on a particularly important class of biological sub- systems with the 
hope that, given their role as developmental building blocks, the account 
can eventually be generalised to a higher- level hylomorphic account of 
organisms.70 While that crucial work yet lies ahead, the hope is that this 
paper has shown it a task worth its toil by making a compelling case that the 
hylomorphic creed is one worthy of contemporary conviction.71
Notes
 1 Kripke (1980; cf. Putnam 1975).
 2 In his Essay Concerning Human Understanding, Locke referred to this as the 
dependence of an entity’s ‘nominal’ essence upon its ‘real’ essence (Woolsey 
1964). For an instance of this in the context of contemporary hylomorphism, see 
Oderberg (2011).
 3 This contemporary notion of ‘matter’ is closest to what commentators have 
called ‘functional matter’ in Aristotle—see Lewis (1994). Notably, this contem-
porary formulation doesn’t place any particular emphasis, as Aristotle did, on 
matter’s definition as pure potentiality and its subsequent role in underlying acci-
dental property- change.
 4 Note that this won’t involve any careful exegesis of Aristotle—the reader is free 
to think of these aspects of a formal definition as neo- Aristotelian.
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 5 Fine (1999), Johnston (2006).
 6 Koons (2014).
 7 Marmodoro (2013).
 8 Johnston (2006), Rea (2011), Marmodoro (2013). The exception to this rule is 
Koslicki (2008), who views formal definitions as picking out some further “non- 
material”, though mereological, part of an entity. However, as this isn’t widely 
held, and as Aristotle himself expressly argued against this type of position—see 
Metaphysics Z 3- 6 and 17 , Barnes (1984) - , I haven’t considered her view in any 
detail here.
 9 Robinson (2014), Jaworski (2016).
10 Johnston (2006), Oderberg (2007), Rea (2011), Marmodoro (2013).
11 Jaworski (2012).
12 Rea (2011).
13 Oderberg (2007), Rea (2011), Jaworski (2012), Marmodoro (2013).
14 Marmodoro (2013) refers to this phenomenon as the “re- identification” of an 
entity’s constituents with respect to the function of its ‘substantial form’.
15 Jaworski (2016).
16 Fine (1999), Johnston (2006), Koslicki (2008).
17 Oderberg (2007), Rea (2011), Jaworski (2012).
18 Marmodoro (2013).
19 The requirement that form provides novel explanatory power with respect to an 
entity’s constituents, rather than a causal power over them, is explicitly defended 
by Rea (2011) and Jaworski (2012).
20 The choice of creature here was no accident—Aristotle was quite interested in 
sea creatures (in History of Animals, Barnes (1984)), and sea urchin mouths are 
now known as ‘Aristotle’s Lanterns’.
21 As in Jaworski (2012).
22 As in Rea (2011).
23 None of this is meant to suggest that these philosophers haven’t dressed the 
doctrine with interesting and elucidating metaphysical flourishes—they certainly 
have. The point is simply that their doing so is often largely independent of any 
examination of the finer biological details. A notable exemption is Walsh (2006), 
and to a lesser extent, Boulter (2012).
24 Aristotle argues (in Ethics I.7, Barnes (1984)) that if the parts of a thing (a human 
eye, for instance) are understood as teleological—that is, having a form—so too 
must the whole thing (the human as an entire organism, in this case).
25 Raff and Sly (2000), Erwin and Davidson (2009).
26 Hall (2003), Davidson and Erwin (2006), Wagner (2014).
27 Brigandt (2007), Brakefield (2011), McCune and Schimenti (2012).
28 The case is even stronger if one thinks, as Clarke (2013) suggests, that any bits 
of our biological ontology upon which natural selection operates have the right 
to be called biological individuals.
29 Gurdon and Bourillot (2001), Tabata (2001), Mann and Carroll (2002).
30 For more on the regulatory “logic” found in GRNs, see Yeger- Lotem et al. (2004) 
and Alon (2007).
31 Salazar- Ciudad et al. (2003).
32 Pigliucci (2001), West- Eberhard (2003), Gilbert and Epel (2015).
33 Schlichting and Smith (2002), Aubin- Horth and Renn (2009).
34 Von Dassow and Munro (1999: 316).
35 Pigliucci et al. (1996: 81).
36 Love (2009: 57).
37 Gurdon and Bourillot (2001), Tabata (2001), Mann and Carroll (2002), Müller 
(2008).
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41 See Wang et al. (2011) and Huang (2012) for more details on the conceptual 
union between Waddington and Kaufmann in DST.
42 There are now a number of specialist journals which focus on holistic treatments 
of developmental phenomena—see, for instance, Molecular Systems Biology and 
BMC Systems Biology.
43 Bhattacharya et al. (2011), Verd et al. (2014).
44 Striedter (1998), Jaeger and Monk (2014).
45 For a (relatively) accessible introduction to how this mapping is done, both theo-
retically and with the aid of empirical data, see Huang (2009) and Wang et al. 
(2011).
46 Wang et al. (2011), Davila- Velderrain et al. (2015).
47 This is, of course, a rather complex task, given that performing it requires taking 
into account multiple cells, their spatial arrangement, and both intra- and inter- 
cellular regulatory interactions.
48 Kim and Wang (2007), Bhattacharya et al. (2011).
49 Technically, assigning an elevation value involves stochastic simulation of groups 
of cells, etc.—but I pass over this complication here. See Bhattacharya et al. 
(2011) for the finer details.
50 Kitano (2004), Huang (2009), Huneman (2010).
51 See Levy and Bechtel (2013) for a good discussion of this general sort of abstrac-
tion process in biological modelling.
52 Jaeger and Monk (2015).
53 Interestingly, Von Dassow and Munro (1999: 310) briefly note in passing the 
conceptual similarity between the causal privileging of end- state morphologies 
in DST models and an Aristotelian form of “goal- directedness”.
54 Gilbert and Bolker (2001), Jaeger and Monk (2015).
55 Thus, in accord with the classic Aristotelian picture, ‘form’ will be multiply 
realisable—the “one over many”—in at least an explanatory sense. See Mitchell 
(2012) for a comprehensive look at the phenomenon’s various incarnations in 
contemporary biology.
56 Rieppel (2005), Brigandt (2007), Love (2009), Wagner (2014).
57 For an account which more explicitly defines homologous morphological struc-
tures in the framework of DST, see Striedter (1998).
58 Even if the explanatory virtues provided by higher- order, dynamic models must 
ultimately somehow “bottom out” in the activity of mechanisms (as Kaplan and 
Craver 2011) argue), it’s not clear that this detracts from their having genuinely 
novel explanatory power (Brigandt 2015); for an opposing view, see Kaplan 
(2015). I discuss these issues in Austin (2016b).
59 Cf. Huneman (2010: 214–19).
60 Bhattacharya et al. (2011), Li and Wang (2013).
61 Álvarez- Buylla et al. (2008).
62 Kaneko (2011).
63 As Aristotle makes clear in Metaphysics E:6, Barnes (1984).
64 There are, of course, other, independent reasons one might have for rejecting that 
move—see Robinson (2014) for a recent critique.
65 Rea (2011), Koons (2014), Jaworski (2016).
66 Boogerd et al. (2005), Mitchell (2012), Salazar- Ciudad and Jernvall (2013).
67 The principle originated in Plato’s Sophist and was reintroduced into contempo-
rary debates by Armstrong (1997).
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68 Henning and Scarfe (2013), Dupré (2013), Jaeger and Monk (2015).
69 Waddington (1969) himself, the progenitor of the ‘epigenetic landscape’ concept, 
professed to being deeply influenced by Whitehead, as Gilbert and Bolker (2001) 
note. More recently, Hall (2013) has characterised the contemporary topological 
models of DST as having a natural home within a Whiteheadean ontology.
70 The conceptual resources utilised here may even be applicable to a hylomorphic 
account of biological ‘natural kinds’, the first steps of which are undertaken in 
Austin (2016a).
71 With thanks to audiences at both Oxford and Cambridge, and to the editors of 
this volume for their invaluable feedback on earlier versions of this paper.
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1.  Introduction: The Unity Problem
In his monumental treatise On Growth and Form, the famous mathemati-
cal biologist D’Arcy Wentworth Thompson commented as follows: ‘The 
biologist, as well as the philosopher, learns to recognise that the whole is 
not merely the sum of its parts. It is this, and much more than this. For it is 
not a bundle of parts but an organisation of parts, of parts in their mutual 
arrangement, fitting one with another, in what Aristotle calls “a single and 
indivisible principle of unity”; and this is no merely metaphysical concep-
tion, but is in biology [a] fundamental truth . . .’.1
The kind of unity to which Thompson is referring—the organisational 
harmony of interacting parts—is a phenomenon we find both within and 
without biology. The unity of chemical compounds, of an atom, a molecule, 
of a lump of iron or uranium, is also a subject of wonder, a phenomenon 
asking for an explanation. In biology, however, as Thompson makes clear, 
following Aristotle before him, there is a special kind of unity. Terence Irwin 
puts it thus when commenting on Aristotle’s discussion of animal souls:2 
‘. . . a collection of flesh and bones constitutes a single living organism in so 
far as it is teleologically organized; the activities of the single organism are 
the final cause of the movements of the different parts’.3
For the many philosophers who reflexively recoil at talk of teleology and 
final causes, the idea can be put in a different yet familiar way: organisms 
act for their own sustenance, maintenance, and development. Their parts 
all serve the overall goal of the organism’s flourishing. The organism, unless 
it has reason, does not set itself this goal; and even rational animals such 
as ourselves do not set every element of our goal of flourishing as human 
beings: much of what we do is no more than what happens to us or consists 
of the processes we inevitably undergo for our own sustenance, mainte-
nance, and development. Yet the goal is there, however we got it and how-
ever any organism of any kind got it. Using more traditional terminology, I 
claim that organisms display immanent causation: causation that originates 
with an agent and terminates in that agent for the sake of its self- perfection. 
By ‘self- perfection’ I do not mean that there is some ideal type that every 
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organism strives to reach. The idea is far more modest—namely that every 
organism aims, whether consciously or not, at the fulfilment of its poten-
tialities such that it achieves a good state of being, indeed the best state it 
can reach given the limitations of its kind and its environment. Immanent 
causation is a kind of teleology, but metaphysically distinctive in what it 
involves. It is not just action for a purpose, but for the agent’s own purpose, 
where ‘own purpose’ means not merely that the agent acts for a purpose it 
possesses, but that it acts for a purpose it possesses such that fulfilment of 
the purpose contributes to the agent’s self- perfection.
This unity cries out for explanation. There is, as I have already implied, a 
‘unity problem’ for all substances, organic and inorganic:4 to put it crudely, 
what holds their essences together?5 This has also been called the ‘problem 
of complex essences’, in other words, the question of ‘the linkage of inher-
ently separable components into a single kind- essence’.6 A typical example 
is the electron: it shares its unit negative charge with the tau lepton but not 
its mass; it shares its mass with the positron but not its charge. The same 
applies to organisms: the flying squirrel (tribe Pteromyini) and sugar glider 
(species Petaurus breviceps) share a gliding membrane but not a pouch; 
the latter shares a pouch with the kangaroo (genus Macropus) but not a 
gliding membrane. The properties I have mentioned are all essential:7 they 
are partially definitive of the things to which they belong. Yet they are also 
really distinct: they are separately instantiated in different kinds of thing yet 
co- instantiated in others. When they are found together, what holds them 
together? In the case of organisms the unity problem is even more acute than 
in the inorganic case, since not only are there distinct yet co- instantiated 
essential properties, but these properties all subserve the organism’s overall 
flourishing, and the organism itself seeks to bring about its overall flourish-
ing by employing its own parts, powers, and other characteristics. In other 
words, the organism, by engaging in immanent causation, displays a further 
kind of unity beyond the harmony and integration of its parts.
Now the immediate objection one is likely to raise is that there is no unity 
problem, only a pseudo- problem. What could it mean for essential proper-
ties to be ‘held’ together other than that, in a given case, they are properties 
belonging to the same essence? This seems to be the view of Jonathan Lowe, 
for whom the particular but regular combination of powers and liabilities in 
members of a given kind consists in the fact that, precisely, the objects in ques-
tion are members of a given kind and that kinds are real universals8. Although 
this account, as Lowe points out, reduces the number of brute facts that must 
be countenanced compared to nominalism, brute facts there are nevertheless. 
It might be thought I am unfair to Lowe here, since he also holds that kinds 
are governed by laws linking them with their attributes, which adds some 
depth, as it were, to the bruteness.9 But Lowe’s official view of laws is that 
they consist in the characterisation of kinds by attributes,10 so no new infor-
mation is added to the account. What if one had a different view of laws, say 
that they involved some sort of metaphysical determination or production; 
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on such a view, one would hold that the essential behaviour or operation of 
members of a kind was governed by the essence of the kind. One might say 
that kangaroos nurse their young in a pouch because this is metaphysically 
necessitated by their essence. But even so, this cannot account for all essential 
properties. Since having a pouch and having a flying membrane can come 
apart, there cannot be a law uniting them if the law involves necessitation. 
But if the law is contingent, what kind of law is it? If it is a law of biology, 
what law? If metaphysical, how can it be contingent? Further, kangaroos are 
essentially mammals, but it is hardly a law that they are mammals in any 
sense beyond that being a mammal is part of the essence of being a kangaroo. 
Similarly, it is not a law that electrons have negative unit charge: it’s just part 
of what it is to be an electron.11
Attempting to explain unity in terms of laws is bound to fail. Taking it to be 
a brute fact is also unacceptable. There is a difference, or so it seems, between 
an organism and an organ, on the one hand, and on the other between an 
organism and a collective of which it is a member, such as a colony.12 That 
is why appealing simply to immanent causation is insufficient to mark out 
organisms as a unique category of living thing. Organs, too, work for their 
own self- perfection: consider homeostasis within the organism, self- repair, 
intake of nutrients, and so on. An organ13 has a similar unity to the organism 
of which it is a part—call it, for now, tight. Yet the organ is subservient to the 
organism in a way that the organism is not subservient to anything. Again, 
many collectives—consider ant and bee colonies, among many others—also 
work for their self- perfection. Unless we merely stipulate—which seems ad 
hoc—that immanent causation excludes this kind of colonial collective agency, 
we should accept that living collectives, too, display immanent causation. By 
contrast with the organ, however, a collective has a similar unity to the organ-
ism that is a member of it inasmuch as neither are subservient to anything in 
the way the organ is subservient to the organism. But the collective’s unity is 
loose. So the organ’s unity is tight but subservient, the collective’s is loose but 
not subservient, and the organism’s is tight but not subservient. What is the 
metaphysical explanation of these differences?
In what follows, I explore and defend the traditional distinction between 
organs, organisms, and collectives by utilising Aristotelian conceptual tools 
that have, for one reason or another, fallen out of favour. Along the way I 
will consider a number (though by no means all) of the hard cases that have 
been raised in the literature as a possible threat to this tripartite metaphysi-
cal distinction. The pivotal concept for clarifying and defending it is that of 
substantial form, which is where I begin the analysis.
2.  Form as a Unifying Principle
The Aristotelian hylemorphist claims that the differences are to be accounted 
for in terms of form, more precisely substantial form. Forms are universal 
determining principles whereby things are endowed with substantial natures 
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and accidental characteristics. Are forms just what we call universals? It 
depends what one means by ‘universal’. There are a number of things that 
can be said here, but for my purpose, the main point is that there are univer-
sal forms, whether of substance or of accident, but the former should not be 
thought of as kinds along the lines of, say, Lowe’s four- category ontology,14 
except by way of synecdoche, inasmuch as having a substantial form entails 
membership of a substantial kind. There is the form of the Eastern Gray 
Kangaroo (Macropus giganteus), which determines the animals that have it 
to be in a corresponding substantial kind. Being in a substantial kind is, so 
to speak, part of what it is to have a substantial form. But the form is not 
the kind, as seen by the fact that on the hylemorphic theory there is only 
one substantial form per substance—the famous doctrine of the unicity of 
form—whereas every substance instantiates more than one kind. Boxer the 
Easter Gray Kangaroo has the single form of the Eastern Gray Kangaroo 
but instantiates numerous kinds, such as that of, once again, Eastern Gray 
Kangaroo but also the kind marsupial and the kind mammal. Membership 
in all the higher metaphysical genera is explained by the substantial form 
inasmuch as there are real features possessed by Boxer, in virtue of his 
form, that are shared by marsupials and mammals that are not Eastern 
Gray Kangaroos. But these various groupings of features are abstractions 
from Boxer’s form and from the form of any other Eastern Gray Kangaroo, 
among other infima or lowest species, again to use the hylemorphic termi-
nology. There is no space to defend the unicity of form here;15 I raise it only 
to clarify the difference between form and kind.
As well as substantial forms there are accidental forms, such as being 
cloven- hoofed, and these too are universals. Kinds of substances, being uni-
versals, have multiple instances—individual substances such as mammals. 
Accidental forms have particular accidents as their instances, now called 
tropes but traditionally called modes; cases of cloven- hoofedness are an 
example. These universals exist both in the mind and in reality, the dif-
ference being that in the mind the universal exists as a single, unified idea, 
whereas outside the mind the universal exists as multiplied: it exists in its 
instances or, to use Lewis’s well- known and apt description, it is ‘wholly pres-
ent wherever and whenever it is instantiated’.16 In other words, although the 
selfsame universal is wholly present in each instance, it is multiplied in the 
sense of having multiple instances.17 The same goes for substantial forms: 
they are grasped as unified ideas by the mind, but in reality, they are multi-
plied in their instances, which are particularised forms. The form of Skippy 
the Eastern Gray Kangaroo is the same as that of Boxer the Eastern Gray 
Kangaroo inasmuch as they share the universal form of that species, which 
explains their belonging to the correlative universal kind. Whereas substan-
tial kinds have substances as instances, however, substantial forms have par-
ticular forms as instances. Skippy and Boxer have different particular forms 
inasmuch as each possesses its own principle of unity, which is also the 
principle of its specificity as a certain kind of kangaroo, and this because, 
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and as surely as, they are each a distinct, individual kangaroo. We can see 
now that for the hylemorphist, while in many respects forms—henceforth, I 
mean substantial forms, unless otherwise indicated—are on a par with other 
universals, the former nevertheless do their own metaphysical work.
Our concern is with form’s work as the unifier of an organism—an indi-
vidual living substance. The first thing that needs to be appreciated is that 
this is not strictly a scientific but a metaphysical matter. Form is not a sci-
entific postulate but a metaphysical one. One way of thinking of it as an 
organising principle, where by ‘principle’ I mean, as the scholastic philoso-
phers did in this context, a real, objective cause of something’s being the 
kind of thing it is, what Aristotelians call a ‘formal cause’. Not every cause 
is efficient, on this picture of reality: form as organising principle is a cause 
in the sense of being metaphysically responsible for something’s having a 
certain nature. As such, form—the formal cause—is not the sort of thing a 
biologist or any other natural scientist could ever discover. What they dis-
cover are the kinds of things there are, to be sure, but they do not discover 
that form is responsible for the essential unity of any kind of thing, either as 
a kind or as an instance of a kind.
Biologists have not and could not discover the existence of form any 
more than a physicist could discover, or ever did discover, the existence of 
matter. It is through properly philosophical reflection that we know such 
things must exist. Without going into detail here, matter is known to us as 
the metaphysical principle of change and potentiality. What we, either as 
ordinary observers or scientists, know are the particular material objects 
that exist. What we know philosophically is that that they have something 
in common that is the permanent substrate, to put it tendentiously, of their 
change and powers. So matter, as understood in purely metaphysical terms, is 
not the everyday matter we bump into when we interact with different kinds 
of thing. It is a metaphysical posit without which, claims the Aristotelian, 
insoluble philosophical problems arise, and which underlies the everyday 
matter of our common experience. The same goes for form. We know philo-
sophically that substances have something in common that is responsible 
for their unity and specificity, but we know through observation, whether 
ordinary or scientific, the particular forms of substances that exist. So on 
this score the by- now stale derision of substantial forms that we have inher-
ited from Galileo, Descartes, Spinoza, Hume et al. can be seen to be far less 
compelling than most philosophers, raised in these post- scholastic world 
views, have thought. Put another way—and quite gesturally, I accept18—the 
early modern rejection of substantial forms owes more to anti- scholastic 
prejudice, in my view, than to irresistible philosophical critique.19
We should, however, only postulate form as a metaphysical principle if it 
can do work in explaining the unity that needs explaining. What I want to 
focus on here is that aspect of unity whereby an organism is clearly neither 
an organ nor a collective of substances, be they other organisms or any-
thing else. I take this to be intuitively clear even if the boundaries between 
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organs, organisms, and collectives are hard to draw. One might object that 
we have no pre- theoretical intuition as to the special metaphysical status of 
the organism; I take it that John Dupré would agree, espousing as he does 
a pluralistic account of the ways in which cells ‘combine to form integrated 
biological wholes’.20 Multicellularity, he goes on to say, comes in many vari-
eties, and we should not think of the organism in a ‘naïve and static way’ as 
a ‘living individual’. It is, rather, a ‘process’ or ‘life cycle’.21
Yet is the intuition so easy to dismiss? It cannot be a scientific discovery 
that the intuition does or does not latch onto reality: who made the discov-
ery one way or the other? Biologists have, to be sure, discovered all kinds 
of unicellular entities as well as multicellular organisation, but no biologist 
discovered—or could discover—that there is no difference in kind between 
organisms as living individual substances, organs that are material parts sub-
servient to organisms, and aggregates of which organisms are members. The 
difference between parts of substances, substances, and aggregates of which 
substances are members cuts across the entire ontological realm: it is not spe-
cial to biology but reflects the way the world in general is organised. And here 
we have the first philosophical argument in favour of the intuition: that if 
these categories are instantiated universally outside biology, we should expect 
them to be found within biology as well. Moreover, given the special teleo-
logically loaded unity of the living world, we should expect the division to 
be even more pronounced than in the world of the inorganic. We should be 
able to identify parts by the service they render to the whole, the whole by 
its integral teleology and hence the service rendered to it by its parts, and the 
aggregate by the service rendered to it by its substantial members.
The second philosophical argument for the intuition is very simple: it 
just seems, from both common and scientific observation, that there are 
many instances of organs, organisms, and collectives or aggregates22 and 
that the categories are mutually exclusive for those instances. And, to para-
phrase Richard Swinburne’s Principle of Credulity, things usually are the 
way they appear to be.23 Now perhaps the most common way of rejecting 
the intuition is by appeal to vagueness, which is effectively what a pluralist 
such as Dupré is doing when he points out, quite correctly, the multifarious 
ways in which multicellularity presents itself. The vagueness, to be of any 
power against the intuition, needs to be ontic. But assuming it is, there are 
two responses one might be tempted to make and yet which I recommend 
resisting in the case of the organic world even if, as I am happy to accept, 
they can be deployed in the inorganic case. One is to point out that vague-
ness is everywhere and appealing to it is often a cheap shot. We all want 
to solve the problems of vagueness. We learn nothing special about biol-
ogy when we see that we can soritify biological predicates like ‘. . . is an 
organism’ as much as any others. Another response is the Johnsonian one:24 
the existence of twilight does not mean we cannot distinguish between day 
and night. If there are clear ontic intermediaries between organs, organ-
isms, and collectives, then to insist upon the importance of these three while 
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ignoring the in- between cases is to treat the latter as second- class biological 
citizens—curious departures from nature’s most important paradigms. This 
is to introduce unwarranted metaphysical (and perhaps methodological) 
bias into what should be a dispassionate allocation of ontological status.
Instead, I propose that we resist the idea that any vagueness in this 
domain is ontic. There is no promise here of an a priori, knockdown argu-
ment (which is not to say there mightn’t be one). I prefer an appeal to igno-
rance, as it were: what kind of thing could there be lying between the organ, 
the organism, and/or the collective? What would be its essential features? 
What kind of teleology would it manifest? Since, however, the goal of this 
paper is more to justify form rather than to prove the existence of what it 
explains, the questions will be left hanging, with the burden, in my view, on 
the opponent of my threefold taxonomy. Moreover, any knockdown argu-
ment, if there is one, should be consistent with what we find in nature, but 
showing this requires detailed, case- by- case evaluation.
As an example, Dupré cites lichens as an case of ‘multispecies organ-
isms . . . symbiotic associations of photosynthetic algae or bacteria with a 
fungus’. He notes the anomalousness of such an object from the perspective 
of the ‘traditional dichotomy between unicellular organisms and monoge-
nomic multicellular organisms’, adding that it is ‘quite unproblematic’ when 
we approach multicellularity from a more ‘comprehensive’ perspective.25 
Now a relatively innocent reading of this passage reflects commitment to 
the special category of organism, but only a broadening of the category to 
include multigenomic organisms. A less innocent reading, which I adopt 
given the entire context of the chapter, is that it downgrades the category 
itself: after all, if there are even multispecies organisms, what is so special 
about the term ‘organism’? Aren’t lichens an example of the vast heteroge-
neity we find in living systems? Even if there are paradigm cases of good 
old- fashioned organisms such as cats, and of organs such as hearts and liv-
ers, and lichens are quite unlike either of these, this no more elevates the 
paradigms above our scientific and other interests than, recalling the earlier 
dictum, the existence of twilight brings out anything ontologically special 
about day and night. Let’s talk about organisms, to be sure; but let us not 
pretend we are carving nature at a privileged joint.
In reply, lichens are not nearly as worrisome for my view as they might 
seem. They are sometimes called ‘dual organisms’ because of the symbiotic 
relation between the mycobiont (fungus) and the photobiont (green algae 
or cyanobacterium); but a dual organism is no more an organism than a 
dual carriageway is a carriageway. That a lichen behaves differently from 
its component organisms does not make it an organism since the same is 
true of any collective and it would be question- begging merely to claim that 
collectives are all organisms for the same reason lichens are. Although there 
are still many gaps in our knowledge, a lichen is usually and best regarded 
as a ‘miniature ecosystem’26 consisting of two kinds of individual organism, 
a fungus and an alga or colony of bacteria (acting as photosynthesising 
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agents), working in extremely close symbiosis. As far as we know, most 
lichen- forming fungi, as too their photobionts, also occur in a free- living 
state in nature or can be cultivated in a laboratory (albeit with generally less 
success than as lichen components, as one would expect).27 The fact that 
either partner can exist free- living distinguishes them metaphysically from a 
true organ, such as an arm, leg, or eye, that has no free- living state. For an 
organ to exist separately from its natural body, similar or identical bodily 
conditions have to be simulated.
The other distinguishing feature is that lichen symbionts both reproduce. 
Hence to speak of lichen reproduction without qualification is misleading. 
There is genuine sexual reproduction, wherein the germinating mycobiont 
(fungal) spores have to find a suitable photobiont in the environment in 
order for successful symbiosis to arise again. Here it is the fungus that repro-
duces, not the lichen as a whole. There is also the propagation (rather than 
reproduction) of the lichen as a whole, fungus and photobionts, through the 
asexual reproduction of the fungus—the breaking off of a part of the fun-
gus (a propagule) but containing photobionts within it. The fungus and the 
photobionts continue to grow as did their respective parents once a suitable 
environment is found. In both the sexual and asexual cases, the mycobiont 
(fungus) has its own mode of reproduction, and the photobiont continues 
to reproduce, always asexually as far as we know, in the mycobiont with 
which it is simultaneously propagated or which captures it following sexual 
reproduction. Now although many individual organisms have more than 
one mode of reproduction, none reproduces itself twice over at the same 
time, or more precisely none engages in two distinct processes of partial 
reproduction. I take this not to be a truth of biology but of metaphysics.28 
Moreover, there would be something strange going on biologically were it 
to be that in the sexual case the fungus reproduces, not the lichen, whereas 
in the asexual case the lichen reproduces, not the fungus. It is far more eco-
nomical, and less bizarre, to take the asexual case to be one of lichen propa-
gation via fungal and photobiont reproduction. Many collectives, such as 
various kinds of bee or ant colony, propagate by splitting or budding. But 
if the components are themselves engaging in reproduction, via their own 
identifiable processes, it is both biologically obfuscatory and metaphysically 
quite dubious to say that the whole collective is itself reproducing. The very 
idea of reproduction itself is called into question.
Returning to form, the central idea is that only an organism has a sub-
stantial form simpliciter: organs and collectives have them only secundum 
quid, or in a manner of speaking. It would be useful to have distinguishing 
terminology here, so I will stipulate that an organism has or possesses a 
substantial form, a collective contains one or more substantial forms, and 
an organ—to use an unfortunate neologism—abtains a substantial form. 
An organism has or possesses a substantial form inasmuch as this is its 
unifying principle as an individual substance of its essential kind. The blue 
whale (Balaenoptera musculus) has precisely the substantial form in virtue 
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of which it is a member of that biological species. A collective contains one 
or more substantial forms inasmuch as it consists, inter alia, of one or more 
individual organisms in some systemic combination. Examples include ant 
colonies, bacterial colonies, forests, obligate colonies such as corals and fac-
ultative ones such as carpenter bees (Xylocopa pubescens).29
The abtaining of a substantial form by an organ is a trickier concept to 
grasp, but it goes a long way towards showing how substantial form acts as 
a unifying principle. I now proceed to elaborate the concept of abtaining, 
which will clarify how, ontologically, an organ is to be distinguished from 
an organism.
3.  Organs and Organisms
An organ—a term I am, to reiterate, using stipulatively to denote any bio-
logically identifiable part of an organism that subserves the whole—does 
not have its own substantial form; for if it did, it would be a substance. But 
it is not a substance since substances are ontologically independent. Now 
there is an important literature on ontological independence, but I have 
no space or need to enter into a technical discussion of its definition.30 For 
present purposes, it is enough to say that a substance has existence in itself 
and by virtue of itself as an ultimate distinct subject of being. This definition 
encompasses several notions. Substance has existence in itself in the sense 
that it is not in anything else, not a modification of, a part of, an aspect of, 
some other thing. It exists by virtue of itself since its continued existence 
does not require it to be a product or projection of something else. As a dis-
tinct and ultimate subject of being, it is the bearer of qualities, but nothing 
bears it or is a subject of it.
An organ is clearly not encompassed by this concept of substance. It is a 
part that serves the whole, and cannot be constituted as an object with its 
own identity in a way that is metaphysically independent of that whole. To 
be more precise, we should say that something is not an organ unless either: 
(i) it is serving the whole; or (ii) is in some way able to carry out its functions 
as if it were serving a whole, such as when a heart is kept warm, pumping 
and oxygenated outside the body; or (iii) is kept in a state whereby its powers 
of serving the whole are preserved, such as when a heart is kept on ice before 
transplant. The first condition corresponds to Aristotle’s second actuality—
the actual exercise of powers; the second to a simulated second actuality; the 
third to first actuality—having powers but not exercising them.31 I cannot 
see how first actuality could be simulated. In all three cases, the identity of 
the organ is still constituted by the function it performs with respect to the 
whole organism to which it belongs. As such, following Aristotle’s famous 
homonymy principle,32 an object that fulfils none of the above three condi-
tions is not genuinely an organ, no matter how much it resembles one.
With this in view, what it means for the organ to abtain the substantial 
form of the whole is as follows. Although the organ does not have its own 
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substantial form in any condition, when actually subserving an organism 
the organ is united to the whole by the substantial form. Here the organ is 
in its normal, natural state. It is thoroughly permeated by the substantial 
form in the sense that every part and property of the organ is co- opted to 
the service of the whole (barring damage or disease). The organ has no life 
of its own: it is the metaphysical slave of the whole, forming just one part, 
however important, of the organism’s total organisation, which is dictated 
by the substantial form.
We still have to explain, though, what is going on when the organ is in 
condition (ii) or (iii) above, which we can call simulation and dormancy, 
respectively. Hoffman and Rosenkrantz think that both cases demonstrate 
the existence of ‘organic living entities’ that are neither organisms nor 
parts of organisms.33 This seems to me wrong, for it misconstrues part-
hood by overemphasising the property of being joined to the whole. In 
fact, Rosenkrantz, on his own account of whole organisms in suspended 
animation, allow that opponents of intermittent existence might plausibly 
construe suspended animation as involving the continued existence of the 
organism as constituted by the preservation of its potentiality for metabolic 
activity in a sense weaker than what he calls ‘capability’.34 This looks just 
like the distinction between Aristotelian first actuality (‘second potentiality’) 
and second actuality referred to above. If he thinks it can apply to whole 
organisms, so he should also allow it for organs. Ad hominem aside, the 
point is that just as an organism can retain its essential powers in a state of 
dormancy or suspended animation, so too can an organ retain its essential 
powers in a similar state although detached from the whole. It is the reten-
tion of essential powers that is crucial, not the state of being joined. This is 
what unites the dormancy case to the simulation case, the only difference 
being that in simulation the organ actually exercises some or all of its pow-
ers, albeit in a way that merely simulates subservience to a real organism.
Yet how is retention of power to be reconciled with the organ’s essentially 
subservient nature? Why not count it as a substance in its own right, one 
that happens in the normal case to reside within another substance, namely 
a whole organism, but that also may not? Yet this is precisely to reject the 
organ’s essentially subservient nature, not to reconcile it with retention of 
power. The organ is a dependent entity, its very identity defined by that of 
which it is an organ. Simulation cannot be understood independently of the 
genuine case, and there is no a priori reason to consider dormancy a privi-
lege of substances. I claim that the most satisfying, perhaps the only plausi-
ble, explanation of retention of power must appeal to the organ’s abtaining 
the substantial form of the whole. It does not have its own substantial form, 
but it does have many forms—accidental forms, as the scholastics put it. 
The organ is a discrete, identifiable, biologically significant portion of mat-
ter possessed of many accidents, the essential ones of which—i.e., the pro-
pria or properties in the strict sense of which—have a certain organisation 
by which the organ is defined as the kind of organ it is for the kind of species 
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to whose members it normally belongs. What unifies those accidents is the 
very substantial form of the organism to which it is subservient. But given 
that the substantial form is not present in the organ, the organ must some-
how derive or borrow the unifying power of the substantial form in one of 
the following ways.
(i) The organ actually belongs to its connatural organism, this being the 
normal case. We might include as a deviant sub- type of (i) the case where 
an organ is grown inside the organism’s body using the organism’s own 
tissue, such as when a person’s nose is rebuilt and grown on their fore-
head.35 One might legitimately wonder, though, whether such an entity fails 
to satisfy any of the three necessary conditions for being an organ stated 
earlier, and hence does not merit being called a nose at all until it is moved 
to its proper place. (ii) The organ once belonged to its connatural organism 
at some prior time. An organ removed from an organism and still satisfy-
ing the dormancy or simulation conditions would be a typical case of (ii). 
(iii) The organ has come into existence via a causal process that began with 
a distinct organ satisfying (i) or (ii). Case (iii) covers organs synthesised from 
other organs (such as cells—recall my stipulative use of the term ‘organ’) 
belonging or having belonged to a connatural organism. An example of 
(iii) would be currently typical organ synthesis, where the organ is grown 
outside the organism’s body using detached cells from the latter, say, a liver 
cultured in a lab from the organism’s stem cells. In case (iii), the organ still 
abtains its unity from the organism, but only indirectly via some other organ 
that abtains it directly.
Now to many, this way of explaining the difference between an organ 
and an organism will seem to partake of the kind of metaphysics that gives 
metaphysics a bad name. This is unfortunate and short- sighted. It is unfor-
tunate because it bespeaks a refusal to engage seriously with hylemorphic 
metaphysics, free of the anti- scholastic prejudices of a bygone age. It is short- 
sighted because it reflects a preoccupation with surface illusions rather than 
the depth of the position. On the surface, the idea that an organ might 
‘abtain’ a substantial form looks like ‘spooky metaphysics’ involving ‘occult 
qualities’ akin to the ‘dormitive virtues’ mocked by Molière. Yet one also 
might wonder how a universal can be wholly present wherever and when-
ever it is instantiated, how any parts can compose a whole, how real causal 
influence can be transmitted from one thing to another; and the list goes on. 
All such things have been wondered about, and many more; if the wonder 
seems insuperable, one adopts the appropriate position, whether nominal-
ism, or compositional nihilism, or regularity theory, and so on. Quite why 
the scholastic framework or any of its key posits should be treated as of 
special concern because of its particularly ‘spooky’ nature is itself a matter 
for wonder.36
The real focus needs to be on whether a given posit can explain some-
thing that needs to be explained, in a way that is not ad hoc or incoherent. 
I don’t see either criticism applying here, but that is where the opponent 
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needs to concentrate their energy. Substantial form as unifier is clearly a 
metaphysical posit: I claim that we must acknowledge its existence if we are 
to explain the unity of the organism and its different metaphysical status 
from the organ and from the collective. It would be quite mistaken to think 
of form as a kind of suprasensible metaphysical ‘glue’ that holds the organ-
ism together, something we need special scholastic spectacles to ‘see’. We do 
not see substantial form, and we do not ‘see’ it either. On my position, we 
know that it must exist or we have no explanation of unity. But to postulate 
form as no more than that which unifies would be ad hoc: claiming simply 
that we need a unifier to explain unity borders on the tautologous, but this 
is something no scholastic has ever said. Substantial form not only unifies, 
it determines the identity of a substance, it actualises matter, it is a principle 
of identity and stability in a substance, and more. In other words, it is a 
key element in an entire metaphysical picture. Needless to say, devotees of 
Quinean ‘desert landscapes’ will have no time for form, but they will have 
no time for universals, substances, powers, and much else besides. To single 
out form as having a special mystery about it is the opposite of special 
pleading, what we might call special prosecution.
Having defended, by appeal to form, the distinction between organs 
and organisms, I move now to the other part of the tripartite distinction—
between organisms and collectives. Here the issues seem to me less subtle, 
though there are still important empirical challenges to the sharpness of the 
distinction. Once again, the appeal to form will show that the distinction is 
both plausible and clear cut.
4.  Organisms and Collectives
Although collectives come in many kinds, as noted above, what they have 
in common—at least in biology—is their consisting of one or more organ-
isms in some sort of systemic relation (whether including or excluding non- 
substances such as an ecological niche or organismically produced tools or 
habitats). This, I argued earlier, is how we should understand lichens.
Yet the idea of a ‘superorganism’ has found its way into the literature, 
and as Michael Ghiselin notes, it has become a recent fad.37 He himself has 
done much to counter some of the excesses found in employment of the 
concept.38 Unreflective comparisons between, say, an organism’s eyes and 
the combined eyes of an insect colony’s members, or between an organism’s 
skin and a colony’s nest, do not withstand scrutiny.39 The argument that 
collectives must be organisms because natural selection works on organisms 
as well as on collectives is an elementary fallacy.40 As far as the historical 
debate goes, I am on the side of those who regard the idea that collectives 
are literally a kind of organism as ‘bad metaphysics’41 or as consisting of 
‘poetic metaphors in scientific guise’.42
That said, for my purposes the main idea to keep in focus is that col-
lectives contain substantial forms but do not possess them. It is not that 
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we can appeal to substantial forms to demonstrate that there is a differ-
ence between organisms and collectives, but that given the distinction, only 
forms can explain it. Pointing to a list of disanalogies will not do the job: 
superorganism theory has long had a ‘magnetic appeal’43 precisely because 
of the many analogies that can be found between the two kinds, in terms of 
such phenomena as selection (at individual and group level) and division of 
labour. Even if the disanalogies overwhelmed the analogies, we would still 
not have arrived at an explanation. For, we should ask, why the disanalo-
gies? Disanalogies point to a significant difference; they do not explain it. 
For an explanation, we must engage metaphysically: organisms are unified 
by a single substantial form that constitutes them as an individual substance. 
An ant colony’s behaviour, for all its beguiling resemblances to multicellular 
co- operation in an organism, does not reflect the existence of a unifying 
form, since the colony contains substantial forms already—those found in 
the individual ants. But if the ants have their own substantial forms, this 
excludes a further, superorganismal form. Why? Couldn’t one object that 
the superorganismal form can be superimposed on the individual ant forms, 
such that the ants each have their own form and the plurality itself has a 
colonial substantial form?
The objection fails. For assume the existence of the individual forms and 
the superorganismal, colonial substantial form. The colony would itself be a 
substance and the ants would be its parts. But the parts of an organism—the 
organs, as I am calling them—are, as set out earlier, essentially subservient, 
ontologically dependent entities whose very identity is defined by the organ-
ism of which they are parts. Putting it loosely, there is no such thing as a 
heart simpliciter, only the heart of a lion, of a man, or of a reptile. Organs 
are defined by the organisms they subserve. So the ants would be defined 
by the superorganism they subserve. But they cannot be, since—ex hypo-
thesi—they already have their own substantial forms as ants; and they are 
defined by these.
They certainly don’t have an extra substantial form, namely the colonial 
form, since this would absurdly imply that each ant was a colony. The colo-
nial form is supposed to be the form of the plurality of ants yet also function 
so as to define each individual ant as an organ of the colony. In other words, 
the individual ant is supposed both to possess its own substantial form and 
abtain another substantial form. It is, then, supposed to be both ontologi-
cally independent and ontologically dependent; and this is a contradiction.
So, on the substantial forms view, we either have to deny that the ant 
is a substance or deny that the colony is a substance. It is clear what we 
must do. Denying that the ant is an individual substance is a non- starter, 
unless we deny that there are any individual substances at all—not a posi-
tion I am questioning here. If anything is an individual substance an ant is, 
since it displays all the hallmarks of ontological independence. What it is, 
its quiddity, is in no way defined by reference to colonies in general or any 
colony in particular. An account of how ants behave, of course, must make 
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reference to necessary colony formation (albeit, note, not for facultatively 
colonial organisms)44, but this is not the same as defining an ant as a kind of 
organism with its distinctive and independent physiology, anatomy, devel-
opmental processes, and so on—all of which constitute its immanent causal 
behaviour, and none of which require defining it in terms of its colonial 
behaviour, whatever the causal connections between the two.
We are faced, then, with the obvious and only remaining move, which is to 
deny that the colony is a substance. It is ontologically dependent inasmuch as 
the kind of thing it is depends, metaphysically, on the kinds of organism that 
belong to it, each having its own independent physiology, anatomy, develop-
mental processes, and so on. This is quite different from the substantial mem-
bers of the aggregate, whose identities as the kinds of thing they are do not 
depend metaphysically on their membership of the aggregate. This is so even 
if it is essential to a given substance to be a member of an aggregate. Now it 
is not for the metaphysician to say what aggregates there are any more than 
what substances there are: this is for the biologist, and hence is a wholly a 
posteriori matter. What the metaphysician can say, however, is that we should 
expect there to be a sharp division between substances and aggregates because 
they are distinct metaphysical categories; so- called borderline cases should 
reflect our investigative limitations rather than a blurriness of the categories.
We see this sharpness, I submit, in the supposed borderline cases of biofilms 
and slime moulds. A biofilm, at its most general, is a colony of bacteria adher-
ing to a surface and often to each other, producing an extracellular polymeric 
substance (EPS) that acts as a matrix holding the colony together, protecting 
it against predators and toxins, helping to digest and pass on nutrients to 
the colonists, and facilitating communication between them.45 Slime moulds, 
on the other hand, are a paraphyletic class of protists that form masses of 
protoplasm containing one or more nuclei and reproduce by means of spores 
emanating from sporangia, much like plants and many fungi.46 There is much 
that we do not know about biofilms and slime moulds, making interpretation 
of their natures a difficult matter. One might wonder, however, whether they 
give credence to the idea of a superorganism constituted by other organisms. 
There is far too much to be said about slime moulds and biofilms to be any-
thing other than cursory here, but a few remarks are in order.
It is difficult to see biofilms as anything but extraordinarily close- knit 
colonies of individual organisms. All biologists, as far as I can tell, refer to 
them as such47 or as ‘communities’48 or with similar terminology. Virtually 
all bacteria can form biofilms,49 and yet all live quite happily in the plank-
tonic state unless either stressed by lack of nutrients or the presence of 
toxins, or attracted by a suitable surface. The bacteria within the biofilm 
maintain their cellular integrity. The biofilm forms precisely through the 
colonisation of a surface by free- living bacteria. It grows by the reproduc-
tion of the bacteria themselves and the addition of new bacteria. The biofilm 
does not itself reproduce, it disperses by the detachment of the bacteria from 
the colony, their movement to a new location, and reattachment to a new 
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substrate. The bacteria themselves produce enzymes that degrade the EPS 
or the substrate. Some biofilms undergo ‘seeding dispersal’, whereby hol-
low cavities in the matrix fill with planktonic bacteria that then breach the 
colony wall and emerge to form new colonies.50
Nevertheless, Ereshefsky and Pedroso argue that biofilms are ‘individuals 
and not merely communities’, by which they mean individual organisms.51 
Without going into the detail of their own account, note for example their 
contrast between biofilms and ‘symbiotic complexes, such as the symbiotic 
relation between ants and acacias . . . Bacteria in a biofilm exchange genetic 
content; ant/acacia symbionts do not’.52 This lateral gene transfer is taken 
by them to be one of many markers of individuality since it facilitates com-
munication between the bacteria and hence development of the colony, espe-
cially the EPS as a boundary between the colony and its environment. Yet 
although they make the contrast with lack of LGT in ant/acacia symbiosis 
they also refer to a supposed lack of LGT in aphid/bacteria symbionts. In sup-
port of the latter, they cite a paper in which the authors find no evidence of 
LGT between the pea aphid (Acyrthosiphon pisum) and its obligate mutual-
ist Gammaproteobacteria (Buchnera aphidicola). Yet these same authors do 
explicitly suggest that there is evidence of functional gene transfer to A. pisum 
from prior rickettsial endosymbionts, given that Rickettsiales symbionts are 
found in some aphids. (Albeit the evidence is consistent also with transfer by 
bacterial infection rather than endosymbiosis.)53 So the claim that biofilms 
are ‘better candidates for biological individuals than aphid- symbiont combi-
nations’54 in virtue of lack of LGT is not warranted by the evidence.
Again, getting less technical, Ereshefsky and Pedroso are impressed by 
the way the biofilm EPS defends the bacteria, digests nutrients and passes 
them on to the bacteria, and facilitates communication between them. Yet 
a bee hive is not far away from this: it protects the bees, facilitates com-
munication, and although it doesn’t digest nutrients, it stores them (which 
is just as important as digestion). I am not denying the EPS is perhaps more 
complex than a bee hive (how do we measure complexity?), but what I am 
suggesting is that being impressed by this or that marker or group of mark-
ers can cause one to lose the wood for the trees. A hylemorphist will look 
at all the characteristics of the entity under consideration, forming a holistic 
judgment as to whether the unity provided by substantial form is present. 
Anything less is bound to risk being skewed or arbitrary.
The same, I submit, applies to slime moulds. In fact they come in two 
quite different kinds, the plasmodial or ‘true’ slime moulds and the cel-
lular slime moulds. The cellular slime moulds have been described by the 
world’s expert on them as ‘no more than a bag of amoebae encased in a 
thin slime sheath’, albeit capable of the most remarkable behaviour ‘equal 
to those of animals who possess muscles and nerves with ganglia, that is, 
simple brains’.55 The amoebae in a cellular slime mould retain their cell 
membranes. They feed and reproduce normally as individual amoebae as 
long as food is plentiful. When they begin to starve, they aggregate into 
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pseudoplasmodia that produce fruiting bodies inside which are spores that 
germinate as free- living amoeba that drift to other locations and will remain 
free- living as long as conditions are favourable. Cellular slime moulds, then, 
do not strictly reproduce: they have a fungus- like property of sporulation 
that produces yet more free- living amoebae, but fungal spores are juvenile 
fungal parts that germinate into the vegetative mycelium or fungal body.
For all their amazing behaviour, cellular slime moulds are rightly des-
ignated as not true slime moulds. They are, in my view, tightly integrated 
colonies, much like biofilms. Their motility, chemotaxis, direction- finding 
behaviour, and the like, can all be found in colonies and swarms constituted 
by birds, bees, fish, and other animals.
Plasmodial slime moulds, the true slime moulds (Myxomycetes), do by 
contrast appear to be genuine individual organisms. The constituent amoe-
bae do not retain their individual membranes, but instead mass into a 
single- celled, multinucleate plasmodium. Reproduction is also typically by 
sporulation, but here the spores are either haploid gametes that later fuse 
with suitable gamete partners to form the juvenile plasmodium via a zygote, 
or (less commonly) the diploid zygotes themselves. The zygotes grow into 
plasmodia through repeated nuclear (but not cellular) division. The entire 
life cycle seems to instantiate the growth and reproductive pattern of an 
individual organism, with no entities within the single- celled plasmodium 
that correspond to potential free- living amoebae.
There is much more to say, and much more to be known, about the 
various kinds of entity that might challenge the idea of a sharp boundary 
between organisms, organs, and collectives. So far I have made out a posi-
tive case for the distinction’s plausibility, utilising substantial form. I want, 
however, to return to more foundational issues by means of a negative argu-
ment. If we grant that the unity of the organism is what marks it out from 
the organ on one side and the collective on the other, why must we go so far 
as to posit substantial form? Mightn’t a lesser principle of unity be sufficient 
for the task? If some of the leading candidates for such a principle are not 
successful we will have further, indirect reason at least to think that only a 
principle as strong as substantial form can do the required work.
4.  Lesser Unity Principles Will Not Work
An objection to substantial form that no doubt arises in many minds is that 
they seem redundant. Why couldn’t I say everything I have about organs 
and collectives, contrasting them with organisms, without even mention-
ing substantial forms? Why not simply talk about substances and non- 
substances? Aren’t substantial forms an ontological spare wheel? In reply, 
as I have already argued, there must be a principle of unity for substances—
that which unifies otherwise disparate elements into a whole. If that prin-
ciple is to have ontological reality, it must be either a substantial form or 
something else. So to underscore the reality of form, we should consider 
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alternative unity principles to see if they can do the required work. I want 
to look briefly at two alternatives, and will argue that both are found want-
ing. The first is that of Hoffman and Rosenkrantz,56 who have a complex 
account of organismic unity in terms of functional organisation, one which 
also requires the existence of a ‘master part’ that controls the processes of all 
the other parts. Details of their specific account of functional organisation 
aside, their basic, quite Aristotelian idea is that organisms are functionally 
united in such a way that their parts subserve or contribute to the typical 
life processes of growth, metabolism, development, and/or reproduction. As 
such, however, there is no distinction between organs, organisms, and col-
lectives, given especially that they do not propose these basic life processes 
to be necessary and sufficient for any living thing. Hence organisms cannot 
be singled out by some privileged set of life processes.
What does single out organisms, according to Hoffman and Rosenkrantz, 
is that they must have a ‘master part’ that controls and regulates their pro-
cesses. They, like I do, take it as a datum that organisms are not proper parts 
of other living things whereas organs are parts of organisms, but they seek 
to explain this terms of the organism’s processes’ being controlled by its 
master part, which excludes the organism’s being functionally subordinate 
to another living entity. A part of an organism, such as a liver cell, is func-
tionally subordinate to the organism and its life processes are controlled by 
the organism’s master part, either directly or indirectly. Hence the nucleus 
of the liver cell is not its master part.
The implied argument for the master part thesis is precisely that anything 
less won’t make the right distinctions: mere functional unity, however com-
plex, is too coarse grained to do the work they require.57 Although they don’t 
put it this way, it would be a miracle were there to be a special kind of func-
tional unity that applied to all and only organisms. The explicit argument, 
however, is one by induction from observed cases of paradigmatic organisms. 
Eukaryotic single- celled organisms seem to have the nucleus as a ‘highly cen-
tralised regulatory system’, and prokaryotes have the system of their DNA 
and mRNA molecules. If a proteinoid microsphere were an organism, its pro-
tein chains would constitute its master part.58 The (central) nervous system of 
an ‘adult vertebrate’ is its master part, as are the roots, stem and leaves of a 
‘typical mature plant’,59 as well as the nerve net of a jellyfish, the nucleoid of 
a bacterium, and the ‘nuclear system’ of a plasmodial slime mould.60
This approach seems to me wrongheaded, for it leads to Rosenkrantz’s 
view that the master part of a plant is all of the plant minus its sap, since the 
sap appears to be the only part that does not control the plant’s life functions. 
He calls the plant minus its sap a ‘decentralized’ master part without show-
ing how to distinguish between centralised and decentralised master parts. 
Yet I submit this is to abuse the term ‘part’, since for biological purposes 
the plant minus its sap is no more a proper part of the plant that is Tibbles 
minus his tail. Moreover, before a vertebrate embryo gastrulates,61 there is 
nothing resembling a nervous system to serve as master part, yet there is still 
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an organism. Furthermore, what on their master- part theory of organisms 
is to be said about non- vascular plants such as algae and bryophytes, all of 
which lack sap? Are we to say that they are their own master parts? After all, 
if we want to justify the idea that, say, the ‘nuclear system’ of a plasmodial 
slime mould is a master part simply because it is a proper part according to 
extensional mereology (not that Rosenkrantz and Hoffman say that, but it 
is an obvious move), why not hold that non- vascular plants are their own 
improper master parts? All in all, it seems that the master- part theory is unac-
ceptably hostage to empirical fortune when it comes to defining the organism.
The other unity principle I briefly want to mention is structure, as exempli-
fied in the work of Kathrin Koslicki.62 She holds that we need something like 
substantial form to act as a scientifically respectable analogue of a metaphysi-
cally discreditable idea. So she proposes structure—a perfectly natural and 
understandable thought. Moreover, instead of the prime matter that accom-
panies substantial form on the hylemorphic theory, she proposed content 
as that on which structure operates to produce a structured whole. I have 
criticised her view elsewhere,63 primarily on the ground of its being subject to 
what I call the ‘content- fixing problem’, which concerns the impossibility in 
principle of choosing any particular content as the content on which structure 
is imposed to constitute a substance. What, for instance, is the content on 
which equine structure operates to constitute a horse? For different contents, 
whether it be flesh and bones, cells, atoms, quarks, there will be a different 
structure, and yet there is no reason in principle to choose one over the other.
There is, however, another problem for structure- based hylemorphism, 
which I call the ‘qualitative problem’. Related to the content- fixing problem, 
and in a way more fundamental and also explanatory of why the first prob-
lem arises, the qualitative problem is that most if not all the candidate con-
tents for a structural account come too late in the metaphysical analysis to 
be viable partners for any given structure. Certainly, if we restrict ourselves 
to biological contents, whether flesh and bones, organs, biological systems, 
genes, or DNA itself, they are all already defined by the organism to which 
they belong before structure even comes on the scene to organise them into a 
substantial whole. No structure imposed on, say, equine organs can explain 
any unity beyond the unity of those specific organs. The unity within each 
organ is left unexplained: and yet each organ is already defined as an equine 
organ before64 the proposed equine structure does any work. The unity prob-
lem, however, is a problem concerning the whole substance, including all of 
its biological parts: in virtue of what are they all united into an organic sub-
stantial whole? Structural hylemorphism cannot answer this question.
5.  Conclusion
For traditional hylemorphism, only substantial form penetrates, in its uni-
fying power, to every element of the organic substantial whole. It leaves no 
aspect of unity in need of further explanation. This is why the traditional 
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hylemorphist holds, for example, that there is as much of the substantial 
form of humanity in my little finger as there is in me as an individual 
human being. The difference, however, is that as an organ my little finger 
abtains my substantial form, whereas I possess it. The unifying power 
of the form nevertheless descends to my finger as much as it does to any 
other part of me and as much as it determines me, as a whole, as the kind 
of thing that I am.
To reiterate, substantial form is a metaphysical posit, not the subject of 
an empirical hypothesis. It is not ‘something we know not what’ that is 
vacuously postulated to explain unity. It is what we must have if unity is to 
be explained. If this is hard for biologists and/or philosophers to swallow, 
it is because both have abandoned the quest for a genuine philosophy of 
nature that combines scientifically informed metaphysics with metaphysi-
cally informed science. An adequate philosophy of nature will resist the wild 
flights of fancy found in superorganism theory, which undermines organis-
mic unity from both ends—blurring the boundaries both between organisms 
and collectives and between organisms and their parts. If D’Arcy Wentworth 
Thompson was right that the unity of the organism is a fundamental truth 
requiring explanation, then only substantial form can claim to be the ‘great 
unifier’ that does the work that needs to be done. With this, I can cite the 
agreement of another Thompson—William R. Thompson (1887–1972), 
one- time research scientist at the Imperial Institute of Entomology and 
Fellow of the Royal Society—who said:
In the unification of a multiplicity, with reference to a specific end, the 
organism resembles a machine; but it is not, like the machine, unified by 
the participated activity of a separate mover. It moves itself, and what 
we call “physico- chemical properties” or “cytological activities” are 
simply the living unit envisaged in abstracto at various levels. They are 
not true nonliving or nonorganismal agglomerates unified and moved 
by something higher. There is nothing to move them but the thing they 
constitute; in other words, nothing to move them but themselves.65
By this, Thompson means that the unity of an organism’s parts does not 
derive from anything external to the organism. The organism moves its 
parts, but only because it moves itself. And it moves itself because of its 
unity as a single substance. I happily side with both Thompsons in regarding 
form as the only thing that can make this possible.66
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66 I am grateful for comments and feedback on a version of this paper to colleagues 
and graduate students at the University of Reading, and to participants in the 
conference on Biological Identity organised by Anne Sophie Meincke and John 
Dupré at Senate House, London, in June 2016.
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1.  Introduction
Perhaps Macbeth was justified in doubting that Birnam Wood could ever 
come to Dunsinane, despite the witches’ prophecy. Barring supernatural 
intervention, we normally have no reason to suspect that trees in a forest 
might spontaneously sprout legs and walk: indeed, when the prophecy is 
fulfilled, it is fulfilled (however unexpectedly!) by means of human agency 
and artifice. Philosophical thought on the subject of action has frequently 
produced the suggestion that actions are unique among the forms of move-
ment in the natural world: the advancement of Malcolm’s army, shielded 
with the leafy boughs of Birnam to secure Macbeth’s doom, seems abso-
lutely unlike the advancement of an electrical storm through a forest or the 
inevitable fall of dry timber. It may even be suggested that action contains a 
hint of the divine: for agents are the ultimate and free originators of states of 
affairs in the world, and are therefore like gods. Agency, it is thus thought, 
is exceptional among causal phenomena in the natural world. In a world of 
material causes, action is thought to represent an exceptional causal type.
This chapter pursues the claim that such causal exceptionalism for human 
agency is false. The idea that the causation of action is unique among other 
causal phenomena poses an obstacle to our understanding of agents and 
their doings as belonging to a ‘naturalistic’ explanatory framework, i.e., one 
that assumes that all causal phenomena, including agency, may be explained 
without invoking non- natural or even divine causal elements.1 For action 
theorists attracted to naturalistic thinking about mind and action, this latter 
claim will come as a welcome proposal. For others, perhaps, any mention 
of a naturalistic program arouses suspicions of a rather predictable, and 
yet understandable sort. Most significantly, there is a tendency to associ-
ate naturalistic explanations of agency with a reductive materialist account 
of agents and their actions, as well as the worry that a denial of causal 
exceptionalism for agency involves a denial of human exceptionalism tout 
court. Yet it is unacceptable to think that these latter conclusions must be 
embraced, having exhausted all other possibilities for a more sympathetic 
naturalism. For one may reject causal exceptionalism with regard to agency 
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without likewise rejecting the concept of an agent cause. Nor indeed, for 
that matter, must one jettison the reasonable judgment that human beings 
are truly exceptional within the natural world.
I argue that we can and should retain both ideas: firstly, that agents are 
themselves causes, and agency an irreducible type of causation; secondly, 
that human beings are exceptional within the animal kingdom, in the vari-
ety of powers exhibited and activities pursued. Moreover, I think it is possi-
ble to retain both of these ideas within a naturalistic programme of a certain 
sort: specifically, one committed to the concept of action as irreducible to 
its fundamentally physical constituent parts. This commitment, obviously, 
requires the support of metaphysical argument. The main point that I wish 
to press about agents and agency is that the causation (or varieties of causa-
tion) concerning them should not be understood as being of an exceptional 
type within the natural world, even while one grants that human beings 
are surely a most exceptional subclass of animal beings. Indeed, I think it 
is impossible to sufficiently appreciate this latter fact while insisting on an 
absolute or more radical conception of human alterity over animal nature.
2.  Are We Animal Agents?
Are we animal agents? That is, when we think of ourselves as agents, is it in 
light of ‘animacy’, i.e. the concept of an animal, that we understand agency? 
Or is there something else, not included within nor entailed by the idea of 
animacy, on account of which we take ourselves to be agents? If we affirm 
the latter, then we cast doubt on the plausibility that non- human animals 
might also be agents, at least in a sense univocally understood with respect 
to our being agents. If we affirm the former, then we must be prepared to 
admit that we are not the only agents in the world.
Thinking that we are not the only agents challenges the assumption that 
the concept of ‘action’ is one pertaining uniquely to human beings. The rea-
sons for excluding non- human animals from the class of agents have tended 
to centre on complex notions such as rationality, freedom, self- recognition, 
and moral judgment. It is thought that these powers, and others related to 
them, are possessed by human beings. I think we should have no trouble 
in granting that human beings possess these powers, certainly to the great-
est observable extent within the animal kingdom, and with an avowedly 
remarkable range of activities. Yet it is a questionable further step to infer 
from the latter observation that, in light of our exceptional abilities, we 
therefore are the only agents there are: that the concept of being an agent is 
one that necessarily excludes all non- human animals.
Donald Davidson, in ‘Rational Animals’ (1982), offers an argument 
against the possibility of non- rational agents. Davidson argues that any 
creature with the capacity of truly possessing beliefs must also possess the 
capacity of exercising propositional speech. Thinking requires the concept 
of a thought, claims Davidson: in order to have a belief, I must recognize 
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my belief qua belief, i.e. as dependent on an entire network of other beliefs. 
And this is a recognition that is supplied only by language, or propositional 
speech concerning the correctness or incorrectness of my beliefs.2 Since 
dumb animals are, by definition, incapable of expressing propositional 
speech, they must be incapable of truly possessing beliefs. And since belief 
possession is a requirement for rational action, according to the causalist’s 
basic definition, Davidson concludes that non- human animals are therefore 
incapable of performing actions, which by his lights represent events of the 
rational type.3 Rational animals are the only agents there are.4
Davidson’s argument in ‘Rational Animals’ has been widely discussed, 
and in particular, much debate arises over his claim that mute animals lack 
the particular sort of belief possession that he holds relevant for agency.5 
However, I would like to dispute his more general premise that agency 
requires this kind of belief possession in the first place. For if it turns out 
that agency does not require it, then it remains an open question whether 
or not non- rational animals ought to be considered agents, regardless of 
whether they have Davidsonian beliefs.
The deeper mischief with Davidson’s argument, I suggest, lies in his cau-
salist approach to the concept of action. Causalists argue that an agent S’s 
A- ing is an action if and only if A- ing was caused in the right way by appro-
priate mental states or events.6 This view has been criticized on the basis 
that the causal relation is placed ‘between events or states of affairs or facts 
of which [the agent] is a constituent’ (Broadie 2013: 574, italics mine).7 The 
agent is understood merely as a logical constituent of the causal relata actu-
ally productive of action: i.e., the events of S’s intending to A and S’s A- ing, 
where A is a set of movements belonging to an agent S. On many causalist 
accounts, this shift from the agent to the causal relations within her implies 
an ontological division between events or states of the mental and physical 
types; this latter division may be expressed via an explicitly Cartesian- style 
dualism, or by a more moderate account, e.g., non- reductive materialism.
The causalist account states that the cause of action is not the agent her-
self, but rather mental occurrences, such as beliefs and desires. Moreover, 
causalism posits a break that occurs, whenever there is an action, between 
the causal relata cited by the causalist: i.e., between agential intentionality 
and its bodily effects. The causalist account involves recognition of certain 
types of entities that qualify as such relata in the causation of action. This 
qualification based on types includes, whether explicitly or implicitly, the 
Cartesian thought that the causal relata can be sorted as mental (or inten-
tional) and physical (or bodily), even if these binary concepts are not under-
stood in contemporary accounts as corresponding precisely to Descartes’s 
original idea.
The worry about a strictly Cartesian ontological division is a familiar 
one. Seeing the agent not as causes but rather constituents of diverse types 
of events is clearly related to the problem of how to explain the efficacy of 
mental events in physical domains, known in the philosophy of mind as the 
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problem of causal exclusion. The requirement of causal closure states that 
every physical effect must have a complete physical cause. Thus, a bodily 
movement must have a physical cause, but the mental items required by 
the causal theory of action lack, by themselves, the kind of efficacy pre-
sumed to generate physical causes. If one views intentions or reasons as 
metaphysically ‘determined’ or ‘realized’ by corresponding physical states, 
such as neurophysiological occurrences in the brain, then causal closure can 
be satisfied by positing that the bodily movement is caused by the physical 
realizers of mental events. But this kind of solution has the cost of literally 
‘excluding’ mental events, such as intentions or reasons, from the causal 
story. They are rendered epiphenomenal, or causally inefficacious, and may 
be dismissed as mere artifacts of ‘folk psychology’. But this is a cost that 
relatively few causalists are willing to accept.8
Davidson rejected the traditional Cartesian account, although he agreed 
with Descartes’s earlier analysis against non- linguistic animal agents. Clearly, 
there is no necessary argumentative connection between a Cartesian- style 
dualism and the exclusion of mute animals from the class of agents. Yet it 
is of more than merely historical interest to recall that the original Cartesian 
argument against animal agents not only gave the same argument from the 
capacity for speech as a condition for mind and action, but it also essentially 
linked this argument to an event- type dualism, characterized by fundamen-
tally disparate realms demarcated by res cogitans, the thinking or mental sub-
stance, and res extensa, the extended or physical substance. For Descartes, 
the connection between substance dualism and a creature’s propensity for 
propositional speech was one of simple logical entailment: it followed from 
his view of physical substance as being, for the most part, separately bounded 
from mind. Declarative or propositional speech, he wrote, ‘is the only certain 
sign of thought hidden in a body’ (1649/1991: 244–5). Although non- human 
animals exceed human beings in certain abilities, Descartes argued, their lack 
of inventiveness with respect to declarative speech
proves that they do not have a mind, and that it is nature that acts in 
them, according to the disposition of their organs—just as one sees that 
a clock made only of wheels and springs can count the hours and mea-
sure time more accurately than we can with all our powers of reflective 
deliberation.
(1637/1998: 59)9
Davidsonian- style causalists may wish, for obvious reasons, to resist the 
conclusion that non- human animals lack minds altogether, or the assertion 
that they are constituted much like the mechanistic assembly of Descartes’s 
clock. They may point out that whereas Descartes draws the stronger con-
clusion that non- human animals’ inability to speak entails the absence of mind, 
Davidson claims that such inability merely implies the absence of belief for-
mation and possession. It may be that Davidson’s account does not outright 
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deny some very rudimentary notion of mind to non- human animals, but 
what would be the significance of retaining such a concept if—as Davidson 
claims—it does not involve the capacity for thought? Nor is the significance 
of this question one that pertains only to mute animals. If the concept of 
agency is one from which non- human animals are excluded, this exclusion—
likewise, of animacy from the concept of action—is one that cannot fail to 
have significant implications for our idea of human action. These implica-
tions, I will argue, are undesirable beyond an acceptable point: therefore, 
we should prefer a concept of agency that includes the possibility of animal 
agents, both rational and non- rational, linguistic and mute.
Causalists do not deny that non- human animals engage in some kind 
of movement, even if such movement falls short of qualifying as action. 
However, according to the Davidsonian causal theory, the movement of 
non- human animals fails to be intentional, because of the absence of propo-
sitional beliefs. This means that, for a movement to be intentional (i.e., for 
the movement to count as an action), it must be caused, inter alia, by a psy-
chological event or state with certain propositional contents. The account of 
human agency that necessarily follows distinguishes mere movement, where 
such movement is uncaused by such a cognitive state or event, from true 
action (intentional movement) where a proper cause is present.
To see why this picture of human agency is problematic, it is helpful to 
revisit a passage from the Philosophical Investigations that has been treated 
over the last decades as an important starting point for philosophical think-
ing about action. Wittgenstein asks:
Let us not forget this: when ‘I raise my arm’, my arm goes up. And the 
problem arises: what is left over if I subtract the fact that my arm goes 
up from the fact that I raise my arm?
(2001: 136)
The question is often presumed to ask for an explanation of the difference 
between what agents do and what merely happens to them. There may be 
cases in which one’s arm goes up without the agent having raised it: perhaps 
the agent suffers from ‘alien’ or ‘anarchic’ hand syndrome, a neurological 
disorder (usually caused by brain injury or surgical separation of left and 
right brain hemispheres) that causes autonomous, ‘rogue’ limb behavior. 
These cases are obviously distinct from cases in which the agent, having full 
and healthy control over her limbs, raises her arm, and yet it seems that they 
also have something in common: in both cases, there is a bodily movement. 
They may even look and feel the same: imagine a scenario in which a neu-
rophysiologist has disabled my ability to control my limb movements and 
connected them artificially so that, when my arm is made to go up, the sen-
sation is identical to one in which I have absolute control over my body. The 
causalist’s explanation of what distinguishes them lies solely in the causal 
etiology leading to the behavioral event. As earlier considerations showed, 
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Davidson’s version of the causal theory insisted that such etiology include 
cognitive states or events with specifically propositional or declarative con-
tent. Davidson’s causal picture suggests that human activity is comprised of 
many movements, but only those that have a suitable causal etiology count 
as intentional and agential. The first difficulty with this picture lies, again, 
in its implausibility. This account, observes Helen Steward,
has always faced a particular sort of embarrassment. The embarrass-
ment is that a great deal of our purposive activity does not really seem 
to be preceded at all by the sorts of mental events and states that figure 
in the story. Often, I just seem to act, without any prior deliberation, 
without first deciding or choosing to do anything, and without at any 
stage consciously forming an intention to act in the way that I do, or 
being conscious of the existence of such a prior intention.
(2012: 66)
In reply to the causalist, Steward suggests that we take notice of all the 
bodily movements that occur in us in the space of just ten minutes. These 
may include crossing and uncrossing of the legs, touching one’s face, stretch-
ing, etc., not to mention the ‘scratchings, shufflings, twiddlings, and jigglings 
that together constitute quite a large sub- class of our bodily movings—[that] 
present the most obvious counterexamples to the claim that to act is to have 
a bodily movement caused by something like a prior intention, decision, 
or choice’ (2012: 66). Causalists will assert that these counterexamples are 
not conclusive. Steward counters that such replies are inevitably ‘tortuous’; 
and, in any case, ‘what exactly is the reason for insisting on preserving [the 
claim that actions are always caused by some prior intention, decision, or 
choice]?’ (2012: 67). Such insistence on preserving the basic causalist idea 
of action’s specific mental antecedents ‘must be a reason for suspicion that 
the . . . model . . . is basically Cartesian. The agent is identified with certain 
of her mental states and events, and her settling how her body will move 
is then thought of as their settling how her body will move; that is to say, 
in what looks from this point of view as though it ought to be the best 
case, as their deterministically causing the wanted bodily movements. But 
we humans are not purely mental beings, we are embodied ones’ (2012: 
67). Davidson’s causalist account is basically Cartesian,10 particularly in its 
solution to Wittgenstein’s infamous question. For Descartes before him gave 
essentially the same explanation of action in the Sixth Meditation:
I might regard a man’s body as a kind of mechanism that is outfitted with 
and composed of bones, nerves, muscles, veins, blood and skin in such a 
way that, even if no mind existed in it, the man’s body would still exhibit 
all the same motions that are in it now except for those motions that pro-
ceed either from a command of the will or, consequently, from the mind.
(1641/1998: 101)
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The causalist need not assert such metaphysical independence of mind 
from the body, in order to agree with the Cartesian view of matter belong-
ing to the agent (where ‘matter’ includes not merely the body but also the 
bodily motions and behavioral events exhibited by that body) as a kind of 
underlying substratum for intentional movement. For the causalist, what 
differentiates action from mere movement is simply the addition of a mental 
antecedent, ‘a command of the will or . . . the mind’, which plays a role in 
the etiology of a behavioral event.11
These philosophical considerations against causalism should not escape 
the notice of the naturalist, for whom the exclusion of non- human animals 
from the class of ‘true’ agents cannot possibly go unchallenged.12 Nor can 
the philosopher prescind from the more basic forms of inquiry about animal 
behavior, learning, and preferences: namely, in our observations from the 
natural sciences, which may go even farther than the philosophical in reveal-
ing a creature’s potential status as an agent.
An obvious problem with excluding non- human animals from the 
class of agents is how implausible such a claim seems in the face of cur-
rent knowledge about animal behavior and learning.13 Observation of the 
group hunting patterns exhibited by Orcinus orca, the largest species of 
oceanic dolphin known commonly as the orca or ‘killer’ whale, suggests 
that learnt, collaborative strategy is crucial in species survival.14 The evi-
dence also suggests that hunting and dietary tactics are not universal to all 
varieties of Orcinus orca: different groups, or ‘pods’, specialize in different 
hunting strategies and hold distinct preferences regarding available prey. 
Such group- specific specialization suggests that the behavioral patterns are 
learnt over generations of the group, rather than being simply mechanistic 
expressions of an innate feature of the species. (These patterns include coop-
erative hunting behavior, known as ‘wave- washing’,15 evidence of butcher-
ing or ‘meticulous postmortem prey processing’, and ‘intentional stranding 
hunting techniques’.)16 Similar examples of complex social, goal- directed 
behavior exist across a variety of animal species.17 In light of the evidence, 
it seems truly implausible to claim that all of these instances fail to count as 
examples of real agency.
My discussion so far does not amount to a definitive argument for the 
claim that the concept of action is necessarily based on the concept of being 
an animal. In this part, I have sought merely to establish the insufficiency 
of the causalist’s claim to the contrary. There are no good reasons, philo-
sophical or scientific, for excluding animals from the class of agents, and the 
behavioral evidence seems to suggest that they are agents. So we humans, 
too, are animal agents: this description is apt insofar as our conception of 
human action necessarily includes features involving our own animality. Of 
course, such a conclusion does not entail that we are nothing but animal 
agents, or nothing but animals tout court. The point simply is that if animals 
other than us can be agents, then we must revise our concept of agency to 
take account of animacy as integral to that concept. Expectedly, this latter 
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point has some rather far- ranging consequences, to be considered in the 
remainder of this chapter.
3.  The Causal Structure of Action
3.1 Agency as Substance Causation
In A Metaphysics for Freedom, Helen Steward argues that the concept of 
agency is best grasped via considerations of the concept of an animal. She 
begins her inquiry by rejecting the proposition that non- rational animals 
are ‘free’ in the same sense or to the same extent that human beings are. Yet 
it remains the case that we are nonetheless animals: ‘It would be surprising 
if anyone thought the freedoms available to a shark or a horse or even to 
a chimpanzee, in and of themselves, were really terribly desirable from the 
point of view of a human being, were “worth wanting”. But for all that, it is 
evident that in order to be a human being, one has to be an animal’ (2012: 
5).18 Much of Steward’s book is a defense against ‘the idea that it is natural-
istically incredible that there should be any such thing as I have alleged an 
animal must be: an object, a substance, that things can genuinely be up to’ 
(2012: 248). Moreover, she seeks to redress the widespread, post- Cartesian 
picture of ‘all non- human animals as deterministic automata’ (2012: 81).
It is important to clear up some points of misunderstanding that poten-
tially arise from an initial canvassing. First, Steward’s account does not 
entail that all animals are agents. Nor does it entail that all agents are ani-
mals. However, there is ‘strong evidence for the view that the concept of 
agency is an outgrowth of the concept of animacy’, i.e., the concept of an 
animal. The central notion defining what it is to be an animal (agent) is that 
of ‘settling’: as Steward explains, ‘it is natural to think of such animals [as 
cows and sheep] as the settlers of various matters that concern the move-
ment through time and space of their own bodies’ (2012: 75). The concept 
of an agent, on her account, has the following additional features in addi-
tion to the idea of ‘settler of matters’ (2012: 71–2):
(i) an agent can move the whole, or at least some parts, of something we 
are inclined to think of as its body;
(ii) an agent is a centre of some form of subjectivity;
(iii) an agent is something to which at least some rudimentary types of inten-
tional state (e.g., trying, wanting, perceiving) may be properly attributed;
(iv) an agent is a settler of matters concerning certain of the movements of 
its own body in roughly the sense [that] . . . the actions by means of 
which those movements are effected cannot be regarded merely as the 
inevitable consequences of what has gone before.
There is much to say about each of these features. My aim in this sec-
tion is to elaborate on (iv) above, by way of the following proposal: ‘The 
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crucial determinant . . . of whether a creature truly can be said genuinely 
to be a self- mover has to do with whether there is any irreducible role to 
be played in the explanation of that organism’s motor activity by a certain 
kind of integration which I believe is part and parcel of the functioning 
of most animals of a certain degree of complexity’ (2012: 16). The focus 
of the remainder of this chapter will be on how such ‘integration’ might 
be coherently understood as playing an explanatory role in the concept of 
agency.
It is clear that, for Steward, ‘integration’ is a metaphysical concept. Further 
elaboration reveals that the agent, as a ‘settler of matters’, exerts a kind of top- 
down causation. Steward’s argument posits a way of organizing the higher- 
level and lower- level parts and processes that exist in whole living organisms 
or certain biological systems. With regards to agency in particular, top- down 
causation entails that ‘the whole of an organized and integrated living system 
is able to affect the intuitively lower level processes that go on in its parts’ 
(2012: 114). Her approach to substance causation distinguishes itself from 
other ‘top- down’ approaches. Many of these other approaches are commit-
ted to the notion of ‘emergent properties’, which possess independent causal 
efficacy over the lower- level properties from which they are argued to emerge 
(Humphreys 1996, 1997a, b; O’Connor 2000; Lowe 2000). Steward’s argu-
ment, however, is exclusively in terms of the causation of wholes versus their 
parts. Emergent properties are normally properties of a complex whole, but 
causation by emergent properties is not necessarily identical to the causation 
by the complex whole itself (2012: 225). Moreover, an important aspect of 
Steward’s argument, as will become clear, is her avoidance of the presump-
tion that causation between properties is primary to causation by substances 
(inanimate things or animals), an aspect that further distances her approach 
from that of emergent properties.19
Steward illustrates her case for substance causation by considering the 
phenomenon of a whirlpool. A whirlpool is a system that involves the 
unfixed constitution of individual molecules of water, which are at one 
moment caught up in the forces of the whirlpool ‘system’ and at other 
times left out. Reductionists argue that the diachronic persistence of the 
whirlpool can be understood entirely in terms of the lower- level molecular 
arrangement, which changes from moment to moment. In other words, a 
‘supervenience base’, or certain set of ‘basal conditions’, is entirely sufficient 
for explanations of apparently higher- level phenomena such as whirlpools. 
But whirlpools are generated by specific macro- level forces, i.e., the flow 
of opposite running currents within a body of water, and these forces are 
what sustain the phenomenon of a whirlpool, regardless of which individual 
molecules of water are constituting the system from one moment to the 
next. Steward suggests, ‘to understand these forces and how they work, we 
do not look to each momentary individual supervenience base and consider 
how it generates the next. The persistence of the whirlpool is a phenom-
enon entirely blind to the details of individual molecules. It may indeed be a 
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complete accident that any given individual molecule is part of the superve-
nience base of the whirlpool at any given moment’ (2012: 241).
The whirlpool is ‘a phenomenon entirely blind to the details’ of its lower- 
level parts, much as my walking home is a process in which I am typically 
unconscious of any details concerning the physiological, neurological, and 
microphysical processes that constitute my journey. Nonetheless, the ‘com-
plete description’ of a whirlpool or a walk necessarily includes reference to 
the lower- level constituents or basal conditions that exist from moment to 
moment. Steward raises a puzzle of coincidence with regard to the ‘assump-
tion that each momentary individual supervenience base necessitates the 
next’ (2012: 241). Nothing in the basal conditions themselves, she argues, 
in the complex arrangement of molecules and other lower- level occurrences, 
reveals how or why these conditions have aggregated just so, with striking 
coordination, as to produce a whirlpool. She asks: ‘What explains the coor-
dination, the collocation? What we need to know is how it has come about 
that all these conditions have managed to obtain so fortuitously together’ 
(2012: 238). Referencing the temporally prior basal set that generates the 
supervenience base of the whirlpool—such as the molecular conditions that 
initially occurred when two opposing water currents were forced together 
at the formation of the whirlpool—does not solve the puzzle of how these 
prior molecular conditions are produced together, of how they are coordi-
nated in such a way by themselves alone. Steward writes, ‘No matter how 
far back we go along the chain, if we never raise our eyes from these lower 
level events, we will lack what is requisite to explain why these conditions 
are (at any stage of the chain) produced together. And yet this is what is 
extraordinary; it is what needs to be explained’ (2012: 238).
This puzzle of coincidence with regard to the whirlpool is not primar-
ily a puzzle about the natural history of molecular particles, or why such 
particles co- exist at all. Rather, the puzzle arises out of a need to explain 
the metaphysical arrangement of microphysical parts with respect to their 
wholes. Hence, the question is not simply a request for an explanation of 
the co- location of the microphysical elements in a particular space and at 
a particular time, but instead: why should such elements exist qua parts, 
with spatial and temporal inter- relations, belonging to a functional, acting, 
macrophysical whole?
A key aspect to understanding Steward’s puzzle of coincidence (of these 
lower- level events) is that the availability of a sufficient condition (or set 
of conditions) for certain phenomena does not by itself entail necessitating 
microphysical conditions or prior circumstances. The issue of sufficiency 
has at least two relevant implications for the analysis of top- down causa-
tion. First, we must ask what the sufficient condition is a condition for. It 
may well be the case that there is a sufficient condition, e.g., a prior micro-
physical movement at t1, for a particle x to be in just the right place at the 
right time: that is, within the formation and flow of a whirlpool at t2. Even 
so, the existence of this sufficient condition does not by itself entail that 
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there exists an entire set of sufficient conditions for a vast microphysical 
collection of particles to be co- located altogether, as a whirlpool, at t2. Even 
if one were to identify a sufficient condition for each particle within the 
whirlpool at t2, such a set of conditions would fall short of explaining how 
it is that the movement of each particle obtains together. Their simultane-
ous co- location is a coincidence for which there is no sufficient condition or 
set of conditions, at least, not as far as one can see from the perspective of 
lower- level (microphysical) events alone.
The second implication related to the issue of sufficiency concerns the 
concept of a ‘sufficient condition’ itself. One may believe that ‘sufficient 
condition’ means conditions that are necessitating: such that, granting 
such conditions for the occurrence of an event or phenomenon, none other 
could have occurred. Here, Steward cites Anscombe: ‘For “sufficient condi-
tion” sounds like: “enough”. And one certainly can ask: “May there not be 
enough to have made something happen—and yet it not have happened?”’ 
(2012: 240). Steward argues in the affirmative:
We cannot just help ourselves to the assumption that everything that 
happens is inexorably necessitated by some prior state of the world. 
We do know, of course, that in another sense of the word ‘sufficient’, 
anything that actually happens must have had causally sufficient con-
ditions, i.e. conditions that were ‘enough’ to allow for its occurrence, 
which is to say that nothing strictly requisite for the occurrence of any-
thing that actually occurs could have been lacking. But that is different 
from there being conditions in place such that nothing else could then 
possibly have happened.
(2012: 240)
Weakening the assumption that ‘sufficient’ entails ‘necessitating’ is par-
ticularly important for Steward’s account of top- down causation. For if the 
coincidental microphysical circumstances of a whirlpool are to be under-
stood entirely in terms of necessitating conditions, all in temporal succession 
generating the next set of microphysical circumstances, then there is literally 
no metaphysical space for the causal workings of higher- level entities, such 
as whirlpools or water currents. Steward comments, ‘Here one can indeed 
see no gap into which a phenomenon like top- down causation might be fit-
ted’ (2012: 240).
Steward’s puzzle of coincidence is thus exacerbated by the assumption 
that ‘sufficient’ entails ‘necessitating’ condition.20 Her solution to the puzzle 
is, firstly, to recognize that the presence of certain sufficient conditions for 
phenomena such as whirlpools does not ipso facto eliminate the availability 
of other sufficient conditions—or, indeed, the possibility that no satisfactory 
answer to a particular event or phenomenon exists at all. Her point is aptly 
illustrated via Aristotle’s example of a man who visits a well at the ‘wrong’ 
time and is murdered by thieves (Meta. VI, 3). To explain what happened to 
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the victim, we have at our disposal a variety of sufficient conditions for his 
being at the well at just the same time as his assailants. ‘But the mere exis-
tence of a sufficient condition does not by itself imply that the question how 
it was that these phenomena obtained together has a satisfactory answer or 
any answer at all’, points out Steward. ‘However, in the case of the complex 
phenomena of which our world consists . . . we surely have the right to 
demand that there be such an answer’ (2012: 239).
The kind of answer she has in mind brings us to the second part of the 
solution to the puzzle of coincidence. The challenge that the case of the 
whirlpool poses specifically for the concept of action is, as Steward puts it, 
‘to understand how on earth it can be that the animal [agent] has any real, 
independent efficacy of its own: any efficacy that does not merely reduce to 
the efficacy of its various parts’ (2012: 227). The argument that the animal 
agent does have an irreducible causal efficacy, just as the whirlpool exists 
‘entirely blind to the details of individual molecules’, purports to offer the 
answer to the question of how the microphysical phenomena all happen 
to obtain together in an apparent coincidence—wherever there are actions 
like one’s walking or complex non- agential occurrences like whirlpools. The 
provision of a higher- level perspective counts not merely as an explanatory 
point in favor of (higher- level) substance causation, but is part of the ‘rel-
evant metaphysics of causation’ (2012: 239). Agents are causes of their own 
movements, operating independently of—or irreducibly with respect to—
the causal succession of microphysical parts constituting action and activity.
This concept of agent cause treats causation by animal agents as having 
‘independent’ efficacy; it is fair to ask precisely what such independence 
entails. That substances exist ‘entirely blind’ to microphysical details might 
be glossed to mean that agent causes do not depend at all on the causal pow-
ers of their constituent parts. This would be a problematic conclusion for 
an account that explicitly aims ultimately to secure the ‘integrity’ of parts 
with respect to their wholes. Top- down causation admits of the constitutive 
necessity of the bottom- level, microphysical parts that constitute actions 
such as walking and systems such as whirlpools. The foregoing objection 
to the idea of sufficient conditions as necessitating sought to establish that, 
although there exists such dependence on microphysical circumstances as 
sufficient conditions, the latter conditions do not by themselves determine 
(i.e., causally necessitate) or explain how it is that causal powers at the 
higher level are possible. The causal efficacy of agents is ‘independent’, 
therefore, not in the sense that there is no dependence upon the causal pow-
ers possessed by an agents’ parts: the existence of such dependence is simply 
not also ‘upwardly’ determinative of the agent’s movements. In arguing for 
the ‘independent’ causal efficacy of the animal agent, Steward thus avoids 
a traditional charge leveled against top- down causationists: that the higher- 
level causal efficacy of agents, unmoored from the reality of its lower- level 
supervenience base, results in a kind of causal power so independent from 
the latter as to evoke something ‘ethereal’. Steward argues:
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Nothing problematically ethereal is . . . involved; just as a whirlpool 
could have no effects were it not for the molecules of which it is com-
posed having effects, so the way is clear for the straightforward admis-
sion that an animal could do nothing unless its parts simultaneously 
did things. The action of an animal is indeed constituted in this way 
by the actions of its parts. But as with the whirlpool, the key to seeing 
how the action of the animal is more than the sum of the actions of its 
parts is . . . likely to be the idea that higher- level processes can dominate 
and dictate the evolution and distribution of certain lower- level ones, 
so that, as far as the important causal metaphysics is concerned, the 
explanation of how a certain complex neural state of affairs has come 
to be depends upon higher- level processes and ontologies. And as with 
the whirlpool, we avoid the puzzle about how there could be anything 
more to be said than what is given by the low- level neural story (or 
indeed than by what is given by stories told at much lower levels than 
the neural) by simply refusing the assumption that each momentary 
lower- level supervenience base necessitates the next.
(2012: 244)
The above passage seems aimed at assuaging physicalist worries that 
Steward’s variety of substance causation does not adequately account for 
microphysical processes and events: she offers assurances that the ontologi-
cal independence of an agent’s causal powers is not incompatible with a 
naturalistic account. So far, however, the analysis has neglected to mention 
how the causal efficacy of agents prevails ontologically in the face of a kind 
of reduction distinct from that involving causal powers (to the causal effi-
cacy of an animals’ lower- level parts): namely, reduction in terms of agent- 
neurological or microphysical events. For let us momentarily assume the 
standpoint of one who resists the foregoing argument, i.e., that the higher- 
level causal powers of animal agents are irreducible to the efficacy of their 
lower- level parts (presumably since the account of top- down causation is 
deemed uncompelling): such an opponent may well resist Steward’s main 
argument based on the idea that the phenomenon of higher level substance 
causation ultimately reduces (both metaphysically and explanatorily) to 
causation between events at a lower level, i.e., the physiological, neural, or 
microphysical.
The argument for the independent causal efficacy of animal agents, par-
ticularly in the face of this latter threat of reduction, ultimately appears to 
rest in Steward’s account of causal pluralism. Some philosophers have denied 
that events can be causes at all, thereby asserting only the causal powers of 
agents or substances (Lowe 2008; Ayers 1968). Steward eschews this route, 
instead adopting the view that ‘causation’ is a category of diverse concepts, 
under which we may accept not only a causation by events, which Steward 
calls ‘makers- happen’, but also substances or collections of substances21, 
which she calls ‘movers’. Her causal pluralism also includes causation by 
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facts, which she calls ‘matterers’. Each of these causal types is ontologically 
independent from and thus also irreducible to one another. This is not to say 
that the causal types may not be related to one another in important ways, 
but Steward insists that
we must not get the categories mixed up and assimilate them wrongly to 
one another in the service of a chimerical uniformity [. . .] In particular, 
it is absolutely essential to recognize that some types of cause (both the 
movers and the makers- happen) are proper spatiotemporal particulars 
while others (the matterers) relate to general factors (properties, fea-
tures, aspects, etc.) and we only make a horrendous hash of our causal 
thinking if we fail to recognize that we are interested, when looking 
for causes, in both things that are particular and things that are gen-
eral . . . [for] causal thinking involves a concern both with particularity 
and generality.
(2012: 211)
Steward’s distinction between spatiotemporal particulars and general 
factors highlights the fact that particulars actually do things, i.e., they enact 
changes (or perform actions). This fact is suggestive of a stronger claim, that 
substance causation is not just another causal kind in addition to events and 
facts, but indeed, a category that holds a sort of ontological primacy over 
all other categories. Sketching the case for this primacy of substance causa-
tion, and in particular the agency of animals, will be the task of the next 
section. Establishing the primacy of substance causation is one way to assert 
the implausibility of reduction, both explanatory and ontological: from the 
level of the substance to the causation by events involving that substance, 
or a causation between relevant facts. It may be, of course, that Steward’s 
argument for the irreducible causal efficacy of animal agents already settles 
this question. The aim of this section, after all, was to sketch her case for the 
claim that agents, as settlers of matters22 and initiators of their own move-
ments, can be causes of a kind also found pervasively in other natural but 
non- agential phenomena. The argument for top- down causation purports 
to provide this explanation and to establish the irreducibility of animal 
agency to causation by the animal’s parts.
Having laid out an account of agency as substance causation, I turn next 
to some of its central difficulties.
3.2 The Problem of Synchronic Dependency
Many theories of top- down or downward causation presume emergentism, 
which posits that emergent properties exert special, or ‘novel’, causal influ-
ence over the basal properties from which they emerge. These emergen-
tist interpretations of top- down causation are susceptible to a number of 
objections, most notably Kim’s (1999, 2006). Although Steward’s account 
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rejects emergent causal powers,23 it may be thought that the variety of top- 
down causation defended by Steward faces these problems as well, so it is 
worth reviewing them. Kim’s criticisms are directed mainly at the emergen-
tist thesis that downward causation by higher- level properties is dependent, 
whether synchronically or diachronically, on basal physical conditions that 
serve as micro- constituents (again, whether synchronically or diachronic-
ally).24 The synchronic dependency is ‘viciously circular’, he argues, in that 
the emergentist claims that what produces higher level mentality, the basal 
set of physical properties, is simultaneously altered by the very mental prop-
erties that the basal set produces, and so on.
It may be thought that the variety of top- down causation defended by 
Steward escapes the brunt of these criticisms, primarily because her view 
is in terms of parts and wholes rather than emergent properties. But Kim’s 
objection—that the basal conditions (or the bottom level parts) are caus-
ally responsible for the whole that the parts constitute—may also apply to 
Steward’s version of top- down causation. Whether emergence is assumed or 
not, a similar problem seems to arise for the mereological version of down-
ward causation: for the whole is causally dependent on the parts that consti-
tute it as a whole, and simultaneously, claims the substance causationist, the 
parts somehow causally depend on the whole of which they are parts. Vicious 
circularity arguably results, as in the emergentist variation. For it seems 
absurd to think that the parts of a whole cause it to exist, while simultane-
ously the whole that depends on these parts also causes them to exist, as parts 
of the whole. Reduction is a tempting solution, in the face of this circularity. 
Should we not admit that a thing’s parts fundamentally determine the thing 
itself, and that this ‘upward determination’ is more foundational than any 
form of causation one might otherwise introduce via ‘downward’ causation?
The substance causationist may respond in a variety of ways to this objec-
tion. First, she could deny that the parts are constitutive of the whole in such 
a way that they causally determine the latter. A whirlpool is not upwardly 
determined by individual water molecules, since from one moment to the 
next, the whirlpool is not constituted by the same collection of water mol-
ecules that happen to be taken up into the whirlpool’s current. That any par-
ticular arrangement of molecules happens to be a part of the supervenience 
base of the whirlpool could be, Steward points out, ‘a complete accident’, 
especially insofar as we grant that ‘we have no right to the assumption that 
each momentary individual supervenience base necessitates the next’ (2012: 
241). Without this assumption, causal determination from below, or the 
upward causation of lower- level parts on wholes, has no conceptual foot-
hold: how is the determination of a constant (in this case, the whirlpool) 
possible when the assumed bottom- level determinants themselves are abso-
lutely variable? So at least in the case of a whirlpool, the notion of ‘upward 
determination’ of parts on the whole can be set aside.
In the meantime, the question remains: does the rejection of lower- level 
causal determination exclude all ‘upward’ causal influence? An extreme 
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variation on Steward’s rejection of upward determination goes so far as to 
deny attributions of any causality exerted by the lower- level parts exerted 
on the whole. The whirlpool surges on regardless of which and how many 
water molecules happen to be taken up into it as parts: its existence is 
wholly independent of the latter, entirely blind to them both explanatorily 
and ontologically. Perhaps one way to understand this approach is to think 
of a whirlpool as the kind of entity or system that simply happens to involve 
water molecules at each instantaneous time slice: no specific molecules of 
water are ‘necessary’ in the sense that the whirlpool would be conceived as 
causally dependent on those particular molecules of water. According to 
this extreme view, then, the whirlpool is a sort of thing whose parts exert no 
causal influence on it whatsoever, even as temporary constituents.
This view is unsatisfactory for the obvious reason that water molecules 
are not merely accidental features of whirlpools. There is at least one fur-
ther problem with a view like this, however: it appears to downgrade the 
sense of parthood, in that it begins to sound incoherent to speak of parts 
and wholes at all. As mere accidental accompaniments to the whirlpool’s 
path, the water molecules that from one moment to the next happen to be 
taken up into the whirlpool apparently lack the status that parts or con-
stitutive elements of a whole characteristically have. The obvious reply to 
this extreme position is that the molecular constituents of a whirlpool are 
important, causally important, for the higher- level substance itself. Even 
when they are not strictly identified with the whole that persists through 
time—for the whirlpool is constantly exchanging its molecular parts for 
new ones, and artifacts such as wheels, although somewhat more stable, 
have parts that one by one may also gradually be replaced, as was the whole 
ship of Theseus—even then, the molecular constituents may be understood 
to have some kind of causal influence on the fact that the whole is what it 
is. For example, the fact that the molecular constituents of a whirlpool are 
water molecules, even though they undergo constant change, explains why 
the whirlpool ceases to exist when temperatures rise above water’s boiling 
point or falls below its freezing point. One could say that constituent parts, 
qua parts of a whole, are causes of another kind.
The more moderate approach to the objection of upward causal deter-
mination, however, still faces the earlier question posed by Kim, concerning 
synchronic circularity. The problem is that the substance causationist cannot 
maintain causal priority of the whole, while simultaneously claiming that its 
parts exert upward causal influence on the whole. The only way to solve this 
problem, I think, is to take seriously the idea of causal pluralism invoked 
earlier in Steward’s argument for substance causation. Her explanation is 
that substances, or ‘movers’, are causes in an entirely different way from 
facts, or ‘matterers’, and events, ‘makers- happen’. That is, there are certain 
kinds of effects that simply cannot be attributed to facts, and other kinds of 
effects that cannot be attributed to substances.25 In order to deflect Kim’s 
criticisms, however, we must add at least another causal type to Steward’s 
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list.26 Specifically, we should consider the category of ‘constituent parts’ or 
the ‘stuff’ that makes up a whole: whatever we call it, these do not cause the 
whole to exist in the same way that the whole causally organizes or spatially 
arranges them, in a very precise way, specifically as parts.27 Constituent 
parts are causes insofar as they make up a whole, but they make it up only 
insofar as the whole takes them in and spatially arranges them as such.
Kim’s criticism holds weight only if we presume that the causal priority 
of the whole over its parts is the very same kind of concept or causal rela-
tion as the upward causal exertion that constituents have on the wholes 
of which they are parts. Substance causation claims that the whole caus-
ally governs its parts—as a cat slinks towards a mouse, or as water funnels 
continuously off the coast of Suriname—in a way entirely distinct from the 
causal relation that constituent parts have with regard to their whole matter. 
There is no problem of vicious circularity for these cases because circularity 
assumes a directional conflict between identical ontological types.28 The cir-
cularity problem relies on the assumption that it is the parts simpliciter that 
both causes and is caused by the whole, and likewise the whole simpliciter 
that both causes and is caused by its parts. But these forms of causation 
are ontologically diverse not merely because wholes obviously are not their 
parts. Rather, causation by the whole on its parts results in a precise spatial 
arrangement of these material constituents, with related causal powers that 
are context- dependent (i.e., dependent on the spatial arrangement produced 
by the whole substance). Upwards causation by these material constituents 
on the whole of which they are a part is radically different: it is not the 
context- dependent causal powers of these parts (which are caused by the 
whole substance) that cause the existence of the whole, but rather their 
generic compositional powers that sustain the existence of the whole as a 
material thing.29
3.3 The Problem of Explanatory Redundancy
The more moderate reading of substance causation does not, however, 
immediately escape the potential challenge that such causation is explan-
atorily redundant. Steward’s earlier argument concerning the puzzle of 
coincidence was intended to meet the challenge apropos constituent parts: 
i.e., that higher level substance causation is theoretically redundant as a 
proposed conception of ‘cause’, given that the lower level microphysical 
constituents and their efficacy constitute all that is needed to explain the 
movement of whirlpools and the agency of animals. Even if Steward’s reply 
eases the trouble as regards the ‘sufficiency’ of constituent parts, the com-
plaint of redundancy remains given the availability of explanations involving 
event causation. The popularity of Davidsonian- type causalism in particular 
has ensured that higher- level substance or agent causation is received with 
skepticism30 or viewed as explanatorily (and ontologically) superfluous. The 
Davidsonian reading, instead, encourages us to view events as the prime 
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causal candidates. If it is true that my noticing a sign for a scenic detour 
causes me to impulsively take that detour, why must it also be said that 
I caused a significant alteration to the planned journey? Presuming that 
there is no issue concerning my responsibility for subsequently arriving late 
to my appointment, then citing agent causation seems like an added and 
unnecessary feature of what happened. Contrary to criticisms advanced by 
‘disappearing agency’ theories (Velleman 1992), proponents of event causa-
tion need not be opposed to the idea of agency or agents, for there is no 
diminishment of the sense that I took the detour path; it signals no conflict 
with my status as agent, in attributing the cause of my action to the event of 
my noticing the detour sign.
One way to counter the challenge of redundancy from the direction of 
event causalism is to deny that events are causes of actions at all (Lowe 2008; 
Ayers 1968). When it comes to actually getting something done, events sim-
ply do not seem to be the sort of things that do causal work. But, as Steward 
rightly points out, this is an extreme way to respond to the present challenge 
of redundancy (2012: 209–10). The event of my noticing a sign for a scenic 
detour does seem to figure causally in my subsequent action of adopting the 
detour route: the event of my noticing what I did explains why I went that 
route instead of another. If we assume the view that the ‘causal’ is broadly 
understood in terms of what explains or enlightens, an understanding that 
should have particular resonance for Aristotelians, then events as well can 
be causes of some kind.
Granting the latter need not amount to conceding that events are the 
causes of actions (even when it is specified, with sensitivity to the concepts 
of agents and agency, that such actions are my actions). Just as one poten-
tially concedes too much in saying that the molecular constituents of an 
animal cause it to exist, one likewise grants too much status to events in 
allowing that they are the causes of actions. Events are better understood 
analogously: as the kind of causes that constituent parts and facts are. Facts 
are causes only insofar that they may play an explanatory role for actions. 
Constituent parts, in turn, are causes only insofar as they help to make 
up the whole that organizes them as parts. Constituent parts are there-
fore causes only in a limited sense, limited relative to the paradigm case of 
(higher- level) substance causation. We can see the limitation of constituents 
especially in the case of living organisms. For attempts to explain the causa-
tion of action by way of parts or properties involving the brain and body 
fall below the level of the animal agent as a whole: they result in explications 
of action in terms of sub- agential, even fragmented elements. Explication 
of action in terms of facts and events achieves a similarly limited result, 
from either direction: facts and events involving molecular, neurological, or 
merely physiological changes in the brain and body result in a similarly sub- 
agential picture of action, while facts and events involving the agent’s wider 
circumstances may sometimes result in a viewpoint so far above and outside 
the agent that one fails to see how action involves an agent at all.
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Events are sometimes indistinguishable from facts, as when ‘the plant 
being wilted on Saturday morning’ is put forth as an event.31 Even more 
straightforward events, e.g., ‘the sun coming out after the rain’, ‘the con-
vocation of the new academic year’, ‘the child’s turning five’, etc., can be 
understood abstractly and recast as facts.32 However they are conceived, the 
critical issue here is whether such entities are responsible for necessitating 
action.33 They are not. Indeed, an important feature of the agent causal view 
under consideration is that we should deny that actions are ever ‘necessi-
tated’ by entities even other than events, such as agents themselves. Given 
the pervasive equivocation between ‘cause’, ‘necessitate’, and ‘determine’, 
considerations thus far have suggested that we cannot unproblematically 
claim that agents cause or necessitate their actions, even on an agent cau-
sationist view. The agent causal view reviewed in the preceding section has, 
instead, advanced the idea that animal agents are causes of their bodily 
movements, not as necessitating or determining causes, but simply as ‘set-
tlers’ of matters.34 As such, agents are causes par excellence. For the variet-
ies of the concept of cause apropos action, and the limited influence that the 
sub- agential (or extra- agential) forms have in bringing it about, generate the 
demand for a higher level whole that explanatorily ‘organizes’ the different 
causal types of event, fact, constituent part, and property; its organization 
of these is such that they may count as playing causal roles (especially in 
the explanatory sense) in action, and without the ontological gaps from 
which causal deviance arises. This organizing higher- level whole for action, 
of course, is the animal agent herself. The threat of reduction, raised in the 
previous section, is overcome once it is understood that the sub- agential 
(or extra- agential) causal features of agency could not be intelligible, qua 
such features, without higher- level substance causation, specifically of the 
agential kind. Why, then, should we assume that event or fact causation, or 
indeed causation by properties or molecular and other microphysical ele-
ments, are the starting points for explicating action?
Rejection of the latter assumption is problematic, however. Steward’s 
arguments involving the example of the whirlpool made the case against 
reduction, specifically of the mereological kind: i.e., against the challenge 
that the whirlpool as constituted by water molecules can be understood 
entirely in molecular terms, so that the whirlpool itself is recognized as, 
explanatorily and ontologically, a superfluous entity. Her response to the 
challenge, as reviewed before, was to argue that the organization of the 
lower- level elements do not make sense without an ‘organizing’ cause 
from the higher- level whole. She states: ‘It is quite true that the lower- level 
arrangements (once we have them) are “all we need”, but the crucial ques-
tion is how the requisite causally proximal lower- level arrangements are 
to be provided for in the first place’ (2012: 236). The success of reduc-
tionist accounts depend upon the presumption that the entities such as the 
agent’s microphysical parts (as well as the events involving the agent’s brain 
and body, related facts and properties, etc.) are entities or elements that are 
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taken for granted: it is assumed that ‘we already have them’, and as such, 
they are entirely adequate to explain agential phenomena without Steward’s 
question, of how they are ‘provided for in the first place’, having to ever 
arise.
Steward’s argument is that her question does arise: for what dictates that 
the microphysical elements are parts of the whirlpool, if not the higher level 
forces of the whirlpool itself? The argument must succeed, however, not 
just against the challenge of mereological reduction, but also over the other 
explanatory routes favored by causalists. For that, it must be shown that an 
agential cause has both ontological and explanatory primacy to generate 
the kind of causation involving these other sub- agential or extra- agential 
features. Just as mereological priority is attributed to a system such as a 
whirlpool, agent causation should garner explanatory first place among its 
related causal explanations. In the case of actions, it is natural for us to 
countenance first of all those explanations concerning the agent as cause, 
e.g., ‘The cat pursued the mouse’. An analysis in terms of events possibly 
follows from the latter explanation, as e.g., ‘The event of the cat’s catching 
sight of the mouse caused its subsequent pursuit of it’. But analysis in terms 
of events or properties cannot possibly be explanatorily prior to explana-
tions involving the agent as cause: what I mean by this is that we could not 
see the reductive analyses as true, without first acknowledging the agent’s 
causal work. For the events in which ‘the cat catches sight of the mouse’ and 
‘its subsequent pursuit’ both take for granted that the cat does something, 
i.e., that an agent causal explanation is already in place. According to this 
line of argument, the explanation of agents as causes is irreducible because 
the supposedly reductive analyses rely on it for their own intelligibility.35
The claim that agential or substance causes are ontologically and explan-
atorily prior to all other causal categories is not explicitly countenanced in 
Steward’s considerations. It may be that my latter remarks in this section 
signal a stronger thesis with which her account disagrees. I am arguing, 
however, that the success of her account relies on this stronger thesis. It is 
not enough to simply posit that agential causes are one of many irreducible 
causal kinds.
There may be doubt that Steward’s puzzle of coincidence proves what it 
purports to prove: that a higher- level substance cause is necessary for the 
lower level microphysical elements to come together, in the first place, as an 
arrangement recognizable as a supervenience base. What does the puzzle 
of coincidence show, but—at most—that the arrangement of microphysical 
entities requires some explanation: any plausible explanation, which may 
or may not cite higher level substance causation?36 Perhaps her arguments 
against the main alternative, i.e., the necessitated succession of microphysi-
cal elements from one moment to the next, are compelling enough for one 
to assume that there could be no other explanation (for the phenomenon of 
coincidence) but that of top- down causation. But one may doubt that the 
latter represents a positive case for substance causation, let alone establishes 
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it as the explanatorily primary situation from which all other varieties of 
causation are derived.37
Notes
 1 Though this may seem a far- fetched prospect in contemporary philosophy of 
action, the concept of agent causation frequently faces the criticism that its pro-
posed causal relation is metaphysically mysterious, even supernatural. Consider 
such agent causationists as Chisholm (1964) or O’Connor (2000), whose char-
acterization of agents as ‘unmoved movers’—a term applied in medieval philoso-
phy to divine being—evokes a notion of causation for agency that is unlike any 
other mode of causation in the natural world: indeed, an exceptional cause.
 2 ‘One belief demands many beliefs, and beliefs demand other basic attitudes 
such as intentions, desires, and if I am right, the gift of tongues’ (Davidson 
1982: 318).
 3 McDowell offers a similar argument, on Kantian grounds (1996).
 4 Davidson resists any strict identification between ‘rational animals’ and ‘human 
beings’. His purpose is not to attribute the concept of an agent universally to any 
particular group, but rather, simply, to pursue the question of ‘what makes an 
animal (or anything else, if one wants) rational’ (318). It follows from his view 
that human beings may not be the only rational animals there are, and also that 
not every human being is necessarily a rational animal, by his definition of that 
term.
 5 See Tim Crane’s ‘What is Distinctive About Human Thought?’ (Inaugural Lec-
ture, Knightbridge Professorship at University of Cambridge): ‘In particular, the 
premise that one can only have beliefs if one has the concept of belief is crucially 
unsupported, and without that, there is no reason to accept his conclusion, and 
no reason to deny thought to non- linguistic animals. In the relevant sense, a 
belief can be a simple representational state, which Ramsey’s chicken can have. 
We can call the chicken’s belief a belief that chickens [sic] are poisonous if we 
like, but this does not require that we attribute to the chicken the “concept” of 
poison. Calling this a belief is just a way of indicating that the chicken represents 
the world in a way that guides its actions, and in way [sic] that can be correct or 
incorrect’ (11).
 6 ‘States and dispositions are not events, but the onslaught of a state or disposition 
is’ (‘Actions, Reasons, and Causes’, 1963: 12).
 7 Broadie’s use of the term ‘constituent’ apparently expresses a logical relation 
between agent and event, comparable to the way that ‘the vase is on the table’ 
may be said to have the logical constituents of ‘the vase’, the ‘being on’ relation, 
and ‘the table’. Perhaps this is an overly loose way of describing the relation 
between agent and events (or states of affairs, or facts), but it should be clear that 
the constituent relation employed here bears no significant similarities (except 
analogously) to metaphysical parthood, e.g., as when the legs of the table are 
understood as its constituent parts, among others.
 8 Even if one excludes determinism from the causal picture, it is possible to con-
strue lower- level states and events (or their laws and properties) as fixing certain 
probabilities about future behavior, such that facts about the whole have no 
causal influence in altering these probabilities. This account likewise bears the 
cost of excluding certain seemingly relevant facts about the whole from hav-
ing causal significance in the performance of action. (Thanks to Rob Koons for 
pointing out this non- deterministic alternative.)
 9 This proof against the mindedness of non- human animals was definitive for Des-
cartes. He rejected any consideration by degrees, i.e. the thought that non- human 
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animals may be less minded than human beings and yet still possess some mental 
capacity, in his argument, that the inability to communicate by tongue proves 
‘not merely . . . the fact that animals have less reason than men but that they have 
none at all’ (1637/1998: 33).
10 Davidson’s distinctively Cartesian approach has little to do with Descartes’s 
metaphysical doctrine of substance dualism. The dualism assumed by David-
sonian causalism is rather one concerned with sets or systems of concepts. One 
set of concepts is employed for describing matter, and another, very different set 
is used for describing mind; neither conceptual system makes reference to any 
of the concepts contained in the other. I have suggested that the problem arising 
from this view, the problem of causal exclusion, produces difficulties for the idea 
of a mental event or state as causing the event of a physical movement. That the 
latter idea encounters difficulties, in the case of contemporary causal theories, is 
not usually the fault of any metaphysical picture in which ghostly or incorporeal 
substances play a putative role in moving or pushing around physical entities 
(unless, of course, one really does subscribe to Descartes’s metaphysical dual-
ism). Instead, the difficulty of accepting physical causation by mental events is an 
explanatory difficulty, for the physical domain is believed to be wholly explicable 
in purely physical terms.
11 A complementary question might arise, although I do not address it here: why is 
it not a problem (for materialist proponents who accept explanatory exclusion 
of the mental) that a physical change or event might cause a mental event, e.g., a 
physiological change that causes an agent to become aware of that change?
12 Sometimes philosophers equate ‘agency’ with ‘morally responsible agency’. Obvi-
ously, this assumption (usually) entails a denial of the claim that non- human ani-
mals have a membership in the class of true agents. I do not see why we should 
accept such an equivalency, at least not without argument.
13 One might include in considerations on this topic the scientific evidence suggest-
ing human evolution from ‘lower’ animal forms. An important implication of 
such evidence is that, if the present evidence does confirm the theory of macro-
evolution, naturally, we should see a certain observable continuity from humans 
to other animal species in aspects of behavior and learning. Such continuity can 
be granted without at all dispensing with the idea that human beings are them-
selves exceptional in the animal kingdom, in obvious (also observable) ways.
14 See research by Robert Pitman and John Durban, ‘Cooperative hunting behav-
ior, prey selectivity and prey handling by pack ice killer whales (Orcinus orca), 
type B, in Antarctic Peninsula waters’, in Marine Mammal Science (Vol. 28, 
Issue 1, January 2012, pp. 16–36). Available at http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/
doi/10.1111/j.1748- 7692.2010.00453.x/full.
15 Wave- washing is a well- documented hunting tactic among family pods. It has the 
goal of tipping ice floes, upon which the targeted prey has been spotted, by the 
group’s swimming quickly in coordinated formation towards the floe, and then, 
in perfect unison, sharply diverging at just the right moment to create a flush of 
water that tips the prey into the water.
16 Christophe Guinet and Jérome Bouvier, ‘Development of intentional stranding 
hunting techniques in killer whale (Orcinus orca) calves at Crozet Archipelago’. 
Canadian Journal of Zoology, 1995, Vol. 73, No. 1: pp. 27–33.
17 Studies of avian nest design represent another research area bearing rich insights 
into animal abilities. Natural scientists (arguably beginning with Aristotle) have 
long observed the highly sophisticated design and aims of nest building, and 
recognized the ‘considerable cognitive abilities’ required for accomplishing such 
ends (Mainwaring et al. 2014, in Ecology and Evolution 4(20): 3909–3928). 
Available at www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4242575/. (See also Col-
lias 1986; Muth and Healy 2011; Walsh et al. 2011).
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18 Here, Steward explicitly notes some of the attributes of human action uniquely 
possessed by us: ‘In order to exercise the forms of agency that we value so highly—
moral choice, exercises of taste and skill, communication, self- disciplined atten-
tion to duties, personal development, creativity, etc.—we have to be able also to 
exercise forms that in themselves almost escape our notice—we have to be able 
to move our bodies in such a way as to make them carry out plans of our own 
devising, in the service of our ends’ (2012: 5).
19 Although emergentism does not always entail exceptionalism, emergent theorists 
also frequently happen to be exceptionalists about emergent causation. They 
argue that human consciousness and free agency are uniquely emergent proper-
ties and ipso facto different in causal character from any other natural phenom-
ena (Chalmers 2006; O’Connor 2000).
20 Steward’s broader point is that the assumption of ‘sufficient’ as ‘necessitating’ is 
precisely one made by proponents of determinism. For my purposes, I presume a 
concept of ‘sufficient condition’ that does not entail ‘necessitating’.
21 Steward’s understanding of ‘substance’ is inclusive not only of animals and per-
sons, but also ‘stones and masses of air and water . . . as well as some of the 
smaller entities that go to make them up, like molecules and ions’ (2012: 212). 
It may be that a different kind of argument is required for defending the inde-
pendent causal efficacy of lower- level substances, as apart from the causation of 
events or facts. I will not address this issue here: my immediate concern is with 
substances that are animal agents.
22 Causation by agents involves a ‘discretionary aspect’ (2012: 246). Steward 
explains: ‘It really is up to the agent which selections are made from the large 
repertoire of possible actions available: the agent counts as the settler of what is 
to happen with her body and thereby as the settler of what will happen to those 
parts of the world on which her body is able to impinge’ (2012: 246).
23 It is not possible to review her objections here. Nor, arguably, is it necessary for my 
present purposes: the argument of this chapter is neutral with respect to the accep-
tance or denial of, e.g., the emergence defended by O’Connor and Wong (2005).
24 Kim’s reply to the diachronic case, as opposed to the synchronic case, is too 
lengthy and tangential to be fully summarized here. As will shortly be seen, the 
synchronic case is accused of producing ‘viciously circular’ causation, given the 
simultaneity of downward and upward causation implicit in the emergentist’s 
account. Because the diachronic case explains the higher- level causal exertion as 
occurring at a later time from the moment of upward determination, it escapes 
this criticism. However, since the diachronic case (like the synchronic version of 
emergentism) assumes the higher- level properties to be mental properties and the 
basal conditions to be physical properties, Kim accuses diachronic emergentism 
of violating the principle of causal exclusion (2000: 318). Because Steward’s ver-
sion of downward causation does not necessarily assume causation by mental 
versus physical properties, the objection does not bear much weight in the pres-
ent discussion.
25 Steward deflects a potential charge that the difference between the causal types 
is merely explanatory; on her view, the differences between them are ontological 
as well as explanatory. She explains: ‘Substances are simply causes of a differ-
ent ontological type than either makers- happen or matterers, and it is entirely 
unsurprising that they do not play exactly the same role in explanation as causes 
of these other sorts’ (2012: 220).
26 One could arguably add many other different causal types to the list, although it 
is unnecessary to plumb the possibilities here. For instance, Anscombe points out 
that the removal of a doorstop from underneath the door it is jamming may be 
one such addition, a causa removens prohibens (Anscombe 1983, ‘The Causa-
tion of Action’).
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27 Aristotelians will recognize the origin of this idea to be that of Aristotle’s mate-
rial cause.
28 Robert Koons has offered a solution along these lines via his ‘parts as sus-
taining instruments’ (PASI) account, which purports to avoid the problem of 
circularity. On Koons’ account, two kinds of dependency relations exist simul-
taneously between a whole and its constitutive parts, the synchronic and the 
diachronic: ‘The synchronic dependency is top- down, with the powers of parts 
grounded in the powers of the whole, while the diachronic dependency is bot-
tom- up, with the later existence of the whole dependent on the earlier activity 
of the parts. Hence, there is no circularity; instead, the dependency diagram 
is a zig- zag path, running down at each moment and up as time advances’ 
(2014: 172). This appears to be an attractive solution, with one problem: as 
a self- identified Aristotelian account, PASI denies that there can be bottom- up 
synchronic causation, which one would assume is needed to retain the exis-
tence of an Aristotelian material cause. My solution to the problem of vicious 
causal circularity is that the material cause is synchronic with top- down sub-
stance causation, where these are distinct ontological types. Vicious circularity 
assumes identical causal types simply running in opposite directions, whereas 
here, the only relevant difference is the fact that material and formal causes are 
of absolutely diverse kinds.
29 Thanks to Rob Koons for this clarification.
30 It has not helped that some proponents of agent causation have characterized it 
in somewhat mystical terms. Farrer, for instance, describes the lower- level parts 
of an organism as ‘the molecular constituents [that] are caught up and as it were 
bewitched by larger patterns of action, and cells in turn by the animal body’ 
(1958: 57, italics mine). From Farrer’s 1957 Gifford Lectures, published as The 
Freedom of the Will (1958).
31 This sort of example follows a liberal conception of events. Indeed, one may 
doubt whether such an example falls within a class of true events or merely facts 
masquerading as events.
32 A great deal could be said on the various linguistic ways to understand these 
statements. Steward argues that insofar as events behave as facts, neither are 
these the sorts of things that can cause actions (2012: 221).
33 Davidson’s interpretation is that a relevant belief and desire pair (the event of an 
agent desiring an object o and believing relevant facts about o) are by themselves 
sufficient in causing physical movement, where ‘causing’ is in the sense of neces-
sitating, and the physical movement being caused (provided that it is caused in 
the appropriate way) is also identified as an action. See his 1963 ‘Actions, Rea-
sons and Causes’.
34 See especially Steward’s Chapter 2, ‘Up- to- Usness, Agency, and Determinism’, in 
A Metaphysics for Freedom (2012).
35 To some extent, a Davidsonian causalist might recognize that he takes agential 
explanation for granted. (Davidson thinks it is simply obvious that mental events 
belong to agents; for this reason the criticism of disappearing agents does not 
impress him.) The problem for the causalist is that agential explanation does 
not reveal anything: it does not offer any kind of explanans, but is rather the 
explanandum, the thing to be explained. So the Davidsonian causalist needs to 
be persuaded that the concept of an agent as cause (i.e., that explanation in terms 
of agent cause) is intelligible and not merely a trivial re- statement of the prob-
lem. Some proponents of agent causation (e.g., Lowe) will face a very different 
problem: they will accept the explanation of agent causation as intelligible and 
informative, but reject the possibility that explanation in terms of causation by 
events or properties can be made available without damaging the view of agent 
as cause. It seems to me that a successful account of agent causation should 
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simultaneously address both of these objections, the Davidsonian causalist’s and 
the agent causationist.
36 Aristotelians will also protest that substance causation, as a kind of formal or 
actualizing cause, is insufficiently described as the organizing principle of a 
supervenience base. As Koons notes, ‘When Aristotle describes the soul as the 
form of the body (e.g., in De Anima II.1, 412a19- 21), he clearly means more 
than just an arrangement or relationship among the parts of the body. A form 
(morphe) of a body is not analogous to the harmonious relations among a set 
of strings (De Anima I.4, 407b)’ (2014: 152). Steward’s puzzle of coincidence, 
on the other hand, seems unable to offer more than an explanation of the mere 
arrangement of the lower- level parts, in place of an account of why there is a 
substance with its own powers in existence at all.
37 Acknowledgements. I am grateful to the editors of this volume, especially Robert 
Koons, for helpful feedback and comments, and also to the Institute for Humane 
Studies at George Mason University for a research grant covering the comple-
tion of this article. Thanks is also owed to those who have reviewed drafts: 
Sarah Broadie, Helen Steward, Adrian Haddock, Raphael Mary Salzillo, OP, and 
Michael D. Breidenbach. All errors are solely the fault of the author.
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1.  The Mental- Physical Dichotomy and Mind- Body 
Problems
Is there a mental- physical dichotomy? Many people seem to think so—both 
the many and the wise, as Aristotle would say. Ordinary folk frequently dis-
tinguish mental health and physical health or the mental aspects of athletic 
performance and the physical ones. Likewise, many standard definitions of 
psychology claim that it is the science of behavior and mental processes,1 
where behavior comprises observable bodily changes in humans and other 
animals, and mental processes supposedly comprise the unobserved inner 
causes of those changes such as thoughts, feelings, and imaginings.2 Even 
if those inner causes turn out to be identical to physical occurrences, psy-
chology does not take an interest in them insofar as they fall under physical 
concepts, but only insofar as they fall under mental ones. The concept of 
mentality is thus used to carve out the special subject matter of psychologi-
cal science, and implicit in that use is a distinction between mental concepts 
and physical ones. Implicit, in other words, is a mental- physical dichotomy.
Despite its ubiquity, the mental- physical dichotomy is associated with 
mind- body problems: persistent philosophical problems understanding how 
mental phenomena are related to physical phenomena. The problem of psy-
chophysical emergence is an example. The physical universe, it says, is a vast 
sea of matter and energy that can be exhaustively described and explained 
in principle by physics. We nevertheless have capacities—the capacities 
to think, feel, and perceive, for instance—that cannot be described and 
explained in any obvious way using only the conceptual resources of phys-
ics. It can thus be difficult to understand how thinking, feeling, perceiving, 
and other mental capacities can exist in the physical universe, as the follow-
ing claims illustrate:
(1) We think, feel, and perceive.
(2) We are composed of physical particles.
(3) The properties of a composite whole are determined by the properties 
of the physical particles composing it.





(4) Physical particles do not think, feel, or perceive.
(5) No number of physical particles could combine to produce a composite 
whole that thinks, feels, or perceives.
Claims (1)–(5) are jointly inconsistent. Claim (1) implies that we can think, 
feel, and perceive, yet claims (2)–(5) imply that we cannot. The claims can-
not all be true; at least one of them must be false, but it is not clear which is 
false, since there are good reasons to endorse each.3
The problem of emergence assumes that there is some type of categorical 
difference between thinking, feeling, and perceiving, on the one hand, and 
the kinds of facts that can be expressed using the concepts of physics, on 
the other. It and other mind- body problems assume that there is some more 
or less well understood distinction to be drawn between mental concepts, 
statements, facts, events, properties, or individuals, on the one hand, and 
physical ones, on the other.
Mind- body problems strike at the conceptual foundations of psychologi-
cal science. They suggest that there is something conceptually problematic 
about the mental- physical dichotomy. If psychological science presupposes 
that dichotomy, then there is something conceptually problematic about psy-
chological science. If the mental- physical dichotomy is somehow incoherent, 
or if it fails in some way to carve nature at its joints, then the questions psy-
chologists ask, the theories they advance, and the research programs they 
pursue are all bound to be misguided in various respects—like the efforts of 
physicians whose approaches to health presupposed the four humors. Even 
if their efforts yield fruitful results, it will be difficult to understand exactly 
what those results mean: how they mesh with findings in correlative disci-
plines such as neuroscience and molecular biology, and what significance 
they have for a synoptic understanding of psychophysical subjects.
Not surprisingly, some philosophers have sought to reject the mental- 
physical dichotomy. According to John Dewey, for instance:
[T]he ‘solution’ of the problem of mind- body is to be found in a revision 
of the preliminary assumptions . . . which generate the problem.4
Consider likewise John Searle:
Both traditional dualism and materialism presuppose conceptual dual-
ism . . . [Conceptual dualism] consists in taking the dualistic concepts 
very seriously . . . What I believe . . . is that the vocabulary [of dualism], 
and the accompanying categories, are the source of our deepest philo-
sophical difficulties . . . [I]t would probably be better to abandon this 
vocabulary altogether.5
But Dewey’s and Searle’s proposals to reject the mental- physical dichotomy 
have not gained much acceptance. In fact, when it comes to stating his own 
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view, Searle himself makes use of the very dichotomy he takes to be prob-
lematic: mental states, he says, are both caused by and realized in physical 
states of the brain.6
There might be many reasons why philosophers—even ones like Searle—
don’t abandon the mental- physical dichotomy. An obvious one is that they 
have no alternative: they don’t have a metaphysical framework that enables 
them to formulate their theories any other way. Dewey seems to be an excep-
tion. He suggests a framework that could provide an alternative:
The difference between the animate plant and the inanimate iron mol-
ecule is not that the former has something in addition to the physico- 
chemical energy; it lies in the way in which physico- chemical energies 
are interconnected and operate . . . Iron as a genuine constituent of an 
organized body acts so as to tend to maintain the type of activity of the 
organism to which it belongs. If we identify . . . the physical as such with 
the inanimate we need another word to denote the activity of organ-
isms . . . Psycho- physical is an appropriate term . . . In the compound 
word, the prefix ‘psycho’ denotes that physical activity has acquired 
additional properties . . . Psycho- physical does not denote an abrogation 
of the physico- chemical; nor a peculiar mixture of something physical 
and something psychical . . . it denotes the possession of certain qualities 
and efficacies not displayed by the inanimate. Thus conceived there is 
no problem of the relation of physical and psychic. There are specifiable 
empirical events marked by distinctive qualities and efficacies. There is 
first of all, organization . . . Each ‘part’ of an organism is itself orga-
nized, and so of the ‘parts’ of the part . . . ‘[M]ind’ is an added property 
assumed by a feeling creature, when it reaches that organized interaction 
with other living creatures which is language, communication.7
According to Dewey, organization or structure is an irreducible ontologi-
cal and explanatory principle, one that concerns both what things are and 
also what they can do. He suggests, moreover, that what people think of as 
mental phenomena (thought, feeling, and perception) can be understood 
as species of structural phenomena. If he is right, then it’s easy to see how 
mind- body problems could be avoided: structural phenomena are uncon-
troversially part of the natural world; mental phenomena are just species 
of structural phenomena, hence they must be uncontroversially part of the 
natural world as well.
What’s needed to cash in on Dewey’s idea is a metaphysic of organization 
or structure, one that squares the notion of structure with our best empiri-
cal methods, descriptions, and explanations, and that enables us to under-
stand thinking, feeling, and perceiving as species of structural phenomena. 
In what follows I outline a metaphysic along these lines and explain how 
it enables us to make sense of psychology without requiring us to adopt a 
mental- physical dichotomy. That metaphysic endorses hylomorphism.
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2.  Hylomorphism: A Metaphysics of Structure
Hylomorphism claims that structure (or organization, form, arrangement, 
order, or configuration) is a basic ontological and explanatory principle. 
Some individuals, paradigmatically living things, consist of materials that are 
structured or organized in various ways. You and I are not mere quantities 
of physical materials; we are individuals composed of physical materials with 
a certain organization or structure. That structure is responsible for us being 
and persisting as humans, and it is responsible for us having the developmen-
tal, metabolic, reproductive, perceptive, and cognitive capacities we have.
The hylomorphic notion of structure is not the same as others that have 
appeared in the literature. It is not the same, for instance, as the notion of 
structure that has been operative in discussions of grounding in metaphys-
ics.8 Nor is it the same as the notion that is operative in debates about sci-
entific realism.9 Nor is it the same as the notion David Chalmers sometimes 
employs when he speaks of structure and dynamics.10
To help illustrate the hylomorphic notion of structure I’ll use a simple 
example; we can call it the squashing example. Suppose we put Gabriel in a 
strong bag—a very strong bag, since we want to ensure that nothing leaks 
out when we squash him with several tons of force. Before the squashing, 
the contents of the bag include one human being; after, they include none. 
In addition, before the squashing, the contents of the bag can think, feel, 
and perceive, but after the squashing, they can’t. What explains these dif-
ferences in the contents of the bag pre- squashing and post- squashing? The 
physical materials (whether particles or stuffs) remain the same—none of 
them leaked out. Intuitively, we want to say that what changed was the way 
those materials were structured or organized. That organization or struc-
ture was responsible for there being a human before the squashing, and for 
that human having the capacities it had. Once that structure was destroyed, 
there no longer was a human with those capacities. Structure is thus a basic 
ontological principle: it concerns what things there are. It is also a basic 
explanatory principle: it concerns what things can do.
When people think of structure they often think of something static such 
as the relatively unchanging spatial relations among atoms in a crystal.11 
But hylomorphists don’t view structure so narrowly. Although we’re free 
to call the sum of spatial relations among something’s parts a ‘structure’ 
in some sense of the term, hylomorphic structures—the kind that, say, 
distinguish living things from nonliving ones—are not static spatial rela-
tions, but dynamic patterns of environmental interaction. They comprise 
programmatic sequences of changes over time, and often involve different 
kinds of changes under different kinds of conditions. The neurophysiologist 
Jonathan Miller brings out this idea of dynamic structure:
[T]he physical universe tends towards a state of uniform disorder . . . In 
such a world the survival of form depends on . . . [either] the intrinsic 
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stability of the materials from which the object is made, or the energetic 
replenishment and reorganisation of the material which is constantly 
flowing through it . . . The configuration of a fountain . . . is intrinsically 
unstable, and it can retain its shape only by endlessly renewing the mate-
rial which constitutes it; that is, by organising and imposing structure on 
the unremitting flow of its own substance . . . The persistence of a living 
organism is an achievement of the same order as that of a fountain . . . it 
can maintain its configuration only by . . . reorganising and renewing the 
configuration from one moment to the next. But the engine which keeps 
a fountain aloft exists independently of the watery form for which it is 
responsible, whereas the engine which supports and maintains the form 
of a living organism is an inherent part of its characteristic structure.12
It is because of their dynamic structures—their abilities to impose structures 
on incoming matter and energy—that composite individuals (paradigmati-
cally living things) persist one and the same through the constant influx 
and efflux of matter and energy that characterize their interactions with the 
wider world.
The hylomorphic notion of structure is close to the notion of organiza-
tion that many biologists and philosophers appeal to. Here is one example 
taken from a popular college- level biology textbook—note the references to 
organization, order, arrangement, and related things:
Life is highly organized into a hierarchy of structural levels . . . Biological 
order exists at all levels . . . [A]toms . . . are ordered into complex bio-
logical molecules . . . the molecules of life are arranged into minute 
structures called organelles, which are in turn the components of cells. 
Cells are [in turn] subunits of organisms . . . The organism we recognize 
as an animal or plant is not a random collection of individual cells, but 
a multicellular cooperative . . . Identifying biological organization at 
its many levels is fundamental to the study of life . . . With each step 
upward in the hierarchy of biological order, novel properties emerge 
that were not present at the simpler levels of organization . . . A mol-
ecule such as a protein has attributes not exhibited by any of its compo-
nent atoms, and a cell is certainly much more than a bag of molecules. 
If the intricate organization of the human brain is disrupted by a head 
injury, that organ will cease to function properly . . . And an organism 
is a living whole greater than the sum of its parts . . . [W]e cannot fully 
explain a higher level of order by breaking it down into its parts.13
This passage suggests that the way things are structured, organized, or 
arranged plays an important role in them being the kinds of things they are 
and in explaining the kinds of things they can do.
Consider likewise the remarks of some philosophers about natural orga-
nization. David Armstrong, for instance, says that, “a man is a physical 
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object distinguished from other physical objects only by the special com-
plexity of his physical organization” (1968: 11). There is nevertheless a 
crucial difference between Armstrong’s notion of organization and the hylo-
morphic one: Armstrong does not take the organization that characterizes 
living things to pose a challenge to physicalism, the claim that everything 
can be exhaustively described and explained by physics. Hylomorphists dis-
agree for reasons I’ll discuss in Section 5. For the moment, it’s worth noting 
that many philosophers seem to concur with hylomorphists that biological 
organization poses a prima facie challenge to the explanatory completeness 
of physics. Among them is Philip Kitcher:
[T]o the extent that we can make sense of the present explanatory 
structure within biology—that division of the field into subfields cor-
responding to levels of organization in nature—we can also understand 
the antireductionist . . . claim that . . . the current division of biology [is] 
not simply . . . a temporary feature of our science stemming from our 
cognitive imperfections but [is] the reflection of levels of organization 
in nature.14
John Heil sometimes employs a notion of organization similar to the hylo-
morphic one as well: “the world presents us with endless levels of com-
plexity and organization” (2003: 245). Heil explicitly rejects the existence 
of so- called higher- order properties—logical constructions expressed by 
predicates whose definitions quantify over other properties. He insists for 
good reason that these predicates do not correspond to genuine properties—
roughly, to the causal powers things have. But if that it is the case, then 
it seems that the levels of organization he mentions cannot be mere logi-
cal constructs, and if that is true, it becomes difficult to avoid the conclu-
sion that he is implicitly committed to organization being a real ontological 
principle—something like hylomorphic structure. It’s somewhat surprising, 
then, that he does not embrace the hylomorphic view.
The notion of organization—of, say, the biological organization that 
distinguishes living things from nonliving ones—does not come for free, 
at least not if we endorse ontological naturalism, the idea that when it 
comes to determining what exists, empirical investigation—paradigmatically 
science—is our best guide.15
Ontological naturalism can be understood as the conjunction of a 
broadly Quinean thesis about ontological commitment with a broad empiri-
cism. The broadly Quinean thesis maintains that we are committed to all 
the entities postulated by our best descriptions and explanations of reality, 
and the broad empiricism maintains that our best descriptions and explana-
tions of reality derive from empirical sources such as the natural and social 
sciences. Suppose we take the natural- language sentences in which our best 
descriptions and explanations are formulated and reformulate them in a 
quantifier- variable idiom the way Quine (1948) suggests. In that case, says 
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the Quinean thesis, we would be committed to the existence of all the enti-
ties needed to make those descriptions and explanations true.
Ontological naturalism puts pressure on philosophers like Heil who 
invoke a notion of organization or structure. Ontological naturalism implies 
that if our best empirical descriptions and explanations posit various kinds 
of organization or structure, then we have good prima facie reason to think 
those structures exist. Those descriptions and explanations thus make of us 
a serious ontological demand. The most straightforward way of meeting 
this demand takes empirical claims about structure at face value. It says 
that structure really is an irreducible ontological and explanatory princi-
ple, and this is what makes descriptions and explanations that appeal to 
structure true. This straightforward realist approach to structure is the one 
favored by hylomorphists. From their perspective, philosophers like Heil 
and Armstrong try to use talk of organization or structure without paying 
the necessary ontological bill. But what exactly is involved in paying that 
bill? What exactly is hylomorphic structure?
The concept of structure is primitive or basic within a hylomorphic 
framework: it cannot be defined in terms of any categories that are more 
basic. The only way of defining a framework’s basic concepts is, as Kit 
Fine says, “to specify the principles by which [they are] governed.”16 The 
remarks about structure surveyed earlier gesture toward some of those 
principles. Together, they specify some of the theoretical roles that struc-
ture is supposed to play. Structure can be defined as what plays the fol-
lowing roles:
Structure matters: it operates as an irreducible ontological principle, 
one that accounts at least in part for what things essentially are.
Structure makes a difference: it operates as an irreducible explanatory 
principle, one that accounts at least in part for what things can do, 
the powers they have.
Structure counts: it explains the unity of composite things, including 
the persistence of one and the same living individual through the 
dynamic influx and efflux of matter and energy that characterize 
many of its interactions with the wider world.
In what follows, I’ll outline a notion of hylomorphic structure that plays 
these roles.
3.  Powers, Composition, and Emergence
The past decade has witnessed a resurgence of interest in hylomorphism. 
Kit Fine, Mark Johnston, David Oderberg, Kathryn Koslicki, Michael Rea, 
Anna Marmodoro, Robert Koons, Simon Evnine, and myself have all artic-
ulated hylomorphic views to be added to those attributed to thinkers of the 
past such as Aristotle, Aquinas, Leibniz, and Merleau- Ponty.17 Among these 
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hylomorphic theories, naturalistic ones, such as those defended by Mike 
Rea and myself, claim that hylomorphic structures are powers.
There are many competing theories of powers in the literature.18 Elsewhere 
I’ve argued in favor of a version of the identity theory of powers—the kind 
of theory defended by C. B. Martin and John Heil.19 The identity theory 
of powers claims that properties are essentially dispositional; each essen-
tially empowers its individual possessor to interact with other individuals 
in various kinds of ways. A diamond’s hardness empowers it to do a variety 
of things—to scratch glass, for instance. We describe this power- conferring 
role in many different ways. We say that the diamond is hard, that the dia-
mond is able (or has the power or potential or capacity) to scratch glass, 
or that the diamond would scratch that mirror if raked across its surface. 
These different vocabularies create the impression that there are different 
kinds of properties: dispositional and categorical (or qualitative). According 
to the identity theory, however, these vocabularies describe the very same 
properties; they just represent different ways of conceptualizing those 
properties—ways that make explicit or leave implicit the various theoretical 
roles those properties play. Dispositional descriptions such as ‘The diamond 
would scratch that mirror if raked across its surface’ bring out the roles the 
diamond’s hardness plays as a power. Nondispositional descriptions such 
as ‘The diamond has a tetrahedral arrangement of carbon atoms’ bring out 
the property’s role as a stable manifestation of the power the carbon atoms 
have to be arranged tetrahedrally. The one property is thus simultaneously 
both a stable manifestation of a power and a power itself, both an actuality 
and a potentiality.
The identity theory of powers claims that powers are essentially directed 
toward their manifestations. This directedness has led some philosophers 
to draw analogies between dispositionality and intentionality.20 Intentional 
mental states are said to be directed at things. My desire is essentially a 
desire for something, my fear is essentially a fear of something. Something 
analogous is true of powers; they are essentially powers for various manifes-
tations. The property of fragility, for instance, is essentially directed toward 
breaking. Likewise, just as my desire can remain unfulfilled and my fear 
unrealized, so too a power can remain unmanifested. A quantity of table salt 
has the power to dissolve in water, but it might never actually be dissolved, 
and a fragile vase might never actually break.21
The identity theory also claims that powers are manifested only in spe-
cific circumstances and typically only in conjunction with individuals that 
have reciprocal powers—what Martin calls ‘reciprocal disposition part-
ners’. Powers can be manifested both actively and passively: both in the 
ways individuals affect things and in ways they are affected by them. In gen-
eral, powers are manifested only when individuals with reciprocal powers 
are conjoined in the right circumstances. Water, for instance, can exercise 
its power to dissolve things only in conjunction with things that have the 
power to be dissolved by it.22
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In addition, the same power can manifest itself differently in conjunction 
with different disposition partners. To use Heil’s example: a ball will roll on a 
hard surface on account of its roundness, and it will make a concave depres-
sion in a soft surface on account of that same roundness. The same property, 
the ball’s roundness, manifests itself in different ways in conjunction with dif-
ferent disposition partners. Likewise, the diamond’s hardness empowers it to 
scratch glass and also to scratch jade, and the batter’s power to hit a baseball 
400 feet also empowers him to hit a bigger, heavier softball 300 feet.
Hylomorphic structures are powers to configure (or organize, order, or 
coordinate) things. What sets hylomorphic structures apart from other pow-
ers is that they cannot exist unmanifested. They are manifested essentially. 
Structured individuals are essentially and continuously engaged in configur-
ing the materials that compose them. I configure the materials that compose 
me, and you configure the materials that compose you. Our continuous 
structuring activity explains our unity and persistence through the dynamic 
influx and efflux of matter and energy that characterizes our interactions 
with the surrounding world. This is what it means to say that structure 
counts: it explains the unity of composite things.
The hylomorphic view of composition is similar to Peter van Inwagen’s.23 
Van Inwagen presents his view as an answer to the Special Composition 
Question: under what conditions do many things compose one thing? Van 
Inwagen’s answer is that composition happens exactly if the activities of 
physical particles constitute a life. This implies that something qualifies as 
a part only if it is caught up in a life.24 The expression “caught up in a life” 
is one that van Inwagen borrows from the biologist J. Z. Young.25 Van 
Inwagen explains with an example:
Alice drinks a cup of tea in which a lump of sugar has been dissolved. 
A certain carbon atom . . . is carried along with the rest of the sugar by 
Alice’s digestive system to the intestine. It passes through the intestinal 
wall and into the bloodstream, whence it is carried to the biceps muscle 
of Alice’s left arm. There it is oxidized in several indirect stages (yielding 
in the process energy . . . for muscular contraction) and is finally carried 
by Alice’s circulatory system to her lungs and there breathed out as a 
part of a carbon dioxide molecule . . . Here we have a case in which a 
thing, the carbon atom, was . . . caught up in the life of an organism, 
Alice. It is . . . a case in which a thing became however briefly, a part of 
a larger thing when it was a part of nothing before or after . . . .26
What exactly is a life? Van Inwagen’s descriptions of lives stay largely at 
the level of metaphor and analogy. The reason is that providing the literal 
details about what lives are and what characteristics they have is, he thinks, 
a job for biologists.27 He does nevertheless offer some general characteris-
tics. Lives, he says, are self- maintaining events like flames and waves except 
that unlike flames and waves they are well- individuated and jealous.
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Flames are not as well- individuated as lives, van Inwagen argues: “If I 
light seven candles from one taper, has a spatially connected flame become a 
scattered flame, or have seven new flames come into existence? Presumably, 
there are no answers to these questions.”28 Waves are better individuated 
than flames, but waves for their part are not jealous:
Consider two waves . . . which are moving in opposite directions and 
which pass through each other . . . I think we must say . . . that both 
the waves exist at the moment of superposition and that each is at that 
moment constituted by the activities of the same water molecules. We 
may describe . . . the possibility of two waves’ being simultaneously 
constituted by the activities of the same objects . . . by saying that a 
wave is not a jealous event. Lives, however, are jealous. It cannot be that 
the activities of the xs constitute at one and the same time two lives . . . 
When two waves impinge upon the same water molecules, the activities 
that each demands of these molecules . . . sum neatly according to the 
rules of vector addition . . . A life, on the other hand, does not deposit 
and withdraw sequentially an invariant sum of energy . . . A life takes 
the energy it finds and turns it to its own purposes.29
Lives are thus a special kind of self- maintaining event on van Inwagen’s 
view, and importantly, they play precisely the kinds of theoretical roles that 
hylomorphic structures are supposed to play. Lives matter on van Inwagen’s 
view; they are ontological principles: whether the xs constitute a life makes 
a difference to whether a composite individual exists. Likewise, lives make 
a difference; they are explanatory principles: living beings can do things 
that cannot be exhaustively described and explained using the conceptual 
resources used to describe and explain the materials that compose them.30 
Finally, lives count; they operate as principles of unity31 and persistence:32 
what binds the simples that compose me into a single being is that their 
activity constitutes a life, and what enables me to persist through changes in 
those simples is the persistence of that life. Because van Inwagen’s lives play 
these roles, it is easy to use his view of composition as a basis for under-
standing the hylomorphic view.
Configuring materials and being composed of materials are co- 
foundational concepts on the hylomorphic view, just as having a life and 
being composed of simples are co- foundational concepts on van Inwagen’s. 
Likewise, just as van Inwagen restricts composition to living things, hylo-
morphists restrict it to structured things in general. According to hylomor-
phists, composition occurs when and only when an individual configures 
materials.
Structured individuals are emergent individuals on the hylomorphic view: 
there are empirically describable conditions that are sufficient to bring into 
existence a new structured individual where previously no such individual 
existed. Suppose, for instance, that b1, b2,…, bn are physical particles or 
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materials of some sort. On the hylomorphic view, there are changes the bs 
can undergo which will result in there being a new individual, a, which is 
composed of the bs. In the natural course of human events, for instance, 
changes of this sort regularly happen in utero: physical materials that 
didn’t compose a human organism at time t1 come by a series of changes to 
compose a human organism at time t2. A new human individual comes to 
exist where previously no such individual did.
Once a structured individual comes into existence it is continuously 
engaged in configuring materials, and the materials it configures are pre-
cisely those that compose it. The individual a comes into existence exactly 
with the start of its configuring activity—exactly when that configuring 
activity begins. When it comes to characterizing that activity, hylomorphists 
can adopt most of what van Inwagen says about lives, at least when it comes 
to the configuring activities of living things, the paradigmatic structured 
individuals. My life is identical to my configuring various fundamental 
physical materials at various times—an event that has the characteristics 
van Inwagen attributes to lives and that has many other characteristics it is 
the business of the biological sciences to describe.
An individual living thing does not configure the same materials for very 
long; the materials composing it are in constant flux. If a’s existence com-
mences with its configuring the bs, it will not take long for it to exchange 
some of the bs for other things. Yet despite this, a maintains itself one and 
the same through these changes on account of its ongoing configuring activ-
ity. That activity is what unifies various materials into a single individual, 
both synchronically and diachronically, just as lives do on van Inwagen’s 
account.
Van Inwagen is well known for embracing the Denial, the claim that many 
objects in a commonsense ontology do not exist, including artifacts and nat-
ural bodies such as mountains and planets. According to van Inwagen, there 
is no table occupying the region of space before me—no single, unified indi-
vidual. There are instead many physical particles spatially arranged table- 
wise. Since the hylomorphic account of composition is similar in its outlines 
to van Inwagen’s, this raises an important question: how do we know which 
quantities of physical materials compose unified wholes on the hylomorphic 
account, and which are mere spatial arrangements of materials? How do we 
know, for instance, that the physical materials located in this region of space 
actually compose a human being, that they are not instead diverse materials 
that are merely spatially arranged human- wise and that do not compose a 
unified whole at all? What prevents us from concluding that, in fact, there 
are no human beings just as there are no tables and mountains?
In response, hylomorphists take a cue from van Inwagen: structured 
individuals have non- redundant causal powers that mere spatial arrange-
ments of physical materials do not have.33 Suppose, for instance, that it 
initially seems to us as if a is a structured whole composed of the bs. This 
initial impression could be accurate or not. Determining which is a matter 
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of determining whether a has powers not had by the bs, and determining 
whether a has any such powers is a matter of determining whether the 
theories or conceptual frameworks that we use to describe and explain a’s 
behavior are reducible to the ones that we use to describe and explain the 
behavior of the bs.
Reduction is a primarily relation between theories or conceptual frame-
works.34 It occurs when one theory or conceptual framework can take over 
the descriptive and explanatory roles of another. Suppose that TB is a con-
ceptual framework whose predicates ‘F1’, ‘F2’,…, ‘Fn’ apply to the bs, and 
that TA is a conceptual framework whose predicates ‘G1’, ‘G2’,…, ‘Gm’ apply 
to a but not to the bs. Even though the predicates of TA do not apply to the 
bs it might still turn out that a’s having this or that G- property is something 
that can be given an exhaustive account in terms of the bs. It might turn out 
that what makes it true that a is Gi is that various bs stand in the relation Fj. 
In that case, a’s being Gi is what van Inwagen calls a “disguised cooperative 
activity” performed by some of the bs.35 By analogy, we are not tempted to 
say that when Alice and Benny perform a tango they bring into existence a 
third entity of which they are proper parts. The reason is that any agency we 
might attribute to such an entity can be understood in terms of the coopera-
tive activity of Alice and Benny alone: the power of each to modulate his or 
her own behavior in coordination with the behavior of the other.
Suppose now that all the properties we attribute to a are like Gi. In that 
case, there is nothing happening in the region we take to be occupied by a 
that cannot be exhaustively described and explained by appeal to the bs 
alone. The conceptual framework TA is reducible to TB. If there is nothing 
to a’s being Gi other than some bs standing in Fj, then we can in principle 
dispense with or replace descriptions and explanations that attribute Gi to a 
with descriptions and explanations that attribute Fj to the bs. If the replace-
ment of TA- descriptions and explanations by those of TB is possible across 
the board, then TB can take over in principle all the descriptive and explana-
tory roles that TA performs. Reduction is what we would expect, therefore, 
if a is not a unified individual in its own right.
Consider now the converse case. Suppose that a is a unified individual 
composed of the bs, and that the predicate ‘Gi’ expresses a power of a not 
had by the bs. There is, then, more to a’s having Gi than simply some bs 
standing in an F- relation. As a result, we cannot dispense with or replace 
descriptions and explanations that attribute Gi to a with descriptions and 
explanations that appeal to the bs alone. TA resists reduction to TB; the lat-
ter is not able to take over, even in principle, all the descriptive and explana-
tory roles that TA performs.
Because a’s ontological status is reflected in the conceptual situation in 
the ways I’ve described, the discovery that TA is reducible to TB gives us 
good reason to think that a is not a unified whole, and conversely, the dis-
covery that TA is irreducible to TB gives us good reason to think that a is 
a unified whole with powers that the bs lack. According to hylomorphists, 
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the conceptual frameworks we use to describe and explain the behavior 
of artifacts and natural bodies are reducible to the frameworks we use to 
describe and explain the behavior of physical materials alone, and this gives 
us good reason to think that strictly speaking there are no artifacts and nat-
ural bodies, but only physical materials spatially arranged in various ways. 
According to hylomorphists, however, the conceptual frameworks we use 
to describe and explain the behavior of living things like us resist this kind 
of reducibility, and this resistance gives us good reason to think that living 
things like us are unified wholes with powers distinct from those of the 
materials composing them.36
The hylomorphic view clearly implies a kind of property pluralism since 
structured individuals have properties of at least two sorts: properties due 
to their structures (or their integration into individuals with structures), and 
properties due to the materials composing them independent of the way 
those materials are structured. This is illustrated by the squashing example 
considered earlier. Gabriel’s powers to think, feel, and perceive are clearly 
structure- dependent properties: destroying his structure destroys those 
properties. By contrast, the squashed contents of the bag have the same 
mass that Gabriel has despite losing Gabriel’s human structure. Mass is thus 
a structure- independent property.
Similarly, subatomic particles, atoms, and molecules have properties such 
as mass irrespective of their surroundings, but when they are integrated 
into structured wholes, they become genes, growth factors, and metabolic 
and behavioral regulators. Each thus admits of two types of descriptions: a 
description in terms of the contribution it makes to the structured system, 
and also a description in terms of the properties it would possess independent 
of any such contribution. Descriptions of the former sort express structure- 
dependent properties, while descriptions of the latter sort express properties 
had independently of being integrated into a structured whole. A strand of 
DNA might always have various atomic or fundamental physical properties 
regardless of its environment, but it acquires new properties when it is inte-
grated into a cell and begins making contributions to the cell’s activities.
Some philosophers and biologists call the new properties of structured 
systems emergent properties. Emergent properties have three characteristics:
1. They are first- order properties, not higher- order ones; that is, they are 
not logical constructions with definitions that quantify over other prop-
erties; they are rather powers in their own right.
2. They are not epiphenomenal, but make distinctive causal or explana-
tory contributions to the behavior of the individuals having them.
3. They are possessed by an individual on account of its organization or 
structure.
Notice: it is not a characteristic of emergent properties (at least not on 
the hylomorphic view) that they are generated or produced by lower- level 
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systems. As a result, hylomorphists do not need an account of how lower- 
level systems generate emergent properties. Emergent properties are due to 
something’s structure, and structure is a basic principle on the hylomorphic 
view; it is not generated by something else.
4.  Functional Analysis
Metaphysicians like van Inwagen are not the only ones attracted to a view 
of composition like the foregoing. Philosophers of biology and neuroscience 
have been attracted to a view like this as well because it is suggested by 
actual work in biology and neuroscience—both the methods of those sci-
ences and the kinds of explanations they employ. Of central importance is 
a method of scientific investigation philosophers sometimes call functional 
analysis. Biologists, cognitive scientists, engineers, and others frequently 
employ this method to understand how complex systems operate. They ana-
lyze the activities of those systems into simpler subactivities performed by 
simpler subsystems.37
Consider a complex human activity such as running. Functional analysis 
reveals that running involves among other things a circulatory subsystem 
that is responsible for supplying oxygenated blood to the muscles. Analysis 
of that subsystem reveals that it has a component responsible for pumping 
the blood—a heart. Analysis of the heart’s pumping activity shows that it 
is composed of muscle tissues that undergo frequent contraction and relax-
ation, and these activities can be analyzed into the subactivities of various 
cells. Analyses of these subactivities reveal the operation of various organ-
elles that compose the cell and that are composed in turn of complex mol-
ecules. We can continue to iterate this analytic process until we reach a 
level at which no further functional analysis is possible. If, for instance, 
electrons contribute to the activities of things by virtue of having negative 
charges, and they have those charges not on account of the activities of 
some yet lower- level subsystems, but as an unanalyzable matter of fact, then 
no further functional analysis is possible. We reach a foundational level of 
functional parts.
Functional analysis provides a way of supplying empirical content to the 
idea that parts contribute to the activities of their respective wholes—that 
they are caught up into the lives of those wholes. If we want to know how 
a part contributes to the activity of a whole, hylomorphism leaves it to the 
relevant empirical disciplines to tell us. When we look at these disciplines, 
we find that they describe those contributions in terms of the operation 
of functional parts—the kinds of parts revealed through functional analy-
sis. Even though it is possible to divide a human along, say, purely spatial 
lines into thirds, or fifths, or tiny metric cubes, empirical practitioners are 
typically more interested in dividing them functionally.38 Given ontological 
naturalism, this provides a basis for understanding the kinds of parts that 
structured individuals have. Those parts are subsystems that contribute in 
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empirically specifiable ways to the activities of the wholes to which they 
belong.
Two clarifications are in order about functional analysis. First, a remark 
about the name: ‘functional analysis’ is a name that has been used by phi-
losophers, but biologists often call the method ‘reduction.’39 This notion 
of reduction is different from the notion typically discussed in connection 
with the philosophy of science and the philosophy of mind.40 The latter 
notion concerns the ability of one conceptual framework to take over the 
descriptive and explanatory roles of another. To claim that, say, psychology 
is reducible to neuroscience implies that it is possible in principle for neu-
roscience to take over all the descriptive and explanatory roles psychology 
currently plays. By contrast, when biologists speak of reduction they are 
typically not speaking of the relation between conceptual frameworks I’ve 
just described, but of a method for studying complex systems—what I’ve 
been calling ‘functional analysis.’ A commitment to employing this method 
does not imply a commitment to reduction in the philosophical sense. 
It might be impossible for neuroscience to take over the descriptive and 
explanatory roles of psychological discourse even though it is possible and 
even necessary to use functional analysis to understand how humans can 
engage in psychological activities. In fact, this is precisely what hylomor-
phists claim. Explanations of living behavior are not reducible to descrip-
tions of the lower- level mechanisms revealed by functional analysis because 
of the distinctive explanatory contributions a living thing’s structure makes.
A second note about functional analysis: the notion of function that gives 
functional analysis its name is different from the notion of function dis-
cussed in connection with functionalism in philosophy of mind. According 
to classic functionalist theories of mind, mental states are postulates of 
abstract descriptions framed in terms analogous to those used in computer 
science—descriptions that ignore a system’s physical details and focus sim-
ply on a specific range of inputs to it, outputs from it, and internal states 
that correlate the two.41 When it comes to functional analysis, by contrast, 
the notion of a function is not abstract in this way, and it has a teleological 
dimension: subsystems contribute to the activities of the wholes to which 
they belong, and that contribution is their reason or purpose for belonging 
to the system: the purpose of the spark plug is to ignite the fuel; the purpose 
of the heart is to pump the blood, and so on.42
Teleological functionalism is a type of functionalist theory that appeals 
to a teleological notion of function along these lines. William Lycan’s 
homunctionalism is an example.43 Like functionalist theories of all sorts, 
however, teleological functionalism claims that higher- level discourse is 
abstract discourse: higher- level properties are higher- order properties—
logical constructions that quantify over lower- order properties. Saying 
that something has a belief, for instance, amounts merely to saying that it 
has some internal state that correlates inputs with outputs in appropriate 
ways. Hylomorphists reject this understanding of higher- level properties; 
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they claim that higher- level properties are first- order properties in their own 
right. So although teleological functionalists and hylomorphists both claim 
that a system’s components contribute teleologically to its overall operation, 
they disagree about how the notion of contribution is to be understood. 
Teleological functionalists say that descriptions of higher- level phenomena 
are simply abstract descriptions of lower- level occurrences. Hylomorphists 
deny this: higher- level descriptions correspond to distinctive natural struc-
tures, ones that factor into descriptions and explanations of living behavior 
in ways that cannot be eliminated, reduced to, or paraphrased in favor of 
lower- level descriptions and explanations.
5.  Activity- Making Structures
So far I’ve focused on composite individuals and their structures—individual- 
making structures, the kinds of things Medieval hylomorphists called ‘sub-
stantial forms.’ But individuals are not the only composite entities on the 
hylomorphic view, nor are individual- making structures the only structures. 
There are composite events as well. The activities in which structured indi-
viduals engage have structures too: activity- making structures.
The activities of structured individuals involve coordinated manifesta-
tions of the powers of their parts. When we walk, talk, sing, dance, run, 
jump, and engage in the various other activities we do, we impose an order 
on the ways our parts manifest their powers. My parts needn’t manifest 
their powers in an ordered way. It is possible for my neurons to fire or my 
muscles to contract in ways that do not compose an activity of, say, throw-
ing a baseball or playing an instrument. Fatigue, injury, insufficient training, 
and many other factors can result in uncoordinated manifestations of the 
powers of my parts. But when I succeed in throwing or playing, I succeed in 
imposing a structure on the way my parts (and in many cases surrounding 
things) manifest their powers: I structure their manifestations throwing- or 
playing- wise. In some cases, the structuring is conscious and intentional, as 
in throwing a baseball or producing the precise limb movements in a dance. 
But in many cases, the structuring is neither conscious nor intentional, as in 
digesting food or increasing blood flow to the legs in response to something 
fearful. In whatever way it occurs, whether consciously and intentionally 
or not, the result of this structuring is not a new individual but rather an 
activity, another manifestation of the power structured individuals have of 
imposing order on things.
Activity- making structures unify diverse events in something analogous 
to the way individual- making structures unify physical materials in com-
posite individuals. The very same muscle fibers that contract in my shoulder 
when I throw a baseball might also contract when I experience an uncon-
trolled muscle spasm. What unifies or coordinates the contractions of the 
muscle fibers along with changes in surrounding things, such as the base-
ball, is what I do when I try to make an out, or try to knock down cans at 
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the county fair, or try to accomplish whatever I try to do when I throw a 
baseball. In undertaking these activities I impose a unified order on the way 
my parts and surrounding things manifest their powers.
On the hylomorphic view, structured activities include thinking, feeling, 
and perceiving. When, for instance, I experience an emotion, I am engag-
ing in an activity in which various parts of my nervous system and vari-
ous objects in the environment manifest their powers in a coordinated way 
that unifies them into a single event. It is possible to describe the unifying 
role of activity- making structures in terms of a notion of activity composi-
tion analogous to the notion of composition for individuals. Just as physi-
cal materials compose an individual exactly if they have the right kind of 
individual- making structure, various events compose an activity exactly 
if they have the right kind of activity- making structure. An individual a 
engages in the activity of F- ing exactly if a’s parts and surrounding things 
manifest their powers F- wise. I throw a baseball exactly if my parts and 
surrounding materials manifest their powers throwing- a- baseball- wise. 
Similarly, I experience anger or enjoyment exactly if my parts and surround-
ing things manifest their powers anger- or enjoyment- wise.
Given reasonable assumptions, activity composition implies that the 
behaviors of structured individuals never violate the laws governing their 
fundamental physical components. According to hylomorphism, the activi-
ties of structured wholes are composed of the structured manifestations 
of the powers of their lower- level components and surrounding things. If 
those components or things were to lose their powers, or were to become 
incapable of manifesting them, they would become incapable of composing 
the activities of structured wholes. Those activities depend on lower- level 
items retaining and manifesting the powers they have. By analogy, it is only 
because bricks and timbers retain their shapes under compression that they 
can be recruited as components of buildings. Similarly, it is only because 
lower- level materials retain their distinctive powers that structured individu-
als can recruit them as components for their own activities. This is one thing 
that sets the hylomorphic view apart from those classic emergentist theories 
such as Roger Sperry’s, which claim that higher- level powers trump or nul-
lify the powers of lower- level things.44
Activity composition also makes it clear in what sense a structured indi-
vidual has the power to engage in various activities because of its parts. 
Those parts form a subset of the individuals with powers whose coordinated 
manifestations compose its activities. We can express this idea by saying 
that a structured individual’s parts embody its powers. My visual system 
embodies my power to see; your circulatory system embodies your power to 
bring oxygenated blood to various parts of yourself; Gabriel’s limbic system 
embodies his power to experience emotions, and so on.
According to the hylomorphic theory I’ve been describing, all the pow-
ers of structured individuals are essentially embodied in their parts; the 
activities in which they engage are essentially composed of the coordinated 
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manifestations of the powers of their parts and surrounding things. It is 
impossible, not just nomologically but metaphysically, for me to engage in 
the activity of throwing a baseball unless my parts manifest their powers in 
the right coordinated way. Likewise, it is impossible, not just nomologically 
but metaphysically, for Gabriel to experience anger or enjoyment unless his 
parts manifest their powers in the right coordinated way.45
On the hylomorphic view, then, thought, feeling, and perception are 
essentially embodied in the physiological mechanisms that compose us, yet 
it is not possible to reduce explanations of them to explanations of physi-
ological mechanisms.46 The reason is that there is more to these activities 
on the hylomorphic view than the operations of physiological mechanisms: 
there is also the way those operations are coordinated or structured, and 
structure in general is something different from things that get structured. 
It is possible for parts of our nervous systems to be activated in the ways 
they are when we are experiencing an emotion, for instance, even though we 
are not experiencing the emotion in fact. Patients with pseudobulbar affect 
suddenly and unpredictably cry or laugh in ways that are indistinguish-
able from the ways they would if they were experiencing sadness or mirth, 
and yet they do not feel sad or amused (Parvisi et al. 2006). Parts of their 
nervous systems are activated in the ways they would be during a real emo-
tional episode, and yet their activation fails to be coordinated in the way 
necessary to compose an emotion. The hylomorphic view is thus robustly 
antireductive despite its commitment to essential physical embodiment.
I’ve already explained how hylomorphism differs from Lycan’s homunc-
tionalism and other nonreductive physicalist views that endorse function-
alism. It will perhaps be helpful to say more about how it differs from 
physicalist theories in general. Physicalism is the claim that everything can 
be exhaustively described and explained by the most empirically adequate 
theories in current or future physics. Philosophers sometimes use the term 
‘physicalism’ to refer to much weaker claims, such as the claim that every-
thing has physical properties, that everything is composed of physical parts, 
or that everything is necessitated by or supervenes upon physical events or 
facts. Elsewhere I’ve argued that these definitions are inadequate because 
each fails to imply the core physicalist thesis that everything is physical.47 
Each is compatible with the existence of nonphysical properties, and because 
of that each is compatible with dual- attribute theories such as emergentism 
or epiphenomenalism.48 This is true especially of many varieties of nonre-
ductive physicalism. As John Bickle observes, “Much current ‘nonreductive 
physicalism’ is not physicalism at all. It is instead . . . a dualism not of sub-
stances but of their properties.”49
Once physicalism is properly defined in the way I’ve suggested it should 
be evident why hylomorphism is incompatible with it. According to hylo-
morphists, there are structures which can’t be described using the concep-
tual resources of physics alone—structures of the sort described by special 
sciences such as biology and psychology. The claim that there are such 
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structures is, we’ve seen, largely an empirical one on the hylomorphic view 
I’ve outlined. That view, like physicalism, operates as a “high- level empirical 
hypothesis,” to use Hartry Field’s expression.50 It is thus open to empirical 
falsification. Perhaps biological or psychological structures can ultimately 
be identified with complex relations that are exhaustively describable by 
physics. In that case, the kind of hylomorphic theory I’ve outlined will be 
false. At present, however, the question is not whether hylomorphism is 
true, but whether it is compatible with physicalism. It should be evident 
why it isn’t: if hylomorphism is true, then there are individual- and activity- 
making structures which cannot be identified with any structures that might 
be described and explained exhaustively by physics. If there are such struc-
tures, then physics cannot exhaustively describe and explain everything, and 
if that is the case, then physicalism must be false. Hylomorphism is thus 
incompatible with physicalism.
Hylomorphism is nevertheless compatible with many weaker claims that 
have sometimes been labeled ‘physicalism.’ We’ve seen, for instance, that 
hylomorphism implies that structured individuals and their activities are 
exhaustively decomposable into the activities and subactivities of their parts 
and surrounding materials, and that these parts and materials are in turn 
exhaustively decomposable into fundamental physical materials. But this 
kind of exhaustive physical decomposition does not imply physicalism in 
the strong sense that everything can be exhaustively described and explained 
by physics. It is possible for individuals that are exhaustively decompos-
able into fundamental physical materials to have first- order nonphysical 
properties and for their behavior to be governed by emergent laws in addi-
tion to those governing their fundamental physical constituents. Claims 
like these are hallmarks of dual- attribute theories such as emergentism and 
epiphenomenalism.
Exhaustive physical decomposition would imply that all properties are 
physical if it were combined with a thesis like the following:
Property exhaustion thesis: Necessarily, for any x, if x is exhaustively 
decomposable into y1, y2,…, yn, and the activities of x are exhaus-
tively decomposable into the manifestations of the powers of the ys, 
then x has no properties other than those of the ys.
We have seen, however, that hylomorphists reject any such thesis. They 
claim that some of a composite individual’s properties depend on its struc-
ture. Even if x is exhaustively decomposable into the ys, x will still have 
some properties that the ys lack, namely the properties due to its structure. 
The same is true mutatis mutandis of x’s activities on the hylomorphic view. 
If my throwing a baseball is exhaustively decomposable into the manifes-
tations of the powers of my parts, there is still the way those manifesta-
tions are structured or coordinated. That coordination is not a property 
of the parts and materials taken on their own; it is rather a property of the 
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individual as a whole—a structure that I impose on them. Hylomorphism 
thus implies that anything like the property exhaustion thesis is false.
6.  Hylomorphism and the Mental- Physical Dichotomy
The hylomorphic view I’ve outlined takes thoughts, feelings, perceptions, 
and other prototypical mental or psychological phenomena to be coordi-
nated manifestations of the powers of our parts and surrounding things. 
When, for instance, Gabriel sees something—a ripe tomato, say—he and the 
tomato both manifest powers they possess. He manifests the power to see 
the tomato, and it manifests the power to be seen by him. Gabriel and the 
tomato are reciprocal disposition partners. The powers of both are mutually 
manifested in each other’s presence when the surrounding conditions are 
right, just as water and salt mutually manifest their powers to dissolve and 
be dissolved when conditions are right.
Moreover, Gabriel has the power to see by virtue of having the parts 
he has. The coordinated manifestations of the powers of some of his parts 
(intuitively those composing his visual system) contribute to his seeing, and 
those parts form a subset of the individuals whose powers, when manifested 
in the right way, compose his seeing. The same is true mutatis mutandis of 
the tomato. Intuitively, the parts of the tomato by virtue of which it has the 
power to be seen are those composing its surface, the ones which reflect 
light to Gabriel’s eyes. In addition, there are other environmental factors 
involved in Gabriel’s seeing the tomato such as the direction and intensity 
of the light, the condition of the air through which he sees it, and so on. 
Gabriel’s seeing the tomato is thus a complex structured activity composed 
of the coordinated manifestation of the powers of his parts and those of 
surrounding things.
Let us now return to our original desiderata. We wanted a metaphysical 
framework that did three things: first, it would enable us to make sense of 
an empirically- informed notion of organization or structure like Dewey’s; 
second, it would enable us to understand thoughts, feelings, and percep-
tions as species of structured phenomena, and third, it would not require us 
to adopt a mental- physical dichotomy. It should be evident how the hylo-
morphic theory I’ve outlined satisfies the first two desiderata. Hylomorphic 
structure carves out composite individuals (paradigmatically living things) 
from the otherwise undifferentiated sea of matter and energy that is or will 
be described by our best physics, and it confers on those individuals powers 
that distinguish what they can do from what unstructured materials can do. 
The activities of those individuals—including the thinking, feeling, and per-
ceiving in which humans engage—are essentially embodied in the powers of 
their parts. Details about what parts those are, what powers they have, and 
how the manifestations of those powers must be structured to compose our 
activities, are all to be supplied through empirical methods like functional 
analysis.
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What of the third desideratum? Based on what’s been said, we can begin 
to appreciate how hylomorphism satisfies it too, for within the hylomorphic 
framework, whether we decide to call some of the powers and activities of 
structured individuals ‘mental’ or ‘nonmental,’ or ‘physical’ or ‘nonphysi-
cal’ is orthogonal to the project of understanding what they are, and why 
and how they operate as they do. Consider some ways of drawing a mental- 
physical distinction:
•	 Something	is	mental	if	and	only	if	it	displays	intentionality.








be exhaustively described by physics.
•	 Something	is	physical	if	and	only	if	it	belongs	to	the	causal	order	of	the	
world.
•	 Something	 is	physical	 if	and	only	 if	we	do	not	have	privileged	access	 
to it.
There is nothing to stop hylomorphists from adopting one of these defini-
tions or another, but nothing about their framework of powers and mani-
festations forces them to do so. The hylomorphic framework does not imply 
a commitment to categorizing powers or manifestations or individuals or 
their parts, as mental or nonmental, physical or nonphysical. According to 
hylomorphists, we can get on with the empirical investigation of powers, 
parts, and manifestations without ever employing these categories. Whether 
we decide to draw these distinctions or not is purely a function of our 
descriptive and explanatory interests. There is nothing built into the nature 
of things on the hylomorphic view that forces us to draw the distinction one 
way or another, or that forces us to draw any such distinction at all.
If we want to understand Gabriel’s running, we might look to locate his 
running within the broader rational structure of his intentional activities: he 
is running because he wants to stay fit, and he wants to stay fit because he 
wants to continue playing baseball, and he wants to continue playing base-
ball because, etc. Or, we might look to understand how he can engage in 
a complex activity like running by analyzing that activity into simpler sub-
activities whose coordinated occurrences compose his running. Whichever 
way we take our inquiry—whether we look to describe the reasons for 
Gabriel’s running or the physiological subsystems that enable him to run—
the important thing is that we do not at any point need to introduce a dis-
tinction between mental factors and nonmental ones or between physical 
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factors and nonphysical ones. Once we accept the hylomorphic framework 
I’ve described, nothing forces us to accept a mental- physical dichotomy.
Nothing forces us to reject a mental- physical dichotomy either. The 
choice to accept or reject such a dichotomy is contingent upon whatever 
theoretical or practical ends we are looking to achieve. Within a hylomor-
phic framework the mental- physical dichotomy is an artifact of our descrip-
tive and explanatory interests.
Because there is nothing canonical about the mental- physical dichot-
omy on the hylomorphic view, the latter provides an alternative way of 
understanding the nature of psychological science. Within a hylomorphic 
framework, sciences can be defined by the kinds of structures their methods 
enable us to investigate. Psychological science can be defined, then, simply 
by appeal to the actual methods that working psychologists employ. Those 
include methods that yield descriptions of higher- level structures in animal 
behavior such as the structures that make thinking, feeling, and perceiv-
ing what they are, as well as methods like functional analysis that yield 
descriptions of various lower- level subsystems whose coordinated opera-
tions compose higher- level behavior. Because this way of defining psycho-
logical science makes no appeal to a mental- physical dichotomy, it gingerly 
sidesteps the mind- body problems which the dichotomy generates. It thus 
has the potential to provide a stable conceptual foundation for understand-
ing how psychological science meshes with biology and neuroscience. An 
example involves the science of perception.
7.  Hylomorphism and the Science of Perception
On the hylomorphic view I’ve been developing, the manifestation of percep-
tual powers—of, say, Gabriel’s power to see and the tomato’s power to be 
seen—is a temporally extended process. To understand this idea, it is helpful 
to contrast it with the approach to perception that has tended to dominate 
the empirical literature. For decades, that approach has been inspired by the 
functionalist thinking described in Section 4. David Marr’s theory of vision 
is an example.51
According to Marr, a perceiver receives sensory stimulation from the 
environment. That stimulation is nevertheless insufficient to tell the per-
ceiver exactly what objects in the environment have produced it since the 
same retinal image could be produced by an infinite number of distinct 
shapes at various distances (Figure 11.1). The perceiver must therefore sup-
plement the meager sensory input with internally stored assumptions about 
its likely environmental causes. Perception is thus a process of constructing 
an internal model of the external world based on a combination of sensory 
stimuli and internally stored assumptions about the environment. That 
process, moreover, does not depend in any essential way on the perceiv-
er’s movements through the environment, nor does it depend on the per-
ceiver having a specific bodily organization since the same manipulations 
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of internal information might be carried out in physical systems of very 
different kinds.
On the hylomorphic view I’ve been developing, by contrast, we come to 
know the perceptible properties of things through a temporally extended 
process of sensorimotor interaction of the sort described by J. J. Gibson 
and, more recently, Alva Noë.52 Objects in the environment reflect light 
to a perceiver in different ways. The differences in reflected light provide 
information about the objects reflecting it—information picked up by per-
ceivers at various points of observation. Those points of observation can be 
understood as points at which pyramids of reflected light converge. The sum 
of converging pyramids of light at a point is what Gibson calls the ambient 
optic array (Figure 11.2). That array changes as a function of a perceiver’s 
movements—what Gibson calls the optic flow.
Some appearances nevertheless remain invariant across the optic flow, 
and these invariants provide information about objects in the environment. 
Invariant proportions among the angles and lines on surfaces, for instance, 
provide information about the relative sizes of objects, while horizon cuts 
and occluding edges provide information about the relative positions of 
objects.53 Because information about objects in the environment is conveyed 
by the reflected light itself, there is no need for sensory information to be 
supplemented with internal representations; all that’s required is that the 
perceiver be equipped with a way of picking up invariants in the optic flow.
Pyramids of reflected light converge at different points. As perceivers 
move through the environment, they pick up information about the sur-
rounding layout from features that remain invariant across changes in the 
optic flow.
As Gabriel moves relative to the tomato, for instance, he gains an implicit 
understanding of how its various facets come into and go out of view as a 







Adapted from Shapiro 2011
Figure 11.1  The Retinal Stimulation Pattern Underdetermines Its Environmental 
Cause
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that will bring into view these or those facets which he expects to look these 
or those ways under the present conditions. In this way, Gabriel comes to 
know the tomato’s perceptible properties—its uniform redness, for instance. 
That redness is revealed through a series of appearances none of which is 
uniformly red. The young child who depicts a tomato by applying a single 
shade of red paint across the canvas fails to capture how it really looks. The 
skilled painter, by contrast, uses a variety of colors to depict the tomato: a 
bit a red here, a bit of gray there, white toward the top, and so on. The result 
is a more accurate depiction of how the tomato really looks from a particu-
lar vantage point. If Gabriel’s vision were limited to the way the tomato 
looks from that point, he might never know its uniform color; there would 
be no explanation for what psychologists call color constancy, the ability of 
perceivers to discern that an object has a uniform color despite changes in 
its nonuniform appearance. But Gabriel’s vision is not limited in this way. 
By moving in relation to the tomato he grasps its uniform redness through 
the shifting appearances.
Perception is not a passive process, therefore, of receiving sensory stimuli 
and constructing internal representations of external objects, but an active, 
temporally extended process of coming to know the perceptible properties 
of objects through a series of appearances that vary as a function of the per-
ceiver’s movements through the environment. Movement is thus essential to 
perception. So too is a perceiver’s specific bodily organization since the way 
Figure 11.2 The Ambient Optic Array (Gibson, 1979, p. 72)
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appearances vary as a function of movement depends on that organization. 
The changes in visual experience that vary as a function of turning one’s 
head side to side, for instance, depend on having a head that can turn in 
that way and having eyes situated in particular locations on that head. On 
the hylomorphic account I’ve described, then, perception is both enactive 
and embodied.
Some empirical work supports an account of perception along these 
lines. One prediction the account makes is that disrupting the interplay 
of sensation and movement will disrupt perception. This is precisely what 
experiments with inverted goggles appear to demonstrate. Inverted goggles 
are equipped with lenses that alter the trajectory of light to the eye: light 
reflected from an object on the left, for instance, is made to enter the eye 
from the right. If perceiving were simply a matter of passively receiving 
sensory stimuli, we would expect that subjects wearing inverted goggles 
would simply perceive objects on the left as if they were on the right. In 
fact, their perceptual abilities are disrupted in a much more radical way.54 
Subjects wearing inverted goggles initially fail to grasp what is in the envi-
ronment and where it is. They undergo what Noë calls experiential blind-
ness: although their retinas receive sensory stimulation, that stimulation 
doesn’t enable them to gain knowledge of their environment.55 An enactive 
account of perception explains why: perception depends not just on sensory 
stimulation, but on the regular interplay of sensory stimulation and move-
ment. Inverted goggles disrupt that interplay: head movements that used to 
alter retinal stimulation in one way no longer do. As a result, subjects are 
unable to perceive things until they master the new patterns of sensorimotor 
correlation.
In addition, Ballard and his colleagues have shown that an embodied 
account of perception yields models of cognitive behavior that are more 
elegant than those based on functionalist assumptions.56 Their experiments 
involve tracking test subjects’ eye movements. Subjects are presented with 
an arrangement of colored blocks on a computer screen and asked to copy 
the arrangement in a workspace using a computer mouse by taking blocks 
from a supply area. Marr’s functionalist account suggests that subjects con-
struct an internal representation of the external environment and guide their 
hand movements by reference to that internal representation. Ballard’s find-
ings challenge this view. Subjects’ eye movements suggest that they employ a 
deictic strategy in performing the task;57 that is, they guide their actions not 
by reference to an internal representation of the external environment, but 
by reference to a fixation point in the environment itself. The environment- 
centered deictic model not only accounts for the experimental data, it also 
simplifies the amount of computational overhead needed to accomplish the 
perception- guided task. An account like Marr’s, which posits an internal 
representation of the external environment, involves a great deal of algo-
rithmic complexity which the environment- centered alternative sidesteps 
entirely.
286 William Jaworski
The upshot of empirical work like the foregoing is reminiscent of the 
criticism Aristotle advanced against a philosopher he calls ‘Socrates the 
Younger,’ who appears to have claimed that human activities could be 
defined abstractly the way we define geometrical objects. The definitions of 
those objects make no essential reference to any realizing materials. Defining 
a circle as an infinite number of points equidistant from a single point does 
not specify that the points be in wood, plastic, metal, air, or any other mate-
rial. Socrates the Younger appears to have claimed that definitions of human 
activities and capacities were like the definition of a circle: they made no 
essential reference to particular bodily parts. Aristotle disagreed:
. . . Socrates the Younger was wrong in always comparing an animal 
with the circle and bronze . . . [I]t supposes that a man can exist without 
his parts, as a circle can exist without the bronze. But in fact, the two 
cases are not similar, for an animal . . . cannot be defined without refer-
ence to parts in the right condition.
(Metaphysics 1037a22–31; 
cf. On the Soul 403a3- b15 and Physics 194a1–27)
Empirical work of the foregoing sort seems to support Aristotle’s conten-
tion. It suggests that the human cognitive capacities are essentially embod-
ied in a specific kind of body plan, that the best models of human cognitive 
performance presuppose that body plan.
A Neo- Aristotelian framework of powers and structured activities rejects 
the canonical status of the mental- physical dichotomy. It leaves it unmyste-
rious how thought, feeling, and perception can exist in the natural world, 
and how psychology and biological subdisciplines such as neuroscience con-
tribute to a synoptic vision of what kinds of things we are and what kinds 
of capacities we have.
Notes
 1 Coon and Mitterer (2012: 14), Kalat (2013: 3), Griggs (2014: 1).
 2 Plotnik and Kouyoumdijian (2013: 3).
 3 Claims (1) and (2) seem to be well- supported empirically, and many examples 
seem to support claim (3): I have the mass I have because I am composed of 
physical particles with smaller masses that collective add up my bigger mass. 
Likewise, I have the position and velocity I do because the particles compos-
ing me are located in such- and- such places and are moving with such- and- such 
velocities. Change their positions or velocities, and you succeed in changing 
mine. Given the range of properties that are like this, it’s not implausible to sup-
pose that all the properties of composite wholes are determined by the properties 
of the particles composing them. It seems, moreover, that the behavior of those 
particles can be described and explained exhaustively by physics. We don’t need 
to use a psychological or even a biological vocabulary to describe and explain 
what they are and what they can do. This lends some support to claim (4). There 
are also, it seems, good reasons to endorse claim (5). One particle by itself does 
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not have the power to think, feel, or perceive. If it did, then thought, feeling, 
and perception would have emerged much earlier in the universe’s history than 
we think they did, and they would also be more widespread—even rocks and 
tables would be thinkers, feelers, and perceivers. But if one particle by itself does 
not have the power to think, feel, or perceive, then it is difficult to see how any 
number of these particles could combine to form a whole that has these powers. 
Suppose that some number of particles, N, do not compose a whole with power 
to think, feel, or perceive. If one particle cannot make a difference to whether 
or not something has these powers, then clearly, N+1 particles cannot compose 
a whole that has them. Since N can be any number one likes, it seems to follow 
that no number of physical particles has the power to compose a whole that 
thinks, feels, or perceives. Each claim, (1)–(5), is therefore plausible.
 4 Dewey (1958: 263).
 5 Searle (1992: 26, 54–5).
 6 Searle (2004: 79).
 7 Dewey (1958: 253–8).
 8 Schaffer (2009), Sider (2012).
 9 Worrall (1989), Ladyman and Ross (2007).
10 Chalmers (2002: 258).
11 In fact, even some contemporary hylomorphists use the term ‘structure’ this way. 
Oderberg (2014: 177) is an example.
12 Miller (1978: 140–1).
13 Campbell (1996: 2–4).
14 Kitcher (1984: 369, 373).
15 John Dupré has endorsed a similar thesis: “I place myself firmly in the philo-
sophical tradition that sees empirical, often scientific, inquiry as providing the 
most credible source of knowledge of how things are” (1993: 1). Replacing the 
phrase ‘how things are’ in Dupré’s statement with ‘what there is’ yields what I 
am calling ‘ontological naturalism.’
16 Fine (2008: 112).
17 Fine (1999), Johnston (2006), Oderberg (2007), Koslicki (2008), Rea (2011), 
Marmodoro (2013), Koons (2014), Evnine (2016), Jaworski (2014, 2016).
18 The hylomorphic theory I develop here assumes a substance- attribute ontology 
which takes substances or individuals, as I’ll typically call them, and attributes or 
properties, to be fundamental entities. Individuals act on other individuals and 
are acted on by them on account of their properties. Properties are sparse, not 
abundant, in Lewis’s (1983) sense (Jaworski 2014, 2016). The only properties 
that exist are ones that empower individuals to enter into causal relations. Prop-
erties are particulars, not universals. They are tropes—also called ‘unit prop-
erties,’ ‘property instances,’ ‘individual accidents,’ and ‘modes,’ among other 
things. I’ve defended this metaphysical framework in detail elsewhere (Jaworski 
2016).
19 Martin (1996a, b, 1997, 2007), Heil (2003, 2005), Martin and Heil (1998, 
1999), Jaworski (2014, 2016).
20 Martin and Pfeifer (1986), Place (1996a, b), Molnar (2003).
21 Martin (1996a) defends this idea with an example: there might be fundamental 
physical particles in the universe that have the power to interact in various ways 
with particles around here, and yet that are so far away that they reside outside 
the light cones of the particles around here. The two groups of particles never 
actually interact, yet it seems obvious that the distant particles still have the 
power to interact with the local ones.
22 Harré and Madden’s (1975) examples of radioactive decay and ammonium tri- 
iodide seem initially to provide counterexamples to the general rule that pow-
ers are manifested or exercised in pairs, or triples, or n- tuples. But even here it 
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might be possible to understand the cases in a way that conforms to the general 
reciprocity model. At the very least, the environment surrounding the radioac-
tive nuclei or the ammonium tri- iodide cannot include any agents that inhibit the 
exercise of their powers to decay or explode, respectively. Environments that are 
free of inhibitory factors might then be viewed as reciprocal disposition partners 
for the decaying nuclei and the explosive compound.
23 Van Inwagen (1990).
24 Ibid.: 94.
25 Young (1971).




30 Ibid.: 122, 180.
31 Ibid.: 121.
32 Ibid.: 145, 148.
33 This response implies a certain meta- mereology which Kathrin Koslicki describes 
as follows: “I take the mereologist’s job to be to devise an appropriate concep-
tion of parthood and composition which accurately reflects the conditions of 
existence, spatio- temporal location and part/whole structure of those objects to 
which we take ourselves to be already committed as part of the presupposed 
scientifically informed, commonsense ontology. The question of which kinds [of 
objects] there are I take to be . . . answered [not] by the mereologist proper, but 
by the ontologist at large, in conjunction with . . . science and common sense, 
which . . . have something to contribute to the question, ‘What is there?’” (2008: 
171).
34 Churchland (1986), Bickle (1998), Jaworski (2011, 2016).
35 Van Inwagen (1990: 122).
36 See also van Inwagen (1990: 118, 122).
37 Fodor (1968), Cummins (1975), Dennett (1978), Lycan (1987), Craver (2007), 
Bechtel (2007, 2008).
38 Bechtel (2007, 2008), Craver (2007: ch. 5) calls purely spatial parts ‘pieces’ and 
parts in the functional sense ‘components.’ John Heil (2003: 100) also suggests 
something like the distinction between merely spatial parts and parts of other 
sorts, which he calls ‘substantial parts.’
39 Campbell et al. (1999: 4).
40 Jaworski (2011: 277).
41 Putnam (1967).
42 Lycan (1987), Sober (1985).
43 Ibid.
44 Sperry (1984).
45 Many hylomorphists of the past have denied that all our powers are essentially 
embodied in the powers of our parts. Aristotle himself appears to deny it in 
De Anima, book 3, chapter 4, where he apparently argues that understanding 
or nous, the power to grasp the essences of things, has no organ and is in gen-
eral unmixed (amigēs) with a body (429a10- 27). A commitment to the essential 
embodiment of our capacities is nevertheless the default position for hylo-
morphists. In fact, Aristotle treats embodiment as the default position as well 
(403a16–19, 24–27; 403b17–18), and he claims that the emotions are essentially 
embodied (403a16–19, 24–27; 403b17–18; cf. 413a4–6). Elsewhere, I’ve argued 
in line with other commentators that the argument of De Anima is flawed in 
multiple ways (Jaworski 2016: 162–70).
46 The term ‘reduction’ is used in a variety of ways in philosophy and the sci-
ences. The notion of reduction that interests us here is intertheoretic reduction 
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(Churchland 1986: 278–9). Intertheoretic reduction is a synchronic relation 
between theories or conceptual frameworks in which one of them, the reducing 
theory or framework, is able to take over the descriptive and explanatory roles 
played by the other, the reduced theory or framework.
47 Jaworski (2016: 221–49).
48 Jaworski (2011: 202–45).
49 Bickle (1998: 8).
50 Field (1972: 357).
51 Marr (1982).
52 Gibson (1979), Noë (2004).
53 Gibson (1979).
54 Taylor (1962), Kohler (1964).
55 Noë (2004).
56 Ballard et al. (1992), Ballard (1996).
57 Agre and Chapman (1987).
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Scholasticism did not know how to draw from its principles the physics 
which could and should flow from them. So our first duty today is to be 
more faithful to the demands of realism than the Middle- Ages were, and 
giving each order of reality its due. In each order, the reality of the form 
should be preserved, since without it one cannot account for structures, and 
it remains the principle of reality’s intelligibility.
Etienne Gilson, Methodical Realism, 103
Many philosophers and scientists believe that the turn to mechanistic expla-
nations in the seventeenth century dealt the final death blow to Aristotelian 
hylomorphism.1 While this might be the correct interpretation of the histori-
cal shift from hylomorphic to mechanistic explanations, in this essay I argue 
that contemporary versions of Aristotelian hylomorphism and the “new 
mechanist philosophy” in biology, neuroscience, and psychology share 
significant commitments about the reality of the organized causal compo-
nents of mechanisms. My aim is to challenge the well- known narrative that 
hylomorphic and mechanistic ontologies are fundamentally incompatible 
by establishing that the new mechanist philosophy and Neo- Aristotelian 
hylomorphism are not only complementary, but are defending many of the 
same ontological claims.
I begin with a brief sketch of the fundamental claims of hylomorphism 
(§1). I then situate the new mechanist philosophy (NMP) within recent devel-
opments in philosophy of science (§2.1), before introducing the basic frame-
work of NMP (§2.2). In the last two sections of the paper I argue for the 
compatibility of hylomorphism and NMP. I start with the major points of 
agreement between hylomorphism and NMP (§3). Significantly, I establish 
that NMP is committed to organization or structure realism (a touchstone 
of hylomorphism), and Neo- Aristotelian hylomorphism is committed to the 
reality of mechanisms or causal powers that produce, underlie, or maintain 
the behavior or capacity of (i) phenomena that are constituted through the 
(ii) spatial, temporal, and active organization of their (iii) component entities 
and (iv) component activities (the four hallmarks of NMP). In the last section 
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(§4) I introduce some possible points of disagreement between these two posi-
tions pertaining to hylomorphism’s substance- attribute ontology, emergence, 
downward causation, and teleology. I show that the disagreements about 
these topics do not distinguish hylomorphists from new mechanists, but rep-
resent disagreements among hylomorphists and among new mechanists. I 
conclude that Neo- Aristotelian hylomorphism should not been seen as fun-
damentally opposed to mechanisms, but that it can and should embrace the 
many complementary features of the new mechanist philosophy in biology, 
neuroscience and psychology. If correct, this is a significant advance over and 
against an influential narrative that should be rejected.
I begin with a few preliminary points of clarification for this compara-
tive study. My principal aim is to encourage a constructive conversation 
between hylomorphists and new mechanists. I therefore intentionally avoid 
trying to settle significant points of disagreement among hylomorphists or 
new mechanists that would prematurely alienate some hylomorphists from 
some new mechanists (and vice versa) on issues that I believe are not perti-
nent to the compatibility of hylomorphism and the new mechanist philoso-
phy. My presentation of both hylomorphism and NMP focuses more on the 
fundamental principles that unite rather than divide hylomorphists under a 
common banner, and that bring together the diverse views of exponents of 
NMP. Finally, in order to achieve a synoptic comparison of these two com-
plex and nuanced philosophical frameworks, my exposition forgoes many 
of the arguments for and against particular positions maintained by hylo-
morphists and the new mechanists.
1.  Neo- Aristotelian Hylomorphism
Hylomorphism originates with Aristotle’s philosophy of nature and takes its 
name from his account of matter (hyle) and form (morphe), that is, the two 
integrated and intrinsic principles or grounds for all physical substances. 
Aristotle’s doctrine of hylomorphism is worked out alongside his account 
of physical substances, attributes, forms of natural change and composi-
tion, act and potency, the four causes (material, formal, agential, and final), 
the distinction between inanimate and animate beings, and his applica-
tion of these positions throughout his philosophical biology and zoology. 
Contemporary exponents of hylomorphism often introduce it as a “third 
way” alternative to substance dualism and various forms of eliminative, 
reductive, and non- reductive physicalism.
1.1 Hylomorphism’s Organization Realism
Contemporary hylomorphism is often characterized by its realist account 
of higher- levels of what is variously called “form,” “organization,” or 
“structure” and causal powers. William Jaworski, a contemporary expo-
nent of hylomorphism, argues that the fundamental distinguishing feature 
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of hylomorphism is its structure realism—I call this form or organization 
realism. Following Jaworski, we can sum up this insight about formal orga-
nization in the following slogans:
Formal organization matters: it operates as an irreducible ontological 
principle, one that accounts at least in part for what things essentially 
are.
Formal organization makes a difference: it operates as an irreducible 
explanatory principle, one that accounts at least in part for what 
things can do, the powers they have.
Formal organization counts: it explains the unity of composite things, 
including the persistence of one and the same living individual 
through the dynamic influx and efflux of matter and energy that 
characterize many of its interactions with the wider world.2
The formal organization realism defended by hylomorphists like Jaworski, 
Robert Koons, David Oderberg, Anna Marmodoro, Bernard Lonergan, and 
others distinguish form from the mere static spatial relation of parts to each 
other.3 For hylomorphism, form, organization, or structure is a dynamic 
intrinsic ordering principle of the organized materials, especially in the case 
of the organizational form of living beings. As Oderberg points out:
[M]ere structure in the sense of configuration of parts is far too static a 
concept to tell you all there is about the form of an animal: There are 
its characteristic functions and behaviour, its dispositions, instincts, ten-
dencies, actions and reactions, and all the rest of which ethology is made. 
These dynamic notions have to be added to the relatively static structural 
notions to get us to something like an account of the form of a living thing.4
Aristotelian hylomorphism maintains that organization is not an additional 
part standing alongside material components that provides a relation of 
unity to material parts; furthermore, form is not a mere extrinsic organiza-
tion imposed on material parts from an extrinsic (efficient) cause; rather, 
formal organization intrinsically transforms the matter, thereby constituting 
a new unity, identity, whole.5
1.2 Hylomorphism’s Substance–Attribute Ontology
This brings us to hylomorphism’s connection to Aristotle’s substance- 
attribute ontology. Hylomorphists distinguish between two kinds of organi-
zation: what many Neo- Aristotelians call substantial and accidental forms, 
what Jaworski calls individual- making and activity- making structures, 
and what Bernard Lonergan identifies as central and conjugate forms.6 I 
employ Lonergan’s terminology of central and conjugate formal organiza-
tion to articulate the main contentions of hylomorphism.7 A central form is 
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a fundamental intrinsic principle that actually organizes and transforms the 
materials that compose a fundamental physical entity, that is, a substance. 
Hylomorphists maintain that the central forms of physical substances are 
essentially and continuously organizing and transforming the material com-
ponents that constitute the substance, and it is this organizing activity of 
central forms that unifies and enables the same physical substances to persist 
through changes in their materials.8 The same is true, mutatis mutandis, of 
conjugate forms, which organize the constituent materials of a substance’s 
powers and activities. Following Jaworski, we can also frame three slogans 
that capture what is specific to conjugate forms.
Conjugate formal organization matters: it is an irreducible ontological 
principle that organized activities possess essentially and which, in part, 
accounts for the very nature of what the activities are that they organize.
Conjugate formal organization makes a difference: because it is the 
form of a power which provides an irreducible explanatory principle; 
and powers enable individuals to engage in organized activities they 
could not perform without such powers.
Conjugate formal organization counts: it confers unity on diverse 
events in a way that is similar to how substantial forms confer unity 
on physical materials that compose organized individual substances.9
In addition, conjugate formal organization also minds: sensation, percep-
tion, affectivity, understanding, rational reflection, and intentional action 
are species of organized activities of psychological powers. The psychologi-
cal powers and activities of humans and other animals are composed from 
the formal organization of their material parts and the manifestation of any 
requisite powers of the organized materials in the surrounding environment. 
Animals have the psychosomatic powers and operations they do in virtue of 
the organization of specific zones of their material parts by their conjugate 
forms.10
The central and conjugate forms of a substance are bound up with its fun-
damental central matter and organized conjugate potencies. The former is what 
is actualized and organized by a substance’s central form, the latter pertains to 
zones of organized material components that are constituted by the conjugate 
forms of an individual substance. Accordingly, there are formal and material 
properties that pertain both to substances and to their conjugate attributes.
1.3  Staunch Hylomorphism: Fundamental Entities, Properties, 
and Powers
Hylomorphism’s account of central and conjugate forms is connected to Rob 
Koons’s division of contemporary proponents of hylomorphism into faint- 
hearted and staunch hylomorphists.11 According to Koons, staunch hylo-
morphists accept the following Aristotelian claims, whereas faint- hearted 
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hylomorphists deny one or more.12 I am only concerned with staunch 
hylomorphism.
(1)  A sparse theory of fundamental entities. A soul is a substantial form, 
and only substances have substantial forms. Socrates is a substance, but 
sitting Socrates is only an accidental unity, and so there is no substantial 
form corresponding to Socrates’s sitting as there is to Socrates’s living.
(2)  A sparse theory of fundamental properties. Only substances have essences 
or natures in the strictest sense. An essence or nature is a fundamental 
property, which accounts for both the possibility and actuality of all other 
properties, acting as a ‘principle’ (arche) of motion (change) and rest.
(3)  A powers ontology. The natures of substances confer fundamental causal 
powers on those substances, and those powers (both active and passive) 
are the ultimate grounds for explaining all change and activity.13
Claims (1) and (2) pertain to the nature of substances and their substantial 
or central form and matter; claim (3) concerns the powers that are conjugate 
attributes of a substance.
Along with an armament of classical and contemporary arguments for its 
organization realism, hylomorphism defends an anti- reductionist naturalist 
ontology that draws upon empirical science, especially the life sciences, to 
fortify and support its position. Indeed, some hylomorphists, like Jaworski, 
even cite proponents of NMP, like Carl Craver and William Bechtel, to pro-
vide empirical support for hylomorphism’s ontological realism.
Hylomorphism is committed to ontological naturalism, the claim that 
when it comes to determining what exists, empirical investigation is our 
best guide. Since many of our best empirical descriptions, explanations, 
and methods appear to posit various kinds of organization or struc-
ture, those descriptions, explanations, and methods give us prima facie 
reason to think that organization or structure exists. Structure realism 
takes empirical appeals to structure at face value. Structure, it says, is 
a basic ontological and explanatory principle: descriptions, explana-
tions, and methods that posit structure cannot in general be reduced 
to, or paraphrased, or eliminated in favor of nonstructural descriptions 
and explanations. This straightforward approach to structure is the one 
favored by hylomorphists.14
2.  New Mechanist Philosophy
2.1 The Rise of the New Mechanists in the Philosophy of Science
The new mechanist philosophy represents a more recent movement in phi-
losophy of science; it is tied to a number of positions in philosophy of science 
that began to coalesce around the end of the twentieth century as a reaction 
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to logical empiricism. In contrast to logical empiricism’s focus on logical 
and mathematical idealizations of the theories of physics, NMP attends 
more to actual scientific practice, especially among the special sciences of 
biology, neuroscience, and psychology. “Many new mechanists developed 
their framework explicitly as a successor to logical empiricist treatments of 
causation, levels, explanation, laws of nature, reduction, and discovery.”15 
While the discovery of mechanisms has always been important to scientists, 
mechanisms were neglected in twentieth- century philosophy of science due 
to the overwhelming influence of logical empiricism’s covering- law account 
of explanations, like the deductive- nomological model. Against the frame-
work of logical empiricism, more recent philosophers of science have argued 
that scientific explanations of a phenomenon, especially outside of phys-
ics, do not consist in showing that a phenomenon was predictable on the 
basis of laws of nature or other generalizations. Carl Craver argues that 
neuroscientists are instead interested in “showing how a phenomenon is 
produced by its causes. To explain neurotransmitter release, one shows that 
the depolarization opens the Ca2+ channels, that opening the Ca2+ channels 
allows Ca2+ to diffuse into the cell, that vesicles dock to the membrane by 
forming SNARE complexes and that the influx of Ca2+ triggers the forma-
tion of a fusion pore.”16 Robert Cummins argues that psychology is not 
concerned with discovering explanatory laws. Following his detailed survey 
of the major explanatory frameworks employed in empirical psychology 
(belief- desire- intention folk psychology, computationalism, connectionism, 
neuroscience, and evolutionary psychology), he concludes:
Explanation in psychology, like scientific explanation generally, is not sub-
sumption under law. Such laws as there are in psychology are specifications 
of effects. As such, they do not explain anything but themselves require 
explanation. Moreover, though important, the phenomena we typically call 
effects are incidental to the primary explananda of psychology, viz., capaci-
ties. Capacities, unlike their associated incidental effects, seldom require 
discovery, though their precise specification can be nontrivial. The search 
for laws in psychology is therefore the search for explananda, for it is either 
the search for an adequate specification of a capacity or for some capacity’s 
associated incidental effects. Laws tell us what the mind does, not how it 
does it. We want to know how the mind works, not just what it does.17
The consolidation of these ideas and others culminated in a new orienta-
tion in philosophy of science that focused on the role of multi- level mech-
anisms in scientific explanation. In their seminal paper “Thinking about 
Mechanisms,” Peter Machamer, Lindley Darden, and Carl Craver (MDC), 
begin with the following claim:
In many fields of science what is taken to be a satisfactory explanation 
requires providing a description of a mechanism. So it is not surprising 
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that much of the practice of science can be understood in terms of the 
discovery and description of mechanisms.18
For NMP, “this new sense of mechanism is deeply anti- reductionist; sci-
ence may uncover explanatory or ontological connections between higher 
and lower levels, but does not thereby either eliminate or reduce the higher 
levels thus connected.”19 Craver contends that the new mechanist approach 
to neuroscience supports what he calls the mosaic unity of neuroscience.
This mosaic view of the unity of neuroscience is broader in scope than 
reduction because it covers both the integration of fields in research 
at a given level and in research that crosses levels. This mosaic view 
also provides a more accurate and elaborate view of interlevel inter-
field integration. Where reductionists understand the unity of science 
in terms of stepwise reduction to lowest levels, the mosaic view treats 
the unity of science as the collaborative accumulation of constraints 
at multiple levels. Whereas reduction focuses on relations of identity, 
supervenience, and ontological reductive links, the mechanistic mosaic 
view emphasizes the importance of explanatory relevance as the bridge 
between levels. Finally, whereas reduction models emphasize the impor-
tance of explanatory reduction to fundamental levels, the mosaic view 
can be pluralistic about levels, recognizing the genuine importance of 
higher- level causes and explanations. The mosaic unity of science is 
constructed during the process of collaboration by different fields in 
the search for multilevel mechanisms. One task for the philosophy of 
neuroscience is to show how that research ought to proceed.20
Many proponents of NMP, influenced by Wesley Salmon’s account of 
causal explanations, are also committed to an ontic conception of scien-
tific explanation, where mechanistic explanations pick out realties that 
are causal structures in the world.21 Craver distinguishes four distinct but 
related senses of explanation employed by English speakers. It can be used 
“(1) to refer to a communicative act, (2) to refer to a cause or a factor that is 
otherwise responsible for a phenomenon (the ontic reading), (3) to refer to a 
text that communicates explanatory information, and (4) to refer to a cogni-
tive act of bringing a representation to bear upon some mysterious phenom-
enon.”22 Craver recognizes that scientists use explanation in all these senses; 
his contention is that, contrary to certain anti- realist views in philosophy of 
science, it is not only perfectly legitimate, but even necessary for scientists 
to make use of the second sense of explanations that depend upon and are 
evaluated in light of the ontic structure of the world.23 Indeed, “the norms 
of scientific explanation fall out of a prior commitment on the part of sci-
entific investigators to describe the relevant ontic structures in the world.”24 
If Craver is correct, then we have good reasons for taking seriously the 
underlying realism of certain ontic explanations in biology and neuroscience 
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that provide accounts (even if inadequate) of the real or ontic structure of 
the world—especially those that appeal to mechanisms constituted by orga-
nized causal components. I shall not enter into the debates over Craver’s 
complex and contentious defense of ontic explanations.25 Nonetheless, it is 
worth pointing out that his defense of scientific realism about ontic explana-
tions and structures found in nature provides one more point of agreement 
between hylomorphism and some proponents of NMP.
2.2 New Mechanists on Mechanisms
There have been many conceptions of mechanisms throughout the his-
tory of philosophy and science, but NMP places some distance between 
its understanding of mechanisms from the conceptions of mechanisms of 
Democritus, Descartes, Boyle, and others. NMP does not endorse the meta-
physically austere accounts of the natural world defended by Cartesianism 
or more recent ontologies that endeavor to reduce all causal activities to a 
few fundamental forces. Unlike many accounts of mechanisms, NMP resists 
the idea that mechanisms are machines or are straightforwardly analogous 
to them.26 Furthermore, according to Craver and other proponents of NMP, 
mechanisms are not essentially: deterministic (many are stochastic), reduc-
tionistic (most require multilevel irreducible ontic structures), localizable 
(many brain mechanisms are highly distributed), and are not mere fictions, 
metaphors, or explanatory heuristics (but describe and explain ontic struc-
tures in the world). So what are mechanisms, according to NMP?
NMP prefers qualitative accounts of the explanatory mechanisms actu-
ally employed by scientists over retailing their necessary and sufficient con-
ditions.27 A number of accounts of mechanisms are on offer from different 
proponents of NMP.
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they are pro-
ductive of regular changes from start or set- up to finish or termination 
conditions.28
A mechanism is a structure performing a function in virtue of its 
component parts, component operations, and their organization. The 
orchestrated functioning of the mechanism is responsible for one or 
more phenomena.29
Mechanisms are entities and activities organized such that they 
exhibit the explanandum phenomenon.30
Minimal mechanism: A mechanism for a phenomenon consists of 
entities (or parts) whose activities and interactions are organized so as 
to be responsible for the phenomenon.31
In what follows, I draw on the work of the philosopher of neuroscience, 
Carl Craver, and other exponents of NMP to summarize the basic claims of 
NMP. Craver presents a detailed account of mechanistic explanations used 
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in neuroscience in his 2007 monograph, Explaining the Brain: Mechanisms 
and the Mosaic Unity of Neuroscience and in his 2013 In Search of 
Mechanisms: Discoveries Across the Life Sciences co- authored with Lindley 
Darden. Craver contends that “Explanations in neuroscience describe 
mechanisms, span multiple levels, and integrate multiple fields.”32 In other 
words, neuroscientific explanations appeal to mechanisms that encompass 
a complex hierarchy of organized component entities and activities that 
require the integration of such scientific fields as biochemistry, genetics, 
microbiology, electrophysiology, neurobiology, neuroscience, neuropsychol-
ogy, and many others.33 Craver’s account of a mechanism draws attention 
to four fundamental elements: (1) a phenomenon, (2) its component entities, 
(3) component activities, and (4) the organization of these components.
2.2.1 Phenomena of Mechanisms
A phenomenon is variously described as the behavior or the manifestations 
of a capacity or power of the mechanism taken as a whole. The proper 
demarcation of a phenomenon depends in part on the level of investiga-
tion relevant to one’s descriptive and explanatory goals: what counts as a 
phenomenon for the biochemist might be a component in a mechanism for 
the microbiologist, what is a phenomenon to be explained by a mechanism 
for the microbiologist, might be a component within a mechanism for the 
neuroscientist, and so on.34 In every case, the phenomenon is the behavior 
of the mechanism as a whole: the mechanism for protein synthesis synthe-
sizes proteins; the mechanism for an action potential generates an action 
potential, and a mechanism for opening ion channels causes ion channels to 
open. For NMP, phenomena are not adequately described as mere input–
output relations, even though mechanisms often do involve many inputs 
and outputs. Some mechanisms operate in a linear causal process from one 
stage to the next, but many more operate in cycles (like the Krebs cycle) 
and feedback loops. Phenomena can range from being products of produc-
tive mechanisms, to being systems dependent on underling mechanisms, or 
systems that are sustained by maintenance mechanisms. Roughly speaking, 
mechanisms explain how organized entities and activities (i) produce, (ii) 
underlie, or (iii) maintain some phenomenon.35
(i) Productive mechanisms typically consist in a causal sequence and often 
explain some terminating end- product. The phenomenon explained by a 
mechanism in the case of protein synthesis is an end- state: the production of 
a protein.36 Other products of mechanisms include activities and events, like 
digestion. (ii) Some mechanisms do not produce but underlie phenomena, 
such as the capacity or behavior of a whole system that is educed from the 
organized interactions of its implementing components. For instance, the 
underlying mechanism of an action potential does not produce it. The mech-
anism that underlies a neuron’s action potential—the rapid depolarization 
and repolarization of the neuronal membrane that implements the electrical 
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potential charge and communicates it down the neuron’s axon—involves the 
whole neuron and the activities of its component parts such as membranes, 
neurotransmitters, ion channels, and ions. “This mechanism involves the 
choreographed opening and closing of sodium- and potassium- channel 
proteins and the diffusion of ions across the nerve cell’s membrane.”37 (iii) 
Mechanisms also maintain phenomena, like regulatory or homeostatic 
mechanisms, which preserve a stable equilibrium among certain properties 
or relationships within a system in response to the alteration of internal 
or external conditions. For instance, “cells have mechanisms to maintain 
concentrations of metabolites, cardiovascular systems have mechanisms to 
maintain stable blood pressure, or warm- blooded animals have mechanisms 
to maintain constant body temperature.”38
Another feature of mechanisms flagged by NMP is regularity. A mech-
anism is regular if it operates “always or for the most part in the same 
ways under the same conditions.”39 This classic Aristotelian adage does not 
exclude some mechanisms from being a one- off, such as mechanisms that 
initiate an epidemic or speciation. NMP also distinguishes the regularity of 
mechanisms from determinism. “Determinism is only the limit of regularity 
in most biological mechanisms.” Many mechanisms, especially biological 
ones, are not deterministic but stochastic where indistinguishable condi-
tions, at least for us, can have very different results. “For example, when the 
action potential arrives at the axon terminal, one, two, or more quanta of 
neurotransmitters may be released, or none at all. One can generate frequen-
cies at which each of the outcomes will occur, but one cannot predict with 
certainty on this basis just which outcome will be in a particular case.”40
2.2.2 Components of Mechanisms: Entities and Activities
NMP distinguishes the entities, activities, and organizational features of mech-
anisms. Entities and their activities or operations constitute the two kinds of 
component parts of a mechanism. Proponents of NMP disagree among them-
selves about which mereological account of parthood best captures the wide 
range of organized components that constitute a mechanism, especially for 
the diversity of parts present in biological mechanisms. Similarly, there are 
various views about how to characterize the causation of causal mechanisms. 
According to Craver, the ongoing NMP debate over causal mechanisms has 
focused on four different accounts of causation: conserved quantity accounts, 
mechanistic accounts, activity accounts, and counterfactual accounts. It 
remains an open question which, if any of these accounts, will persevere 
among proponents of NMP. In the absence of space, I shall not enter into this 
debate.41 Despite such disagreements over these details, Craver identifies a 
few points of agreement among proponents of NMP on causality.
New mechanists have in general been at pains both (1) to liberate 
the relevant causal notion from any overly austere view that restricts 
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causation to only a small class of phenomena (such as collisions, attrac-
tion/repulsion, or energy conservation), and (2) to distance themselves 
from the Humean, regularist conception of causation common among 
logical empiricists.42
For NMP, entities are component parts of mechanisms that interact with 
other entities through their reciprocal activities. A mechanistic explanation 
in neuroscience, for instance:
includes various entities (N- type Ca2+ channels, Ca2+ ions, active 
zones, a host of intracellular molecules such as Rab3A, Rab3C, VAMP/
synaptobrevin, SNAP- 25, and syntaxin, vesicles containing neurotrans-
mitters, fusion pores, and neural membranes) and their various activi-
ties (opening, clamping, diffusing, docking, fusing, incorporating, 
phosphorylating, and priming).43
Activities induce causal changes in entities with the properties exigent for 
various actions or passions. “Activities are the producers of change. They 
are constitutive of the transformations that yield new states of affairs or 
new products. Reference to activities is motivated by ontic, descriptive, 
and epistemological concerns.”44 For example, a neurotransmitter and its 
post- synaptic receptor are two entities that are able to engage in a recipro-
cal activity of binding by virtue of such properties as their structure and 
charge distributions. Entities have properties like location, size, structure, 
duration, and orientation; they typically have masses, carry charges, and 
transmit momentum.45 Enzymes, neurotransmitters, neurons, organs, and 
organisms are all entities that engage in activities—the causal components 
of mechanisms—including:
productive behaviors (such as opening), causal interactions (such as 
attracting), omissions (as occurs in cases of inhibition), preventions 
(such as blocking), and so on. In saying that activities are productive, I 
mean that they are not mere correlations, that they are not mere tem-
poral sequences, and, most fundamentally, that they can potentially be 
exploited for the purposes of manipulation and control . . . There are 
many kinds of activity, and it is the task of science rather than phi-
losophy to sort them out. The mechanism of neurotransmitter release 
includes different forms of chemical bonding, conformation changes, 
diffusion, attraction and repulsion.46
Activities are individuated by their spatiotemporal location, rate, dura-
tion, the kinds of reciprocal entities and properties required for such activi-
ties, their setup, start and terminating conditions, modes of signaling (via 
autocrine, juxtacrine, paracrine, endocrine signaling), range, and energy 
requirements.47
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2.2.3 Organization of Mechanisms
NMP unequivocally draws attention to the ontic organization of compo-
nent parts—entities and activities—of mechanisms. The mechanisms that 
underlie an action potential are, for instance:
organized together spatially, temporally, causally, and hierarchically 
such that transmitters are released when the axon terminal depolarizes. 
The voltage- sensitive ion channels are located in the terminal, they span 
the membrane, and they open to expose a channel. Biochemical cas-
cades in the cytoplasm have sequences or cycles of interactions, they are 
organized in series and in parallel, and their steps have different orders, 
rates and durations. The components in the mechanism often stand in 
mechanism/component relations, a species of part–whole relation. As a 
result the mechanism is hierarchically organized. The behavior of the 
mechanism as a whole requires the organization of its components.48
The component parts of a mechanism are organized spatially, temporally, 
and actively, and this organization makes a difference to the mechanism as a 
whole. Spatial organization consists in locations, sizes, shapes, positions and 
orientations of component entities; temporal organization pertains to the 
orders, rates, and durations of entities and their activities. Active organiza-
tion comprises the diverse ways the properties of components—entities and 
activities—enable components to make a difference to other components.
Active organization distinguishes mechanisms from mere aggregates (or 
heaps) of matter, such as piles of sand. The parts act and interact with 
one another in such a way that the whole is literally not a mere sum of 
its parts. Mechanisms are in this sense nonaggregative: the parts of the 
mechanism are organized in ways that go beyond, e.g., the contribution 
made by the mass of a grain of sand to the mass of the pile. Mechanisms 
are not mere sums of properties of their component parts . . .49
The active organization of a mechanism’s components is essential to the 
way NMP distinguishes organized mechanisms from aggregates. Aggregate 
properties are simply a sum of the properties of their parts, which change 
through the addition and subtraction of parts; the parts of aggregates can be 
rearranged or intersubstituted and the whole can be decomposed and recom-
posed without altering the properties or behavior of the whole. “These fea-
tures of aggregates hold because organization is irrelevant to the property 
of the whole.”50 In contrast to aggregates, mechanisms are non- aggregative, 
they are “not mere static or spatial patterns of relations, but rather patterns 
of allowance, generation, prevention, production, and stimulation. There 
are no mechanisms without active organization, and no mechanistic expla-
nation is complete or correct if it does not capture correctly the mechanism’s 
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active organization.”51 NMP contends that nature is replete with a spec-
trum of forms of organization that extends from truly aggregative proper-
ties, which are relatively rare, through a whole range of organized parts and 
causes to very complex organized mechanisms, sometimes characterized as 
forms of mechanistic emergence by NMP.52 “Organization is the interlevel 
relation between a mechanism as a whole and its components. Lower- level 
components are made up into higher- level components by organizing them 
spatially, temporally, and actively into something greater than a mere sum 
of the parts.”53 Craver argues at length that mechanisms, “by virtue of their 
organization, are able to do things that their parts cannot do individually. 
They can respond to inputs that the parts alone cannot detect. They can 
produce behaviors that their parts alone cannot produce. There are gener-
alizations about causal relevance that are true of mechanisms and false of 
their parts.”54
2.2.4 Levels of Mechanisms
The commitment to ontic organization of mechanistic components by NMP 
is connected to its antireductionist account of the hierarchy of integrated 
levels in the mechanisms of biology and neuroscience. Talk of levels, how-
ever, is ambiguous; in order to distinguish levels of mechanisms from other 
types of levels, Craver provides an extensive field guide to levels, the rich 
details of which exceed the scope of this article.55 In brief, Craver contrasts 
levels of causality, which are relations between distinct entities, from lev-
els of mechanisms, which are relations between a whole and its parts. The 
distinctive feature of levels of mechanisms is mechanistic composition, 
which Craver contrasts with levels of size, formal mereology, aggregativ-
ity, and spatial containment. Mechanistic composition takes the behaving 
components of a mechanism to be salient for the individuation of levels 
over any distinguishable boundaries between levels of objects or their sizes. 
Consequently, two or more items belong to the same level of a mechanism if 
they belong to the same mechanism and neither item is a component of the 
other. Working components of a mechanism, however, are at a lower mech-
anistic level than the mechanism taken as a whole. Craver defines levels of 
mechanisms in terms of the relationship between system S’s ψ- ing behavior, 
taken as a whole, and some φ- ing activity of a component entity X of the 
system S, where the relata are the behaving mechanism at the higher- level 
and its component acting- entities at lower- levels. Accordingly, X’s φ- ing is 
at a lower- level of mechanistic organization than S’s ψ- ing if and only if X is 
a component entity of S and X’s φ- ing is a component activity in S’s ψ- ing.56
2.2.5 Causal and Constitutive Relations
Craver’s account of levels of mechanisms is connected to his sharp distinc-
tion between intralevel causal relations and interlevel constitutive relations. 
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Levels of mechanisms are a kind of part–whole constitutive relation that 
is not causal. There is no “interlevel causation” or “causal interaction” 
between items at different levels for Craver. If we accept “the common 
assumptions that causal relationships are contingent and that cause and 
effect must be wholly distinct” then there can be no conflation of the 
levels of mechanisms with causal relationships.57 The component parts 
of the mechanism are not causes that are contingently related to distinct 
effects identified with the behavior of the mechanism as a whole; rather, 
the higher- level behavior of the whole mechanism is itself constituted or 
composed from the organization of its lower- level components, which 
are themselves constituted from the organization of their own lower- level 
components. NMP’s denial of “interlevel causation” between the behavior 
of a mechanism as a whole and its organized component parts does not 
entail the rejection of interlevel dependency; this is captured by constitu-
tive relationships.
The behavior of the whole is dependent on the behavior of the com-
ponents in such a way that interventions to change the components 
can change the behavior of the whole and vice versa. While there are 
not interlevel causal relations in [levels of mechanisms], there are many 
interlevel relations of dependency, and thereby interlevel relations of 
regularity and predictability. One can disrupt spatial memory by ablat-
ing the hippocampus or knocking out NMDA receptors.58
In short, causal relations concern the intralevel causes of entities and their 
activities at the same level, constitutive relations pertain to the interlevel 
forms of dependency among the behaviors of whole mechanisms and their 
organized component parts at different levels.
2.2.6 “Top- Down Causation Without Top- Down Causes”
This brings us to the revisionary account of top- down causation and emer-
gentism of Craver and Bechtel. They accept that the language of top- down 
and bottom- up interlevel “causation” employed by scientists often does 
identify “perfectly coherent and familiar relationships” between the activi-
ties of wholes and the activities of their component parts. However, for 
Craver and Bechtel, it is a category mistake to conceptualize the interlevel 
whole–part dependency between levels of mechanisms as a form of top- 
down or bottom- up causes, given standard assumptions about (efficient) 
causation. They argue that any unobjectionable cases of “interlevel cau-
sation” referenced in the scientific literature can be reinterpreted, without 
remainder, as “appeals to mechanistically mediated effects.”
Mechanistically mediated effects are hybrids of constitutive and causal 
relations in a mechanism, where the constitutive relations are interlevel, 
Hylomorphism and the New Mechanist Philosophy 307
and the causal relations are exclusively intralevel. Appeal to top- down 
[or bottom- up] causation seems spooky or incoherent when it cannot be 
explicated in terms of mechanistically mediated effects.59
The account of mechanistically mediated effects of Craver and Bechtel not 
only provides an alternative interpretation of reputed cases of interlevel 
bottom- up or top- down causation, but also establishes concrete grounds 
for distinguishing mechanistic emergence from spooky emergence, via 
the presence or absence, respectively, of mechanistic hybrids of constitu-
tive interlevel and causal intralevel relations. “Mechanistic (or organiza-
tional) emergence thus understood is ubiquitous and banal but extremely 
important for understanding how scientists explain things.”60 According to 
NMP, mechanistic or organizational emergence is common to the entire 
biological world, for organizational emergence pervades the hierarchy of 
multilevel constitutive and causal relationships described and explained by 
the mechanisms discovered by scientists. Unlike mechanistic organizational 
emergence, spooky or strong emergence lacks mechanistic explanations for 
it fails to provide the explanatory hybrid of constitutive and causal rela-
tions that are essential to mechanistic emergence. Consequently, the sense of 
“level” connected with strong emergence must be distinguished from NMP’s 
account of levels of mechanisms.61 “Levels of mechanisms are constitutive 
levels; levels of strong emergence are not. For this reason, the notion of 
strong emergence can borrow no legitimacy from its loose association with 
the levels of mechanisms so ubiquitous in biology and elsewhere.”62 Craver 
and Bechtel conclude:
This hybrid framework provides a way to understand most, if not all, 
the cases for which appeal to top- down causes seems compelling. There 
may be cases that cannot be handled by this account, but if there are, 
those who invoke the notion of top- down causation for them owe us 
an account of just what is involved . . . Although our explication of 
interlevel causation in terms of mechanistically mediated effects renders 
reference to top- down causation unproblematic, it does not show that 
the phenomenon is unimportant. The biological world, and much of 
the world besides, is populated by multilevel mechanisms. Talk of inter-
level causation is merely a misleading way to talk about an explana-
tory interlevel relationship that, upon close inspection, does not involve 
interlevel causes.63
In sum, the NMP in biology, neuroscience, and psychology defends an 
account of mechanistic ontic explanations. This account consists in 
explanations of how a multilevel hierarchy of organized intralevel causal 
interactions among components entities can constitute the interlevel orga-
nizational emergence of mechanisms and their manifestation of various 
phenomena.
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3.  Points of Agreement Between Hylomorphism and  
New Mechanisms
Those familiar with the basic principles of hylomorphism will recognize in 
the foregoing summation of the new mechanist philosophy many points 
of agreement—and even some identical doctrines expressed in a different 
nomenclature—with Neo- Aristotelian hylomorphism. I shall take note of 
some of the more fundamental points of agreement, beginning with hylo-
morphism’s organization realism. As was noted before, exponents of hylomor-
phism are minimally committed to some account of organization or structure 
realism. Hylomorphism’s organization realism touches upon a variety of 
interconnected philosophical topics, such as Aristotle’s substance- attribute 
ontology, property, causal and explanatory pluralism, theory of composi-
tion and parthood, and Aristotle’s metaphysics of act and potency—which 
overlaps with significant features of contemporary views in the metaphys-
ics of causal powers. Let us begin with NMP’s and hylomorphism’s shared 
commitment to the reality of organization.
3.1 Organization Realism
Hylomorphists understand the organization of material things to be a real 
and fundamental ontological and explanatory principle that accounts both 
for the very nature of what a distinct physical substance is and what its pow-
ers enable it to do.
Hylomorphism claims that structure (or organization, form, arrange-
ment, order, or configuration) is a basic ontological and explanatory 
principle. Some individuals, paradigmatically living things, consist of 
materials that are structured or organized in various ways. You and I 
are not mere quantities of physical materials; we are quantities of physi-
cal materials with a certain organization or structure. That structure is 
responsible for us being and persisting as humans (as opposed to, say, 
dogs or rocks), and it is responsible for us having the particular devel-
opmental, metabolic, reproductive, perceptive, and cognitive capacities 
we have.64
The organization realism of hylomorphism corresponds to NMP’s account 
of the ontic structure of spatial, temporal, and active organization in biolog-
ical organisms as a significant factor—along with the organized component 
entities and activities—that constitute any mechanism. One way NMP dis-
tinguishes itself from classical mechanisms is by emphasizing that organiza-
tion is an ineliminable and irreducible feature of mechanistic explanations. 
For NMP, spatial, temporal, active organization is a fundamental explana-
tory factor that accounts for the way the causal component parts constitute 
a mechanism as a whole. While the interaction of component entities and 
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their activities explain the intralevel causal relations in mechanisms, it is 
the active organization of these components that provides the most salient 
explanatory factor of the interlevel constitutive relation between the parts of 
a mechanism and the mechanism as a whole. It is this constitutive relation 
that enables and so explains, in part, what the mechanism as a whole is, 
what it is able to do, and accounts for the persistent unity and organization 
of the component parts of some mechanistic functional whole. In short, for 
NMP, as with hylomorphism, organization matters, makes a difference, and 
it counts.
3.2 Property, Causal, and Explanatory Pluralism
Hylomorphism’s commitment to property, causal, and explanatory plural-
ism resonates with numerous features of NMP. For hylomorphism, every 
organized physical entity and its activities possess two kinds of properties:
Organizational or Formal Properties: Properties due to organization or 
being integrated within an organized entity
Material Properties: Properties due to matter irrespective of its being 
integrated within an organized entity65
Because hylomorphism maintains that all physical entities are constituted by 
the organization of their material components, a complete description and 
explanation of any physical, chemical, biological, neurophysiological, psy-
chological, ethological, or anthropological phenomenon must detail both 
the formal properties due to organization and the material properties due 
to the materials that are organized. Jaworski provides a number of illus-
trations of these two kinds of properties. Subatomic particles, atoms, and 
molecules have material properties like mass regardless of whether they are 
taken up into the life of an organism and integrated into its formal organiza-
tion. But whenever such entities do become organized constitutive parts of 
a living organism, they contribute formal properties to the animated activi-
ties of these living things; for instance, nucleic acids, hormones, and neural 
transmitters have such formal properties as being genes, growth factors, and 
metabolic and behavioral regulators. The atomic or fundamental material 
properties of a strand of DNA might not be modified by its surrounding 
environment, but it exhibits new formal properties when it is integrated into 
the organization of a cell and is enlisted in the cell’s activities.66
Hylomorphism is also committed to causal and explanatory pluralism. 
There are many different kinds of causes and causal relations; causes are 
explanatory factors and explanatory relations target causal relations. In the 
case of rational animals, like human persons, Aristotelian hylomorphists 
distinguish between personal and sub- personal level descriptions and expla-
nations.67 Personal level explanations address rational patterns of organized 
human activities that are best explained by reasons for action, but personal 
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level explanations also appeal to perceptions, desires, emotions, and other 
forms of psychosomatic cognitive and motivational factors that humans 
share with other animals. Subpersonal level descriptions and explanations 
provide the material causes of these personal level descriptions and explana-
tions, and this includes the kinds of mechanisms treated by NMP.
While most proponents of NMP do not speak in such terms, their com-
mitment to multilevel ontic explanations of mechanisms constituted by the 
organization of a plurality of component entities with different intralevel 
causal activities, can be explicated in terms that are consistent with hylo-
morphism’s commitment to property, causal, and explanatory pluralism. 
For as we have seen, the entities at distinct levels of mechanisms have 
different properties that enable them to engage in different causal interac-
tions with other intralevel entities. The properties and causal activities 
of the components of a mechanism are typically very different from the 
behavior and causal capacities of the mechanism as whole, which is consti-
tuted from the organization of such components. The coordinated open-
ing and closing of transmembrane ion channels (along with the interaction 
of many other component entities) that constitute the underlying mecha-
nism of a neuron’s action potential, are very different from the phenom-
enon of an action potential itself, such as the rapid and transient changes 
in the electrical potential difference across a neuron’s membrane and the 
unidirectional propagation of the action potential from the cell body to 
the axon terminal.
For NMP, mechanistic explanations enlist a hybrid of constitutive 
and causal relations that are consonant with hylomorphism’s distinction 
between material and formal properties. While there are important differ-
ences among the organized components that underline the mechanism for an 
action potential as well as variations among action potentials, nonetheless, 
the action potentials of neurons do possess a range of similar material prop-
erties, causes, and explanations that constitute organized components for a 
myriad of higher- level neural assembles and neural systems (e.g., peripheral, 
central, motor, sensory, and a host of more fine- grained systems for recogni-
tion, memory, language, attention, etc.). And these latter wholes or systems 
have components with distinct formal properties, causes, and explanations 
in virtue of the way neurons and patterns of action potentials are organized 
constituents of these higher- level systems.
Explanations for NMP and hylomorphism aim to account for the way 
reality is, to capture its ontic structure. For NMP, “Mechanistic decompo-
sition cuts mechanisms at their joints.”68 This does not mean higher- level 
phenomena are explanatorily reduced to the mechanisms of a lower- level; 
rather, such joint- carving requires integrative explanations of the hybrid of 
constitutive and causal relations that comprise mechanisms. In short, hylo-
morphism and NMP agree that descriptions and explanations must take 
into account the plurality of causal and organizational factors that consti-
tute living organisms.
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3.3 Composition, Wholes, and Parts
As with NMP, there are a range of disagreements among hylomorphists 
about the best accounts of causality, the metaphysics of powers, and the-
ories of composition and parthood. Because such internal disagreements 
do not distinguish hylomorphism from other views, they do not provide 
grounds for showing the incompatibility of hylomorphism and NMP. One 
area of agreement pertains to some general claims about composition and 
parthood that follows from the organizational realism and plurality of 
properties, causes, and explanations maintained by NMP and hylomor-
phism. Hylomorphism is committed to a number of positions pertaining to 
the nature of composition and mereology, that is, a theory about parts and 
wholes.69 Let us take note of widespread agreement between hylomorphism 
and NMP on such issues. First, for hylomorphism, organized entities and 
activities are more than the sum of their parts; an entity includes both its 
material parts and the organization of these parts. New mechanists also 
maintain “Every complex is a mereological sum, but mechanisms are always 
literally more than the sum of their parts. Any account of the composition 
relation in [levels of mechanisms] must accommodate this fact.”70
Second, hylomorphism holds that the organization of an entity and its 
activities can persist and remain the same notwithstanding the continuous 
ebb and flow of its material parts through its interactions with the environ-
ment. The persistence conditions of the entity are contingent on the conti-
nuity of its organization of some material parts, not on the continuity of 
these material parts. As Jaworski points out, when an animal breathes, the 
oxygen atoms it inhales become organized in a particular way by becoming 
integrated into the organized material parts of the animal and its metabolic 
activities. Conversely, when the animal exhales, carbon atoms cease to be 
organized material parts of the overall organization of the animal and its 
metabolic activities.71
Third, the nature of parthood requires being integrated into the organiza-
tion of the whole and contributing to the overall functioning of the whole 
and its activities, and parts are distinguished according to the different ways 
in which they contribute to the different activities of the whole. “Genes and 
messenger molecules are both parts of cells; they both contribute to the cell’s 
activities, and what distinguish them from each other are the different roles 
they play in protein synthesis: their different jobs within the cell qualify 
them as different parts of it.”72 Many hylomorphists accept the existence of 
a range of proper parts, especially biofunctional parts in living things (from 
organelles and cells to distinguishable organs and their organic parts), and 
recognize the organic parts identified by our best empirical descriptions and 
explanations.
Fourth, even though hylomorphists are divided over the details of the 
best theory of parthood, most hylomorphists would grant the following 
general account of parthood from Jaworski: “roughly, x is a part of y if x 
312 Daniel D. De Haan
contributes to the activities of y. An electron is a part of me, for instance, 
if it contributes to my activities—if, say, it depolarizes one of my cellular 
membranes. This notion of composition dovetails with work in biology, 
philosophy of biology, and philosophy of neuroscience.”73 Robert Koons’s 
version of staunch hylomorphism defends an account of Parts as Sustaining 
Instruments (PASI). According to PASI, “the persistence of the whole is 
grounded in the ongoing cooperation of the parts, and the active and pas-
sive powers of the parts are grounded in corresponding primary powers of 
the whole. In addition, the whole acts through the parts, as teleologically 
subordinate instruments.” Furthermore, PASI “ties the whole and parts 
together in such a way that the whole is neither existentially separate from 
its parts nor able to act in a way that is separate from the actions of its 
parts. The staunch hylomorphist must accomplish two things: (1) ensure 
that the persistence through time of the composite whole is grounded in the 
cooperation of its parts, and (2) ensure that the whole cannot act or be acted 
upon except, at least in part, doing so ‘through’ the powers of its parts.” 
Accordingly, Koons offers the following “Definition of ‘proper part’: x is a 
proper part of y at t iff x is a sustaining instrument of y at t.”74
Fifth, hylomorphism is committed to an account of fundamental entities 
constituted by a complex hierarchy of parts and causal powers comprised of 
organized systems and sub- systems with corresponding activities and subac-
tivities. This is paradigmatically the case with living organisms.75
As we have seen, NMP is committed to a similar dynamic account of 
the unity of the organization that constitutes the distinct levels of mecha-
nism, and an account of parthood and levels of mechanisms whereby the 
organized activities of component entities contribute to the activities of the 
whole. Indeed, the general hylomorphic account of parthood is nearly iden-
tical to the aforementioned account of the individuation of component parts 
within the levels of a mechanism from Craver.76
3.4 Levels of Organization and Emergence
The causal powers of a higher- levels of organization emerge or are educed 
from the potentialities of the materials they organize and integrate. Because 
higher- level systems of, say, living organisms are composed from the orga-
nized materials of lower- level systems, the activities of an organism’s higher- 
level powers cannot violate the fundamental activities that belong to the 
lower- level organic systems and chemical and physical subsystems. Indeed, 
the novel activities of higher- level powers depend upon the activities of 
lower- level activities that compose them. “It is because fundamental physi-
cal entities behave in stable, characteristic ways that they can be recruited to 
play in organisms the higher- level roles they do. It is because electrons have 
a characteristic mass and charge, for instance, that they are able to oper-
ate as membrane depolarizers within certain structures.”77 Hylomorphism’s 
understanding of the eduction or emergence of higher- level properties is 
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therefore radically different from more well- known accounts of strong 
emergence.
First, hylomorphism rejects standard accounts of strong emergentism that 
maintain higher- level emergent properties are products generated or caused 
by the organization of lower- level properties. For hylomorphism, educed 
or emergent properties are not distinct from the organization of lower- level 
organization; rather, the hylomorphic emergent properties are constituted 
from the organization of their components. Second, it is the central form 
of a physical substance that grounds all of its conjugate properties, whether 
they be higher- level psychosomatic powers or the lower- level biochemical 
powers that are components within psychosomatic powers. Finally, hylo-
morphic emergence is not unique to psychological powers or phenomenal 
consciousness, but is ubiquitous to the entire biological world.
The hylomorphic account of hierarchies of organized levels that consti-
tute an organism—where a higher- level phenomenon is educed or emerges 
from the organization of lower- level components—is nearly identical to 
Craver’s presentation of mechanistic emergence of higher- levels of mecha-
nisms from the organization of lower- level mechanistic components.
When one says that atoms compose molecules, which are organized 
into cells, which are linked into networks from which mental properties 
spookily emerge, the first three steps are upward steps in a hierarchy of 
levels of mechanisms, but the last is not. The ability of organization to 
elicit novel causal powers (that is, nonaggregative behaviors and prop-
erties) is unmysterious both in scientific common sense and common 
sense proper . . . Appeal to strong or spooky emergence, on the other 
hand, justifiably arouses suspicion.78
Both NMP and hylomorphism reject standard accounts of emergence in 
favor of complementary, if not equivalent, alternative conceptions of orga-
nizational emergence.
In sum, hylomorphism is committed to a range of issues concerning 
(1) organization realism, (2) property, causal, and explanatory pluralism, 
(3) the composition of wholes and parts, and (4) levels of organization that 
are compatible, if not in complete agreement, with stands that NMP takes 
on these same topics. In short, these fundamental features of hylomorphism 
set in relief a significant range of points of agreement, and the possibility 
for fruitful collaboration, between proponents of hylomorphism and NMP.
4.  Points of Disagreement Between Hylomorphism and 
New Mechanisms
The synoptic character of this comparative essay prevents me from digging 
any deeper into the details and more substantive arguments for and against 
the connections I have been making between hylomorphism and NMP. My 
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presentation of hylomorphism will certainly leave the metaphysician unsat-
isfied, and my digest of NMP will have the philosophers of science yearning 
for a more critical examination of empirical literature. I realize more needs 
to be said to sift out the exact points of substantive agreement from other 
mere naïve correlations between superficially similar positions. I conclude 
by taking up some apparent objections and potential points of disagreement 
between hylomorphism and NMP.
4.1 Substance- Attribute Ontology: Central and Conjugate Forms
The first concerns the substance- attribute ontology of hylomorphism, espe-
cially its distinction between the central and conjugate formal organization 
of a substance. Are these features of staunch hylomorphism compatible with 
NMP?
It is important to point out a difference of scope between the princi-
pal concerns of hylomorphism and NMP. NMP is a philosophy of science; 
hylomorphism is an ontology. Hylomorphism aims to provide a general 
ontology of the physical world. NMP is not specifically concerned with 
addressing more general metaphysical questions about the nature of organ-
isms, substances, fundamentality, and so forth; rather, it is focused on the 
concrete macro and micro ontic structures of organisms that constitute 
the mechanisms discovered in biology, neuroscience, and psychology. Few 
of these forms of ontic organization will prove to be ontologically funda-
mental; most will comprise forms of conjugate attributes. Consequently, 
the distinction between substantial organization and conjugate organiza-
tion does not arise for the more specialized studies of NMP. Nevertheless, 
given the basic contentions of NMP, there seems to be no principled reason 
that militates against an exponent of NMP defending a substance–attribute 
ontology that squares with the multileveled view of the new mechanists (as 
Glennan, Maley, and Piccinini do),79 or even from adopting hylomorphism’s 
full- fledged distinction between the substantial organization of substances 
and the conjugate organization of its components. Likewise, there is nothing 
to prevent hylomorphists from looking to NMP (as Jaworski does) to pro-
vide a more concrete empirical account of the organization of biofunctional 
components of the mechanisms or capacities that comprise the conjugate 
attributes of a substance’s proper parts.
The general strategy of NMP’s defense of hybrid causal and consti-
tutive explanations is to acknowledge mechanistic emergence wherever 
there are higher- level wholes constituted from the organization of causal 
components. Insofar as the staunch hylomorphist employs a similar strat-
egy to make the case that substances constitute distinct organized wholes 
over and above their organized components, then the staunch hylomor-
phism stands on solid ground—by NMP’s own lights—for distinguish-
ing between substantial and conjugate forms of organization. Seen in this 
light, a new mechanist–cum–staunch hylomorphism could hold that the 
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substantial form and matter of a substance, say, of an animal, explains a 
thing’s fundamental nature and grounds the overall multilevel organiza-
tion of its matter and a wide range of physical, chemical, biological, and 
psychological powers. A substance’s higher- level psychological powers, 
say, memory, are form- matter conjugate properties that admit of mecha-
nistic explanation via NMP’s hybrid constitutive and causal relations. The 
causal relation of mechanistic explanations concerns the way the causal 
powers of these organized material component entities enable them to 
engage in intralevel interactions. The constitution relation of mechanistic 
explanation pertains to the way the organization of these material compo-
nent parts compose form- matter conjugate properties. The conjugate form 
of a psychological power explains the active, spatial, and temporal for-
mal organization of the zones of organized material components of some 
power, say, neural distributed within the medial temporal lobe (and per-
haps elsewhere), which in turn are mechanistically explained by the formal 
organization of these component’s organized material subcomponents, 
say, the patterned firing rate of individual pyramidal neurons in the hip-
pocampus and the diffusion of glutamate into the synaptic cleft. Similarly, 
these zones of organized material components have various material and 
formal properties that explain the range of causal interactions these com-
ponent parts are capable of engaging in, as well as the way their enabling, 
precipitating, inhibiting, and modulating conditions influence how these 
mechanistic components constitute (or fail to constitute) the manifestation 
of a higher- level mechanism or capacity, like the animal actually remem-
bering.80 In short, far from being incompatible, hylomorphism and NMP 
provide a wealth of insights for thinking about diverse forms of organiza-
tion found among substances and their attributes.
4.2 Emergentism and Bottom- Up and Top- Down Causation
These points bring us to another apparent incompatibility between NMP 
and hylomorphism. Most defenders of NMP adopt Craver’s and Bechtel’s 
rejection of top- down and bottom- up interlevel causation in favor of their 
distinction between intralevel causation and interlevel constitutive rela-
tions. However, many hylomorphists defend accounts of top- down or 
downward causation. This conflict, I suggest, is less substantive and more 
terminological. The causal pluralism of hylomorphism opens it up to more 
forms of dependence than those captured by standard contemporary views 
on efficient causation. Classically, Aristotelians distinguish four kinds of 
dependence, and so four distinct kinds of causes and explanations: mate-
rial, formal, efficient or agential, and final causes. The material stuff or 
components of some entity make a difference to what that entity is and 
can do; material causes explain this kind of dependency. As we have seen, 
the organization of these material components also matters, makes a dif-
ference, and counts; formal causes explain the dependency of a whole 
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on the organization of its material components. Efficient causes explain 
the range of dependencies between events, properties, and substances that 
consist of moving, exerting force, attracting, repelling, producing, gener-
ating, corrupting, transforming, and so on. Final causes explain the range 
of functional dependencies, the way the formally organized material com-
ponents are ordered towards constituting and enabling powers of efficient 
causation to perform or produce stereotyped, organized operations, prod-
ucts, properties, substances, and so forth in organized material objects 
with reciprocal powers.
NMP rightly distinguishes its constitutive relation between the component 
parts and the mechanism as a whole from standard accounts of (efficient) 
causation, which maintain that causes and effects are distinct. However, 
Aristotelian hylomorphism defends two forms of causal dependency that 
are equivalent to NMP’s constitution relation, namely, its understanding of 
the way a whole is constituted or composed from the union of its formal 
and material causes, that is, the way the organization of material compo-
nents cause the whole. This constituted whole is not a separate effect or 
entity produced and distinct from the formal and material causes, the whole 
as effect is united with and dependent on its intrinsic formal and material 
causes. In short, the disagreement here is terminological. The causal plural-
ism of NMP and hylomorphism permits both views to stipulate accounts 
of “causality” that either pragmatically appease widespread assumptions 
about causality among their interlocutors and introduce alternative terms 
to capture other forms of dependency (such as constitution or grounding 
or realization) or that maintain some version of Aristotelian causal plural-
ism, albeit recognizing that this approach hazards being misunderstood by 
contemporary philosophers.
A similar conclusion can be drawn with respect to downward causation. 
Neither NMP nor hylomorphism need to be committed to a strong emer-
gentist view of downward causation, where the manifestation of higher- 
level causal powers efficiently cause lower- level effects. So, for some strong 
emergentists, psychological powers not only manifest psychological effi-
cient causes like an intention to walk home, but also efficiently cause the 
motor cortex in the brain to generate the appropriate bodily movements 
of an intentional action. Instead, NMP and hylomorphism can maintain 
that intentional actions are comprised of a plurality of causes or a hybrid 
of constitutive and causal relations, where higher- level factors like practical 
reasoning and other psychological motivations can provide personal level 
explanations for an intentional action. Again, given causal and explana-
tory pluralism, personal level explanations do not compete with, but make 
a distinctive complementary difference to mechanistic explanations of an 
embodied intentional action. An embodied intentional action is itself a 
whole composed of a complex hierarchy of levels of mechanisms, all of 
which are integrated and engaged by the higher- level psychological pow-
ers for intentional action. On this score, intentional actions (like walking 
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home) should not be conceived as mere efficient causes acting on sites of the 
nervous system. Rather, since higher- level psychological phenomena (like 
intentional actions) are enabled by and constituted from the organization 
of lower- level mechanisms (such as the nervous system), intentional actions 
consist of rationally coordinated patterns of activation of the organized 
causal components that underlie and constitute them. In this way, mecha-
nistic explanation
offers significantly more insight into what interlevel integration is, into 
the evidential constraints by which interlevel bridges are evaluated, 
and into the forces driving the co- evolution of work at different levels. 
Constraints on the parts, their causal interactions, and their spatial, 
temporal, and hierarchical organization all help to flesh out an inter-
level integration. Finally, mechanists repeatedly recognize the need to 
not only look down to the constitutive mechanisms responsible for a 
given phenomenon (emphasized by classical reduction models), but also 
to look up and around to the context within which the phenomenon is 
embedded: interlevel integration is an effort to see how phenomena at 
many different levels are related to one another . . .81
A great deal more needs to be said about the way hybrid explanations 
from staunch hylomorphism and NMP would address issues of psychologi-
cal operations and causal powers. I hope this sketch is at least suggestive of 
the possibility of fruitful exchange of perspectives from these two comple-
mentary approaches to multilevel organization realism and causality. NMP 
provides a rich way to think more concretely and empirically about the 
kinds of embodied causal powers of organized components which hylomor-
phism addresses in its more abstract ontological framework.
4.3 Teleology and Mechanisms
I conclude with what might seem to be the most controversial point of dis-
agreement between staunch hylomorphism and the new mechanist philoso-
phy, namely, the compatibility of mechanistic explanations with teleology 
and final causality. Aristotelian hylomorphism seems to be wed to some 
form of teleological explanation; after all, final causality is taken to be the 
cause of causes for Aristotelians. The difficulty is that a widely accepted 
script tells us that mechanistic science caused the final end to teleological 
explanations.82 Consequently, if mechanist explanations are against teleo-
logical explanations and Aristotelian hylomorphism requires teleology, then 
the two positions seem to be fundamentally at odds. As with many disputes, 
the real point of disagreement is more complicated.
First, while it is the case that Aristotelian hylomorphists are committed 
to some robust realist doctrine of teleology, there are some hylomorphists 
that are neutral about the nature of teleological explanation. Surprisingly, 
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a similar range of views about teleology has emerged among new mecha-
nists, but the battle line that divides the different views among NMPs is not 
drawn where one might expect. The contention at issue is not about teleol-
ogy versus no teleology; rather, the recent dispute among NMPs is between 
ineliminable perspectivalism about the function of teleological explanations 
in mechanistic explanations and realism about hybrid teleological- cum- 
mechanistic ontic explanations. Craver defends a version of perspectivalism 
on teleological functions. He holds that our explanatory interests render 
teleology ineliminable from our efforts to make the world intelligible. 
Craver distinguishes his mechanist design stance from the “associations 
with adaptationism and optimality” characteristic of Daniel Dennett’s well 
known account of the intentional, design, and physical stances. Craver’s 
conclusion is worth quoting at length, as it provides one among many stark 
examples of how misleading the received wisdom is on the incompatibility 
of mechanisms and teleology.
In the contemporary mechanical philosophy, functional and mechanis-
tic descriptions work in tandem to bring intelligible order to complex 
systems. By identifying functions within such systems, one approaches 
the system with some set of interests and perspectives in mind. One 
might be interested in understanding how parts of organisms work, 
how they break or become diseased, or how they might be comman-
deered for our own purposes. Regardless of which perspective one 
takes, the identification of functions is a crucial step in the discovery 
of mechanisms. We no longer speak of mechanisms simpliciter, but 
rather as mechanisms for some behavior. Mechanistic descriptions 
thus come loaded with teleological content concerning the role, goal, 
purpose, or preferred behavior of the mechanism. This teleological 
loading cannot be reduced to features of the causal structure of the 
word, but it is ineliminable from our physiological, and particularly 
neural, sciences, precisely because their central goal is to make the 
busy and buzzing confusion of complex systems intelligible and, in 
some cases, usable.83
Craver concludes that adopting his mechanist design stance makes intel-
ligible the way a mechanism as a whole exhibits some behavior which is 
constituted from the organization and interaction of the components of the 
mechanism. It remains an open question for Craver whether or not these 
teleological aspects of the new mechanist worldview are reducible, without 
any remainder, to other features of the causal structure of the world; “here 
we have a, perhaps the, central puzzle that any properly mechanical under-
standing of mind must someday face.”84
For many, Craver’s rather rich perspectivalism about teleology will be real 
enough.85 Functions are ineliminable features within mechanistic explana-
tions, even if they are not real. Craver’s account is honest about the exigency 
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of employing teleological explanations in mechanistic explanations. More 
recently, Corey Maley and Gualtiero Piccinini have argued that Craver’s 
perspectivalism is inadequate and that new mechanists should embrace a 
realist account of teleological explanations in psychology and neurosci-
ence.86 Perspectivalism understands all ascribed teleological functions to be 
“observer- dependent and hence subjective, and in no way objective.”87 For 
perspectivalism, the range of explanatory interests accounts for the prolif-
eration of otherwise unchecked teleological attributions. If we adopt the 
perspective of an organism’s survival, then the function of the heart is to 
pump blood, but seen from the perspective of diagnosing heart conditions, 
the heart’s function is to make thumping noises, and so forth.88 NMP pro-
ponents like Maley and Piccinini are not impressed with perspectivalism’s 
line of argumentation against realism about functions. They argue, contrary 
to perspectivalism, that the function of the heart is to pump blood, and 
assigning the heart this function is independent from any observer’s perspec-
tive or explanatory interests. Of course, some traits have multiple functions, 
but again, this is not due to multiple perspectives. According to Maley and 
Piccinini:
Perspectivalism does not do justice to the perspectives we actually take 
in the biological sciences. If we could identify non- teleological truth-
makers for teleological claims, we would avoid perspectivalism and 
deem functions real without deeming them mysterious. That is our 
project.89
Indeed, if one is willing to accept Craver’s argumentative strategy in favor 
of taking mechanisms and organization to provide ontic explanations, it 
becomes difficult to resist the similar argumentative strategy in favor of tak-
ing teleology to provide ontic explanations as well. I leave the debate here.
My aim, once again, is to show that proponents of the NMP—of both 
perspectivalist and realist stripes—take teleology seriously. Within this 
debate between realists and perspectivalists the function of teleological 
descriptions and explanations remains controversial for new mechanists 
and hylomorphists. In short, these more restricted disagreements about tele-
ology do not divide NMP and hylomorphism. NMP perspectivalism about 
function is compatible with a variety of non- Aristotelian versions of hylo-
morphism that are neutral or even skeptical about the reality of teleology. 
Similarly, a NMP defender of teleological realism, like Maley and Piccinini, 
can adopt an Aristotelian hylomorphism that endorses finality realism. This 
conclusion is significant, for this compatibility between hylomorphism and 
the new mechanists reveals that the long- standing script that teleology and 
mechanisms are fundamentally opposed, is mistaken. For the NMP’s recog-
nition of organizational realism and the significance of teleology in biology, 
neuroscience, and psychology provide an amiable philosophy of science ally 
to Aristotelian hylomorphism.
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Conclusion
Neo- Aristotelians and hylomorphists often participate in debates in philoso-
phy of mind and metaphysics, but they rarely address topics in philosophy 
of biology, neuroscience, and psychology. My aim has been to introduce 
Aristotelian hylomorphists to the new mechanist philosophy in biology, 
neuroscience, and psychology, and, I hope, to convince hylomorphists that 
there is a real potential here for fruitful constructive engagement with scien-
tific research, philosophy of science, and especially with the new mechanist 
philosophy. In this essay, I have argued that Neo- Aristotelian hylomorphism 
is perfectly compatible with the account of mechanisms presented by NMP. 
I have established that there are substantial points of agreement between the 
two views on fundamental issues that typically distinguish hylomorphism 
and NMP from other views. In light of such common points of agreement, 
I believe their integration would be mutually beneficial. Hylomorphism 
provides a robust abstract ontological framework for NMP, and NMP can 
enrich hylomorphism with its detailed concrete exposition of the complex 
hierarchy of organized mechanisms discovered by biologists, neuroscien-
tists, and psychologists. Finally, I have shown that despite any historical 
controversies concerning the compatibility of teleology and mechanisms, 
there are no principled reasons for taking Neo- Aristotelian teleology and 
the mechanisms of the new mechanistic philosophy to be incompatible.90
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recently, Cartwright and Pemberton have pointed out similarities with their work 
on powers and activities with NMP. “Our account of change- processes develops 
previous ideas of Pemberton (2011) that mesh Cartwright’s account of nomo-
logical machines, involving powers and their contributions, with features taken 
from the closely related account of mechanisms by Machamer et al. (2000), most 
notably their account of activities. Activities are important for understanding 
what the nomological machine does in changing arrangements from one stage to 
another” Cartwright and Pemberton (2013: 96, n. 8).
16 Craver (2007: 8).
17 Cummins (2000: 140).
18 Machamer et al. (2000: 1). For brief histories and bibliographies concerning the 
development of NMP, see Bechtel (2007, 2009: 548–53), Craver (2007), Craver 
and Darden (2013: 26–9), Glennan (2016: § 2).
19 Andersen (2014: 276). See Darden (2016), Glennan (2010).
20 Craver (2007: 271).
21 Craver (2014), Craver (2007), Salmon (1984).
22 Craver (2014: 35).
23 “. . . the ontic mode of thinking about explanation, does not depend on the 
existence of intentional agents . . . A given ontic structure might cause, produce, 
or otherwise be responsible for a phenomenon even if no intentional agent ever 
discovers as much” Craver (2014: 36).
24 Craver (2014: 51).
25 Some proponents of NMP, like William Bechtel, are less sanguine about ontic 
explanations; see Bechtel (2007), Illari (2013), Wright (2012).
26 Craver (2007), Craver and Darden (2013: 48–50), Craver and Tabery (2016).
27 Craver and Tabery (2016).
28 Craver and Darden (2013: 15), Machamer et al. (2000: 3).
29 Bechtel and Abrahamsen (2005: 423), Bechtel and Richardson (2010).
30 Craver (2007: 6).
31 Glennan (2016: § 3).
32 Craver (2007: 1).
33 Craver (2007: ch. 7), Craver and Darden (2013: 167–72, 193–4).
34 Craver and Darden (2013: 21–2). In connection to what they call topping- off 
and bottoming- out, “In the practice of scientific explanation, decomposition in 
a given inquiry bottoms out when the investigation reaches entities and activities 
that are viewed as unproblematic or for which investigators lack tools for further 
decomposition. Few decompositions extend more than a small number of levels” 
Craver and Bechtel (2007: 549, n. 5).
35 Craver and Darden (2013).
36 Craver and Darden (2013), Darden (2006), Tabery et al. (2017).
37 Craver and Darden (2013: 19).
38 Glennan (2016).
39 Machamer et al. (2000: 3).
40 Craver and Darden (2013: 20).
41 Bogen (2005, 2008), Craver (2007: ch. 3), Glennan (2016). Aristotelians will be 
interested in Bogen’s efforts to wed Anscombe on causality and productive activi-
ties to NMP.
42 Craver and Tabery (2016: § 2.3).
43 Craver (2007: 5).
44 Glennan (2016: § 5), Machamer et al. (2000: 4).
45 Craver (2007: 5–6).
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46 Craver (2007: 6).
47 Craver and Darden (2013: 16–20).
48 Craver (2007: 6).
49 Craver and Darden (2013: 20).
50 Craver and Tabery (2016: § 2.4.1), Wimsatt (1997).
51 Craver (2007: 136). “Action potentials cannot be explained by mere temporal 
sequences of events utterly irrelevant to the phenomenon, but one can derive 
a description of the action potential from descriptions of such irrelevant phe-
nomena. Action potentials cannot be explained by mere patterns of correlation 
that are not indicative of an underlying causal relation. Irrelevant byproducts 
of a mechanism might be correlated with the behavior of the mechanism, even 
perfectly correlated such that one could form bridge laws between levels, but 
would not thereby explain the relationship. Merely finding a neural correlate of 
consciousness, for example, would not, and is not taken by anyone to, constitute 
an explanation of consciousness” Craver and Tabery (2016: § 3.1).
52 Craver and Tabery (2016: § 2.4.1).
53 Craver (2007: 189).
54 Craver (2007: 227). My emphasis.
55 See Craver (2007: ch. 5) “A Field Guide to Levels.”
56 Craver (2007: ch. 5).
57 Craver (2007: 179).
58 Craver (2007: 183), Glennan (2010).
59 Craver and Bechtel (2007: 547).
60 Craver and Tabery (2016: § 4.2).
61 Craver (2007: ch 5).
62 Craver and Bechtel (2007: 551).
63 Craver and Bechtel (2007: 562).
64 Jaworski (2016: 8).
65 Jaworski (2016: ch. 14), Stump (2012: 60).
66 Jaworski (2016: 106).
67 I employ this distinction akin to the way it is used by Hornsby, McDowell, 
and Hacker’s related account of the mereological fallacy. A similar distinction 
between the animal level and sub- animal level descriptions and explanations can 
be employed for non- rational animals. See Hacker and Bennett (2003), Hornsby 
(2000), McDowell (1994).
68 Craver (2007: 188).
69 Jaworski notes: “Fine and Johnston conceive of hylomorphic structures as rela-
tions among something’s parts. I conceive of them rather as relations between 
wholes and their parts: a whole configures or structures its parts. This has impor-
tant implications for how my hylomorphic theory avoids some versions of Wil-
liams’ worry” Jaworski (2016: 96, n. 2).
70 Craver (2007: 186).
71 Jaworski (2011: 210).
72 Jaworski (2011: 275).
73 Jaworski (2011: 269). Roughly, staunch hylomorphists can be divided up into 
minimalists and substantivists about the way formal organization transforms 
the ontological identity of material components. Minimalists, like Jaworski (and 
perhaps pluriformists like Avicenna and Duns Scotus), hold that the formal iden-
tity of the materials remain fundamentally the same whether they exist in the 
wild or as integrated material parts that depend upon the organization of the 
whole. Radical minimalists about formal transformation of materials go so far 
as to say that sometimes these material parts, say fundamental physical particles, 
are individual substances integrated within more complex substances. Minimal-
ists argue substantivists cannot account for the continuity of the substrate that 
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is required for change. Substantivists deny that material components—even the 
ground- floor physical stuff—can actually remain what they are when they are 
incorporated into the organization of an inclusive whole: electrons are trans-
formed into animated material components when integrated into the life of an 
animal. Substantivists contend the minimalist view undermines the integrity, 
unity, and identity of the organized whole, since parts of a whole cannot possess 
their own central or substantial formal identity. Radical Substantivists about the 
formal transformation of materials hold that there cannot be any actual parts in 
hylomorphic individuals, only potential parts. I leave the debate here.
74 Koons (2014: 171). For a detailed account of various hylomorphic accounts of 
composition and a defense of PASI, see Jaworski (2016: chs. 6–7, 10, 14), Koons 
(2014).
75 Jaworski (2016), Lonergan (1992: chs. 6, 8, 15), Ross (2008).
76 Craver (2007: ch. 5).
77 Jaworski (2011: 274–5).
78 Craver (2007: 217).
79 Glennan (2010), Maley and Piccinini (2017).
80 Craver (2007: 122–8).
81 Craver and Tabery (2016: § 5.2).
82 Gilson (2009).
83 Craver (2013: 155).
84 Craver (2013: 156).
85 Darden and Craver use William Harvey’s (1578–1657) argument for his revolu-
tionary account of the circulation of blood as an illustration of the various con-
straints (locations, structures/entities, abilities, activities, timing, roles/functions, 
production, global organization) on mechanism schemata that guide empirical 
discoveries and the verification of mechanisms. In their section on the importance 
of roles or functions, they note, “The teleological form of thought embodied in 
reasoning about an item’s role, a form of thought that asks what the different 
components and activities are for, or what they contribute to a mechanism, is not 
merely a façon de parler maintained as yet another vestige of Aristotelianism in 
Harvey’s thinking. Rather, it is crucial to understanding how biological mecha-
nisms work: to seeing how a part fits into the organization of the mechanism as 
a whole” Craver and Darden (2013: 115).
86 In their excellent account of teleological functions as stable causal powers that 
contribute towards the (objective and subjective) goals of organisms, Maley and 
Piccinini provide an ontologically serious account of functional or teleological 
mechanisms that “grounds a system’s functions in objective properties of the sys-
tem or the population to which it belongs, as opposed to features of the epistemic 
or explanatory context of function attribution.” On their account, “functions 
are an aspect of what a system is, rather than an aspect of what we may or may 
not say about that system” Maley and Piccinini (2017).
87 Maley and Piccinini (2017).
88 Maley and Piccinini (2017).
89 Maley and Piccinini (2017).
90 I would like to thank the editors of this volume for their helpful comments on 
previous drafts of this article.
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